The 
PHILIPPINES 


To  theEnd  of  the  Miliiary  Regime 


CHARLES  B.ELLIOTT 


4J^»^: 


THE  PHILIPPINES 


COPYRIGHT,  CLINEDINST 


THE  PHILIPPINES 

To  the  End  of  the  Military  Regime 

AMERICA  OVERSEAS 

By 
CHARLES  BURKE  ELLIOTT,  Ph.D.,LL.D. 

Author  of 

THE  LAW  OF  PRIVATE  CORPORATIONS 

Former  Member  United  States  Philippine  Commission, 
Secretary  of  Commerce  and  Police  in  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  Philippines,  Associate  Jus- 
tice of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
Philippines,  Associate  Justice 
Supreme  Court  of 
Minnesota 

PREFATORY  NOTE  BY  ELIHU  ROOT 


Ptrtraits  In  Photogravure 


INDIANAPOLIS 

THE  BOBBS-MERRILL  COMPANY 

PUBLISHERS 


IC^^^vfm'^ 


\AJUb^ 


Copyright  1916 
BY  Charles  Burke  Elliott 


PR(88    OF 

BRAUNWORTH    Jr    CO. 

■OOK   MANUFACTUREM 

BROOKLYN,    N.    V. 


By  acknowledging  and  accepting  the  Sovereignty 
of  the  United  States  throughout  the  entire  Archipelago, 
as  I  now  do  without  any  reservation  whatsoever,  I  be- 
lieve I  am  serving  thee,  my  beloved  Country, 

— Emuio  Aguinaldo. 


How  weary  a  step  do  those  take  who  endeavor  to 
make  out  of  a  great  mass  a  true  political  personality. 

^Edmund  Burke. 


To  my  friend 

SIR  FREDERICK  DEALTRY  LUGARD 

G.C.M  G..  D.S.O.,  D.C.L. 

GoverncMT-General  of  Nigeria, 
Soldier  and  Colonial  Administrator 


PREFATORY  NOTE 

Other  matters  of  critical  importance  have  engrossed  the  inter- 
est of  the  people  of  the  United  States  in  recent  years  to  such  a 
degree  that  we  have  been  losing  rather  than  gaining  in  our  knowl- 
edge of  affairs  in  the  Philippine  Islands.  When  the  dramatic 
incidents  of  war  had  ceased  to  furnish  material  for  striking  news 
items  and  new  issues  had  superseded  the  political  and  Anti-Im- 
perialist controversies  of  our  early  occupation  we  ceased  to 
hear  or  to  think  very  much  about  what  was  going  on  in  that 
distant  part  of  the  world.  That  is  not  strange  in  view  of  the 
preoccupation  of  our  domestic  politics,  of  Mexican  affairs,  and 
of  the  great  war  in  the  Old  World;  but  it  is  a  condition  which 
ought  not  to  continue. 

The  question  whether  it  was  wise  or  unwise  for  the  United 
States  to  take  title  to  the  Philippines  and  assume  the  burden  of 
government  there  no  longer  calls  for  consideration.  We  did  take 
the  Philippines.  We  acquired  the  rights  and  undertook  the  du- 
ties of  sovereignty.  We  declared  a  trust  for  the  benefit  of  the 
people  of  the  Islands.  We  are  committed  to  the  undertaking. 
Self-respect  requires  that  we  should  discharge  the  obligations 
that  we  have  assumed.  We  can  not  relieve  ourselves  from  them 
except  in  one  way,  and  that  is  by  carrying  our  performance  to 
such  a  point  that  our  cestuis  que  trustent  will  be  competent  to 
take  care  of  themselves.  When  that  point  is  reached  we  can 
resign  the  trust  with  credit;  but  not  until  then.  This  is  not  a 
new  view.  It  is  the  view  with  which  we  began.  We  took  a  po- 
sition at  the  very  outset  removed  as  far  as  possible  from  the  old 
ideas  of  colonial  exploitation  of  which  Java  has  been  the  most 
long  continued  and  conspicuous  illustration.  We  declared  our 
adherence  to  the  most  advanced  modem  view  of  colonial  rela- 
tions— the  view  that  the  good  of  the  colony  is  to  be  the  primary 
consideration  in  all  administration.  We  did  what  is  rather  a 
remarkable  thing  for  any  people  to  do.    We  took  the  same  view 


Prefatory  Note 

of  rights  and  duties  when  we  became  sovereign  and  the  Filipinos 
colonists  that  we  did  in  the  time  of  the  American  Revolution 
when  we  were  colonists  and  Great  Britain  was  sovereign.  We 
did  not  stop  there.  We  undertook  to  go  a  little  farther  than 
other  countries  had  gone  and  to  make  the  first  consideration  in 
our  government  of  the  Islands  the  training  of  the  inhabitants  in 
the  difficult  art  of  self-government  so  that  they  would  as  soon 
as  possible  become  competent  to  govern  themselves  instead  of 
being  governed  by  us.  Accordingly  one  of  the  first  things  that 
we  did  was  to  send  over  teachers  by  the  shipload — thousands  of 
them — and  to  establish  schools  all  over  the  Islands.  And  then 
we  provided  a  form  of  government  under  which  the  Philippines 
should  receive  what  may  be  called  clinical  instruction  in  admin- 
istration and  in  the  application  of  the  principles  which  we  con- 
sider vital  to  free  self-government,  and  we  provided  that,  step 
by  step,  just  as  rapidly  as  they  became  familiar  with  the  institu- 
tions of  free  government  and  capable  of  continuing  them,  the 
powers  of  government  should  be  placed  in  their  hands.  I  am 
sure  that  this  view  of  suitable  treatment  of  the  Philippines  so 
long  as  we  are  to  be  in  the  Islands  at  all  commends  itself  to  the 
best  intelligence  and  the  practical  idealism  of  the  American  peo- 
ple. If  we  carry  it  through  successfully  it  will  result  in  great 
credit  to  our  country  throughout  the  world ;  but  we  can  not  fail 
in  it,  whether  by  our  own  misconduct  or  by  weak  abandonment 
of  the  duty  we  have  undertaken,  without  being  greatly  discred- 
ited throughout  the  world.  One  peculiarity  of  having  colonial 
affairs  to  deal  with  in  these  times  is  that  the  country  which  ex- 
ercises control  over  a  colony  is  always  itself  on  trial  in  the  public 
opinion  of  mankind.  The  people  of  a  country  can  make  a  thou- 
sand mistakes  about  their  own  internal  affairs  and  recover  from 
them  as  best  they  may,  and  very  few  people  outside  the  country 
know  or  think  anything  about  it.  The  treatment  of  a  colony, 
however;  success  or  failure  in  establishing  good  government 
there;  in  producing  peace  and  prosperity  and  human  progress 
there — ^all  the  multitude  of  facts  involved  in  this  success  or  fail- 


Prefatory  Note 

ure  constitute  a  simple,  concrete  whole  of  which  the  world  takes 
notice  and  upon  which  the  ruling  country  is  judged.  More  im- 
portant still  probably  is  the  effect  upon  national  self-respect  and 
patriotism  of  doing  such  a  piece  of  work  well  or  making  a  dis- 
creditable failure  in  it. 

As  I  look  back  over  American  administration  in  the  Philip- 
pines from  the  Treaty  of  Washington  in  the  spring  of  1899  down 
to  the  close  of  the  Taft  Administration  in  the  spring  of  1913, 
I  think  the  American  people  are  entitled  to  say  to  themselves 
that  their  work  was  well  done.  We  maintained  in  the  Islands 
a  very  able  and  honest  government  which  constantly  and  effect- 
ively kept  in  view  the  very  high  standard  of  purpose  with  which 
we  began.  By  limiting  this  statement  to  the  end  of  the  Taft 
Administration  I  do  not  mean  to  imply  that  I  think  any  differ- 
ently of  our  administration  since  that  time.  I  simply  do  not 
know  enough  about  it  since  then  to  make  an  assertion  one  way 
or  the  other.  The  time  during  which  I  knew  about  the  Philippine 
government  covers  the  first  fourteen  years,  and  as  to  that  time 
I  say  that  the  people  of  the  United  States  ought  to  be  proud  of 
their  government  in  the  Philippines  and  grateful  to  the  men  and 
women  who  reflected  credit  on  their  country  by  giving  their 
strength  and  lives  to  that  public  service. 

It  is  idle,  however,  to  expect  that  kind  of  service  to  continue 
indefinitely  if  nobody  at  home  cares  or  knows  anything  about  it. 
The  service  will  inevitably  deteriorate  and  become  a  source  of 
painful  discredit  if  the  people  of  the  United  States  do  not  keep 
themselves  sufficiently  informed  about  what  is  being  done  in  the 
Philippines  and  sufficiently  interested  in  it  to  make  service  there 
the  basis  of  reputation  here.  The  standard  of  service  will  in- 
evitably be  lowered  and  the  best  men  will  refuse  it  if  the  people 
in  the  United  States  become  so  ignorant  and  indifferent  that 
there  is  no  way  of  discriminating  between  just  criticism  upon  a 
bad  officer  and  that  detraction  to  which  faithful  service  is  always 
subject,  or  between  just  condemnation  and  the  fulsome  praise 
which  is  dictated  by  policy  and  a  desire  to  curry  favor.    Comip- 


Prei^atory  Note 

tion  and  abuse  will  creep  into  any  official  service  that  is  not  sub- 
ject to  be  inspected  and  called  to  account.  If  the  people  of  the 
United  States  wish  to  have  good  government  carried  on  in  the 
Philippines  and  to  have  their  duties  there  discharged  in  a  cred- 
itable way  they  must  take  an  interest  in  that  government  and 
watch  it. 

Moreover,  there  are  serious  questions  about  the  Philippines 
to  be  determined,  not  by  the  Filipinos  or  the  local  government, 
but  by  the  people  of  the  United  States.  The  question  to  what 
extent  the  natives  are  showing  themselves  competent  to  carry 
on  government;  when  we  ought  to  consider  that  our  task  has 
been  so  far  performed  that  we  are  at  liberty  to  turn  the  Islands 
over  to  the  control  of  the  natives ;  what  measure  of  protection 
we  shall  accord  to  them  thereafter,  if  any;  what  reservations,  if 
any,  will  be  necessary  to  make  any  such  protection  to  them  con- 
sistent with  our  own  safety,  such,  for  instance,  as  the  provisions 
of  the  Piatt  Amendment  regarding  Cuba.  All  these  questions 
are  of  great  importance  to  the  people  of  the  United  States  as 
yjeW  as  to  the  people  of  the  Philippine  Islands.  We  ought  not 
to  decide  them  without  knowledge — ^and  that  knowledge  to  be 
really  useful  must  be  acquired  not  at  the  moment  when  the  ques- 
tions have  to  be  decided,  but  through  keeping  up  a  familiarity 
with  the  government  of  the  Islands  as  we  go  along  from  year 
to  year.  The  American  people  have  had  some  very  serious  les- 
sons to  teach  them  the  truth  that  self-government  is  an  art  to 
be  acquired  and  that  it  is  a  terrible  evil  for  a  people  to  have  im- 
posed on  them  a  form  of  government  which  it  is  beyond  their 
capacity  to  carry  on.  We  gave  the  ballot  to  the  Blacks  of  the 
South  at  the  close  of  the  Civil  War  upon  the  theory  that  if  they 
had  an  opportunity  to  vote  they  would  be  self-governing;  and 
we  made  a  ghastly  failure  of  the  experiment  and  inflicted  great 
injury  upon  the  Blacks  themselves  because  our  theory  was  wrong. 
We  have  now  a  distressing  illustration  in  Mexico  of  the  evils 
which  can  befall  the  people  who  are  relieved  from  the  restrictions 
of  one  form  of  government  before  they  have  become  competent 


Prefatory  Note 

to  establish  another.  In  the  Caribbean  we  have  been  proceeding 
upon  an  entirely  different  theory  as  illustrated  by  the  Piatt 
Amendment  with  Cuba  and  the  San  Domingo  treaty.  This  the- 
ory is  that  the  best  service  we  can  render  to  the  peoples  whom 
we  wish  to  benefit  is  to  help  them  to  acquire  the  art  of  self-gov- 
ernment. This  is  the  theory  upon  which  we  are  proceeding  in 
the  Philippines,  but  the  application  of  such  a  theory  requires 
knowledge  and  genuine  interest  and  S3nnpathy,  and  these  quali- 
ties ought  to  characterize  the  relations  of  the  people  of  this  coun- 
try to  the  people  of  the  Philippine  Islands. 

I  think  that  the  book  by  Judge  Elliott  to  which  this  is  a  prefa- 
tory note  will  be  very  useful  in  making  the  people  of  the  United 
States  better  acquainted  with  the  Filipinos  and  with  our  govern- 
ment there.  The  Judge's  long  service  upon  the  Bench  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  Islands  and  as  a  member  of  the  Philippine 
Commission  and  Secretary  of  the  Department  of  Commerce  and 
Police  gave  him  special  facilities  for  observation  and  sound  judg- 
ment regarding  men  and  affairs  in  the  Islands,  and  it  seems  to 
me  that  he  has  availed  himself  of  that  opportunity  with  the  im- 
partiality and  thought  fulness  which  have  characterized  his  pre- 
vious valuable  work. 

EuHU  Root. 

August  8th,  1916, 


ACKNOWLEDGMENT 

Throughout  the  preparation  of  these  pages  I  have  been  very 
fortunate  in  securing  the  cheerful  cooperation  and  generous  as- 
sistance of  many  of  my  friends  and  former  colleagues  in  the 
Philippine  government,  as  well  as  of  others  who  are  familiar 
with  the  subject  treated.  To  acknowledge  my  indebtedness  in 
detail  would  consume  far  more  space  than  is  available.  It  is 
possible  to  mention  only  a  few  of  those  who,  with  counsel  and 
labor,  have  rendered  me  invaluable  aid  during  the  years  which 
the  writing  has  consumed. 

I  am  indebted  to  Honorable  Elihu  Root  for  many  courtesies 
and  particularly  for  the  prefatory  note. 

Admiral  of  the  Navy  George  Dewey  was  kind  enough  to  sup- 
ply me  with  certain  valuable  information  which  I  could  have 
obtained  from  no  other  source. 

Brigadier-General  Frank  Mclntyre,  U.  S.  A.,  Chief  of  the 
Bureau  of  Insular  Affairs  at  the  War  Department,  and  his  as- 
sistants have  invariably  responded  with  unfailing  kindness  to  my 
many  calls  upon  them  for  information. 

To  my  son.  Lieutenant  Charles  Winslow  Elliott,  Thirty-Sixth 
United  States  Infantry,  I  owe  much  of  the  material  embodied 
in  the  chapter  on  the  Moros.  The  proofs  of  that  chapter  were 
very  kindly  read  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  John  P.  Finley,  Fourth 
United  States  Infantry,  who  was  for  many  years  Governor  of 
the  District  of  Zamboanga  in  the  Moro  Province.  A  recognized 
authority  on  Moro  life  and  customs,  he  made  many  valuable 
suggestions  and  important  corrections. 

To  my  wife,  without  whose  constant  encouragement  and  active 
assistance  the  work  would  never  have  been  completed,  I  acknowl- 
edge my  deepest  obligations. 

Mackinac  Island,  C.  B.  E. 

August  25th,  1916. 


CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTORY 
CHAPTER  I 

PAGE 

The  Theory  and  Practise  of  Colonization 1 

Problems  of  Modern  Colonization — Changing  Theories — Develop- 
ment of  Backward  Races — American  Theories — Political  and  Eco- 
nomic Growth — Ancient  Colonization — Nature  of  Greek  and  Roman 
Colonies — The  Middle  Ages — Spanish,  Portuguese  and  French  Colo- 
nization— English  Methods  and  Theories — The  New  Era — Develop- 
ment of  the  Tropics — New  French,  Italian  and  German  Colonization 
— Modern  Native  Policies — Recognition  of  Obligations — Queen  Vic- 
toria's Proclamation  of  1858 — ^The  Self-government  Principle  in 
India  and  Egypt — Moral  Justification  for  Western  Rule — The 
United  States  in  the  Tropics — Recognition  of  Duty  to  the  Natives — 
Their  Political  Development  —  European  Criticism  —  Controlling 
Principles — Education  of  the  Natives — Attitude  Toward  Native 
Aspirations — Policy  Not  Repressive. 

PART  I 
The  Land  and  the  People 

CHAPTER  II 
The  Phiuppine  Archipelago 63 

Location — Number  and  Extent  of  the  Islands — Configuration- 
Character  of  the  Coasts — Rivers — ^Underground  River — Mountain 
Streams — The  Rainfall — Location  of  Cities — Mountains  and  Forests 
— Volcanoes — Earthquakes — Coast  Line — Ocean  Currents — Faima 
and  Flora — Minerals — Fish  and  Fishing — Climate. 

CHAPTER  in 
The  Native  Peoples .      80 

Non-Christians  and  Filipinos 
Varieties  of  People — "East  is  East  and  West  is  West" — Extent  to 
Which  This  Statement  Is  True — Classification  of  the  Inhabitants- 
Aborigines  and  Malays  and  Subdivisions  of  Each — The  Negritos 
^Various  Tribes  of  Wild  Men — Head-Hunting— The  Beginnings  of 
Civilization — The  Filipinos — The  Seven  Groups — ^Various  Opinions 
as  to  Their  Characteristics. 


CO'tiTENTS— Continued 

PAGE 

CHAPTER  IV 
The  Native  Peoples 114 

The  Moros 
A  Special  Problem — The  Designation  More— The  Different  Tribes 
—  Their  Warlike  Character  —  Running  Amok  —  Weapons  —  Moro 
Forts — The  Language  and  Books — Varying  Habits — Physical  Char- 
acteristics—  Dress  and  Ornaments  —  Temperate  —  The  Betel  Nut 
Habit — Houses — Polygamy — Tribal  Government — Slavery — Schools 
— Their  Religion  —  Burial  Customs  —  Their  Industries  —  Power  of 
Datus  —  The  Moro  Laws  and  Courts  —  Penalties  —  Old  Customs 
Slowly  Being  Abandoned. 

PART  II 
The  Historical  Background 

CHAPTER  V 
Discovery  and  Conquest 137 

A  Half-Century  of  Accomplishment 
Route  to  the  East — Struggle  Between  Spain  and  Portugal — Appeal 
to  the  Pope — The  Demarcation  Bulls — Treaty  of  Tordesillas — Ferdi- 
nand Magellan  —  Extension  of  Demarcation  Line  around  the 
Globe — The  Circumnavigation  of  the  Globe — Discovery  of  the  Phil- 
ippine Islands — The  Junta  of  Bandajos  and  the  Treaty  of  Saragossa 
— Voyage  of  Villalabos  and  Naming  of  the  Islands — Andreas  de 
Urdaneta — Expedition  Under  Legaspi — Mohammedism  in  the  Phil- 
ippines— Conquest  of  Luzon  and  Founding  of  Manila — Death  of 
Legaspi — Expedition  of  Salcedo — Limahong's  Expedition  against 
Manila — Expedition  to  Borneo — The  Conquest  Completed  and  Gov- 
ernment Established — Missionary  Character  of  the  Enterprise — Pro- 
prietary Government — Salazar  and  the  Appeal  for  Reform — San- 
chez Sent  to  Spain — Reorganization  of  Affairs — Salazar  the  First 
Archbishop — ^The  End  of  the  Constructive  Era. 

CHAPTER  VI 

Two  AND  One-Half  Centuries  of  Stagnation 160 

Loss  of  Energy-^Quarrels  of  Officials — Character  of  Governors — 
Financial  Difficulties — Governor  Corcuera  and  Archbishop  Guerrero 
— Salcedo  and  Pobleta — ^Vargas  and  Pardo — Difficulties  of  Reform- 
ers— Ferdinand  de  Bustamente — Capture  of  Manila  by  British — 
Archbishop  Roja  and  Simon  de  Anda — The  Indemnity  and  the  Dis- 
honored Drafts — A  Friar's  Opinion  of  Governor  Torre — Chinese 
Uprisings  and  Massacres — Moro  Raids — ^The  Obras  Pias — An  En- 
terprising Governor — The  Liberal  Movement  in  Spain — Representa- 
tion in  the  Cortes — Discontent — Description  of  Conditions  by  Mas 
and  Matta. 


CONTENTS— Continued 

PAGB 

CHAPTER  VII 
The  Awakening  and  Revolt 182 

A  New  Era — Changing  Conditions — Attack  on  Monastic  Orders — 
Revolts  and  Insurrections — The  Cavite  Revolt — Execution  of  Native 
Priests — The  Movement  for  Reforms — The  Propaganda  Abroad — 
Jose  Rizal — The  Idea  of  Independence — Insurrection  of  1896 — The 
Katipunan — Execution  of  Rizal — ^The  Pact  of  Biak-na-bato — De- 
parture of  the  Leaders. 

PART  III 
The  Spanish  Colonial  System 

CHAPTER  VIII 
The  Governmental  Organization 211 

Literary  Theories  of  Government — Theory  and  Practise — The  Min- 
ister of  Ultramar  and  the  Conscja  de  Filipinas — The  Chief  Execu- 
tive— The  Board  of  Authorities  and  the  Council  of  Administration 
— The  Audiencia — The  Residencia — The  Ecclesiastical  System — The 
Monastic  Orders — Powers  of  the  Friars — Conflicting  Opinions  of 
Their  Work — The  Inquisition — ^The  Provincial  Governments — Prov- 
inces and  Pueblos — Organization  of  Municipalities  Under  Maura 
Law. 

CHAPTER  IX 

Legislation,  Codes  and  Courts 232 

Sources  of  the  Law — The  Laws  of  the  Indias — Extension  of  Penin- 
sular Laws  to  Philippines — The  Ancient  Spanish  Codes — The  Fuera 
Jusgo — Siete  Partidas — La  Nueva  Recopilacion — The  Prelation  of 
Laws — The  Modem  Codes — The  Judicial  Tribunals — The  Audiencia 
— Its  Organization  and  Powers — The  Provincial  Courts — The  Courts 
of  First  Instance — Justice  Courts — Ecclesiastical,  Military,  Treasury 
and  Contentious  Courts — The  Judicial  Personnel — Unsatisfactory 
Procedure — Popular  Dissatisfaction  with  the  Courts. 

CHAPTER  X 

Taxation  and  Revenue 249. 

The  Tax  System— Direct  Taxes— The  Tribune— Abolished  in  1884 
— The  Cedula  Personal — Special  Provisions  for  Chinese — The  In- 
come Tax  —  Indirect  Taxes  —  Customs  Duties  —  Classification  of 
Goods  —  Rates  Levied  —  Certain  Special  Charges  —  Monopolies  — 
Stamps,  Cockpits,  Lotteries,  etc. — The  Tobacco  Monopoly — Govern- 
ment Receipts  and  Disbursements. 


CONTENTS— Co«fmuei 

CHAPTER  XI 

Personal  Status  and  Trade  Restrictions      .........    270 

Classification  of  Residents — Restrictions — Status  of  Natives — Slav- 
ery Forbidden  by  Law — The  Tribute  and  Its  Collection — The  En- 
comiendas — A  Sort  of  Slavery — Restrictions  on  Commerce — The 
Galleons — Japanese  and  Chinese — Segregation  and  Regulation  of 
Chinese — Massacres — Effect  of  the  Restrictive  System  on  Character 
of  the  Natives. 

PART  IV 
American  Occupation  and  Change  of  Sovereignty 

CHAPTER  XII 

The  Capture  of  Manila 28S> 

Conditions  in  1898 — Means  of  Defense — Opinions  as  to  Relative 
Power — Dewey  at  Hong  Kong — And  Mirs  Bay — Localizing  a  War 
— Spanish  Preparations  at  Manila — Destruction  of  the  Spanish  Fleet 
—At  Anchor  on  the  Battle-field— New  Problems  for  the  Govern- 
ment—  Attitude  of  Foreign  Naval  Officers  —  The  Germans  —  The 
Filipinos  Disloyal  to  Spain — Arrival  of  American  Troops — Camp 
Dewey — The  Military  Situation — Delaying  the  Attack — Plan  for 
Painless  Extraction  of  Spaniards — Night  Attacks — Demands  for 
Surrender — Capture  of  the  City — Terms  of  Capitulation — The  In- 
surgents and  Their  Claims — Conflict  Avoided — ^The  Materiel  Cap- 
tured. 

CHAPTER  XIII 

The  Peace  Protocol  and  the  Treaty  of  Paris 319 

Spain  Sues  for  Peace — Negotiations  Through  French  Ambassador 
— The  Protocol — Status  of  Spain  in  Philippines — Effect  of  the 
Capitulation — The  Peace  Commissioners — Opening  of  Conference — 
Uneasiness  about  Philippines — Spanish  Preliminary  Demands — Pro- 
posals for  Treaty — Assumption  of  Sovereignty  over  Cuba — The 
Colonial  Debts — Refusal  of  United  States  to  Assume  Debts — Orig- 
inal Instructions  as  to  Philippines — Growth  of  Sentiment  in  United 
States — Investigations  by  Commission — Conflicting  Opinions — Final 
Instructions — Claim  of  Conquest — The  Philippine  Public  Debt — 
Continental  Sentiment  Favors  Spain — British  Attitude — Offer  of 
$20,000,000 — Spain  Accepts  America's  Terms — Certain  Minor  Issues 
— The  Treaty — Purchase  of  Additional  Islands — ^The  End  of  a  Colo- 
nial Empire. 


CONTENTS— Conh'»«<ri 

FAGi 

CHAPTER  XIV 

The  Policy  of  Expansion  and  the  Anti-Imperialists      .....    359 

Some  Generalities — First  Impressions — McKinley's  Original  Views 
— Publicists  and  Literary  Men — Their  Arguments  Ineflfective — A 
Question  of  National  Policy — Instincts  of  the  People — Natural  De- 
sire for  Growth  —  Decision  Rested  with  McKinley  —  The  Anti- 
Imperialists — Nature  of  Their  Opposition — Sentiment  in  Continental 
Europe  —  British  Feeling  —  Kipling's  Appeal  —  Opposition  at  First 
Negative — The  Policy  of  "Walk  Alone" — Senator  Hoar's  Sugges- 
tion for  a  Convention  of  Nations — The  World  Power  Idea,  Altru- 
ism and  Commercialism — Not  Originally  a  Party  Issue — Mr.  Bryan's 
Responsibility — Ratification  of  the  Treaty — Future  Policy  Left  Un- 
determined. 

CHAPTER  XV 

The  Diplomacy  of  the  Consulates 380 

Early  Relations  With  the  Insurgents 

Charges  of  Bad  Faith — Consular  Activities — Wildman's  Relations 
With  Hong  Kong  Junta — Forbidden  to  Discuss  Policies — Aguinaldo 
at  Singapore — The  Pratt-Dewey  Cables — No  Reference  to  Independ- 
ence— Aguinaldo  at  Hong  Kong — Minutes  of  Meeting  of  Junta — 
Aguinaldo  Meets  Dewey — Is  Assisted  with  Arms — Organizes  Army 
and  Government — Dewey^s  Statement — Proclaims  Independence — 
Origin  of  the  Promise  Myth — Filipino  Claims — Bray  and  St.  Clair — 
Aguinaldo's  Report  to  the  Junta — Summary — Filipino  Plans  and 
Policies — American  Policy  Unknown — No  Promise  Made  and  No 
Bad  Faith. 

CHAPTER  XVI 

The  Period  of  Military  Occupation — Suspended  Sovereignty    .     .     .    422 

Military  Occupation — Powers  of  a  Military  Occupant — Merritt's  In- 
structions—  The  Proclamation  —  Organization  of  Civil  AflFairs — 
The  Peace  Protocol — Spanish  Claims  Thereunder — Relations  with 
Insurgents — No  Joint  Occupation — Aguinaldo  Required  to  With- 
draw His  Troops — Consolidation  of  Civil  Officers — The  Courts — 
Trade  and  Commerce — Prisons — Ownership  of  Bonds  and  Money  in 
the  Treasury — Spanish  Prisoners — Spanish  Priests  and  Nuns  as 
Prisoners — The  Chinese — Closing  up  Spanish  Affairs — Difficulties  at 
Iloilo — The  "Benevolent  Assimilation"  Proclamation — Aguinaldo's 
Response — Conferences  with  Insurgents — The  Schurman  Commis- 
sion— The  Attack  on  Manila. 


CONTENTS— Con/in«fd 

pAcat 
CHAPTER  XVII 

The  Fiupino  Rebellion  and  the  Days  of  the  Empire 4SS 

Nature  of  the  War — Filipinos  Misjudged — Aguinaldo  at  Zenith  of 
Power — The  Malolos  Congress  His  Creature — Character  of  Leaders 
— Encouraged  and  Misled  by  Americans — Democrats  Vote  Supplies 
for  War — Bitter  Opposition  by  Anti-Imperialists — Military  Situa- 
tion at  Manila — State  Volunteers  Remain — New  United  States  Vol- 
unteers— Campaign  to  the  North — Capture  of  Malolos,  Calumpit  and 
San  Fernando — Minor  Movements  near  Manila — Lawton's  Cam- 
paign toward  San  Maguil  de  Mayiima — Fight  at  Zapote  River — 
Situation  in  the  Vasayas  and  to  the  South — The  Occupation  of  Jolo 
— Spanish  Relation  with  Moros — The  Bates  Agreement — The  Re- 
public of  Negros — Special  Military  Government — Arrival  of  Schur- 
man  Commission  —  Negotiations  with  Insurgents  —  Statement  of 
American  Intentions — Efforts  at  Conciliation — The  Insurgents  Con- 
fident of  Foreign  Intervention — Aguinaldo  Inclined  to  Peace — Influ- 
ence of  Mabini  and  Agoncillo — The  Congress  Votes  for  Peace — 
Pacification  in  Sight — Reversal  of  Policy  by  Luna — The  End  of 
Filipino  Government — Negotiations  for  Peace  End  in  Failure — 
Military  Despotism — Final  Campaign  in  the  North — Searching  for 
the  Enemy — Escape  of  Aguinaldo — Death  of  General  Lawton — 
End  of  Organized  Warface — General  MacArthur  Succeeds  General 
Otis — Character  and  Work  of  General  Otis — New  Phase  of  the 
Insurrection — Guerrilla  Warfare — Attitude  of  Municipalities — Peo- 
ple of  Luzon  Support  Guerrillas — Beginning  of  Educational  Work. 

CHAPTER  XVIII 

The  End  of  the  Military  Regime 487 

Building  a  Government 
Policy  of  the  Administration — Civil  Government  in  Occupied  Terri- 
tory— Unpopularity  of  the  Policy — Elihu  Root,  Secretary  of  War — 
War  Department  in  Charge — War  Powers  of  President — Civil  Gov- 
ernment by  Civilian  Agents — Constitutional  Questions — Theories  of 
National  Power — Power  to  Acquire  and  Hold  Territory — The  Po- 
litical Precedents — Secretary  Root's  Theory — The  Insular  Cases — 
The  United  States  Philippine  Commission — The  President's  Instruc- 
tions— Principles  of  Government  Adopted — Questions  for  Consid- 
eration— Legislative  Power  of  Commission — Reception  in  Manila — 
Local  Conditions — Building  a  Government — Further  Efforts  at  Rec- 
onciliation— Presidential  Elections  in  the  United  States — Final  Blow 
at  the  Insurrection — Deportations — Organization  of  Federal  Party 
—  Early  Legislation  —  Civil  Service  Law  —  Reorganization  of  the 
Judicial  System — Municipal  Code — Provincial  Government  Law — 
The  Beginnings  of  Baguio — Tour  of  the  Islands — Organization  of 
Provincial  Governments — The  Spooner  Law — Capture  of  Aguinaldo. 

Index 531 


THE  PHILIPPINES 


INTRODUCTORY 


THE  PHILIPPINES 

CHAPTER  I 
The  Theory  and  Practise  of  Colonization 

Problems  of  Modern  Colonization — Changing  Theories — Development  of 
Backward  Races — American  Theories — Political  and  Economic  Growth — An- 
cient Colonization — Nature  of  Greek  and  Roman  Colonies — The  Middle  Ages 
— Spanish,  Portuguese  and  French  Colonization — English  Methods  and  Theo- 
ries— The  New  Era — Development  of  the  Tropics — New  French,  Italian  and 
German  Colonization — Modern  Native  Policies — Recognition  of  Obligations 
— Queen  Victoria's  Proclamation  of  1858 — The  Self-government  Principle  in 
India  and  Egypt — Moral  Justification  for  Western  Rule — The  United  States 
in  the  Tropics — Recognition  of  Duty  to  the  Natives — Their  Political  Develop- 
ment— European  Criticism — Controlling  Principles — Education  of  the  Natives 
— Attitude  Toward  Native  Aspirations — Policy  Not  Repressive. 

It  is  only  within  recent  years  that  colonizing  states  have  found 
it  necessary  to  adopt  a  systematic  policy  for  controlling  and 
developing  the  native  population  of  their  tropical  possessions. 
Prior  to  the  opening  of  the  present  era  colonies  were  supposed  to 
exist  for  the  sole  benefit  of  the  metropolitan  state;  the  natives 
were  regarded  as  obstructions  to  be  as  rapidly  as  possible  elim- 
inated or  assimilated. 

In  the  tropics  industry,  although  directed  by  white  men,  has 
always  been  dependent  upon  native  labor.  After  slavery  ceased 
to  exist  and  forced  labor  could  no  longer  be  exacted,  some 
method  had  to  be  devised  to  induce  the  people  of  their  own  free 
will,  to  furnish  the  labor  which  was  essential  for  the  develop- 
ment of  industrial  and  agricultural  enterprises.  In  addition 
thereto  in  colonies  where  the  natives  have  made  some  progress, 
affairs  have  to  be  so  managed  as  to  induce  the  subject  people  to 

1 


2  THE    PHILIPPINES 

accept  and  be  satisfied  with  the  supremacy  of  a.  foreign, 
power. 

Two  problems,  one  economic  and  the  other  poHtical,  are  thus 
present  in  every  modern  colonial  situation  and  the  predominant 
element  at  any  time  or  place  is  determined  by  the  stage  of  de- 
velopment of  the  colony  and  the  aims  and  conceptions  of  the 
colonizing  state.  Thus,  when  the  present  European  war  com- 
menced, German  colonization,  which  was  still  in  the  plantation 
stage,  was  concerned  primarily  with  the  economic  problem ;  Great 
Britain  was  groping  for  a  native  policy  which  would  prevent  the 
overthrow  of  her  political  supremacy,  and  the  United  States  was 
placing  the  stress  on  the  development  of  the  natives. 

All  advanced  nations  now  agree  that  the  management  and  de- 
velopment instead  of  the  destruction  of  backward  races  is  an 
essential  part  of  the  raison  d'etre  of  colonization.  But  this  is 
a  modern  conception.  Two  generations  ago  Sir  George  Come- 
wall  Lewis,  then  the  leading  English  authority,  defined  a  colony* 


^The  French  classify  colonies  as  Colonies  de  commerce,  Colonies  d'ex- 
ploitation,  and  Colonies  de  Peuplement.  Francois  et  Rouget,  Manual  de  legis- 
lation coloniale,  p.  11.  Leroy-Beaulieu,  De  la  Colonisation  chez  les  Peuples 
Modernes  (Sixieme  edition,  1908),  Chaps,  V,  XL  As  used  in  Eng- 
land, the  word  colony  has  no  exact  meaning.  For  various  definitions,  see 
Lewis,  Government  of  Dependencies  (Lucas  ed.),  p.  168;  Lucas,  Introduction 
to  a  Historical  Geography  of  the  British  Colonies,  Chap.  1  (1899)  ;  Snow, 
Administration  of  Dependencies,  Chap.  6;  Keller,  Colonization,  Chap.  \. 

The  British  Colonial  Office  makes  an  arbitrary  classification  of  British 
possessions  into  Dominions,  India  and  the  Crown  Colonies.  For  a  classifica- 
tion of  the  colonies  with  reference  to  the  forms  of  government,  see  Bruce, 
The  Broad  Stone  of  Empire,  1,  p.  226. 

An  approach  to  accuracy  is  reached  if  we  describe  an  English  colony  as 
a  dependent  political  community  the  majority  or  dominant  portion  of  whose 
members  belong  by  birth  or  origin  to  the  metropolitan  country  to  which  they 
have  no  intention  of  returning.  They  are  communities  in  which  people  from 
the  home  country  have  established  their  permanent  homes.  See  Egerton, 
Short  History  of  English  Colonies,  p.  9. 

This  fairly  well  describes  all  the  British  possessions  other  than  depend- 
encies, protectorates,  and  India,  which  is  a  class  by  itself.  The  essential  ele- 
ments are  the  origin  and  permanency  of  residence  of  the  dominant  element  of 
the  population.  The  original  American  settlements,  Canada,  Australia  and 
South  Africa,  were  thus  properly  called  colonies.  Purely  military  settlements 
such  as  Malta,  Gibraltar,  and  semi-commercial  and  military  stations  such  as 
Hong  Kong  and  Wei-Hai-Wei  are  not  colonies.  Ceylon,  Jamaica  and  Mau- 
ritius have  a  fair  number  of  English  settlers  but  are  governed  very  much  as 
Hong  Kong  and  are  designated  as  Crown  colonies.  India,  Egypt,  and  the 
tropical  settlements  of  France  and  Holland  are  properly  called  dependencies, 
(juam  is  a  military  station  and  the  Philippines  a  dependency.  In  all  communi- 
ties of  this  class  the  animus  revertendi  is  always  present  in  the  minds  of  the 
greater  portion  of  the  dominant  race  who  reside  in  the  country.    They  are 


THEORY    AND    PRACTISE    OF    COLONIZATION        3 

as  a  body  of  persons  belonging  to  one  country  and  political  com- 
munity, who  having  abandoned  that  country  and  community, 
form  a  new  and  separate  system,  independent  or  separate,  in 
some  district  which  is  wholly  or  nearly  uninhabited  *^and  from 
which  they  expel  the  ancient  inhabitants." 

A  few  years  later  Charles  Dickens  amused  the  public  with  his 
satirical  portrait  of  Mrs.  Jelleby,  who  was  "devoted  to  the  subject 
of  Africa,  with  a  view  to  the  general  cultivation  of  coffee — and 
the  natives."  But  the  sense  of  obligation  for  the  growth  of  the 
natives  as  well  as  the  coffee  gradually  developed  until  at  present 
no  statesman,  trader  or  colonial  business  man  dares  ignore  it. 
Recently  Lord  Milner,  speaking  at  a  meeting  of  the  Royal  Colo- 
nial Institute,  said*  that  in  the  rivalry  between  the  nations  that 
one  "will  be  most  successful  which  exhibits  the  greatest  wisdom 
in  its  efforts  to  promote  the  welfare  and  progress  and  content- 
ment of  its  subject  people." 

Colonization  has  thus  come  to  signify  the  extension  by  annexa- 
tion or  some  form  of  protectorate,  of  the  authority  and  activities 
of  an  established  power  over  lands  vacant  or  inhabited  to  some 
extent  by  a  people  of  a  lower  order  of  civilization  with  the  ob- 
ject of  developing  the  resources  of  the  country  and  ameliorating 
the  physical  and  moral  conditions  of  the  natives.  It  thus  in- 
volves moral,  political  and  economic  considerations'  but  not  nec- 
essarily the  training  of  the  natives  for  self-government,  or  even 
for  participation  in  the  government. 

In  fact,  European  states  generally  affect  to  ignore  the  question 


there  for  purposes  of  government,  or  of  trade,  with  the  ever-present  intention 
of  returning  to  the  homeland.  Egerton,  supra.  The  great  body  of  the  people 
who  are  born,  live  and  die  in  such  countries  are  of  a  different  race  and  of  a 
lower  order  of  civilization.  Colonies,  as  distinguished  from  dependencies, 
and  from  Crown  colonies,  in  British  nomenclature,  belong  almost  entirely  to 
the  temperate  zone.  Dependencies  and  most  Crown  colonies  are  in  the 
tropics. 

2  United  Empire  (N.  S.),  II,  p.  136.  On  the  same  occasion  Mr.  George 
E.  Foster,  Minister  of  Trade  and  Commerce  of  Canada,  said  that  the  solution 
of  the  whole  problem  largely  depends  upon  "the  view  we  take  as  colonizing 
people  of  the  trust  which  is  imposed  upon  us  by  the  assumption  of  dominion 
over  the  countries  and  peoples  who  inhabit  those  countries." 

•Francois  et  Rouget,  Legislation  Coloniale.  p.  3  (1909).  See  Girault, 
Principes  de  Colonisation  et  Legislation  Coloniale  (1895). 


4  THE   PHILIPPINES 

of  the  political  development  of  the  native  people  because  it  in- 
volves tlie  question  of  the  permanency  of  their  tenure.  The 
United  States  has  frankly  put  it  in  the  forefront  of  the  pro- 
gram. Her  experiment  in  tropical  colonization  in  the  Philippines 
has  therefore  certain  features  which  deserve  special  attention. 
She  accepts  as  axiomatic  the  principle  that  the  good  of  the  native 
people  is  the  primary  object  of  the  metropolitan  state.  Her 
policy  is  distinctive  in  that  it  places  stress  upon  the  political  as 
well  as  the  economic  development  of  the  natives  and  on  educa- 
tion as  the  primary  means  by  which  such  development  is  to  be 
effected.*  It  is  almost  unique  in  that  its  complete  success  requires 
the  elimination  of  the  metropolitan  state  from  the  situation." 

The  modern  theory  of  colonization  leads  logically  to  this  con- 
clusion, but  the  United  States  only  has  announced  that  complete 
self-government  and  ultimately  an  Independent  state  is  not  only 
the  incidental  and  possible  result  of  its  Philippine  policy,  but  the 
direct  object  of  its  activities.  America  hopes  that  a  prosperous 
tropical  dependency  will  in  the  course  of  time  grow  into  a  free 
state  through  the  development  of  the  capacity  of  the  people  for 
self-government.  If  this  most  generous  and  altruistic  of  co- 
lonial projects  fails,  it  will  be  because  the  Filipinos  prove  un- 
equal to  the  responsibility  which  has  been  laid  upon  them.  In 
that  event  America  must  be  content  with  having  given  the  dis- 
tracted country  order,  peace,  justice,  and  a  high  degree  of  ma- 
terial prosperity. 

The  work  of  the  United  States  in  the  Philippines  has  therefore 
an  important  place  in  the  history  of  colonization.  It  recognizes 
the  naturalness  and  propriety  of  the  aspiration  of  the  natives 
for  nationality  and  also  the  certain  efTect  of  Western  education 
on  Eastern  people.    It  sees  what  is  written  across  the  heavens 


*  The  difference  is  one  of  priority  and  degree.  Great  Britain  places  order 
and  material  prosperity  first  and  education  second.  The  United  States  would 
use  education  as  a  means  to  secure  these  necessary  objects. 

*  This  is  also  true  of  England  in  Egypt,  In  India  the  concession  of 
greater  powers  of  self-government  and  larger  participation  in  the  work  of 
gorernment  implies  the  permanence  of  British  rule.  Logically,  however,  it 
leads  to  the  ultimate  elimination  of  Great  Britain,  should  the  Indians  ever 
grow  into  a  nation  and  prove  themselves  capable  of  self-government 


THEORY    AND    PRACTISE    OF    COLONIZATION        5 

and  frankly  attempts  to  aid  and  direct  instead  of  obstruct  what 
is  a  perfectly  natural  growth.* 

A  rapid  glance  over  the  history  of  colonization  will  enable  one 
to  understand  and  appreciate  the  dynamic  force  of  the  idea  of 
nationality  which  is  now  so  powerfully  influencing  the  minds  of 
Eastern  peoples. 

Colonization  is  as  old  as  history.  It  has  been  going  on  since 
men  first  founded  families,  communities,  cities,  states  and  na- 
tions. Few  things  in  nature  have  been  less  permanent  than  na- 
tional boundaries  and  the  territorial  possessions  of  nations.  States 
have  been  born,  struggled  for  life,  expanded,  absorbed  their 
neighbors,  established  colonies,  decayed,  been  absorbed  and  dis- 
appeared from  the  map.  Europe  has  been  overrun,  repeopled, 
divided  and  subdivided,  and  Asia  is  one  vast  burial  place  of  dead 
states. 

All  primitive  peoples  engaged  in  some  form  of  colonization. 
The  Chinese  from  motives  of  safety  or  trade  gradually  extended 
their  boundaries  until  they  embraced  the  great  plains  to  the 
north  and  west,  which  have  so  recently  been  lost  to  a  more  ag- 
gressive race.  They  spread  throughout  the  world  but  they 
establish  no  colonies;  they  remain  strangers  in  the  lands  of 
their  adoption. 

The  Phoenicians  were  the  first  colonizing  people  of  whom  we 
possess  a  record,  and  their  influence  has  extended  even  to  mod- 
em times.  Forced  out  of  their  diminutive  home  country  and 
impelled  by  the  instinct  of  the  trader,  they  established  trading 
posts  along  the  shores  of  the  Mediterranean  and  even  to  the  north 
as  far  as  the  coasts  of  Britain  and  Germany.  They  were  not 
idealistic — they  cared  nothing  for  empire — and  the  political 
bonds  between  their  colonies  were  weak  or  non-existent.  Their 
motives  were  commercial  or  religious,  not  political.  Absorbed 
in  the  struggle  for  wealth  they  were  unable  to  consolidate  and 
preserve  a  colonial  empire  and  in  time  gave  way  for  the  Greeks. 

« It  may  be  well  to  state  that  few  if  any  writers  on  colonial  subjects  show 
much  confidence  in  the  success  of  popular  or  representative  government  in 
the  tropics.   See  Reinsch,  Colonial  Governtnrnt,  Chap.  XI. 

Lewis,  Government  of  Dependencies,  p.  307. 


6  THE   PHILIPPINES 

The  Greek  state  occasionally  established  subordinate  govern- 
ments outside  of  its  boundaries,  but  Greek  colonization  generally 
was  conducted  upon  other  theories.  The  Greek  word  for  colony 
signifies  a  separation  of  dwelling,  a  departure  from  home,  a 
going  out  of  the  house.  It  suggests  a  derivative  but  politically 
independent  community.'^  "An  ancient  Greek  colony,"  says 
Archbishop  Whately,*  "was  like  what  gardeners  call  a  layer,  a 
portion  of  the  parent  tree,  with  some  twigs  and  leaves  embedded 
in  fresh  soil,  till  it  has  taken  root  and  then  severed."  It  was  of 
such  colonies  that  Turgot  was  thinking  when  he  wrote  that 
"colonies  are  like  fruits  which  only  cling  until  they  ripen."  When 
this  final  condition  was  reached  separation  according  to  the 
Greek  conception  of  a  political  community  as  a  mere  city,  was 
inevitable.  According  to  Aristotle,*  the  state  must  be  of  moderate 
population  because  otherwise  "who  could  command  in  war  if  the 
population  were  excessive,  or  what  herald  short  of  a  Senator 
could  speak  to  them?"  As  each  Greek  city  increased  in  popula- 
tion it  was  necessary  to  replant  another  shoot  because  no  city 
should  be  so  large  that  any  part  of  it  was  beyond  the  reach  of  a 
herald's  voice.  Such  colonization  has  been  compared  to  the 
swarming  of  bees  or  the  migration  of  married  children  to  their 
own  homes. 

As  the  city  state  increased  in  population  it  was  therefore  nec- 
essary that  some  should  emigrate  and  we  may  assume  that  it  was 
the  adventurous,  the  unsuccessful,  and  the  needy  who,  under  the 
lead  of  a  few  bold  spirits,  became  the  founders  of  new  states. 

That  assisted  emigration  was  not  unknown  even  In  those  early 
days  appears  from  the  institution  ver  sacrum  which  flourished 
among  the  Greco-Italian  branch  of  the  Aryan  family  during  the 
time  when  Italy  was  being  occupied.  All  the  children  bom  in 
one  spring  were  dedicated  to  a  certain  deity  which,  being  a  rea- 
sonable deity,  was  willing  to  accept  emigration  in  lieu  of  sacrifice. 
Its  votaries  were  accumulated  and  when  they  reached  a  proper 

'  See  Adam  Smith's  Wealth  of  Nations,  Book  IV,  Chap.  7. 
8  Note  to  Bacon's  Essay  on  Plantations. 
^Politics,  Book  VII,  Chap.  4. 


THEORY    AND    PRACTISE    OF   COLONIZATION        7 

age  were  driven  across  the  frontier  and  left  to  found  a  city  for 
themselves.*" 

The  Greek  colonies  -were  often  founded  without  the  express 
authority  of  the  state,  and  were  not  designed  to  increase  its 
power  and  dominion.  They  were  usually  established  in  some  un- 
occupied or  partially  occupied  territory  and  were  practically  in- 
dependent from  the  first.  Their  relation  to  the  parent  state 
resembled  somewhat  that  of  the  American  colonies  to  England 
after  the  War  of  Independence. 

Roman  colonization  was  conducted  under  different  conditions 
and  upon  entirely  different  theories.  Rome  dealt  with  subject 
people  and  was  satisfied  if  she  gave  them  peace,  order  and  jus- 
tice under  Roman  domination.  Her  vast  and  complicated  system 
of  dependencies  can  only  be  glanced  at.  Those  in  Italy  were 
either  city  communities  known  as  municipia  or  colonia.  The 
former  were  cities  formerly  independent,  which  after  being  con- 
quered, retained  their  local  civil  laws.  The  latter  were  generally 
established  in  existing  towns  after  the  citizens  had  been  ejected. 
They  were  strictly  dependent  on  the  home  state. 

The  colonists  were  sent  out  by  Rome  for  the  purpose  of  con- 
firming and  extending  her  influence  and  were  paid  for  their 
services  by  grants  of  land.  The  old  military  colonies — the  col- 
onice  civium  Romanorum — were  simply  garrisons  of  Roman  sol- 
diers placed  in  the  conquered  towns  of  Italy.  As  the  incoming 
Romans  amalgamated  with  the  native  community  they  formed 
a  colony  which  in  time  became  a  part  of  the  Roman  state.  In 
the  time  of  the  Gracchi,  colonies  were  founded  beyond  seas  for 
the  purpose  of  drawing  off  the  surplus  population  and  thus  re- 
lieving the  agrarian  situation.  Later,  generals  like  Marius,  Pom- 
pey  and  Caesar  established  military  colonies  for  the  purpose  of 
aiding  their  veteran  soldiers. 

Beyond  Italy,  conquered  states  after  being  "reduced  under  the 
formula  of  a  province"  became  Roman  dependencies.  A  province 
was  under  the  immediate  supervision  of  a  resident  provincial 
Roman  governor  styled  at  various  periods,  praetor,  propraetor, 

^'^  Seeley,  Expansion  of  England,  p.  47. 


8  THE   PHILIPPINES 

or  proconsul.  Augustus  divided  the  provinces  into  two  classes — ' 
senatorian  and  imperatorial.  Whether  a  province  belonged  to 
one  or  the  other  of  these  classes  was  determined  by  the  lex  prO' 
vincia  under  which  it  was  organized.  In  the  former  class  a  gov- 
ernor appointed  by  the  Roman  Senate  controlled  civil  affairs, 
while  military  functions  were  reserved  to  an  officer  appointed  by 
the  Emperor.  Civil  and  military  authority  were  thus  separated. 
In  the  imperatorial  province  a  lieutenant  of  the  Emperor  directed 
both  civil  and  military  affairs.^ ^ 

The  laws  regulating  the  appointment,  powers  and  rank  of  Ro- 
man governors  were  uniform  throughout  the  provinces.  In  all 
other  respects  the  greatest  diversity  prevailed.  The  policy  of 
the  conquering  Romans  was  to  make  only  such  changes  in  local 
laws  and  customs  as  were  necessary  to  reduce  the  place  to  sub- 
jection. Civil  laws,  rehgion  and  local  customs  usually  remained 
untouched.  The  Romans  seem  indeed  to  have  concerned  them- 
selves as  little  as  possible  with  local  affairs.  Like  some  modern 
colonial  powers,  they  were  satisfied  with  military  rule  and  the 
prompt  payment  of  the  tribute. ^^ 

The  laws  of  a  Roman  province  consisted  of  the  formula  which 
prescribed  the  terms  upon  which  it  was  annexed,  the  acts  of  the 
supreme  Roman  legislature,  the  edicts  of  the  provincial  governor, 
and  the  native  laws  as  they  existed  before  the  country  became  a 
Roman  dependency.  The  revenues  were  collected  by  Roman  offi- 
cers who  remitted  to  Rome  what  was  left  after  paying  the  ex- 
penses of  the  provincial  government.  A  province  sometimes  paid 
its  tribute  in  a  gross  sum.  Taxation  was  not  ordinarily  excessive 
but  the  people  suffered  from  the  rapacity  and  extortions  of  gov- 
ernors such  as  Verras,  made  famous  by  Cicero's  denunciation. 
Roman  rule  was  maintained  by  a  military  system  of  marvelous 


^1  See  Lewis,  Government  of  Dependence,  p.  118,  note. 

12  When  Paul  was  brought  before  the  judgment  seat,  Gallic,  the  deputy  of 
Achaia  said:  "If  it  be  a  question  of  words  and  names,  and  of  your  law,  look 
ye  to  it;  for  I  will  be  no  judge  of  such  matters.  And  he  drave  them  from  the 
judgment  seat.  Then  all  the  Greeks  took  Sosthenes,  the  chief  ruler  of  the 
synagogue,  and  beat  him  before  the  judgment  seat.  Ahd  Gallic  cared  for 
none  of  those  things."  Acts  xviii,  15-17. 


THEORY    AND    PRACTISE    OF    COtONIZATION        9 

efficiency.  Magnificent  roads  and  bridges  connected  the  towns 
and  fortified  camps. 

In  the  course  of  time  the  distinction  between  the  different 
classes  of  dependencies  in  Italy  and  the  provinces  disappeared. 
The  privileges  of  Roman  citizenship  were  extended  to  the  whole 
of  Italy  and  finally  to  the  distant  provinces.  During  the  reign  of 
Constantine  the  provincial  government  system  was  completely 
revised.  Financial  and  judicial  functions  were  separated  from 
the  military  power.  A  system  of  inspectors  was  established  for 
the  purpose  of  a  more  efficient  control  of  the  provincial  gov- 
ernors. The  Roman  military,  administrative  and  judicial  sys- 
tems, and  Roman  law,  language  and  institutions,  because  of 
their  value  and  efficiency,  gradually  superseded  those  of  the  na- 
tives. The  vast  superiority  of  the  Roman  law  and  particularly 
its  scientific  codification  led  to  its  universal  adoption.  In  Jus- 
tinian's time  the  provincial  governors  were  required  to  receive  a 
regular  education  in  the  Roman  law  schools.  The  provinces 
always  retained  subordinate  governments.^^ 

It  has  been  generally  asserted  that  Rome  ruled  the  provinces 
for  the  good  of  her  subjects  and  not  for  selfish  gain;^*  but  Fer- 
rere  says^'  that  "we  must  abandon  one  of  the  most  general  and 
most  widespread  misconceptions  which  teaches  that  Rome  admin- 
istered her  provinces  in  a  broad-minded  spirit,  consulting  the  gen- 
eral interest  and  adopting  wide  and  beneficial  principles  of  gov- 
ernment for  the  good  of  the  subjects."  Lord  Cromar  also  says^" 
that  the  colonial  policy  of  Rome,  when  judged  by  modem  stand- 
ards, stands  condemned. 

The  feudal  kingdoms  which  arose  upon  the  ruins  of  the  Ro- 
man Empire  were  in  some  respects  aggregations  of  dependencies. 
In  the  sixteenth  century  Spain  ruled  the  kingdoms  of  Naples 
and  Sicily,  the  Netherlands,  and  the  Duchy  of  Milan,  as  prov- 

^3  See  Lewis*  Government  of  Dependencies,  Chap.  2,  pp.  112-134;  Keller, 
Colonization,  Chap,  11 ;  Broderick.  Political  Studies,  Roman  Colonies  (1879)  ; 
Arnold,  Roman  System  of  Provincial  Administration  (1879). 

1*  Gwatkins,  "Early  Church  History  to  A.  D.  313,"  p.  52. 

"^^  Greatness  and  Decline  of  Rome,  V,  p.  3. 

'^^  Ancient  and  Modern  Imperialism,  p.  SO. 


10  THE   PHILIPPINES3 

inces  under  a  system  which  resembled  that  of  the  Romans.  Na- 
poleon created  a  system  of  dependent  states  in  Europe  of  which 
nothing  vital  remains. 

During  the  early  Middle  Ages  the  maritime  republics  of  Italy 
instituted  the  system  of  commercial  posts  or  "factories"  in  the 
Levant,  which  later  played  so  great  a  part  in  the  development 
of  the  Far  East.  These  factories  were  ordinarily  parts  or  sep- 
arate walled  sections  of  certain  cities  within  which  the  foreign 
merchants  lived  with  their  families.  They  were  similar  to  the 
sections  assigned  to  the  Jews  in  European  cities  and  centuries 
later  to  the  Dutch  and  English  on  the  coast  of  China.  They 
were  often  fortified  and  not  infrequently  became  the  basis  for 
territorial  as  well  as  commercial  conquest. 

During  the  period  of  the  Latin  Empire  of  the  East,  the  Vene- 
tians, Genoese  and  Pisans  maintained  factories  in  Constantino- 
ple. The  Venetians  established  colonies  on  the  Black  Sea,  the 
Propontis,  the  Archipelago,  the  Morea,  the  coast  of  Syria, 
Cypress,  and  along  the  Adriatic  Sea.  These  colonies  were  pat- 
terned after  the  mother  city.  When  taxation  was  too  heavy  the 
people,  subject  to  their  government,  occasionally  revolted.  In 
1361  the  population  of  Candia,  which  had  been  acquired  by 
Venice,  refused  to  pay  a  tax  for  public  works  and  demanded 
representation  in  the  Great  Council  of  the  home  city.  Venice 
considered  her  colonies  in  the  Levant  as  an  integral  part  of  the 
state,  but  as  existing  for  purely  commercial  purposes.  She  en- 
couraged the  members  of  her  noble  families  to  migrate  to  the 
colonies  for  the  purpose  of  enriching  themselves  and  upon  their 
return  to  Venice  with  their  ill-gotten  wealth,  raised  them  to  the 
highest  order  of  nobles.  Necessarily  under  such  a  system  the 
native  people  within  her  colonies  were  subjected  to  all  kinds  of 
oppression. 

It  is  a  remarkable  fact  that  modern  colonization  was  begun  by 
the  people  who  probably,  judged  by  modern  standards,  had  the 
fewest  qualifications  for  such  work/'^ 

*^  Leroy-Beaulieu,  De  la  colonisation  ches  les  Peu/yles  Modernes,  I,  p.  3. 
Keller,  Colonisation,  p.  81,  takes  a  contrary  view.  See  generally,  Roscher, 
The  Spanish  Colonial  System,  Translation  by  Bourne  (1904). 


THEORY    AND    PRACTISE    OF   COLONIZATION      11 

Spain  at  that  time  was  neither  rich,  prosperous,  nor  overpop- 
ulated.  Her  long  struggle  with  the  Moors  had  cultivated  the  mili- 
tary spirit  and  induced  a  contempt  for  labor  and  agricultural  life 
which  was  reflected  in  all  her  laws  and  colonial  administration. 
Church  and  state,  engaged  in  a  common  struggle  for  life  with 
the  infidel,  had  been  welded  into  a  unit.  Enthusiasm  for  ex- 
tending the  Empire  of  the  Cross  glowed  with  an  intensity  else- 
where unknown.  To  Spain,  whose  monarchs  had  financed  Co- 
lumbus, fell  the  lion's  share  of  the  new  Western  world  and  she 
entered  upon  its  exploration  and  exploitation  with  great  energy. 
The  kingdoms  were  full  of  needy  nobles  and  soldiers  recently 
released  from  the  wars  and  eager  for  adventure.  They  were 
sent  by  shiploads  to  Mexico  and  South  America  to  search  for 
gold  and  silver  and  the  loot  of  conquered  native  states,  some- 
thing which  could  be  carried  back  to  Spain  to  be  enjoyed  and  to 
enrich  the  royal  treasury.  Spain  established  few  colonies  in  the 
temperate  zone.  In  America  and  in  the  Philippines  she  con- 
quered countries  already  inhabited  by  natives  who  had  reached 
some  degree  of  civilization.  Her  conquests  were  easy,  and  there- 
after she  ruled  a  native  population,  for  the  benefit  of  Spain.  No 
effort  was  made  to  populate  the  new  colonies  with  Spaniards. 
Her  possessions  were  dependencies  and  not  colonies  as  the  term 
is  ordinarily  understood  by  English-speaking  people. 

The  ancient  civilizations  of  Mexico  and  Peru  were  swept 
away ;  the  natives  were  killed  in  battle  or  reduced  to  slavery  and 
forced  to  toil  for  their  masters.  The  governments  were  admin- 
istered entirely  by  Peninsula-bom  Spaniards.  Viceroys  in 
Mexico  and  Lima  represented  the  person  and  the  authority 
of  the  king  and  governed  under  the  discretion  of  the  Council 
of  India  after  it  was  established  in  1514.*' 

The  rights  of  the  native  people  were  ignored  by  the  civil  offi- 
cials. Good  and  benevolent  laws  enacted  for  their  protection 
were  ordinarily  disregarded.*'    The  work  of  developing  the  ag- 


1'  This  was  the  first  attempt  to  exercise  control  over  colonics  by  means  of 
a  separate  public  department  in  the  home  country. 

"See  Lea,  "The  Indian  Policy  of  Spain,"  Yale  Review,  August  1899; 


12  THE    PHILIPPINES 

ricultural  resources  of  the  new  country  was  considered  as  beneatK 
the  dignity  of  the  adventurous  soldiers  and  needy  and  rapacious 
nobles  who  constituted  the  bulk  of  the  Spanish  residents.  At  one 
time  forty-five  marquises  and  counts  with  their  families  resided 
in  Lima.    Rare  material  indeed  for  colonists ! 

The  church  was  all-powerful.  With  earthly  ambitions  went 
the  spirit  of  proselytism.  The  passion  of  the  adventurers  for 
gold  was  no  stronger  than  that  of  the  monks  and  priests  for  the 
saving  of  souls.  Notwithstanding  the  glow  of  religious  enthusi- 
asm in  which  it  was  enveloped,  Spanish  colonization  was  con- 
trolled by  a  spirit  as  sordid  as  that  of  the  ancient  Phoenicians 
and  the  Venetians  of  the  Middle  Ages.  Spain  adopted  their 
system  of  trade  monopoly  and  passed  it  on  to  the  Dutch,  French 
and  English.  To  the  end  of  her  career  as  a  colonial  power  she 
retained  all  the  worse  principles  of  the  original  system.  Never- 
theless there  was  something  vital  in  her  system.  The  native 
races  under  her  rule  never  entirely  disappeared  as  they  did  in 
the  French  and  English  colonies  in  the  West  Indies,  to  be  sup- 
planted by  negro  slaves  brought  from  Africa.  While  often  cruel 
and  oppiessive  she  managed  in  some  degree  to  assimilate  the 
natives  and  to  impress  upon  them  her  religion  and  civilization,  as 
no  other  country  has  been  able  to  do.  In  the  course  of  time  all 
her  colonies  revolted,  but  to-day  the  people  of  the  Philippine 
Archipelago  and  of  most  of  the  great  AVestern  continent  south 
of  the  United  States  are  the  children  of  Spanish  civilization.^*^ 

While  Spain  was  establishing  dependencies  in  the  west  the 
Portuguese  were  scattering  their  outposts  of  trade  about  the  Med- 
iterranean and  along  the  route  of  the  East.  Considering  the 
insignificance  of  Portugal  in  Europe,  the  part  she  played  in  early 
expansion  and  trade  is  little  less  than  marvelous.     Her  enter- 


Bourne,  Spain  in  America,  Chap.  18;  Chejmey,  European  Background  of 
American  History,  Chaps.  5,  6. 

20  Leroy-Beaulieu.  De  la  colonisation  ches  Peuples  Modernes,  I,  Chap.  1. 
_  "From  the  beginning  the  Spanish  establishments  in  the  Philippines  were 
missions  and  not  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  term  a  colony.  They  were 
founded  and  administered  in  the  interests  of  religion  rather  than  of  commerce 
and  industry."  Blair  and  Robertson,  The  Philippine  Islands,  I,  Introduction. 
Hereafter  this  work  will  be  cited  as  B.  &  R. 


THEORY    AND    PRACTISE    OF    COLONIZATION      13 

prises,  however,  were  almost  purely  commercial.  She  established 
factories  and  trading  posts  but  founded  few  states  or  permanent 
colonies,^^  and  in  the  course  of  time  her  conquests  in  the  East 
fell  to  the  Dutch  and  the  English. 

For  many  years  the  Dutch  were  satisfied  to  secure  Eastern 
products  at  the  port  of  Lisbon,  where  they  were  granted  special 
commercial  privileges,  and  distribute  them  throughout  Europe. 
It  was  a  profitable  trade.  The  Portuguese  handled  the  situation 
very  skilfully.  They  not  only  withdrew  entirely  from  the  Euro- 
pean coastwise  trade,  but  even  forbade  the  exportation  of  India 
goods  from  Portugal  in  Portuguese  ships.  By  leaving  this  trade 
to  the  Dutch  they  hoped  to  satisfy  them  and  prevent  them  from 
interfering  with  their  monopolies  in  the  Far  East.  A  great  mys- 
tery was  made  of  the  voyages.  The  difficulties  and  dangers  of 
navigation  were  greatly  exaggerated.  The  sailing  routes  were 
kept  secret.  All  information  with  reference  to  the  Indies  which 
was  disseminated  was  designed  to  play  upon  the  credulity  of  the 
age. 

Although  the  Dutch  had  been  feeling  their  way  into  the  East- 
ern trade,  they  would  probably  for  many  years  have  remained  sat- 
isfied with  the  profitable  role  of  intermediaries  had  not  the  ac- 
quisition of  Portugal  by  Spain  threatened  the  destruction  of  the 
Lisbon  trade.^^  In  1595  Philip  II  seized  two-fifths  of  the  entire 
Dutch  merchant  fleet  in  Spanish  and  Portuguese  harbors. 

Houtman's  voyage  by  way  of  the  Cape,  to  Java,  led  to  the 
organization  of  various  companies  to  trade  with  the  East.  In 
1602  these  companies  were  consolidated  into  the  East  India 
Company  which  for  two  centuries  thereafter  controlled  Dutch 
commerce  and  colonization.  The  powers  conferred  on  this 
famous  company  gave  it  not  only  a  monopoly  of  trade  but  made 
it  practically  sovereign  in  the  territory.     It  was  authorized  to 


21  Brazil  is  all  that  is  left.  It  has  been  said  that  during  two  centuries  of 
colonization  the  Portuguese  taught  the  natives  nothing  more  important  than 
how  to  distil  a  poor  quahty  of  rum  by  the  use  of  an  old  gun  barrel. 

For  an  account  of  the  pioneer  work  of  the  Portuguese,  see  Cheyncy, 
European  Background  of  American  History,  Chap.  4;  Cambridge  Modern 
History,  I,  Chap.  1. 

*'  Cunningham,  Western  Civilisation,  II,  pp.  183  et  seq. 


14  THE    PHILIPPINES 

make  treaties  with  native  rulers  in  the  name  of  the  States  Gen- 
eral, to  build  forts,  appoint  military  governors  and  judges,  and 
to  take  any  and  all  measures  necessary  for  the  establishment  and 
maintenance  of  government.  The  directors  were  given  full 
authority  to  do  anything  they  chose  except  establish  a  govern- 
ment independent  of  the  Netherlands.  Designed  to  act  as  a  sub- 
stitute for  the  state  it  soon,  by  the  simple  process  of  absorbing 
the  statesmen,  assumed  the  powers  and  functions  of  the  state. 
Another  company  known  as  the  West  India  Company,  organized 
in  1621,  operated  in  Brazil  and  elsewhere.  For  many  genera- 
tions these  two  companies  controlled  Dutch  commercial  and  co- 
lonial enterprises.^^ 

The  Dutch  East  India  Company  was  organized  for  trading 
purposes  solely,  but  political  control  was  soon  found  necessary 
for  the  protection  of  the  trade.  From  the  creation  of  this  com- 
pany until  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  Dutch  coloniza- 
tion pursued  one  definite  object.  It  had  no  theoretical  or  hu- 
manitarian aims.  It  was  not  in  the  least  interested  in  the  heathen 
or  in  posterity.  It  was  after  dividends  and  for  general  unscru- 
pulousness  and  cupidity  it  stands  unrivaled  in  the  history  of  com- 
merce and  government.  It  finally  came  to  an  inglorious  end  and 
its  rights,  property  and  obligations  were  assumed  by  the  govern- 
ment. The  judgment  of  history  upon  this  famous  monopoly  is 
stated  by  the  Dutch  publicist,  DeLouter  :^* 

"To  the  day  of  its  downfall  the  Company  remained  faithful 
to  its  origin.  It  was  a  company  of  brisk  and  energetic  tradesmen, 
who,  with  profit  as  their  lode-star,  and  greed  as  their  compass, 
obtained,  through  the  chance  of  events,  absolute  control  of  one 
of  the  most  beautiful  and  fertile  regions  of  the  earth  and  unhesi- 
tatingly sacrificed  it  to  their  low  ideals." 

With  the  exception  of  the  invigorating  five  years  of  English 


23  Many  of  these  commercial  companies  were  organized  about  the  begin- 
ning of  the  seventeenth  century.  England,  Holland,  France,  Sweden,  Den- 
mark and  other  countries  had  their  East  India  companies.  See  Cheyney's 
European  Background  of  American  History,  Chap.  7. 

'*  Quoted  with  approval  in  Ireland's  The  Far  Eastern  Tropics,  p.  173. 


THEORY    AND    PRACTISE    OF    COLONIZATION      15 

control  under  Sir  Stamford  Raffles,^'  Holland  has  ruled  Java 
for  more  than  three  hundred  years,  but  she  can  teach  modem  col- 
onizing states  only  the  things  to  be  avoided.  She  made  the 
beautiful  island  of  Java  a  fruitful  plantation  and  worked  it  by 
natives  who  were  as  truly  slaves  as  were  the  negroes  of  Jamaica. 
An  early  effort  to  settle  the  country  with  white  men  failed  mis- 
erably through  the  narrow  and  monopolistic  policy  of  the  com- 
pany, and  thereafter,  until  within  very  recent  times,  the  country 
was  exploited  for  the  financial  benefit  of  the  Netherlands  govern- 
ment and  Dutch  traders  in  utter  disregard  of  the  rights  of  the 
Javanese.  The  East  India  Company  took  vast  sums  of  money 
out  of  the  country,  but  almost  from  the  beginning  of  its  history 
the  great  trading  concern  was  a  fraud  and  a  swindle.  It  paid 
huge  dividends,  which  were  often  little  more  than  bribes,  out  of 
its  capital,  or  with  borrowed  money,  and  in  the  end  it  fell  into 
discreditable  bankruptcy.  The  Netherlands  government  for  many 
years  after  it  took  charge  made  no  real  change  of  policy.  The 
colony  continued  to  exist  for  the  benefit  of  the  Netherlands. 
It  must  be  made  to  pay,  and  to  pay  in  money.  The  government 
was  merely  a  trader  dealing  in  the  products  of  the  island.  It 
forced  the  natives  to  raise  the  quantity  of  coffee  and  sugar  re- 
quired and  fixed  the  price  at  which  such  products  must  be  sold 
to  it.  The  natives  were  not  permitted  to  share  in  the  prosperity, 
such  as  it  was. 

The  Dutch  found  an  old  and  well  developed  civilization  in 
Java.  The  native  governments  were  harsh  and  tyrannical  but 
well  adapted  for  the  trade  purposes  of  the  newcomers.  Instead 
of  attempting  to  organize  a  new  system  which  would  protect  the 
natives  from  the  rapacity  of  their  rulers,  the  Dutch  retained  the 
ancient  system  and  adapted  it  to  their  own  purposes.  They  dealt 
only  with  the  local  rulers  who  in  time  were  made  Dutch  officials 
and  charged  with  the  duty  of  collecting  the  designated  products 
from  the  natives  under  their  local  jurisdiction.  No  attempt  was 
made  to  train  or  educate  the  people,  and  no  responsibility  for 

25  For  an  account  of  the  remarkable  work  of  this  young  Englishman,  see 
Boulger,  The  Life  of  Sir  Stamford  Raffles  (London,  1899). 


16  THE    PHILIPPINES 

their  well  being  was  assumed  by  the  government.  This  system 
without  substantial  change  was  continued  until  the  humanitarian 
spirit  of  the  present  age  forced  the  abandonment  of  the  old 
iniquitous  methods. 

The  so-called  "culture"  system  which  for  a  time  brought  so 
much  credit  to  the  Dutch  now  appears  to  have  been  the  greatest 
instrument  of  injustice  ever  devised  by  a  civilized  power.  Until 
recently  it  was  pointed  to  as  the  conclusive  evidence  of  Dutch  ca- 
pacity for  governing  a  tropical  colony.  When  in  1830  Van  den 
Bosch  became  governor-general,  the  finances  of  the  colony  were 
in  a  desperate  condition.  The  India  government  owed  more 
than  thirty  million  gulden  and  was  becoming  more  deeply  in- 
volved with  each  passing  year.  Under  the  system  which  he 
devised  the  natives,  instead  of  paying  the  government  a  certain 
proportion  of  their  crops,  were  required  to  place  at  its  disposal 
one-fifth  of  their  land  and  of  their  labor  time.  The  government 
was  thus  enabled  to  determine  the  products  which  should  be 
grown  under  its  direction.  Theoretically  the  natives  were  re- 
quired to  contribute  this  one-fifth  of  their  time  in  lieu  of  the  two- 
fifths  of  the  crops  demanded  under  the  old  system.  The  loss 
from  failure  of  crops,  when  not  due  to  the  fault  of  the  cultivators, 
was  in  theory  to  fall  upon  the  government.  The  labor  would  be 
directed  to  the  cultivation  of  the  products  which  had  the  greatest 
value  in  the  markets  of  the  world.^^  The  system  was  heralded 
as  the  solution  of  all  the  difficulties  of  colonization.  Van  den 
Bosch,  who  had  been  a  leader  in  charitable  enterprises  in  Hol- 
land, introduced  it  to  the  world  as  a  measure  of  philanthropy 
designed  to  elevate  and  educate  the  natives.  He  constantly  urged 
the  necessity  for  protecting  the  natives. 

"So  long,"  he  wrote  in  1834,  "as  we  do  not  regard  and  treat 
the  Javanese  as  our  children,  and  do  not  honestly  fulfil  to  them  all 
the  duties  which  rest  upon  us  as  their  leaders  and  protectors,  our 
arrangements  will  constantly  be  subject  to  shocks,  and  the  aim 

28  Day,  The  Dutch  in  Java,  p.  249. 


THEORY    AND    PRACTISE    OF    COLONIZATION       17 

that  we  propose  will  not  be  attained  but  will  lead  constantly  to 
disappointments."^' 

The  sincerity  of  such  statements  may  be  doubted. 

"Only  one  strong  motive,"  says  Day,^*  "underlay  the  founda- 
tion and  the  maintenance  of  the  culture  system,  the  desire  to  ob- 
tain revenue  for  the  Dutch  treasury.  Pious  hopes  of  benefiting  the 
natives  which  may  have  been  at  first  sincere  could  be  only  hypo- 
critical after  a  few  years'  experience  with  the  workings  of  the 
system,  and  at  any  rate  never  interfered  materially  with  its  de- 
velopment." 

The  author  of  a  recent  comprehensive  work  on  Java  says  '?* 

"In  1833  the  colony  was  in  debt  and  the  coffers  of  Holland 
were  absolutely  empty  at  the  end  of  the  war  of  secession  with 
Belgium.  General  Count  Van  den  Bosch  presented  himself  with 
an  offer  to  relieve  the  budget  and  fill  the  coffers.  He  was  given 
a  free  hand,  and  installed  in  the  East  Indies  the  system  of  forced 
cultures,  which  at  one  moment  was  the  glory  of  his  name,  and 
afterward  became  his  disgrace.  ...  It  has  deprived  Java  of 
enormous  sums  of  money  and  of  precious  lives.  By  condemning 
the  population  for  more  than  fourteen  years  to  hard  labor,  which 
was  also  for  them  unjust  and  fruitless  labor,  it  led  to  their  intel- 
lectual retrogression ;  it  was  therefore  from  the  etliical  standpoint 
absolutely  unpardonable.  Yet  we  can  not  forget  that  by  this 
realistic  sacrifice  of  a  whole  generation  it  transformed  the  island 
into  one  of  the  richest  and  most  fruitful  of  agricultural  coun- 
tries. .  .  .  Once  more  the  truth  of  the  famous  adage  is  exem- 
plified, *Woe  to  them  that  make  revolutions ;  happy  are  they  who 
inherit  after  them.' " 

The  culture  system  was  in  full  force  from  1830  to  1850,  and 
during  that  time  Java  was  made  to  pay  two  hundred  milHon  dol- 
lars into  the  Netherlands  treasury. 

'"Ihid,  p.  255. 

28  Day,  The  Dutch  in  Java,  p.  257. 

2»A.  Cabaton,  Java  and  the  Dutch  East  Indies  (London,  1911),  pp.  207, 
210.  The  attempt  of  the  Spaniards  to  apply  the  system  of  forced  culture  in 
the  Philippines  resulted  unfortunately  for  the  country.  Day,  The  Dutch  in 
Java,  p.  637. 


18  THE    PHILIPPINES 

Speaking  of  the  system  Professor  Keller  says  :'* 

"It  looks  philanthropic,  but  was  in  reality  mercenary;  in  its 
application  all  the  features  which  interfered  with  revenue  speed- 
ily dropped  away.  For  example,  the  fifth  of  the  people's  working 
time  which  was  put  under  requisition  lengthened  out  indefinitely, 
and  they  often  bore  the  land  tax  besides,  from  which  the  system 
was  supposed  to  free  them.  Moreover  the  government  evaded 
shouldering  the  losses,  both  by  a  specious  use  of  the  proviso  at- 
tached and  otherwise;  and  paid  the  natives,  if  at  all,  in  the 
scantiest  and  stingiest  manner.  The  system  was  unworkable  in 
any  way  profitable  to  all  parties/' 

Gradually  information  as  to  the  treatment  of  the  Javanese 
found  its  way  to  Europe,  and  the  publication  of  a  popular  novel 
dealing  with  the  abuses  of  the  culture  system,  prepared  the  public 
mind  for  the  legislation  which  followed  the  introduction  of  con- 
stitutional government  after  the  revolution  of  1848.^* 

The  enforcement  of  the  provisions  of  the  Colonial  Constitu- 
tion of  1854  for  the  protection  of  the  natives  meant  the  end  of 
the  culture  system.  In  1870  it  was  formally  superseded  by  the 
system  of  "free  labor"  which,  as  usual,  soon  degenerated  into 
credit  bondage.  In  1903  the  States  General  enacted  a  law  under 
which  all  the  income  of  the  Indian  government  was  required  to 
be  expended  in  the  islands,  and  from  that  time  until  the  present 
Holland  has  governed  her  dependencies  under  a  system  which  is 
worthy  of  the  modern  age.^^ 


30  Keller,  Colonisation,  p.  475. 

31  This  story,  entitled  Max  Havelaar,  or  The  Coffee  Auctions  of  the  Dutch 
Trading  Company,  was  published  in  1860,  and  its  influence  upon  the  culture 
system  may  be  compared  to  that  of  Uncle  Tom's  Cabin  upon  the  slavery 
question. 

The  repute  which  the  culture  system  formerly  enjoyed  in  England  and 
America  was  due  largely  to  a  book  by  Mr.  J.  W.  B.  Money  entitled,  Java,  or 
How  to  Manage  a  Colony  (London,  1861).  Doctor  Day  (p.  254),  calls  atten- 
tion to  the  influence  this  book  had  on  the  opinion  of  such  writers  as  Ireland 
(Tropical  Colonization)  and  Wallace  (Malay  Archipelago)  and  says,  "No  one 
at  all  conversant  with  the  actual  conditions  in  Java,  as  they  are  known  to  us 
on  unimpeachable  evidence,  can  retain  the  slightest  respect  for  Money's  au- 
thority after  reading  his  book."   Ibid.,  p.  253. 

32  See  Cabaton,  Java  and  the  Dutch  East  Indies,  p.  152. 

Until  recently  the  Dutch  denied  the  Indians  Western  education.  Consider- 
able attention  is  now  being  devoted  to  the  education  of  the  natives.  Generally 
separate  schools  are  maintained  for  the  natives  and  white  children,  but  ia 


THEORY    AND    PRACTISE    OF    COLONIZATION       19 

For  almost  two  centuries  France  contended  for  territory  and 
colonies  on  equal  terms  with  England.  The  opening  days  of  the 
nineteenth  century  found  her  in  possession  of  only  a  few  scat- 
tered islands.  Her  old  colonial  empire  was  never  real;  it  was 
all  appearance.  She  had  few  real  colonists.  Her  people  were 
facile  and  could  accommodate  themselves  to  all  conditions.  They 
were  sympathetic  with  natives  but  they  rarely  took  root  in  the 
land.  France  furnished  audacious  and  intrepid  adventurers  but 
few  colonists.  Leroy-Beaulieu  attributes  her  failure  to  defects 
in  the  national  character  as  well  as  in  her  political  system.  Her 
people  were  too  ready  to  assimilate  with  the  natives.'*  Her 
trading  companies  induced  monopoly  and  trade  restrictions.  In 
the  East,  Dupleix,  Labourdonnais,  and  other  brilliant  leaders 
sought  glory  instead  of  commercial  advantages.  The  extrava- 
gant spirit  of  adventure  and  desire  for  immediate  results  on  a 
large  scale  led  to  a  scattering  of  energy.  Empires  are  neither 
built  nor  consolidated  by  voyageurs  or  gentleman  adventurers. 
The  stolid  Englishman  or  the  phlegmatic  Dutchman  stays. 

In  the  beginning  England  was  distanced  by  Spain,  Portugal 
and  Holland.  Each  of  these  countries  had  secured  the  control 
of  vast  territories  while  England  possessed  not  a  foot  of  land 
beyond  the  British  Isles.  It  requires  an  effort  to  realize  that  in 
those  days  England  was  in  fact  a  very  small  and  rather  insig- 
nificant country.  Not  until  the  time  of  Elizabeth  did  English- 
men wake  to  the  fact  that  empires  were  to  be  won  beyond  the 
narrow  seas  which  swept  her  shores.  Then  came  those  wonder- 
ful years  during  which  Drake  and  his  like  won  for  England  the 
control  of  the  seas,'*  when — 


Ternati  in  1911  I  saw  Dutch  and  Javanese  children  sitting  on  the  same 
tenches  in  schools  where  the  text-books  and  the  instruction  were  in  the  Dutch 
language. 

83  Leroy-Beaulieu.  De  la  colonisation  chec  les  Pcuplcs  Modcmes  (Sixieme 
edition),  Chap.  5. 

8*  In  the  hall  of  Buckland  Abbey  there  is  preserved  an  old  drum  said  to 
have  been  used  on  Drake's  ship. 

Newbolt's  stirring  ballad  makes  the  old  hero  say : 

"Take  my  drum  to  England,  hang  it  by  the  shore, 

Strike  it  when  your  powder's  runnin'  low, 

If  the  Dons  sight  Devon, — I'll  quit  the  port  of  Heaven, 

And  drum  them  up  the  Channel,  as  we  drummed  them  long  ago." 


20  THE    PHILIPPINES 

"They  diced  with  Death.    Their  big  sea  boots 
Were  greased  with  blood.  They  swept  the  seas 
For  England;  and — we  reap  the  fruits 
Of  their  heroic  deviltries." 

Her  first  colonies  were  planted  in  temperate  climes  where 
Englishmen  could  live  and  establish  permanent  homes.  They 
were  settlement  colonies.  By  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth  cen- 
tury they  had  passed  the  experimental  stages  and  become  per- 
manencies. The  enactment  in  1651  of  the  first  of  the  Navigation 
Laws^®  opened  a  century  of  trade  expansion^^  during  which  it 
was  held  that  the  colonies  existed  solely  for  the  benefit  of  the  so- 
called  mother  country — a  period  dominated  by  "that  baleful  spirit 
of  commerce  that  wished  to  govern  great  nations  on  the  maxims 
of  the  counter."  It  was  the  same  theory  which  controlled  the 
Dutch  in  the  management  of  their  colonies  down  almost  to  the 
present  time.  In  a  paper  written  in  1726  by  Sir  W.  Keith^'^  it 
was  said,  "All  advantageous  projects  or  commercial  gain  in  any 
colony  which  are  truly  prejudicial  to  and  inconsistent  with  the 
interests  of  the  mother  country,  must  be  understood  to  be  illegal, 
and  the  practise  of  them  unwarrantable,  because  they  contradict 
the  end  for  which  the  colonies  had  a  being/* 

This  system  led  to  the  loss  of  the  American  colonies.  It  "in- 
volved the  theory,"  says  Egerton,^^  "that  the  colony  was  to  be 
always  the  producer  of  the  raw  material  which  the  industries  of 
the  mother  country  should  work  up.  By  implication  it  denied  the 
equality  of  colonial  Englishmen  with  Englishmen  at  home  and 
by  this  means  poisoned  the  wells  of  common  patriotism." 

But  India  was  under  the  control  of  the  East  India  Company, 
and  there  Clive  and  Hastings  had  laid  the  foundations  of  the 
Empire.    During  the  Napoleonic  wars  England,  to  some  extent, 

35  The  navigation  laws  were  not  passed  in  any  spirit  of  hostility  to  the 
colonies.  They  were  directed  at  the  naval  supremacy  of  Holland  and  their 
effect  on  the  colonies  was  incidental.  Egerton,  History  of  British  Colonial 
Policy,  p.  62. 

^^  For  the  mercantile  system,  see  Egerton,  Origin  and  Growth  of  English 
Colonies,  Chap.  6 ;  Day,  History  of  Commerce,  pp.  167-172. 

27  Cited  by  Egerton,  History  of  British  Colonial  Policy,  p.  72, 

88  Origin  and  Growth  of  English  Colonies,  p.  118. 


THEORY    AND    PRACTISE    OF    COLONIZATION      21 

made  good  her  losses  in  America  by  the  capture  of  French  and 
Dutch  colonies. 

In  the  readjustment  which  after  1815  took  place  England  re- 
turned much  of  the  most  valuable  territory  which  she  had  con- 
quered, including  the  great  island  of  Java,  retaining  only  Tobago 
and  San  Lucia  in  the  Antilles  and  Mauritius  in  the  East.  The 
settlement  of  Australasia  was  then  commenced  and  pushed  with 
considerable  vigor. 

The  growing  humanitarian  spirit  of  the  age  led  to  the  aboli- 
tion of  the  slave  trade  and  finally  to  the  emancipation  of  the 
slaves  in  the  colonies.  During  the  years  of  exhaustion  and 
stagnation  which  followed  the  war  many  economic  and  social 
evils  developed  and  the  disposition  of  the  unemployed  be- 
came a  serious  question.  In  1826  a  committee  of  the  House 
of  Commons  recommended  that  the  local  authorities  provide 
means  for  assisting  unemployed  laborers  to  emigrate  and  locate 
on  the  Crown  lands,  and  in  1830  the  famous  Colonization  So- 
ciety was  founded  for  the  purpose  of  directing  and  systematizing 
the  work.*" 

Then,  for  the  first  time  in  English  history,  a  systematic  plan 
for  colonization  was  worked  out  and  applied,  and  during  the 
succeeding  thirty  years  so  much  progress  was  made  in  develop- 
ing the  settlement  colonies  that  they  began  to  resent  the  interfer- 
ence which  the  system  involved  and  to  aspire  to  self-government. 

English  colonial  history  has  passed  through  three  clearly  de- 
fined periods.  During  the  first  the  colonies  were  regarded  as 
political  and  commercial  necessities.  Every  unoccupied  island 
was  appropriated  and  promptly  organized  into  a  colony.  The 
policy  was  satirized  by  Disraeli  in  his  novel  Popanilla.  Accord- 
ing to  the  story  a  tiny  speck  upon  the  sea  originally  thought  to 
be  a  porpoise  proved,  upon  closer  investigation,  to  be  a  rock  and 
it  was  immediately  provided  with  all  the  paraphernalia  of  a  civ- 


8»The  credit  for  this  policy  belongs  to  Gibbon  Wakefield  and  Lord 
Ilowick,  afterward  Lord  Grey.  Its  central  idea  was  tlie  sale  of  the  Crown 
lands  and  the  use  of  the  money  thus  obtained  to  assist  the  emifirrants.  Eger- 
ton,  History  of  British  Colonial  Policy,  p.  281  et  j^g.-  Wakefield,  Vinv  of 
the  Art  of  Colonisation  (1849) ;  New  Edition  (1914)  ;  Pari  Com.,  Pari  Pap. 
1836. 


22  THE    PHILIPPINES 

ilized  government.  *'Upon  what  system,"  asked  Popanilla,  "does 
your  government  surround  a  small  rock  in  the  middle  of  the  sea 
with  fortifications  and  cram  it  full  of  clerks,  soldiers,  lawyers 
and  priests  ?"  **Well,  your  Excellency,"  was  the  reply,  *'I  believe 
it  is  called  the  Colonial  System." 

During  the  second  period,  which  came  in  with  the  Victorian 
era,  there  was  a  disposition  to  regard  all  colonies  as  politically 
mischievous  and  commercially  useless.  England's  attitude  dur- 
ing that  time  resembled  that  of  the  mother  of  a  numerous  family 
of  maturing  daughters,  all  dear  to  her  heart  but  horribly  ex- 
pensive.   To  them  she  was  inclined  to  say : 

"Keep  to  yourselves. 
So  loyal  is  too  costly,  friends,  your  love 
Is  but  a  burden ;  loose  the  bond  and  go." 

In  plain  prose,  set  up  your  own  establishment  as  soon  as  possi- 
ble and  relieve  me  from  the  burden  of  your  support. 

The  Whig  statesmen  were  inclined  to  accept  Turgot's  theory 
of  the  inevitable  falling  of  ripe  fruit.  Many  of  them  as- 
sumed that  the  tropical  colonies  particularly  were  a  positive 
detriment  to  England  and  that  the  sooner  the  settlement  colonies 
such  as  Canada  and  Australia  were  able  to  establish  themselves 
as  independent  states,  the  better  it  would  be  for  all  concerned. 
Therefore,  "all  that  could  be  done  was  to  insure  that  the  eutha- 
nasia of  the  empire  should  be  as  mild  and  as  dignified  as  pos- 
sible." "We  must,"  says  Sir  Charles  Bruce,*°  "bear  in  mind  that 
for  decades  our  colonial  policy  had  for  its  aim  to  supply  the 
colonies  with  a  constitutional  apparatus,  to  educate  them  in  politi- 
cal methods,  and  to  provide  them  with  an  equipment  of  political 
leaders  and  departmental  officials  with  a  view  to  their  ultimate 
separation  as  independent  states."*^ 

It  would  be  easy  to  fill  many  pages  with  quotations  from  the 
speeches  and  letters  of  leading  Englishmen  which  tend  to  con- 

«  The  Broad  Stone  of  Empire,  I,  p.  170. 

^'^This,  of  course,  applied  to  Englishmen  in  the  settlement  colonies,  not  to 
the  backward  native  people.    We,  in  the  Philippines,  include  the  natives. 


THEORY    AND    PRACTISE    OF    COLONIZATION      23 

firm  this  statement/^  The  Liberahsm  of  the  period  was  wilHng 
to  concede  a  very  large  measure  of  self-government  to  the  settle- 
ment colonies  and  experience  seemed  to  show  that  self-govern- 
ment meant  ultimate  independence. 

Lord  John  Russell  in  introducing  his  bill  to  provide  autono- 
mous governments  for  the  Australian  colonies  declared  that  its 
object  was  "to  train  the  colonies  into  a  capacity  to  govern  them- 
selves." In  his  speech  to  the  House  of  Commons*'  on  February 
8,  1858,  he  said :  "It  is  important  that  you  should  know  on  what 
it  is  that  you  will  have  to  deliberate ;  i  f  your  public  spirit  should 
induce  you  to  preserve  your  colonies;  or  if  your  wisdom  should 
induce  you  to  amend  your  policy,  or  finally,  if  an  unhappy  judg- 
ment should  induce  you  to  abandon  your  colonies,  it  is  essential 
to  know  what  you  would  preserve,  or  amend,  or  abandon." 

In  1861  Sir  George  Cornewall  Lewis,  who  twenty  years  earlier 
had  published  his  well-known  book  on  the  government  of  de- 
pendencies, said  in  Parliament :  "I  for  one  can  only  say  that  I 
look  forward  without  apprehension,  and  I  may  add,  without 
regret,  to  the  time  when  Canada  might  become  an  independent 
state."  John  Stuart  Mill  wrote:  "England  is  sufficient  to  her 
own  protection  without  the  colonies  and  would  be  in  a  much 


42  The  historian  Froude,  writing  in  Fraser's  Magasine  for  January,  1870, 
said :  "It  is  even  argued  that  our  colonies  are  a  burden  to  us  and  that  the 
sooner  they  are  cut  adrift  from  us  the  better.  They  are,  or  have  been,  de- 
monstrably loyal.  They  are  proud  of  their  origin,  conscious  of  the  value  to 
themselves  of  being  a  part  of  the  Empire  and  willing  and  eager  to  find  a  home 
for  every  industrious  family  that  we  can  spare.  .  .  .  Whether  the  colonies 
themselves  rernain  under  our  flag  or  proclaim  their  independence,  or  attach 
themselves  to  some  other  power,  is  a  matter  which  concerns  themselves,  and 
to  us  of  profound  indifference."  See  also  Froude's  article  in  Fraser's  for 
August,  1870;  "How  Not  to  Retain  Colonies,"  by  Lord  Chancellor  Norton, 
Nineteenth  Century,  July,  1879;  Robinson,  The  Colonies  and  the  Century, 
Appendix  (1871).  As  to  the  methods  of  the  Colonial  Office,  see  Leshe 
Stephen's  Life  of  F.  J.  Stephen,  p.  443 ;  Bruce's  The  Broad  Stone  of  Empire, 
I,  Chaps.  VI,  VII. 

"  Spencer  Walpole,  Life  of  Lord  John  Russell,  II,  p.  103.  Vide  Stan- 
hope's History  of  England,  VI,  p.  143.  On  February  7,  1850,  John  Bright 
made  the  following  entry  in  his  diary:  "Colonial  policy  explained  by  Lord 
John  Russell  in  a  long  speech.  Very  important.  Colonies  at  the  Cape  and  in 
Australia  to  have  legislative  chambers  and  to  have  liberal  self-government 
Great  agreement  in  the  House  on  the  subject  Marvelous  absence  of  preju- 
dice when  the  objects  are  ten  thousand  miles  away.  Should  like  to  move  that 
the  Bill  be  extended  to  Great  Britain  and  Ireland."  Trevelyan,  Life  of  John 
Bright,  p.  176. 


24  THE   PHILIPPINES 

stronger  as  well  as  more  dignified  position  if  separated  front 
them  than  when  reduced  to  be  a  single  member  of  an  American, 
African  or  Australian  Confederation.  Over  and  above  the  com- 
merce which  she  might  equally  enjoy  after  separation,  England 
derives  little  advantage,  except  in  prestige,  from  her  depend- 
encies, and  the  little  she  does  derive  is  quite  outweighed  by  the 
expense  they  cost  her  and  the  dissemination  they  necessitate  of 
her  naval  and  military  forces,  which,  in  case  of  war,  or  any  real 
apprehension  of  it,  requires  to  be  double  or  treble  what  would 
be  needed  for  the  defense  of  the  country  alone."^* 

Lord  Morley^'  says  that  in  his  views  of  colonial  policy  Mr. 
Gladstone  "was  in  substantial  accord  with  the  radicals  of  the 
school  of  Cobden,  Hume  and  Moles  worth.  He  does  not  seem  to 
have  joined  a  reforming  association  founded  by  these  eminent 
men  among  others  in  1850,  but  its  principles  coincided  v/Ith  his 
own — local  independence,  an  end  of  rule  from  Downing  Street, 
-the  relief  of  the  mother  country  from  the  whole  expense  of  the 
local  government  of  the  colonies,  save  for  defense  from  aggres- 
sion from  a  foreign  power." 

In  a  speech  at  Chester  in  1855  Gladstone  said:  "Govern  them 
upon  a  principle  of  freedom.  Defend  them  against  aggression 
from  without.  Regulate  their  foreign  relations.  These  things 
belong  to  the  colonial  connection.  But  of  the  duration  of  that 
connection  let  them  be  the  judges,  and  I  predict  that  if  you  leave 
them  the  freedom  of  judgment  it  is  hard  to  say  when  the  day 
will  come  when  they  will  wish  to  separate  from  the  great  name 
of  England.""" 

Statesmen  were  greatly  impressed  by  the  dangers  of  war  orig- 
inating in  connection  with  colonial  questions.  It  was  generally 
believed  that  the  United  States  had  designs  on  Canada  and  that 
the  Trent  affair  in  1861  was  a  deliberate  attempt  to  involve  the 

**To  the  contrary,  the  Great  War  has  shown  that  England's  reserve 
strength  is  in  her  great  colonies. 

*5  Morley,  Life  of  Gladstone,  I,  p.  361.  "He  had  from  his  earliest  parlia- 
mentary days  regarded  our  colonial  connection  as  one  of  duty  rather  than 
one  of  advantage."    Ibid.,  p.  359. 

«/&tU,  p.  363. 


THEORY    AND    PRACTISE   OF    COLONIZATION      25 

country  in  war.  About  this  time  the  Duke  of  Newcastle,  the 
colonial  secretary,  wrote  that  "he  should  see  a  dissolution  of  the 
bond  between  the  mother  country  and  Canada  with  the  greatest 
pleasure."  Sir  Henry  Taylor,  who  for  many  years  was  an  offi- 
cial in  the  Colonial  Office,  in  an  official  Minute  addressed  to  the 
duke,  said:*'^  "As  to  the  American  provinces,  I  have  long  held, 
and  have  often  expressed  the  opinion  that  they  are  a  sort  of 
damnosa  hereditas,  and  when  your  Grace  and  the  Prince  of 
Wales  were  employing  yourselves  so  successfully  in  conciliating 
the  colonists,  I  thought  that  you  were  drawing  closer  ties  which 
might  better  be  slackened  if  there  were  any  chance  of  their  slip- 
ping away  altogether.  I  think  that  a  policy  which  has  regard  to 
a  not  very  farnDff  future  should  prepare  facilities  and  propensi- 
ties for  separation ;  .  .  .  I  should  desire  to  throw  the  current 
military  expenditure  upon  the  colonists,  as  tending,  hy  connect' 
ing  self-protection  with  self-government,  to  detach  the  colonies 
and  promote  their  independence  and  segregation  at  an  earlier  day, 
and  thereby  to  withdraw  this  country  in  time  from  great  con- 
tingent dangers.  If  there  be  any  motives  which  should  plead 
for  a  prolonged  connection,  it  appears  to  me  that  they  are  of  a 
cosmopolitan  and  philanthropic  nature,  and  not  such  as  grow; 
out  of  the  interests  of  this  country,  though  there  may  be  no 
doubt  some  minor  English  interests  which  are  the  better  for  the 
connection.  There  are  national  obligations  also  to  be  regarded, 
and  some  self-sacrifice  is  required  of  this  country  for  a  time. 
All  that  I  would  advocate  is  a  preparatory  policy,  loosening  ob- 
ligations, and  treating  the  repudiation  by  the  colonists  of  legisla- 
tive and  executive  dependence  as  naturally  carrying  with  it  some 
modification  of  the  absolute  right  to  be  protected.  As  to  prestige, 
I  think  it  belongs  to  real  power,  and  not  to  a  merely  apparent 
dominion  by  which  real  power  is  impaired." 

In  fact  nearly  every  responsible  statesman  of  the  period  at  some 
time  used  language  which,  standing  alone,  would  mark  him  as  an 
advocate  of  what  is  now  known  as  an  anti-imperialistic  policy, 

*''  See  Bruce,  The  Broad  Stone  of  Empire,  I,  pp.  109-111. 


26  THE   PHILIPPINES 

but  as  Sir  Charles  Bruce  says  :*^  "There  was  not  one  of  these 
statemen  of  the  first  rank,  including  Cobden,  who  did  not,  either 
by  immediate  reservation  or  subsequent  profession,  at  some  time 
or  other  express  himself  in  terms  consistent  with  what  we  should 
at  the  present  day  consider  sound  imperial  judgment.  The  truth 
is  that  there  was  a  good  deal  of  justification  at  the  time  for  the 
policy  now  condemned,  and  for  the  utterances  it  is  the  present 
fashion  to  treat  with  contemptuous  ridicule." 

Of  course  the  men  who  advocated  the  policy  of  training  the 
olonies  for  independence  were  thinking  only  of  the  settlement 
colonies  inhabited  by  Englishmen,  not  of  India  and  the  Crown 
colonies. 

It  is  a  remarkable  fact  that  the  idea  of  abandoning  the  col- 
onies was  strongest  among  the  aristocratic  Whig  statesmen  who 
then  governed  England  and  that  it  never  seems  to  have  been  pop- 
ular with  the  general  public.  The  transition  from  the  laisser  faire 
policy  to  that  which  created  Greater  Britain  was  coincident 
with  the  rise  of  democracy  in  England.  By  that  time  the  col- 
onies had  become  great  democratic  communities  and  their  forms 
of  government  and  ideals  appealed  more  to  the  English  working 
men  and  the  middle  class  generally  than  to  their  aristocratic 
rulers. 

There  were  also  economic  and  political  reasons  for  a  change  of 
policy.  Great  military  powers  were  being  built  up  on  the  con- 
tinent. England's  free  trade  policy  had  not  brought  the  expected 
millennium.  Other  countries  were  erecting  tariff  walls  against 
her.  France,  Italy  and  Germany  were  adopting  an  aggressive 
colonial  policy.  The  pressure  from  without  thus  tended  to  bring 
England  and  her  colonies  into  closer  relationship.  About  this 
time  Sir  John  Seeley  in  his  brilliant  book.  The  Expansion  of 
•England,  developed  the  attractive  idea  that  the  colonies  were 
merely  England  beyond  the  seas.**  The  American  Captain  Ma- 

han's  early  writings  on  the  influence  of  sea  power  also  made  a 
t.  - 

*8  The  Broad  Stone  of  Empire,  T,  p.  94. 

■*9  "Probably  no  single  book  has  ever  exerted  a  more  powerful  influence  in 
the  direction  of  the  appreciation  of  English  colonial  enterprise  than  Professor 
.Seeley's  Expansion  of  England."    Ireland,  Tropical  Colonization,  p.  24. 


THEORY   AND    PRACTISE   OF   COLONIZATION      27 

great  impression  upon  Englishmen.  The  feeling  of  loyalty  on 
the  part  of  the  colonies  toward  the  mother  country  which,  during 
the  preceding  generation,  had  been  almost  non-existent,  was 
suddenly  revived.  The  new  movement  was  represented  by  the 
Conservative  party  under  the  leadership  of  Disraeli.  Speaking 
at  Crystal  Palace  in  1872,  Disraeli  said:  "Well,  what  has  been 
the  result  of  this  attempt  during  the  reign  of  Liberalism  for  the 
disintegration  of  the  Empire?  It  has  entirely  failed.  But  how 
has  it  failed?  Through  the  sympathy  of  the  Colonies  with  the 
Mother  Country.  They  have  decided  that  the  Empire  shall  not  be 
destroyed ;  and  in  my  opinion  no  Minister  in  this  country  will  do 
his  duty  who  neglects  any  opportunity  of  reconstructing  as  much 
as  possible  our  colonial  empire  and  of  responding  to  those  dis- 
tant sympathies  which  may  become  a  source  of  incalculable 
strength  and  happiness  to  this  land." 

The  creed  of  the  new  policy  was  to  be  "the  maintenance  of  our 
institutions,  the  preservation  of  the  Empire,  and  the  improvement 
of  the  condition  of  the  people."^" 

Slowly  the  attitude  of  England  toward  her  colonies  changed. 
Under  the  threat  of  a  common  danger  the  parts  of  the  far-flung 
empire  were  wedded  together.  Conflicting  interests  were  ad- 
justed, and  the  Great  War  of  1914  found  Greater  Britain  fight- 
ing as  a  unit  for  the  empire  and  that  for  which  it  sjtands. 

When  in  1898  the  United  States  acquired  the  Philippines  the 
world  had  entered  upon  a  new  era  in  the  history  of  colonization. 
Colonies  in  the  ordinary  English  sense  of  the  word  had  almost 
ceased  to  exist — they  had  all  become  independent  states  or  do- 
minions. The  dependencies  were  all  in  the  tropics.  Coloniza- 
tion, with  its  medley  of  objects,  motives,  desires,  ambitions — 
noble,  ignoble,  personal,  disinterested,  material,  spiritual — after 

60  Bruce,  The  Broad  Stone  of  Empire,  I,  p.  166.  Disraeli,  while  in  oppo- 
sition, often  spoke  slightingly  of  the  colonies,  hut  his  statements  were  gen- 
erally directed  at  the  policy  of  his  political  opponents.  In  Lord  Malmes- 
bury's  Memoirs  of  an  Ex-Minister,  II,  p.  57,  there  is  a  letter  of  August  13, 
1852,  in  which  Disraeli,  writing  about  the  Newfoundland  fisheries,  said: 
"These  wretched  colonies  will  all  be  independent,  loo.  in  a  few  years  and  are 
a  millstone  around  our  necks.  If  I  were  you  I  would  push  matters  with 
Fillmore,  who  has  no  interest  to  pander  to  the  populace  like  Webster,  and 
make  an  honorable  and  speedy  settlement." 


28  THE   PHILIPPINES 

passing  through  various  epochs  had  been  reduced  very  largely 
to  the  problem  of  developing  the  tropics  and  governing  depend- 
ent people. 

Only  the  people  of  temperate  countries  are  colonizers,  and 
the  land  within  the  temperate  zones  had  all  been  occupied.  It 
was  generally  recognized  that  the  time  for  establishing  settlement 
colonies  had  passed,  although  some  enthusiasts  still  hoped  to 
plant  white  men  upon  the  table-lands  of  Africa.  The  future  of 
colonization  was  therefore  in  tropic  lands  already  inhabited  by 
savages  or  by  people  of  a  comparatively  low  order  of  civilization. 
The  demand  for  tropical  products  had  increased  enormously. 
In  1898,  the  year  of  Manila,  the  combined  trade  of  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States  with  the  tropics  was  about  forty-four  per 
cent,  of  their  combined  trade  with  all  the  rest  of  the  world.^^ 
What  had  been  luxuries  had  become  necessities.  It  was  evident 
that  the  rivalry  of  the  future  would  be  for  the  trade  of  the  tropics 
and  the  control  of  the  channels  along  which  it  would  flow.  The 
people  whose  capacity  and  energy  had  made  the  modem  world 
were  not  willing  that  vast  areas  of  productive  lands  should 
longer  lie  fallow.  The  world  demanded  their  products,  and  the 
feeling  prevailed  that  the  natives  must,  under  pressure  if  neces- 
sary, be  forced  to  join  the  onward  march  of  the  world  and  do 
their  part  of  its  work.  It  was  evident  that  this  would  be  done 
only  on  the  initiative  and  under  the  direction  of  men  from  tem- 
perate climates. 

Political  and  social  conditions  in  Europe  also  impelled  the 
Continental  states  toward  a  policy  of  territorial  expansion  and 
schemes  of  colonization.  The  pressure  of  population  had  been 
partially  relieved  by  the  flow  of  emigration  to  America.  Social 
dissatisfaction  prevailed  very  generally  and  the  ambition  of  the 
working  classes  for  better  things  was  probably  stronger  than 
ever  before  in  the  history  of  the  world.  The  protective  policy 
of  the  United  States  and  the  British  dominions  had  narrowed 
the  markets  for  manufactured  articles.    It  was  felt  that  the  loss 


61  It  amounted  to  £208,000,000— more  than  a  billion  dollars.     For  further 
(details,  see  Kidd,  The  Control  of  the  Tropics,  p.  6  et  seq. 


THEORY    AND    PRACTISE    OF    COLONIZATION      29 

of  so  many  of  the  people  who  were  emigrating  to  foreign  coun- 
tries was  a  disgrace  to  their  native  lands. 

With  German  and  Italian  unity  came  the  ambition  which 
seems  only  satisfied  by  the  possession  of  colonies.  France  had 
acquired  control  of  Algiers  and  was  engaged  in  a  system  of  colo- 
nization and  development  under  conditions  resembling  in  many 
respects  those  now  existing  in  the  Philippines.  She  was  also  in 
possession  of  Tonkin  in  the  Orient  and  was  slowly  regaining 
some  of  her  lost  prestige  as  a  colonizing  power.  Germany,  a 
late  entry  in  the  race,  found  practically  all  desirable  territory  in 
tropic  climes  occupied.  As  epigrammatically  stated  by  Bismarck 
at  that  time,  England  had  colonies  and  colonists,  Germany  had 
colonists  but  no  colonies,  France  had  colonies  but  no  colonists. 
Nearly  all  the  states  of  Europe  were  contemplating  colonial 
schemes  in  Africa  and  were  represented  at  the  Berlin  Confer- 
ence in  1884. 

French  statesmen  had  accepted  the  theory  that  without  colo- 
nies France  would  cease  to  be  a  great  power.  The  distinguished 
publicist.  Monsieur  Paul  Leroy-Beaulieu,  urged  upon  French- 
men the  necessity  for  developing  their  colonies.  "From  now 
on,"  he  wrote,  "our  colonial  expansion  must  occupy  first  place 
in  our  national  consciousness.  .  .  .  We  must  found  a  great 
French  empire  in  Africa  and  in  Asia;  else  of  the  great  role 
which  France  has  played  in  the  past  there  will  remain  nothing 
but  the  memory,  and  that  dying  out  as  the  days  pass.  .  .  . 
Colonization  is  for  France  a  question  of  life  or  death.  Either 
France  must  found  a  great  African  Empire,  or  in  a  century  she 
will  be  but  a  secondary  European  power;  she  will  count  in  the 
world  scarcely  more  than  Greece  or  Roumania  counts  in  Europe." 

Then  followed  the  scramble  which  resulted  in  the  carving  up 
of  Africa  and  the  apportionment  of  a  share  to  each  claimant. 
From  that  time  until  the  beginning  of  the  war  in  1914  the  Euro- 
pean nations  pushed  the  work  of  colonization  in  the  Dark  Conti- 
nent with  energy  and  a  fair  but  unequal  degree  of  success.  The 
objects  and  methods  of  each  colonizing  state  were  clearly  under- 
stood and  for  my  present  purposes  it  is  not  material  whether 


30  THE    PHILIPPINES 

Great  Britain,  Germany,  France  or  Belgium  shall  in  the  future 
control  any  particular  territory.  The  colonial  policy  of  each 
nation  had  been  clearly  defined  long  before  the  eventful  third  day 
of  August,  1914. 

France  has  created  a  new  colonial  empire.^^  She  controls  forty- 
five  per  cent,  of  the  land  and  twenty-four  per  cent,  of  the  popu- 
lation of  Africa.  Her  policy  has  been  pacific  and  reasonably 
effective.  She  has  built  public  works,  improved  the  means  of 
communication,  introduced  modem  agricultural  methods,  mutual 
benefit  societies,  and  many  other  institutions  designed  to  improve 
the  material  condition  of  the  native  people.  "In  all  these  mat- 
ters," says  Lord  Cromer,®^  "the  French  have  certainly  nothing 
to  learn  from  us.  Possibly,  indeed,  we  may  have  something  to 
learn  from  them." 

In  fact,  French  colonial  policy  more  nearly  resembles  that  of 
America  than  of  England,  Germany  or  Italy,  as  it  attaches  more 
importance  to  education  and  seems  more  sympathetic  toward 
native  aspirations.  But  too  much  must  not  be  claimed  for  it  in 
this  respect.  Apparently  none  of  her  subjects  is  at  present 
aspiring  to  separate  nationality,  and  the  problem  therefore  dif- 
fers from  that  of  England  or  the  United  States.  All  they  de- 
mand is  equal  rights  and  privileges  with  white  colonists,  and 
this  France  has  denied,  but  seems  now  preparing  to  concede  to 
them.  In  Algiers  important  political  reforms  are  in  contempla- 
tion, which  wil^  grant  the  natives  greater  numerical  strength  in 
the  Conseil  Superior,  the  Delegations  Financier es,  and  in  the  lo- 
cal provincial  and  municipal  bodies.^*    France  seems  to  be  mak- 


^2  Certain  English  writers  depreciate  French  colonial  work  because  it  has 
not  been  financially  profitable.  See  France  in  the  Twentieth  Century,  by 
W.  L.  George.  But  more  competent  critics  commend  her  work  in  Algiers. 
Lord  Cromer,  Pol.  and  Lit.  Essays,  p.  256  (1813).  As  to  French  equatorial 
Africa,  see  an  article  by  A.  G.  Leonard,  United  Empire,  V.  (N.  S.)  No.  3, 
p.  237  (1914). 

See  generally,  "French  Colonization  in  North  Africa,"  by  T.  R.  Balch, 
American  Pol.  Sci.  Rev.,  Nov.,  1909;  "French  Colonial  Expansion  in  West 
Africa,  the  Soudan  and  the  Sahara,"  by  N.  D.  Harris.    Ibid.,  Nov.,  1911. 

^^  Pol.  and  Lit.  Essays,  p.  256. 

^*  As  to  present  conditions,  see  Roy,  Aspects  of  Algeria  (London,  1913)  ; 
an  article  by  Philippe  Millet,  "France  and  Her  Algerian  Problem,"  The  Nine' 


THEORY    AND    PRACTISE    OF   COLONIZATION      31 

ing  a  success  of  her  colonial  work  because  she  is  controlled  by 
liberal  ideas,  does  not  exploit  the  natives  and  recognizes  that  "to 
attempt  to  govern  a  country  without  those,  or  against  those  to 
whom  it  belongs,  is  a  blunder."'* 

Italy  was  without  experience  in  such  work  and  it  is  still  uncer- 
tain whether  her  people  possess  at  present  the  qualities  which  are 
essential  for  it.  Colonies  it  was  urged  would  increase  her  impor- 
tance politically,  build  up  her  trade,  provide  a  place  for  her  dis- 
satisfied contadini  and  thus  stop  the  draining  away  of  her  man- 
hood. But  she  entered  the  field  hesitatingly.  Soon  after  the 
opening  of  the  Suez  Canal  in  1869  she  purchased  Assab  on  the 
coast  of  the  Red  Sea.  For  a  time  thereafter  the  agitation  for 
colonies  seems  to  have  subsided.^'  In  1882  Italy  refused  to  co- 
operate with  Great  Britain  in  Egypt.  The  occupation  of  the 
Port  of  Massowah  in  1885,  in  consequence  of  the  massacre  of 
a  party  of  scientists,  resulted  in  one  of  those  outbursts  of  public 
feeling  to  which  the  people  of  all  races  seemed  to  be  subject. 
"Were  not  the  Romans  the  first  of  colonizers?  Could  the  Ital- 
ians acknowledge  themselves  degenerate  sons  of  these  hardy 
Venetians,  Genoese  and  Pisans  who  were  medieval  lords  of  trade 
and  of  commercial  factories?"  Between  1885  and  1895  Italy 
acquired  by  conquest  approximately  one  hundred  thousand  square 
miles  of  territory  along  the  western  shores  of  the  Red  Sea  and 
a  protectorate  over  some  of  the  surrounding  country.     But  in 

teenth  Century,  Vol.  LXXIII,  p.  728  (April,  1913),  and  tr  feview  of  Mrs. 
Roy's  book  by  Lord  Cromer  in  The  Spectator  for  May  31,  1913. 

M.  Millet  says :  "The  new  conception  .  .  .  implies  that  France  has  to 
grant  definite  rights  to  her  citizens.  The  Algerian  Moslems  are  to  enjoy 
fiscal  equality,  justice  and  sufficient  power  to  defend  their  own  interests  and 
to  take  part  in  the  administration  of  the  colony." 

*55  Powell  (The  Last  Frontier,  p.  6)  says:  "The  most  casual  traveler  can 
not  but  be  impressed  by  the  thoroughness  with  which  France  has  gone  into 
the  schoolmaster  business  in  her  African  domains.  She  believes  that  the  best 
way  to  civilize  native  races  is  by  training  their  minds,  and  she  does  not  leave 
so  important  a  work  to  the  missionaries  either.  ...  In  Tunisia  alone 
there  are  something  over  1,500  educational  institutions;  all  down  the  fever- 
stricken  West  Coast,  under  the  palm-thatched  roofs  of  Madagascar  and  the 
crackling  tin  ones  of  Equatoria,  millions  of  dusky  youngsters  are  being  taught 
by  Gallic  schoolmasters  that  p-a-t-r-i-e  spells  'France'." 

soBrunialti,  Le  colonic  degli  Italiani  (Torino,  1897),  p.  323;  cited  in 
Keller,  Colonisation,  p.  519. 


32  THE    PHILIPPINES  ' 

1896  she^  met  with  a  disaster  which  for  a  time  dampened  the 
enthusiasm  for  a  colonial  policy.  At  the  battle  of  Abba  Garima 
an  Italian  force  of  twelve  thousand  men  was  annihilated  by  the 
Abyssinians. 

During  the  succeeding  years  the  Italian  possessions  were  or- 
ganized under  the  name  of  Eritrea.  No  more  territory  was  to 
be  acquired  and  Eritrea  was  to  be  governed  on  the  most  advanced 
and  liberal  principles.  The  Italians  intended,  so  they  announced, 
to  avoid  Spanish  formalism,  Dutch  egoism,  French  concentra- 
tion and  the  too  diverse  conditions  of  English  colonization. 
They  intended  to  give  the  people  simple  justice  and  economic  and 
commercial  prosperity.  So  much  for  the  theory.  In  reality, 
says  Professor  Keller,  they  "always  proceeded  toward  Abyssinia 
as  toward  a  people  ignorant  and  barbarous,  whom  they  thought 
it  not  only  allowable,  but' easy  to  deceive."^'^ 

Nevertheless  considerable  progress  was  made  toward  develop- 
ing the  country.  Roads  were  constructed,  artesian  wells  dug,  and 
lighthouses  built,  all  by  native  labor.  Schools  were  established 
in  which  the  boys  and  girls  were  taught  Italian,  Arabic,  arith- 
metic, hygiene  and  gymnastics.  Although  the  administration 
was  not  phenomenally  successful,  it  was  creditable  to  the  Ital- 
ians.^^ 

In  1912  the  revival  of  the  expansion  fever  led  to  the  war  with 
Turkey  and  the  annexation  of  Tripoli,  which  is  now  being  ad- 
ministered render  the  name  of  Libia.  The  work  is  as  yet  in  the 
experimental  stage.  There  is  in  Italy,  as  in  the  United  States, 
a  strong  party  which  is  violently  opposed  to  expansion,^^  but 
its  supporters  assert  that  the  colonial  policy  has  already  been 
justified  by  results.^**  It  is  not  yet  time  to  pass  judgment  upon 
modern  Italy  as  a  colonizing  power.  Her  initial  efforts  were 
failures,  but  she  seems  to  have  learned  something  from  her  mis- 
fortunes.    Her  statesmen  and  administrators  are  studying  the 


^^  Keller,  Colonisation,  pp.  525,  526. 
58  See  "Italy  in  Africa,"  The  Nation,  LX,  p.  179. 
5^  "Italian  Imperialism,"  Fortnightly  Review,  February,  1914. 
^°  "Italy  a  Year  After  the  Libian  War,"  by  Luigi  Villari,  Fortnightly  Re- 
view, November,  1913. 


THEORY    AND    PRACTISE    OF   COLONIZATION      33 

problems  of  colonization  in  a  scientific  spirit,"*  and  there  seems 
to  be  no  reason  why  she  may  not  ultimately  be  successful. 

During  the  thirty  years  immediately  preceding  the  war,  Ger- 
many was  the  most  active  and  aggressive  of  the  colonial 
powers.  Having  determined  to  claim  her  "place  in  the  sun" 
she  acted  with  characteristic  promptness  and  precision.**  Her 
theory  of  colonization  was  definite  and  understandable.  Each 
colony  was  to  be  a  little  Prussia,  and  there  was  to  be  no  non- 
sense about  native  rights  and  privileges. 

Soon  after  the  Franco-Prussian  War  the  Germans  began  to 
look  about  for  new  territory.*'  Bismarck,  who  was  not  much 
of  a  Kolonialmensch,  waited  patiently  until  the  new  empire  had 
been  firmly  cemented  and  the  foundation  of  a  navy  laid  and 
then  yielded  to  the  growing  demand.**  In  1884  Germany  had 
no  territory  beyond  the  seas.  One  year  later  she  was  in  posses- 
sion of  an  external  empire  of  more  than  one  million  square  miles 
with  a  population  of  ten  million.  Of  this  all  but  ninety-six  thou- 
sand square  miles  was  in  Africa.  With  the  exception  of  the  Bis- 
marck Archipelago,  the  so-called  New  Philippines,  a  few  small 
islands  such  as  in  the  Samoan  group,  and  Kaiou  Chau,  which 
was  Germany's  gateway  to  China,  her  colonial  possessions  at  the 


*i  For  a  list  of  recent  Italian  books  and  monographs  on  colonization,  see 
United  Empire  (N.  S.)  IV,  p.  284. 

82  "German  Colonial  Policy,"  an  address  by  Prof.  M.  Bonn,  of  Munich, 
before  the  Royal  Colonial  Institute,  January  13,  1914,  United  Empire,  V.  (N. 
S.),  No.  2,  pp.  126.  This  is  an  authoritative  and  very  valuabU  statement  of 
the  condition  of  the  German  colonies  and  of  the  national  colonial  policy  just 
before  the  beginning  of  the  war.  See  also  "The  German  Colonies,  1010-11," 
by  L.  Hamilton,  United  Empire,  III,  (N.  S.).  No.  12;  "German  Colonial 
Policy,"  by  the  same  writer,  United  Empire,  IV  (N.  S.),  No.  2  (1913),  p.  150; 
"German  Colonies  in  1912-13,  United  Empire,  V,  No.  6,  p.  493, 

63  Mr.  E.  A.  Powell  (The  Last  Frontier),  p.  166  (1912),  gives  the  follow- 
ing graphic  description  of  German  methods : 

"Germany  has  deliberately  embarked  on  a  systematic  campaigrn  of  world 
expansion  and  exploitation.  Finding  that  she  needs  a  colonial  empire  in  her 
business,  she  set  out  to  build  one  just  as  she  would  build  a  fleet  of  dread- 
naughts  or  a  ship  canal.  The  fact  that  she  has  nothing,  or  next  to  nothing  to 
start  with,  does  not  worry  her  at  all.  What  she  can  not  obtain  by  purchase 
or  treaty  and  what  she  can  not  obtain  by  threats  she  stands  ready  to  obtain 
by  going  to  war.  Having  once  made  up  her  mind  that  the  realization  of  her 
political,  commercial  and  economic  ambition  requires  her  to  have  colonial 
dominion,  she  is  not  going  to  permit  anjrthing  to  stand  in  the  way  of  her 
getting  it." 

6*  Lowe,  Prince  Bismarck,  p.  172 ;  Keltie,  The  Partition  of  Africa,  p.  17a 


34  THE    PHILIPPINES 

beginning  of  the  war  in  August,  1914,  were  divided  into  four 
groups — Togo,  the  Cameroons,  German  East  Africa  and  Ger- 
man Southwest  Africa. 

The  Cameroons  and  Togo  are  tropical  coimtries  consisting  of 
malarial  lowlands  with  high  inland  plateaus  inhabited  by  about 
three  and  one-half  million  natives.  In  1913  there  was  a  small 
German  population  of  about  sixteen  hundred,  of  which  five  hun- 
dred were  merchants. 

German  East  Africa  is  also  a  tropical  country  with  an  enor- 
mous table-land  about  thirty-five  hundred  feet  above  the  sea 
level,  where  Europeans  may  live  with  reasonable  comfort.  The 
population  consists  of  seven  and  one-half  million  natives  and  five 
thousand  Europeans. 

German  Southwest  Africa  is  mainly  an  elevated  table-land 
divided  from  the  sea  by  a  broad,  slowly  rising,  uninhabited  desert 
and  interspersed  with  mountain  ranges.  The  climate  resembles 
that  of  the  Orange  River  country  and  Rhodesia.  It  has  a  sparse 
native  population.  It  is  not  suitable  for  close  settlement  and  the 
Germans  divided  the  country  into  big  farms  ranging  from  six  to 
forty  thousand  acres  each.  There  are  only  about  eighty-five 
thousand  natives.  In  1914  the  white  population  was  consider- 
able and  was  slowly  increasing.  It  Is  the  most  European  of 
Germany's  colonies.  It  can  fairly  be  said  to  be  a  white  man's 
country,  but  all  manual  labor  is  done  by  natives.  "The  real 
problem  of  .Southwest  Africa,"  said  Professor  Bonn,^^  "has  al- 
ways been  not  only  how  to  find  the  white  men  to  settle  the  coun- 
try, but  quite  as  much  how  to  find  colored  laborers  to  support 
them  when  settled." 

This  statement  suggests  a  remarkable  fact  in  the  recent  eco- 
nomic history  of  Germany.  She  entered  upon  her  career  as  a 
colonial  power  during  a  period  of  commercial  depression,  and 
it  v/as  assumed  that  the  emigration  which  marked  the  preceding 
period  would  continue.  The  Germans  were  asking  themselves, 
"Are  we  going  on  contributing  to  build  up  foreign  states  with 

65  German  Colonial  Policy,  supra. 


THEORY    AND    PRACTISE    OF    COLONIZATION      35 

our  best  bone  and  brain?  If  not,  what  is  the  remedy?"  The  an- 
swer was,  acquire  territory  where  they  can  settle  and  remain 
Germans.  But  after  the  territory  was  acquired  Germans  almost 
ceased  to  emigrate.^"  The  yearly  loss  of  one  hundred  thirty  thou- 
sand between  1881  and  1890  fell  to  twenty-two  thousand  during 
the  years  1901-10  and  to  eighteen  thousand  five  hundred  in  1913. 
For  several  years  before  the  war  about  seven  hundred  thousand 
migratory  foreign  laborers  entered  Germany  each  year  to  engage 
in  agricultural  work.  While  developing  colonies  the  Germans 
were  developing  Germany  as  well.  In  1882  German  industry 
employed  six  million  four  hundred  thousand  men;  in  1907, 
eleven  million  three  hundred  thousand  men.  Nor  was  Germany 
overpopulated,  having  but  310.4  persons  to  the  square  mile,  as 
against  618  in  England. 

Even  if  the  establishment  of  settlement  colonies  in  Africa 
was  practicable,  it  had  become  evident  that  no  German  material 
would  be  available  until  industrial  depression  or  social  discon- 
tent again  moved  the  Germans  to  leave  their  Fatherland. 

Germany  was  thus  in  the  possession  of  a  great  territory  in  the 
tropics  which  she  was  developing  with  money  out  of  the  Imperial 
Treasury  by  the  use  of  native  labor.  While  a  few  enthusiasts 
still  hoped  to  establish  settlement  colonies,  the  German  govern- 
ment, according  to  Professor  Bonn,  had  "shown  plainly  enough 
that  their  idea  of  colonisation  is  not  a  policy  of  settlement,  but 
one  of  commercial  exploitation/'  That  is,  Germany  was  still  in 
the  plantation  era  of  colonial  development.  She  wanted  land 
where  she  could  grow  raw  material  and  develop  open  markets 
for  her  manufactured  articles.  Her  real  and  only  immediate 
problem  was  the  old  one  of  securing  and  handling  native  labor 
in  the  tropics.  The  question,  said  Professor  Bonn,  was:  "What 
are  we  going  to  do  with  the  natives  when  we  have  the  power  to 
shape  their  fate?  We  want  them  to  be  as  numerous  as  possible 
and  as  skilful  and  as  intelligent  as  we  can  make  them.    For  only 

*8  Many  German  emigrants  preferred  to  live  and  do  business  in  British 
colonies.    Powell,  The  Last  Frontier,  pp.  2,  185. 


36  THE    PHILIPPINES 

their  numbers  and  their  industry  can  make  our  colonial  empire 
as  useful  and  as  necessary  as  it  ought  to  be  to  us."^'^ 

Japan  also,  under  the  impulse  of  her  ambition  to  secure  the 
mastery  in  the  East  and  provide  for  her  surplus  population,  has 
been  pushing  colonial  projects  with  feverish  activity.  Formosa, 
as  fast  as  it  is  pacified  by  the  use  of  the  army,  is  being  devel- 
oped.^' The  Japanese  deal  ruthlessly  with  the  natives."^  They 
have  so  far  shown  no  great  capacity  for  handling  and  developing 
backward  people  or  even  for  colonizing  their  own  people.'^*' 

The  question  of  a  native  policy  which  has  now  become  of  vital 
importance  to  colonizing  powers,  was  almost  unknown  before 
the  great  discoveries  of  the  sixteenth  century.  In  ancient  times 
the  colonists  seldom  settled  outside  the  zone  of  their  accustomed 
climate.  There  were  no  great  ethnological  differences,  no  im- 
possible chasms  between  the  colonists  and  the  natives,  due  to 
race  characteristics.  There  was  nothing  to  prevent  them  from 
mingling  freely  on  a  footing  of  substantial  equality.  The  for- 
mer found  no  call  to  make  over  the  latter,  politically  or  morally. 
They  were  not  engaged  in  crusades.  Their  objects  were  purely 
commercial  and  the  conditions  were  not  such  as  to  incite  to  the 
cruelties  which  later  became  common.  The  more  prosperous  the 
natives  the  more  profitable  the  commerce.     There  were  no  rea- 


^"^  "In  the  Cameroons  and  in  Togo,  we  are  ruling  native  states  and  native 
tribes  by  a  bureaucracy  somewbat  on  the  lines  of  the  Indian  Bureaucracy. 
In  East  Africa  we  are  creating  a  mixed  colony,  planting  fragments  of  a  white 
society  among  dense  African  masses.  In  Southwest  Africa  we  have  created 
a  kind  of  manorial  system  with  a  European  lord  of  the  manor  and  an  African 
serf.  Each  type  has  its  advantages  and  each  has  its  drawbacks."  Bonn, 
United  Empire,  supra.  Powell  (Tne  Last  Frontier,  p.  182)  charges  the  Ger- 
mans with  treating  the  natives  harshly. 

^s  The  natives  of  Formosa  resemble  the  mountain  people  of  the  northern 
Philippines,  who  are  now  reconciled  to  American  control.  The  Japanese  seem 
to  have  made  no  serious  efforts  to  placate  the  natives,  and  the  result  is  con- 
stant war. 

For  a  semi-official  account  of  the  administration  of  Formosa  see  Count 
Okuma's  Fifty  Years  of  New  Japan,  II,  Chapter  XVIII,  (1909). 

^^  L'ImperialismJapanais,  par  Henri  Labronc  (Paris,  1910). 

'■"  Belgium  was  just  beginning  to  recognize  the  Congo  when  the  Great  War 
opened.  At  his  New  Year's  reception  in  1914  King  Albert  said:  "It  is  my 
duty  to  tell  the  Chamber  that  modifications  in  the  charter  of  the  Congo 
Colony  are  necessary.  ...  A  responsible  autonomy  must  be  able  to  assert 
itself  under  the  direction,  control  and  sovereignity  of  the  motherland." 
London  Times,  January  2,  1914.  See  the  chapter  on  "The  Transition  of  the 
Belgian  Congo,"  in  Harris'  Intervention  and  Colonization  of  Africa  (1914). 


THEORY    AND    PRACTISE    OF    COLONIZATION      37 

sons  for  oppressing  and  exploiting  the  people  among  whom  the 
settlements  were  made.  Only  that  degree  of  submission  was 
required  which  was  necessary  for  trading  purposes.  Diversity  of 
customs  and  morals  were  regarded  of  no  consequence.  Such 
changes  in  the  social  organizations  as  took  place  were  the  result 
of  imitation  and  not  of  intimidation  or  imposition.'^ 

In  the  newly  discovered  countries  colonization  was  carried  on 
under  different  conditions.  The  natives  were  of  another  type 
from  the  invaders.  The  stages  of  culture  were  so  different  as  to 
render  sympathetic  relations  almost  impossible.  Hence  wars  of 
extermination  were  common  and  those  natives  who  could  not 
be  reduced  to  abject  submission  or  slavery  were  ruthlessly  de- 
stroyed. 

The  desire  to  convert  the  Indians  to  Christianity  burned 
fiercely  in  the  breasts  of  many  of  the  earlier  explorers,  but  the 
religious  motive  for  colonization  soon  spent  its  force.  Hugue- 
nots and  Puritans  established  colonies  in  order  to  secure  religious 
and  political  liberty  for  themselves,  not  to  carry  the  Gospel  to 
the  Indians. 

The  Spanish  monarchs  were  very  careful  to  see  that  just  laws 
were  provided  for  the  protection  of  the  natives  and  that  priests 
be  given  the  opportunity  to  teach  them  religion.  Nevertheless 
the  conquistadors  murdered  them  and  the  encomendadors  made 
slaves  of  them.  The  English  and  Dutch  treated  the  natives 
little  if  any  better  than  the  Spaniards.  For  more  than  two  cen- 
turies these  conditions  continued  without  much  change. 

Then  a  new  spirit  began  to  pervade  the  world,  a  spirit  which 
recognized  the  kinship  of  all  mankind.  Improved  means  of  com- 
munication and  a  public  press  made  visible  the  dark  comers  of 
the  world.  Enlightened  selfishness  also  played  a  part  in  the 
amelioration  of  the  hard  lot  of  the  natives  of  tropical  colonies. 
After  the  slave  trade  was  destroyed  the  native  laborers  had  to  be 
conserved,  and  the  planters  finally  learned  the  lesson  that  their 
efficiency  and  value  increased  in  proportion  as  they  were  main- 
tained in  health  and  contentment.     With  the  growth  of  the  hu- 


Ti  Keller,  Colonisation,  pp.  S,  76. 


38  THE    PHILIPPINES 

manitarian  spirit  came  also  a  sense  of  duty  and  obligation  toward 
subject  people.  At  first  a  vague  sentiment  which  found  expres- 
sion in  protest,  it  became  in  course  of  time  an  effective  and  con- 
trolling force.  The  impeachment  of  Warren  Hastings  did  much 
to  strengthen  it  and  direct  it  particularly  toward  India.  By  the 
sacrifice  of  an  individual  an  iniquitous  system  was  destroyed  and 
a  principle  established.  Burke's  speeches  left  an  indelible  im- 
pression upon  the  public  mind.  "The  great  lesson  of  the  impeach- 
ment," says  Lord  Morley/^  was  "that  Asiatics  have  rights  and 
that  Europeans  have  obligations ;  that  a  superior  race  is  bound  to 
observe  the  highest  current  morality  of  the  time  in  all  its  deal- 
ings with  the  subject  race.  Burke  is  entitled  to  our  lasting  rev- 
erence as  the  first  apostle  and  great  upholder  of  integrity,  mercy, 
and  honor  in  the  relation  between  his  countrymen  and  their 
humble  dependents." 

But  for  several  generations  thereafter  the  principle  meant 
little  more  than  that  natives  should  not  be  ruthlessly  killed, 
robbed  or  otherwise  mistreated.  In  fact,  their  exploitation  was 
involved  in  the  theory  that  colonies  existed  for  the  exclusive 
benefit  of  the  colonizing  state.  Benevolently  inclined  colonists 
adopted  the  theory  that  if  the  languid  denizens  of  the  tropics 
were  forced  to  labor  hard  enough  and  long  enough  they  would 
form  the  habit  and  thereafter  all  would  be  well  for  the  country. 

The  people  of  India  are,  and  during  the  entire  period  of  British 
rule  have  been,  very  different  from  those  of  any  of  the  other 
colonies  or  dependencies.  They  are  the  product  of  an  ancient 
and  highly  developed  as  well  as  distinctive  civilization.  In  blood, 
religion  and  philosophy  they  differ  from  the  English.  The  great 
mass  of  the  people  of  India  are  ignorant,  but  there  has  always 
been  a  small  proportion  of  highly  cultivated  and  educated  native 
people.  England's  responsibility  for  the  good  government  of 
the  natives  was  recognized  long  before  the  administration  of  the 
country  was  formally  taken  over  by  the  Crown.  To  Lord  Will- 
iam Bentinck,  says  Sir  Charles  Trevelyan,'^  "belongs  the  great 


''^  Life  of  Edmund  Burke,  p.  133. 

'3  Rulers  of  India,  III,  p.  137.   "The  foundation  of  British  greatness  upon 


THEORY    AND    PRACTISE    OF    COLONIZATION       39 

praise  of  having  placed  our  dominion  in  India  on  the  proper 
foundation  in  the  recognition  of  the  great  principle  that  India 
is  to  be  governed  for  the  benefit  of  the  Indian  and  that  the  ad- 
vantages which  we  derive  from  it  should  be  such  as  are  incidental 
to  and  inferable  from  that  course  of  proceeding." 

This  doctrine  was  accepted  without  reservation  by  the  Crown. 
In  the  famous  proclamation  of  November  1,  1858,  Queen  Vic- 
toria announced  that 

"We  hold  ourselves  bound  to  the  natives  of  our  Indian  terri- 
tories by  the  same  obligations  of  duty  which  bind  us  to  all  our 
other  subjects,  and  those  obligations,  by  the  blessing  of  Almighty 
God,  we  shall  faithfully  and  conscientiously  fulfil. 

"It  is  our  further  will  that  so  far  as  may  be,  our  subjects,  of 
whatever  race  or  creed,  be  freely  and  impartially  admitted  to 
offices  in  our  service  the  duties  of  which  they  be  qualified  by  their 
education,  ability  and  integrity  duly  to  discharge. 

"We  know  and  respect  the  feelings  of  attachment  with  which 
natives  of  India  regard  the  lands  inherited  by  them  from  their 
ancestors,  and  we  desire  to  protect  them  in  all  rights  connected 
therewith,  subject  to  the  equitable  demands  of  the  State;  and  we 
will  that  generally,  in  framing  and  administering  the  law,  due 
regard  be  paid  to  the  ancient  rights,  usages  and  customs  of 
India." 

For  many  years  the  specific  promises  of  this  proclamation  were 
not  fully  performed.  The  Indian  people  were  being  slowly  edu- 
cated and  the  country  developed.  But  the  higher  English  educa- 
tion given  a  few;  of  the  natives  and  the  comparative  material  pros- 
perity resulted  in  dissatisfaction  with  the  government.  Had 
England  deliberately  planned  an  educational  system  designed  to 
destroy  the  type  of  government  which  she  established  in  India 
it  is  doubtful  whether  she  could  have  improved  on  the  one  ac- 
tually adopted.  It  commenced  at  the  top  and  has  never  reached 
very  far  downward.  It  was  inevitable  that  a  generation  of  Indi- 
ans brought  up  on  the  philosophy  of  English  Liberalism,  and 
nourished  on  the  writings  of  Burke  and  Mill,  would  demand  that 

Indian  happiness  was  to  be  Lord  William  Bentinck's  own  special  work.* 
Ibid.,  p.  133. 


40  THE    PHILIPPINES 

their  principles  be  applied  to  India.  Why,  they  asked,  did  not 
the  arguments  of  Burke's  speech  on  Conciliation  with  America 
hold  good  in  India?  There  was  no  answer  other  than  that  India 
was  not  America  and  Indians  not  Americans  or  Englishmen. 
That  answer,  which  implied  inferiority,  was  not  satisfactory  to 
the  Indians. 

It  seems  difficult  for  an  Englishman  to  understand  why  any 
person,  white,  black  or  yellow,  should  not  wish  to  live  under  the 
British  flag.  Does  it  not,  he  asks,  mean  the  blessings  of  law, 
order,  peace  and  justice,  and  what  more  should  any  reasonable 
and  well  disposed  person  desire?  In  fact,  these  very  desirable 
things,  as  understood  by  Europeans,  are  what  the  majority  of 
Orientals  do  not  want  and  object  to  having  imposed  upon  them. 

If  the  English  government  desired  to  perpetuate  British 
rule  In  India  it  should  in  1836  have  rejected  instead  of  approved 
Macaulay's  plan  for  reorganizing  the  educational  system.^* 

It  decided  that  Indian  youth  should  be  educated  on  English 
instead  of  Oriental  lines  and  proceeded  to  give  an  Oxford  train- 
ing to  excitable  young  men  who  were  destined  to  be  clerks  and 
subordinate  officials.  The  history  and  literature  of  England  are 
instinct  with  the  spirit  of  personal  liberty  and  political  freedom, 
and  it  was  to  be  expected  that  an  India  educated  on  such  lines 
would  demand  control  of  her  own  affairs. 

The  movement  took  the  form  of  an  agitation  for  greater  par- 
ticipation In  the  government — that  Is,  for  more  offices  for  natives. 
The  so-called  National  Congress  which  met  annually  after  1885 
enabled  the  agitators  to  reach  the  ear  of  the  world.'''  Being 
without  vision  the  government  attempted  at  first  to  ignore  and 
then  to  suppress  aspirations  which  under  the  circumstances  were 
as  natural  as  the  sequence  of  the  seasons.  The  concessions  made 
were  made  grudgingly  and  therefore  were  not  appreciated.  Brit- 
ish policy  Is  generally  just  but  seldom  generous.  It  Is  never 
Idealistic. 

]*  Vide  Chailley,  Problems  of  British  India,  Book  II,  Chap.  6  (1910),  for  a 
review  of  the  Indian  educational  problem. 

'^^  For  a  fair  estimate  of  the  work  of  the  Congress,  see  Sir  Charles  Dilke's 
Problems  of  Greater  Britain,  p.  432. 


THEORY    AND    PRACTISE    OF    COLONIZATION      41 

The  United  States  pursued  a  different  policy  in  the  Philippines. 
She  skilfully  adopted  as  her  own  the  cry  which  the  Filipinos  had 
raised  of  "the  Philippines  for  the  Filipinos,"  and  has  been  able  in 
a  measure  to  direct  a  movement  which  could  not  be  suppressed. 
Writing  of  the  situation  in  India  M.Joseph  Chailley  says :  "If  the 
English  were  an  idep.^Istic  people  their  rule  would  be  easy  and 
splendid;  in  their  turn  they  would  seize  on  the  motto,  'India  for 
the  Indians.' " 

The  modest  concessions  produced  no  great  moral  effect.  In 
1870  Lord  Mayo  inaugurated  a  restricted  system  of  local  govern- 
ment which  was  somewhat  extended  by  his  successor.  Lord 
Lytton.  By  1878  the  native  press  had  become  so  violent  that  it 
was  necessary  to  establish  a  censorship.  The  first  serious  effort 
at  reform  on  principles  favorable  to  native  participation  in  the 
government  was  made  by  Lord  Ripon — "the  first  Viceroy  to  dis- 
cover the  new  India,  the  India  not  of  expanding  boundaries,  but 
of  expanding  souls."  During  his  term  of  office  municipal  and 
urban  boards  based  on  the  elective  principle  were  established. 
For  the  first  time  "the  natives  became  of  some  account  in  the 
management  of  their  own  affairs."  The  Press  Act  was  repealed, 
but  an  attempt  to  authorize  the  trial  of  Europeans  by  native 
judges  raised  such  a  storm  of  indignation  that  it  had  to  be  mate- 
rially modified.'* 

In  1892,  under  Lord  Lansdowne,  a  large  non-official  element 
was  introduced  into  the  Provincial  Legislative  Councils.  Some 
very  substantial  concessions  were  thus  made,  but  nevertheless  the 
Indians  remained  politically  strangers  in  their  own  land. 

Thus  matters  rested  for  sixteen  years.  During  that  time  there 
was  a  general  movement  throughout  Asia  which  boded  ill  for 
European  control.  The  success  of  the  Japanese  in  the  war 
against  a  European  power  greatly  stimulated  the  activities  of 
those  who  were  working  to  develop  the  idea  of  nationality  and 
to  consolidate  the  Asiatic  races.  Lord  Curzon,  who  ruled  India 
from  1899  to  1905,  sympathized  with  the  aspirations  of  the  In- 


'8  For  the  history  of  the  famous  "Ilbert  Bill."  see  Lord  Cromer's  article 
on  Sir  Alfred  Lyall,  in  The  Quarterly  Review  for  July,  1913. 


42  THE   PHILIPPINES 

dians  for  greater  national  unity  and  with  their  ambition  to  play 
a  part  in  the  life  of  the  country,  but  he  believed  that  India  then 
needed  administrative  reforms  more  than  political  concessions. 
The  keynote  of  his  remarkable  administration  was  "efficiency,"  a 
word  which  he  believed  to  be  a  "synonym  for  the  contentment  of 
the  governed." 

The  experience  of  the  British  in  India  and  of  the  Americans 
in  the  Philippines  shows  that  this,  like  many  other  perfectly 
sound  and  valid  principles,  will  not  always  work  with  Orientals. 
The  fact  is  that  they  care  very  little  for  efficiency  in  administra- 
tion. In  a  community  of  politically  half  developed  and  excitable 
Eastern  people  who  are  living  under  the  imposed  dominion  of 
an  alien  race,  it  is  a  waste  of  breath  to  advise  them  to  eschew 
politics  and  devote  themselves  solely  to  the  developing  of  the 
material  resources  of  the  country.  Probably  it  is  exactly  what 
they  should  do,  but  certainly  it  is  what  they  will  not  do. 

Soon  after  Lord  Morley  became  secretary  of  state  for  India 
in  1905  it  was  decided  to  make  further  substantial  concessions 
to  the  natives  of  India.  The  jubilee  of  the  Queen's  Proclama- 
tion of  1858  furnished  an  occasion  for  stating  this  intention  in 
an  impressive  way.  In  the  Proclamation  of  the  King-Emperor, 
November  2,  1908,  it  was  announced  that: 

"Steps  are  being  continually  taken  toward  obliterating  distinc- 
tions of  race  as  the  test  for  access  to  posts  of  public  authority 
and  power.  In  this  path  I  confidently  expect  and  intend  the 
progress  henceforward  to  be  steadfast  and  sure,  as  education 
spreads,  experience  ripens,  and  the  lessons  of  responsibility  are 
well  learned  by  the  keen  intelligence  and  apt  capabilities  of 
India. 

"From  the  first  the  principle  of  representative  institutions  be- 
gan to  be  gradually  introduced,  and  the  time  has  come  when  in 
the  judgment  of  my  Viceroy  and  Governor-General,  and  others 
of  my  Counsellors,  that  principle  may  be  prudently  extended. 
Important  classes  among  you,  representing  ideas  that  have  been 
fostered  and  encouraged  by  British  rule,  claim  equality  of  citi- 
zenship and  a  greater  share  in  legislation  and  government.  The 
politic  satisfaction  of  such  a  claim  will  strengthen,  not  impair, 


THEORY    AND    PRACTISE    OF    COLONIZATION      43 

existing  authority  and  power.  Administration  will  be  all  the 
more  efficient  if  the  officers  who  conduct  it  have  greater  oppor- 
tunities of  regular  contact  with  those  who  influence  and  reflect 
common  opinion  about  it."^'^ 

Just  at  this  inopportune  time  the  irreconcilable  and  criminal 
element  among  the  agitators  began  throwing  bombs  and  murder- 
ing officials.  The  Liberal  government  met  the  situation  with 
firmness,  but  refused  to  abandon  its  plans  at  the  instigation  of 
the  extremists  of  either  violence  or  conservatism.  The  regula- 
tions of  1818  relating  to  the  deportation  of  seditious  characters 
were  revived  and  in  recognition  of  the  fact  that  "you  may  put 
picric  acid  in  a  pen  and  ink  just  as  much  as  in  any  steel  bomb," 
a  Press  Act  and  an  Explosives  Act  were  passed. 

In  a  speech  replete  with  the  greatest  magnanimity.  Lord  Mor- 
ley  appealed  for  support  to  the  best  class  of  Indians: 

"Time  has  gone  on  with  me,"  he  said,'®  "experience  has  wi- 
dened. I  have  never  lost  my  invincible  faith  that  there  is  a  bet- 
ter mind  in  all  civilized  communities — and  that  this  better  mind, 
if  you  can  reach  it,  if  statesmen  in  time  to  come  can  reach 
that  better  mind,  can  awaken  it,  can  evoke  it,  can  induce  it  to 
apply  itself  to  practical  purposes  for  the  improvement  of  the 
conditions  of  such  a  community — they  will  earn  the  crown  of 
beneficent  fame  indeed.  Nothing  strikes  me  much  more  than 
this,  when  I  talk  of  the  better  mind  of  India — there  are  subtle 
elements,  religious,  spiritual,  mystical,  traditional,  historical  in 
what  we  may  call  for  the  moment  the  Indian  mind,  which  are 
very  hard  for  the  most  candid  and  patient  to  grasp  or  to  realize 
in  their  full  force.  But  our  duty,  and  it  is  a  splendid  duty,  is 
to  try." 

In  1907  two  Indians  were  appointed  members  of  the  Council 
of  India  in  London,  and  soon  thereafter  another  was  made  the 
legal  member  of  the  Viceroy's  Executive  Council.  The  legisla- 
tion of  1909  resulted  in  the  enlargement  of  the  Imperial  and 
Provincial  Legislative  Councils.  The  size  of  the  former  was 
trebled,  the  number  of  non-official  members  increased,  and  greater 


'■'The  Proclamations  of  1858  and  1908  are  printed  in  the  Appendix  to 
Morley's  Indian  Speeches,  1907-1909. 

w  Speech  at  Arbroath,  October  21,  1907,  Indian  Speeches,  p.  42. 


44  THE   PHILIPPINES 

scope  was  given  to  the  elective  principle.  As  increased,  the  Im- 
perial Council  consists  of  sixty-eight  members,  of  whom  thirty- 
six  are  official  and  must  vote  with  the  government.  Of  the  re- 
maining thirty-two  non-official  members,  four  are  nominated  by 
the  viceroy,  two  elected  by  Chambers  of  Commerce,  one  by  the 
Indian  trading  communities,  seven  by  the  landed  interests  of 
seven  provinces,  six  by  the  Mohammedans  and  twelve  by  the 
non-official  members  of  the  Provincial  Councils  or  by  rural  and 
urban  boards  in  the  Central  Provinces  where  no  councils  exist. 
The  control  thus  remains  with  the  government.  In  the  Provin- 
cial Councils,  however,  the  non-official  members  have  a  majority 
and  may  outvote  the  government  on  legislative  matters.  In  the 
Provincial  Council  of  Bengal  the  elected  non-official  members 
outnumber  the  nominated  members,  both  official  and  non-official. 

It  is  not  easy  to  overestimate  the  importance  and  significance 
of  these  concessions.  They  are  especially  interesting  in  view 
of  the  charges  of  rashness  which  were  so  generally  made  against 
the  United  States  when  similar  powers  were  conceded  to  the 
Filipinos. 

As  to  the  general  effect  of  this  reform  legislation.  Sir  Bamp- 
fylde  Fuller  says  'J^ 

"For  the  educated  and  well-to-do  the  State  is  then  no  longer 
to  be  regarded  as  an  esoteric  institution,  with  whose  behests  their 
only  concern  is  to  obey.  Encouraging  results  can  already  be  ob- 
served, although  so  far  they  are  mainly  indirect  fruits  of  the  con- 
cession. At  the  Council  board  Indians  meet  British  officials  upon 
equal  terms;  this  equality  is  advantageous  to  both  parties;  the 
one  gains  in  invigorating  self-esteem,  the  other  loses  an  aggra- 
vating air  of  superiority.  Non-official  opinion  is  bridled  by  re- 
sponsibility, and  elected  members,  who  make  their  entry  in  decla- 
mation, soon  settle  down  to  dispassionate  discussion.  The  offer 
of  an  authorized  opportunity  to  public  criticism  lessens  its  incli- 
nation for  tempestuous  attacks,  whether  in  the  press  or  in  such 
informal  gatherings  as  the  National  Congress — a  convention  in 
which  representatives  of  the  educated  classes  have  annually  met 
to  discuss  and  ventilate  their  grievances.  These  gains  are  indi- 
te TAe  Empire  of  India  (1913),  p.  284. 


THEORY   AND    PRACTISE    OF    COLONIZATION      45 

rect,  but  they  are  very  substantial.  In  the  direct  exercise  of  their 
legislative  functions  non-official  members  have  not  as  yet  made 
any  great  mark  upon  state  policy;  they  generally  find  that  their 
earnestness  is  discharged  by  their  eloquence;  having  spoken  with 
credit  they  feel  relieved  of  concern  with  practical  issues.  But 
in  this  they  do  not  differ  from  many  Western  orators." 

He  then  calls  attention  to  a  fact  which  is  noticeable  in  all  East- 
ern countries  which  are  subject  to  Western  control — the  disposi- 
tion of  the  politically  favored  to  represent  their  class  only  and 
ignore  the  common  man. 

"There  is,"  he  says,  "  a  real  danger  that,  under  the  new  regime, 
the  States  will  find  it  so  troublesome  to  interfere  on  behalf  of  the 
working  classes  (who  have  in  Council  no  spokesman  of  their 
own)  that  it  will  treat  their  interests  with  the  indifference  which 
they  have  suffered  under  the  middle  class  Cabinets  of  the  West." 

Lord  Morley  said  that  the  government  in  passing  this  reform 
legislation  had  no  intention  to  pave  the  way  for  parliamentary 
government  in  India.  It  is  hard  to  believe,  however,  that  he  and 
the  other  responsible  Liberal  statesmen  could  have  been  unaware 
of  the  fact  that  they  were  entering  upon  a  road  along  which 
their  successors  must  continue  to  travel  until  the  goal  is  reached 
— and  that  is  the  government  of  India  by  the  Indians,  subject 
possibly  to  sufficient  control  to  maintain  its  connection  with  the 
British  Empire.'" 

At  a  meeting  of  the  National  Congress  at  Madras  in  1908,  one 
of  the  leading  Indians,  Mr.  Surendra  Nath  Banerjee,  thus  ex- 
pressed the  understandings  and  aspirations  of  his  people.  *'I 
will  not  say  that  we  have  got  all  that  we  want.  We  want  abso- 
lute control  of  our  own  finances  and  executive  administration. 
We  have  got  neither ;  but  I  believe  that  these  reforms  and  prO' 

®°  "Some  Englishmen  appear  to  think  that  our  duty  lies  in  the  direction  of 
developing  self-governing  principles  all  along  the  line,  and  that  we  must 
accept  the  consequences  of  their  development  whatever  they  may  be — even,  I 
conclude,  to  the  extent  of  paving  the  way  for  our  own  withdrawal  from  the 
country.^  ...  I  do  not  conceal  from  myself  that  the  consequences  may  be 
serious  in  so  far  that  they  may  materially  increase  the  difficulty  of  governing 
the  country;  but  I  altogether  reject  the  extreme  consequence  of  possible 
"withdrawal"    Lord  Cromer,  Ancient  and  Modern  Imperialism,  p.  125. 


46  THE   PHILIPPINES 

posals  in  their  moral  development  and  in  their  ultimate  evolution 
will  give  them  both." 

Under  these  circumstances  there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that 
the  agitation  for  further  concessions  will  cease,  and  the  most 
disinterested  observers  think  that  the  natives  will  win.  "It  is 
certain,"  says  M.  Chailley,^^  "that  this  struggle  must,  in  the  long 
run,  end  in  the  victory  of  the  natives,  and  that  the  English  must 
one  day  be  reduced  to  the  occupation  of  a  very  small  number  of 
high  appointments — a  mere  symbol  of  their  rule.  Stendhal  has 
said  that  as  the  prisoner  thinks  more  often  of  escape  than  the 
jailor  of  keeping  him  there  .  .  .  the  prisoner  must  in  the  end 
succeed.  The  Indian,  too,  will  succeed — ^that  is  certain ;  hut  it  is 
good  for  him  and  for  India  that  he  should  not  triumph  pre- 
maturely" 

Great  Britain's  real  problem  is  the  maintenance  of  her  su- 
premacy over  a  land  as  large  as  Europe  west  of  the  Vistula  and 
with  thirty  million  more  people,  full  of  ancient  nations,  of  great 
cities,  of  varieties  of  civilization,  of  armies,  nobilities,  priest- 
hoods, organizations  for  every  conceivable  purpose  from  the 
spreading  of  great  religions  down  to  systematic  murder.  It  is  a 
vast  territory  in  which  there  are  more  Hindustanees  than  there 
are  white  men  in  the  United  States,  more  Bengalees  than  there 
are  Frenchmen  in  Europe,  more  Maharattas  than  there  are  Span- 
iards in  Spain;  in  which  the  number  of  fighting  men  under  a 
military  system  such  as  is  in  force  in  Germany  would  place  two 
and  one-half  million  soldiers  in  barracks,  add  eight  hundred 
thousand  recruits  thereto  annually,  and  leave  the  reserves  un- 
touched.*^ 

The  difficulties  presented  by  the  government  of  such  a  coun- 
try are  almost  inconceivable,  and  yet  for  more  than  a  century 
India  has  been  governed  by  a  few  thousand  resolute  detached 
Englishmen  supported  by  a  white  army  smaller  than  the  regular 
army  of  Belgium.  Of  course  British  rule  has  rested  on  the  pres- 
tige of  moral  and  political  superiority,  and  the  people  have  acqui- 


^'^  Problems  of  British  India,  p.  526. 
*2Townsend,  Asia  and  Europe  (1910),  p.  84. 


THEORY    AND    PRACTISE    OF    COLONIZATION      47 

esced  in  that  rule  because  they  reahzed  that  under  existing  condi- 
tions it  was  for  the  good  of  India.  It  has  given  them  peace, 
order  and  justice.  Its  withdrawal  would  probably  mean  an  in- 
ternecine struggle  and  invasion  by  some  other  great  power. 

The  moral  justification  of  Western  rule  over  Eastern  people 
rests  on  race  superiority  and  the  possession  of  a  higher  civiliza- 
tion— a  civilization  so  superior  as  to  justify  its  imposition  upon 
the  ancient  system  by  force.  Like  the  American  rule  in  the  Phil- 
ippines, English  rule  in  India  is  justified  by  the  moral  and  politi- 
cal superiority  of  the  rulers.  It  follows  that  when  those  condi- 
tions no  longer  exist  the  moral  justification  for  the  rule  will  be  at 
an  end.  As  Mr.  Meredith  Townsend  says,^^  "If  the  Englishman 
by  virtue  of  the  superior  morale  of  his  race  has  not  a  moral  right 
to  govern  and  administer  India  irrespective  of  the  opinion  of  her 
people,  then  he  has  no  right  to  remain  there  when  she  bids  him 
go,  no  right  of  any  kind  to  office  if  an  Indian  can  beat  him  at 
the  tests  set  up." 

Whatever  the  final  destiny  of  India,  the  work  which  England 
has  done  is  permanent  and  will  endure.  As  Lord  Curzon  so  elo- 
quently said,  "The  message  is  carved  in  granite,  it  is  hewn  out 
of  the  rock  of  doom — that  our  work  is  righteous  and  that  it  shall 
endure."  It  is  for  England  to  say  when  her  work  is  finished.  It 
is  for  her  to  determine  when  and  to  what  extent  the  people  of 
India  are  prepared  to  manage  their  own  affairs.  In  the  mean- 
time she  must  resist  the  demands  of  the  impracticable  enthusiasts 
and  grant  concessions  only  as  a  reasonable  proportion  of  the 
people  are  prepared  for  self-government.  But  the  rapidly  devel- 
oping feeling  of  nationality  should  not  and  can  not  be  suppressed. 
It  should  be  cultivated  and  directed.  Its  worst  features  are  the 
results  of  discontent  and  dissatisfaction;  its  best  form  will  de- 
velop from  the  prosperity  and  well-being  of  the  people.  Agita- 
tion, a  free  press,  Western  literature  and  education  all  make  for 
the  same  end.  It  is  doubtful  whether  any  Asiatic  race  will  in  the 
future  willingly  submit  to  the  permanent  rule  of  a  white  race. 
The  white  and  yellow  people  may  for  a  time  occupy  the  same 

M/fctU,  p.  116. 


48  THE   PHILIPPINES 

territory,  cooperate  in  the  same  government,  fight  for  the  same 
cause  and  labor  for  the  development  of  the  same  country,  but  if 
the  white  man  is  successful  in  his  efforts  to  raise  the  yellow  race 
to  his  own  standards  of  efficiency  and  culture,  he  will  have  com- 
pleted his  political  work.  That  time  has  already  come  in  Japan, 
and  it  will  come  in  China,  in  Java  and  in  the  Philippines.  The 
recognition  of  the  fact  does  not  in  the  least  detract  from  the  use- 
fulness or  the  dignity  of  the  white  man's  work  in  the  tropics. 
The  master  is  responsible  for  those  under  his  tutelage,  and  his 
honor  and  glory  are  in  the  success  achieved  by  his  pupils  after 
they  grow  to  manhood.  The  world's  work  must  be  done,  and  the 
East  and  the  tropics  must  do  their  fair  proportion.  For  the 
present  it  must  be  done  under  the  direction  of  the  white  races. 
There  is  little  in  the  history  of  the  past  to  encourage  the  belief 
that  the  period  of  tutelage  will  be  short.  The  issue  rests  with  the 
natives  themselves.  If  they  have  not  the  will  or  the  capacity  to 
develop  on  modern  lines,  the  white  man's  control  will  be  perma- 
nent. 

The  demand  for  some  degree  of  self-government  by  the  na- 
tives of  tropical  countries  is  general.®*  Even  the  Javanese  are 
feeling  its  impulse.*'    Great  Britain's  constructive  work  in  Egypt 


8*  "Self-government  after  the  model  of  our  self-governing  colonies  seems 
to  be  at  present  the  ideal  of  every  administrative  unit  of  the  Empire.  Let  it 
be  so;  but  let  us  also  bear  in  mind  that  the  justification  of  that  type  of 
government  depends  on  conditions  that  it  may  take  generations,  perhaps  cen- 
turies, to  realize.^  Ohne  Hast  ohne^  Rast  (unhasting,  unresting)  must  be  our 
maxim ;  our  spirit  a  spirit  of  caution  in  every  procedure  which  has  a  tend- 
ency to  bring  into  collision  the  usages  and  prejudices  of  communities,  a  spirit 
giving  time  for  the  slow  and  silent  operation  of  desired  improvements,  with 
a  constant  conviction  that  every  attempt  to  accelerate  the  end  will  be  attended 
with  the  danger  of  defeat."    Bruce,  The  Broad  Stone  of  Empire,  I,  p.  35. 

85  The  nationalist  movement  there  is  not  at  present  of  much  importance, 
There  are,  however,  indications  of  an  attempt  at  organization  for  the  purpose 
of  agitation. 

Mr.  Bernard  Miall,  in  a  preface  to  Cabaton's  Java  and  the  Dutch  East 
Indies,  p.  23,  says :  "The  nationalist  cry  is  only  dangerous  when  it  is  a  demand 
that  a  helpless  and  ignorant  people  shall  be  handed  over  to  a  horde  of  semi- 
westernized  lawyers,  agitators,  bureaucrats  and  contractors.  It  is  to  be  hoped 
that  the  Indies  have  once  and  for  all  passed  the  period  of  spoliation ;  and 
there  is  every  indication  that  the  wise  and  paternal  rule  of  the  Dutch,  and  the 
lack  of  enormous  urban  populations  will  forever  be  a  safeguard  against  the 
poisonous  growth  of  a  spurious  nationalism.  But  we  can  not  be  surprised  if 
the  Dutch,  with  India  and  Egypt  before  their  eyes,  prefer  to  proceed  with  the 
utmost  caution." 


THEORY    AND    PRACTISE    OF    COLONIZATION      49 

is  greatly  to  her  credit.  She  has  rescued  the  country  from  bank- 
ruptcy, converted  its  deserts  into  cotton-fields,  protected  the  com- 
mon people  from  oppression  by  their  native  rulers  and  encour- 
aged the  people  to  expect  self-government.**  She  entered  Egypt 
for  financial  purposes ;  she  remained  as  a  schoolmaster.  Until  the 
exigencies  of  a  European  war  made  the  establishment  of  a  pro- 
tectorate necessary  she  exercised  but  denied  sovereignty  over  the 
country.  She  promised  that  her  occupation  would  be  temporary, 
but  conditions  made  it  permanent.  For  twenty  years  she  con- 
trolled the  country  through  a  strong  skilful  diplomat  and  admin- 
istrator who  masqueraded  under  the  ostentatiously  simple  title 
of  British  agent.  Lord  Cromer,  who  ruled  with  a  wise  and  firm 
hand,  was  succeeded  by  Sir  Elden  Gorst,  who  soon  after  his  ar- 
rival in  Cairo  informed  a  gathering  of  British  officials  that  "they 
were  not  there  to  govern  Egypt  indefinitely,  but  to  teach  the 
Egyptians  to  govern  themselves."  He  weakened  his  government 
by  too  much  talking,  just  as  we  have  done  in  the  Philippines. 

Gorst's  well-meant  efforts  at  conciliation  were  interpreted  by 
the  nationalists  as  evidence  of  weakness,*'^  and  for  a  time  British 
prestige  suffered.  "When,"  says  Lord  Cromer,®*  "a  very  well 
intentioned  but  rather  rash  attempt  was  made  to  advance  too 
rapidly  in  a  liberal  direction,  the  inevitable  reaction,  which  was 
to  have  been  foreseen,  took  place.  Not  merely  Europeans,  but 
also  Egyptians  called  loudly  for  a  halt,  and,  with  the  appoint- 
ment of  Lord  Kitchener,  they  got  what  they  wanted." 

The  movement  for  nationality  has  probably  been  stronger  and 
more  aggressive  in  Egypt  than  in  any  other  Eastern  country.   It 

8*  "Nothing  that  England  has  done  in  Asia,  and  Germany  or  France  in 
Africa,  has  been  so  swift,  so  certain,  so  unquestionably  beneficial  to  the 
world  at  large  and  to  the  populations  immediately  concerned."  Low,  Egypt  in 
Transition  (1914),  p.  253. 

87  Fyfe,  The  New  Spirit  in  Egypt  (1911),  Chap.  16.  This  is  an  interesting 
but  one-sided  book.  The  author  prefaces  his  chapter  on  "The  Fruits  of  Sen- 
timental Anarchism"  with  Ex-President  Roosevelt's  wise  statement  that: 
"There  are  foolish  empiricists  who  believe  that  the  granting  of  a  paper  con- 
stitution, especially  if  prefaced  by  some  high-sounding  declaration,  can  of 
itself  confer  the  power  of  self-government  upon  a  people.  This  is  never  so. 
Nobody  can  give  a  people  self-government  any  more  than  it  is  possible  to  give 
an  individual  self-help." 

^^  Political  and  Literary  Essays,  p.  255.  See  also  Cromer's  Abbas  II, 
Preface  (1915). 


50  THE    PHILIPPINES 

will  nevertheless  be  many  years  before  any  real  nationality  can 
be  developed  from  the  congeries  of  races  which  inhabit  that  an- 
cient land.  Egypt  presents  scarcely  a  problem  other  than  that 
of  religion  which  is  not  duplicated  in  kind  in  the  Philippines. 
Even  the  declared  objects  of  the  two  governments  were  the  same 
and  there  is  a  remarkable  resemblance  in  the  methods  which  have 
been  adopted.  The  origin  of  British  power  in  Egypt  and  Ameri- 
can power  in  the  Philippines  and  the  original  objects  were  very 
different.  But  in  each  country  the  primary  purposes  of  the  gov- 
ernment were  declared  to  be  the  education  of  the  people  and  the 
material  developm.ent  of  the  country  for  the  benefit  of  the  na- 
tives with  the  hope  and  reasonable  expectation  that  indirect  and 
incidental  benefits  would  accrue  therefrom  to  the  metropolitan 
power.  In  a  recent  book  on  Egypt,  Mr.  Henry  Cunningham®^ 
says:  "It  may  be  argued  that  the  Philippine  Islands  are  a  col- 
ony whereas  Egypt  is  an  indefinable  something  which  certain 
British  politicians  even  hesitate  to  pronounce  a  protectorate,  but 
the  fact  remains  that  the  work  of  both  powers  is  identical  in 
principle — each  has  promised  self-government  when  the  people 
are  considered  to  be  fitted  by  education  and  training  to  re- 
ceive it." 

Nothing  illustrates  better  the  force  of  the  general  movement 
toward  self-government  than  that,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that 
Lord  Kitchener  was  sent  to  Egypt  to  "put  a  stop  to  the  non- 
sense" which  was  being  encouraged  by  Sir  Elden  Gorst,  he  found 
it  advisable  to  grant  the  natives  further  participation  in  the  legis- 
lative department  of  the  government.^" 

Lord  Dufferin,  who,  after  the  battle  of  Tel-el-Kebir,  was  sent 
to  report  on  the  situation  in  Egypt,  recommended  the  institution 
of  certain  representative  institutions  which  would  give  the  edu- 
cated natives  some  part  in  the  government.^*    The  Organic  Act 


^^  Cunningham,  To-day  in  Egypt  (1913),  p.  48. 

90  Lord  Kitchener's  Rept.,  Egypt,  No.  1  (1913). 

81  Sir  Auckland  Colvin  (The  Making  of  Modern  Egypt,  p.  31)  says  with 
reference  to  Lord  Dufferin's  recommendation  of  local  government:  "There 
was  a  feeling  in  England  that  as  the  Egyptian  revolt  had  raised  the  cry  of 
self-government,  some  measure  of  self-government  should  be  accorded.  A 
Liberal  government  looked  with  unction  on  such  an  issue ;  the  British  public, 


THEORY    AND    PRACTISE    OF    COLONIZATION      51 

of  1883,  provided  for  a  Legislative  Council  of  thirty  members, 
of  whom  fourteen  were  nominated  by  the  government,  with 
authority  to  examine  the  budgets  and  proposed  laws  and  com- 
municate its  opinions  with  reference  thereto  to  the  government. 
There  was  also  a  General  Assembly  composed  of  the  Legislative 
Council,  the  six  ministers,  and  forty-six  elective  members.  No 
new  tax  could  be  imposed  or  public  loan  contracted  without  the 
consent  of  this  General  Assembly.®* 

By  the  law  enacted  in  1913,  after  Kitchener  became  British 
Agent,  the  General  Assembly  was  merged  into  the  Legislative 
Council,  which  became  the  Legislative  Assembly.  This  body  has 
eighty-nine  members  of  whom  sixty-six  are  elected  by  elector 
delegates,  each  of  whom  represents  fifty  inhabitants  and  must  be 
elected  by  an  absolute  majority  of  votes.  The  cabinet  ministers 
are  ex  officio  members  of  the  Assembly  and  the  government 
nominates  seventeen  members  to  represent  certain  elements  of  the 
population,  such  as  the  Copts,  Bedouins,  and  certain  occupations 
and  professions,  such  as  merchants,  doctors  and  engineers.  The 
powers  of  the  new  Assembly  are,  however,  little  more  than  con- 
sultative and  advisory.  The  government  is  still  absolute,  and 
legislation  and  administration  are  executive  functions.  Never- 
theless the  reorganized  Assembly  will,  if  its  members  are  wise, 
exercise  considerable  influence  upon  legislation.  It  may  initiate 
a  pro  jet  of  a  law  and  send  it  to  the  Council  of  Ministers  for  con- 


profoundly  ignorant  in  Egyptian  matters,  but  pleased  to  see  its  most  char- 
acteristic features  reflected  in  all  waters,  acquiesced.  Too  great  stress  has 
sometimes  been  laid  on  Lord  Dufferin's  generous  recognition  that  the  meta- 
morphic  spirit  of  the  age  was  working  even  in  Egypt;  as  on  his  brilliant 
metaphor  that,  like  her  own  Memnon,  she  had  not  remained  irresponsive  to 
the  beams  of  the  new  dawn ;  that  the  lips  of  Egypt  had  trembled,  if  they  had 
not  articulated.  This  was  only  to  recall  to  his  countrymen,  with  character- 
istic felicity  of  language,  that  so  far  from  her  being  capable  of  self-govern- 
ment the  breath  of  a  free  spirit  had  but  now  for  the  first  time  touched 
Egypt." 

See  also  Cromer.  Modern  Egypt,  T,  Chap.  18 ;  Lyall's  Life  of  the  Marqms 
of  Dufferin,  II,  p.  260.  For  an  account  of  the  development  of  self-govern- 
ment in  Egypt,  see  Lord  Cromer's  Report  of  1906  (Egypt,  No.  1,  of  1907, 
p.  29).  Lord  Cromer  says  that  the  leading  idea  of  Lord  Dufferin's  law  was 
"to  give  the  Egyptian  people  an  opportunity  of  making  their  voices  heard, 
but  at  the  same  time  not  to  bind  the  Executive  Government  by  Parliamentary 
fetters."    Modern  Egypt,  11,  p.  274. 

82  Milner,  England  in  Egypt,  p.  308. 


52  THE   PHILIPPINES 

sideration.  The  Council  is  required  to  consult  with  the  Assembly 
and  will  doubtless  be  greatly  influenced  by  its  advice.  The  "peo- 
ple" are  thus  consulted  and  advised  with  and  to  that  extent  prog- 
ress has  been  made  along  the  road  which  all  governments  are 
traveling. 

England  in  the  Soudan,  like  Germany  and  France  in  their 
African  colonies,  is  dealing  with  primitive  conditions  and  unde- 
veloped people.  Politically  the  Soudan  is  Anglo-Egyptian,  flying 
both  flags,  a  sort  of  hybrid  state,  "of  a  nature  eminently  calcu- 
lated to  shock  the  susceptibilities  of  international  jurists."  The 
country  is  quiet  and  orderly,  and  great  progress  is  being  made 
in  material  development  and  the  preparation  of  the  people  for 
civilization.  It  is  in  the  Soudan,  United  Nigeria  and  British 
East  Africa,  where  native  political  aspirations  have  not  yet  de- 
veloped, that  British  genius  for  colonial  work  at  present  finds  its 
greatest  opportunities.®' 

In  the  British  Crown  colonies  the  agitation  for  participation 
in  the  government  by  the  natives  is  in  the  incipient  stage.  In 
India,  Egypt  and  the  Philippines  it  has  become  not  merely  a 
question  of  native  participation  but  of  native  control.  France 
in  her  colonies  has  avoided  the  question  to  some  extent  by  a  pol- 
icy of  assimilation.  The  Englishman  keeps  himself  and  his 
government  as  much  aloof  as  possible  from  the  natives  and 
grants  concessions  as  a  favor  from  above.  The  Frenchman  takes 
the  natives  of  Algiers,  Tonkin  and  the  other  colonies  into  the 
political  family  and  invites  them  to  send  representatives  to  the 
National  House  of  Deputies  in  Paris.    La  ou  est  le  drapeau,  la* 


93  For  present  conditions  in  the  Soudan,  see  Sydney  Low,  Egypt  in  Tran- 
sition (1914),  Chaps.  2-13,  with  introduction  by  Lord  Cromer;  and  Yacoub 
Pasha  Artin's  England  in  the  Sudan  (1911).  For  an  account  of  Sir 
Frederick  Lugard's  work  in  Nigeria,  see  Harris'  Intervention  and  Coloniza- 
tion in  Africa,  Chap,  7.  In  South  Africa  the  British  have  constructed  a  self- 
governing  dominion  out  of  the  various  colonies,  which  came  to  her  as  the 
result  of  the  Boer  War.  The  loyalty  of  the  Boers  during  the  present  war  is 
a_  tribute  to  British  skill  as  state  builders.  It  is  interesting  to  note  the  great 
similarity  of  British  methods  and  those  of  the  Americans  in  the  Philip- 
pines. For  a  detailed  account  of  the  methods  pursued,  see  Worsford, 
Reconstruction  of  the  New  Colonies  Under  Lord  Milner,  2  Vols.  (1913). 


THEORY   AND    PRACTISE    OF    COLONIZATION      53 

est  France.^*  The  Germans  were  busy  teaching  their  natives  to 
labor.  The  Americans  are  serving  as  schoolmasters  training  the 
natives  in  state-building,  agriculture,  sanitation,  road-making, 
and  how  to  live  like  self-respecting  members  of  a  self-governing 
community. 

Previous  to  the  war  with  Spain  the  United  States  had  taken 
no  part  in  the  work  of  colonizing  and  developing  the  tropics. 
Her  territorial  growth  had  been  rapid  but,  with  one  exception, 
her  acquisitions  had  been  of  contiguous  territory.  Her  entry 
into  the  field  of  modem  colonization  was  perhaps  fortuitous. 
What  Sir  John  Seeley  said  of  England  may,  in  one  sense,  be 
said  of  the  United  States — she  seems  to  have  acquired  an  em- 
pire "in  a  fit  of  absence  of  mind." 

The  first  decade  of  the  twentieth  century  found  her  definitely 
committed  to  a  policy  of  colonization  according  to  the  modern  un- 
derstanding of  that  word.  Under  forms  of  governments,  adapted 
to  the  special  conditions  of  each,  she  was  governing  Alaska,  Ha- 
waii, the  Philippines,  Porto  Rico,  Guam  and  the  Panama  Canal 
Zone,  all  distant  non-contiguous  territory.  Cuba  was  an  American 
protectorate ;  San  Domingo  a  sort  of  protege.  Her  control  over 
the  petty  states  of  Central  America,  although  less  tangible  was 
no  less  real.  It  was  already  apparent  that  for  political  purposes 
the  Panama  Canal  should  be  considered  as  the  southern  boundary 
of  the  United  States. 

With  the  exception  of  Alaska,  which  wfvS  almost  uninhabited, 
all  these  possessions  were  situated  in  the  tropics  and  inhabited 
by  alien  peoples  with  a  lower  order  of  civilization.  The  matter 
of  contiguousness,  which  had  seemed  so  important  to  earlier 
generations,  was  important  only  in  so  far  as  it  involved  diffi- 
culties of  communication.  But  distances  had  so  shrunk  that  a 
few  thousand  miles  of  intervening  ocean  had  become  less  for- 
midable than  the  weary  miles  our  forefathers  traveled  in  cross- 
ing New  England.  The  steamship,  the  cable  and  the  wireless 
telegraph  had  annihilated  distances. 

**Reinscli,  Colonial  Government,  p.  190;  Lewis,  Government  of  Depend- 
encies, Cliap.  X. 


54  THE   PHILIPPINES 

The  acquisition  of  territory  in  the  Orient  was  neither  an  un- 
natural nor  an  abnormal  fact  in  the  history  of  the  United  States. 
It  did  not  even,  to  use  the  language  of  the  geologists,  constitute 
a  fault  in  the  structural  development  of  the  nation.  It  is  a 
curious  fact  that  more  than  fifty  years  before  Dewey  sailed  Into 
Manila  Bay  the  German  scientist  and  traveler,  Jagor,  predicted 
that:  *'In  proportion  as  the  navigation  of  the  west  coast  of 
America  extends  the  influence  of  the  American  element  over  the 
South  Sea,  the  captivating,  magic  power  which  the  great  Re- 
public exercises  over  the  Spanish  Colonies,  will  not  fail  to  make 
itself  felt  also  in  the  Philippines.  The  Americans  are  evidently 
destined  to  bring  to  a  full  development  the  germs  originated  by 
the  Spaniards.^^ 

The  entry  of  the  United  States  into  the  field  of  tropical  col- 
onization came  as  a  surprise  to  a  world  which  had  assumed  that 
her  policy  of  isolation  was  necessarily  a  permanent  policy  and 
that  it  would  forever  limit  her  activities  to  the  Western  Hemis- 
phere. Nor  did  the  manner  in  which  she  proposed  to  manage  her 
new  dependencies  meet  with  the  enthusiastic  approval  of  Euro- 
pean experts  in  colonization.  It  was  to  be  expected  that  she 
would  accept  the  generally  approved  theory  that  the  welfare  of 
the  people  under  her  control  should  be  her  first  consideration.  A 
republic  with  her  traditions  might  be  excused  even  for  overstating 
the  formula,  but  it  was  felt  that  there  could  be  no  excuse  ex- 
cept Ignorance  for  statesmen  who  deliberately  and  seriously  an- 
nounced to  the  world  and  to  the  natives  that  the  country  would 
be  managed  solely  in  the  interest  of  the  natives  with  the  delib- 
erate purpose  of  preparing  them  for  the  management  of  their 
own  affairs.  To  British  colonial  statesmen  of  even  the  modern 
liberal  school  the  announcement  of  such  a  policy  seemed  like 
flying  in  the  face  of  nature  which  had  intended  certain  races  to 
remain  in  a  perpetual  condition  of  subordination. 

It  was  conceded  that  the  welfare  of  the  natives  should  be  the 


*5  Jagor,  Travels  in  the  Philippines  (London,  1875),  p.  369.  In  an  article 
published  in  La  Solidaridad,  September  30,  1891,  Rizal  discussed  the  possibil- 
ity that  the  United  States  would  acquire  the  Philippines. 


THEORY    AND    PRACTISE   OF   COLONIZATION      55 

primary  object  of  the  government,  but  back  of  all  such  statements 
was  the  implication  that  what  was  for  the  welfare  of  the  natives 
should  always  be  determined  by  the  Europeans.®^  Now  came  the 
impracticable  and  theoretical  Americans  and  announced  that  the 
natives  themselves  should  not  only  have  a  large  share  of  the 
offices  but  a  constantly  increasing  influence  in  determining  their 
own  affairs,  and  ultimately,  when  they  had  been  educated  and 
trained,  if  they  so  desired  the  entire  government  should  be  turned 
over  to  them. 

It  involves  the  assumption  that  an  Oriental  people  of  Malayan 
origin  with  three  centuries  of  Spanish  training  are  capable  of 
being  educated  and  trained  to  govern  themselves  on  modem 
lines. 

Much  of  the  criticism  of  this  policy  was  captious  and  founded 
on  complete  ignorance  not  only  of  the  policy  but  also  of  the 
tendencies  of  modem  colonization.  Thus  it  was  alleged  some- 
what superciliously  that  the  Americans  were  disregarding  all 
precedents  and  assuming  inherent  capacity  for  solving  problems 
which  the  Dutch,  English  and  French  experts  had  not  been  able 
to  solve  to  their  entire  satisfaction  by  the  most  scientific  meth- 
ods.®^ In  fact  the  United  States  in  adopting  a  policy  and  or- 
ganizing a  government  for  the  Philippines  followed  the  most 
approved  British  theories  and  precedents.  Every  principle  which 
she  applied  had  been  approved  by  British  statesmen  or  was  the 

*^The  same  conservative  doctrine  is  thus  stated  by  Lord  Cromer:  "In 
dealing  with  Indians,  Egyptians,  Shilluks,  or  Zulus,  the  first  question  is  to 
consider  what  course  is  most  conducive  to  Indian,  Egyptian,  Shilluk  or  Zulu 
interests.  We  need  not  always  inquire  too  closely  what  these  people,  who  are 
all,  nationally  speaking,  more  or  less  in  statu  pupillari,  themselves  think  is 
best  in  their  own  interests,  although  this  is  a  point  which  deserves  serious 
consideration.  But  it  is  essential  that  each  special  issue  should  be  decided 
mainly  with  reference  to  what,  by  the  light  of  Western  knowledge  and  ex- 
perience tempered  by  local  considerations,  we  conscientiously  think  is  best  for 
tlie  subject  race,  without  reference  to  any  real  or  supposed  advantage  which 
may  accrue  to  England  as  a  nation."  Political  and  Literary  Essays  (1913), 
p.  12. 

It  may  be  doubted  whether  in  the  administration  of  her  colonies  England 
always  subordinates  her  interests  to  that  of  her  native  subjects.  Her  leading 
statesmen,  however,  certainly  recognize  her  obligation  to  do  so.  It  needs 
hardly  be  said  that  in  practise  America  reserves  the  power  to  determine 
what  is  best  for  the  natives  of  her  dependencies. 

97  We  have  seen  to  what  extent  scientific  methods  had  been  applied  to 
British  colonization. 


56  THE   PHILIPPINES 

logical  conclusion  of  British  practises.  She  followed  the  way 
the  Zeitgeist  pointed.  There  was  nothing  novel  in  her  methods 
of  procedure  unless  it  was  in  the  stress  laid  on  education  as  a 
means  of  elevating  and  developing  the  native  people. 

The  instructions  of  President  McKinley  to  the  Philippine 
Commission  followed  the  lines  laid  down  in  the  Queen's  Procla- 
mation of  1858.  Compare  the  following  with  the  language 
which  I  have  already  quoted  from  that  proclamation.  The 
commissioners  jvere  directed  to : 

"devote  their  attention  in  the  first  instance  to  the  establish- 
ment of  municipal  governments,  in  which  the  natives  of  the 
islands,  both  in  the  cities  and  in  the  rural  communities,  shall 
be  afforded  the  opportunity  to  manage  their  own  local  affairs  to 
the  fullest  extent  of  which  they  are  capable,  and  subject  to  the 
least  degree  of  supervision  and  control  which  a  careful  study  of 
their  capacities,  and  observation  of  the  workings  of  native  con- 
trol show  to  be  consistent  with  the  maintenance  of  law,  order  and 
loyalty." 

As  different  degrees  of  civilization  and  varieties  of  customs 
and  capacity  among  the  people  precluded  specific  instructions  as 
to  the  part  which  the  people  should  take  in  the  selection  of  their 
officers,  the  following  general  rules  were  to  be  observed : 

*Tn  all  cases  the  municipal  officers  who  administer  the  local 
affairs  of  the  people  are  to  be  selected  by  the  people,  and  that 
wherever  officers  of  more  extended  jurisdiction  are  to  be  se- 
lected in  any  wzy,  natives  of  the  islands  are  to  be  preferred,  and 
if  they  can  be  found  competent  and  willing  to  perform  the  duties, 
they  are  to  receive  the  offices  in  preference  to  any  others.  It 
will  be  necessary  to  fill  some  offices  for  the  present  with  Ameri- 
cans which  after  a  time  may  well  be  filled  by  natives  of  the 
islands." 

In  all  the  forms  of  government  and  administrative  provisions, 
the  Commission  should  bear  in  mind  that : 

**The  government  which  they  are  establishing  is  designed  not 


THEORY   AND    PRACTISE   OF   COLONIZATION      57 

for  our  satisfaction,  or  for  the  expression  of  our  theoretical 
views,  but  for  the  happiness,  peace  and  prosperity  of  the  people 
of  the  Philippine  Islands,  and  the  measures  adopted  should  be 
made  to  conform  to  their  customs,  their  habits  and  even  their 
prejudices,  to  the  fullest  extent  consistent  with  the  accomplish- 
ment of  the  indispensable  requisites  of  just  and  effective  gov- 
ernment." 

But  the  Commission  was  instructed  that  the  people  of  the 
islands  should  be  made  plainly  to  understand  that : 

"there  are  certain  great  principles  of  government  which  have 
been  made  the  basis  of  our  governmental  system,  which  we  deem 
essential  to  the  rule  of  law  and  the  maintenance  of  individual 
freedom,  and  of  which  they  have,  unfortunately,  been  denied 
the  experience  possessed  by  us;  that  there  are  also  certain  prac- 
tical rules  of  government  which  we  have  found  to  be  essential 
to  the  preservation  of  these  great  principles  of  liberty  and  law, 
and  that  these  principles  and  these  rules  of  government  must  be 
established  and  maintained  in  their  Islands  for  the  sake  of  their 
liberty  and  happiness,  however  much  they  may  conflict  with  the 
customs  or  laws  of  procedure  with  which  they  are  familiar." 

Then  follows  an  enumeration  of  all  the  provisions  of  the  Bill 
of  Rights  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  except  those 
relating  to  trial  by  jury  and  the  right  to  bear  arms. 

Quoting  the  pledge  contained  in  the  capitulation  of  the  City 
of  Manila,  the  president  closed  the  instructions  with  the  follow- 
ing words : 

"As  high  and  sacred  an  obligation  rests  upon  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  to  give  protection  for  property  and  life,  civil 
and  religious  freedom,  and  firm,  wise,  and  unselfish  guidance  in 
the  paths  of  peace  and  prosperity  to  all  the  people  of  the  Philip- 
pine Islands." 

There  was,  after  all,  nothing  very  radical  in  this  statement  of 
controlling  principles.  The  government  was  to  be  for  the  benefit 
primarily  of  the  people  of  the  islands;  In  their  local  affairs  they 
jvere  to  have  every  opportunity,  subject  to  proper  supervision,  to 


58  THE   PHILIPPINES 

manage  their  own  affairs,  through  officers  elected  by  themselves, 
to  the  fullest  extent  to  which  they  were  capable ;  in  filling  offices, 
natives,  when  competent,  were  to  have  the  preference;  their  cus- 
toms, habits  and  even  prejudices  were  to  be  respected,  and  their 
civil  and  political  rights  protected;  all  subject  to  certain  great 
principles  which  the  United  States  deemed  essential  for  the  rule 
of  law  and  the  maintenance  of  individual  freedom. 

But  the  United  States  was  charged  with  placing  undue  con- 
fidence in  the  governmental  value  of  education.  All  colonizing 
states  now  provide  a  certain  amount  of  education  for  their  native 
subjects.  Great  Britain  makes  order  and  material  prosperity  the 
primary  objects  of  her  governments  and  applies  what  money  is 
left  toward  education,  regarding  it  as  a  necessity  but  nevertheless 
the  generator  of  difficulties  innumerable.  "In  the  long  course  of 
our  history,"  says  Lord  Cromer,^^  "many  mistakes  have  been 
made  in  dealing  with  subject  races,  and  the  line  of  conduct  pur- 
sued at  various  times  has  often  been  very  erratic.  Nevertheless, 
it  would  be  true  to  say  that,  broadly  speaking,  British  policy  has 
been  persistently  directed  toward  an  endeavor  to  strengthen  po- 
litical bonds  through  the  medium  of  attention  to  material  in- 
terest." 

It  seems  unnecessary  to  say  that  the  Americans  also  recognize 
that  order  is  the  first  essential  of  every  government.  But  the  work 
of  education  was  commenced  in  the  Philippines  at  once  upon 
the  restoration  of  comparative  order.  In  speaking  of  English 
and  Dutch  colonization.  Governor  Ta ft  said:  "The  chief  differ- 
ence between  their  policy  and  ours  in  the  treatment  of  tropical 
people  arises  from  the  fact  that  we  are  seeking  to  prepare  the 
people  under  our  guidance  for  popular  self-government.    We  are 

98  Cromer,  "The  French  in  Algeria,"  The  Spectator,  May  31,  1913.  See  Ire- 
land, The  Far  Eastern  Tropics,  p.  240. 

In  reference  to  Lord  Cromer's  policy  in  Egypt,  Sir  Auckland  Colvin  {The 
Making  of  Modern  Egpyt,  p.  406)  says : 

"Moral  and  intellectual  progress  have  not  been  lost  sight  of,  but  they  have 
been  deliberately  relegated  to  a  subordinate  place.  The  economic  base  of  the 
Agents'  policy  has  been  the  desire  to  leave  an  appreciable  margin  in  the  hands 
of  the  taxpayer,"    And  yet  Lord  Cromer  says : 

"They  [certain  Pashas]  recognized  that  the  acquisition  of  knowledge  was 
the  sole  instrument  by  the  use  of  which  Egypt  might  perhaps  eventually  be 
free  from  foreign  control."    Modern  Egypt,  II,  p.  528. 


THEORY   AND   PRACTISE   OF   COLONIZATION      59 

attempting  to  do  this  first  by  primary  and  secondary  education 
oflFered  freely  to  the  FiHpino  people.  .  .  .  Our  chief  object 
is  to  develop  the  people  into  a  self-governing  people,  and  in 
doing  that  popular  education  is  in  our  judgment  the  first  and 
most  important  means." 

Time  tends  to  show  the  wisdom  of  this  policy.  No  British, 
Dutch,  German  or  French  colony  has  made  more  progress  ma- 
terially than  have  the  Philippines,  during  the  last  ten  years,  or 
enjoyed  a  higher  degree  of  order  and  justice.  Considering  the 
educational  work  which  has  been  done  in  Egypt,  Mr.  Cunning- 
ham says:*'  "A  larger  measure  of  education  might  conceivably 
have  made  the  task  of  government  easier  and  facilitated  the  prog- 
ress of  civilization.  A  similar  view  was  taken  by  the  United 
States  when  the  responsibility  for  the  government  of  the  Philip- 
pines was  thrust  upon  her,  a  responsibility  which,  as  in  the  case 
of  England  and  Egypt,  was  unpremeditated  and  undesired. 
America  came  promptly  to  the  conclusion  that  the  first  step  to  be 
taken  was  the  education  of  the  people  and  they  set  about  it  in 
their  characteristic  fashion.  Instead  of  sending  a  score  or  two, 
as  we  have  done  in  Egypt,  they  sent  teachers  out  in  battalions 
.  .  ,  starting  schools  everywhere  and  improving  the  many 
scholastic  institutions  already  in  existence." 

Without  much  exaggeration  it  may  be  said  that  the  American 
common  school  was  carried  to  the  East  as  a  part  of  the  materiel 
of  the  army.  Probably  nothing  exactly  like  it  was  ever  before 
witnessed.  Soldiers  left  to  guard  the  towns,  opened  extemporized 
schools  for  the  instruction  of  the  children  while  their  com- 
rades were  in  the  fields  fighting  the  parents.  It  may  have  been 
foolish,  but  it  was  a  powerful  agency  in  convincing  the  Filipinos 
of  the  good  will  of  the  Americans. 

"Behold,  they  clap  the  slave  on  the  back,  and  behold  he  ariseth 
a  man! 

They  terribly  carpet  the  earth  with  dead,  and  before  their  can- 
non cool, 

They  walk  unarmed  by  twos  and  threes  to  call  the  living  to  school." 

»' To-day  in  Egypt  (London,  1912),  p.  48. 


60  THE    PHILIPPINES 

It  has  been  said  that  the  EngHshman's  sense  of  justice  and  the 
Frenchman's  sense  of  humor  are  their  chief  assets  as  successful 
colonizers  and  rulers  of  alien  people,  and  that  the  German,  pos- 
sessing neither  of  these  invaluable  attributes,  is  heavily  handi- 
capped. Americans  possess  the  sense  of  justice  and  of  humor 
and  possibly  something  more. 

America  has  controlled  the  Philippines  for  seventeen  years, 
nearly  a  third  of  which  were  years  of  war  and  organization.  In 
that  short  time  she  has  demonstrated  not  only  that  her  people 
possess  the  Englishman's  capacity  for  governing  dependencies 
but  that  they  have  a  certain  quality  of  enthusiasm  for  high  ideals 
which  British  colonial  history  has  not  always  disclosed  and  to 
the  lack  of  which  friendly  foreign  critics  attribute  her  present 
difficulties  in  India  and  Egypt.  Law,  order  and  justice  prevail 
in  the  Philippines  as  in  all  British  colonies.  The  Filipinos  have 
their  national  aspirations,  their  agitators,  sedition  mongers,  irre- 
sponsible politic  OS  and  objectionable  newspapers.  They  are  as 
eager  for  self-government  as  the  Indians  and  Egyptians,  but  it 
is  a  noticeable  fact  that  these  conquered,  irritable  and  excitable 
people  have  not  thrown  a  bomb  or  attempted  to  murder  an 
American  official.  America's  policy  has  not  been  repressive;  it 
has  not  presented  a  stone  wall  of  opposition  to  native  aspirations, 
and  it  gives  every  indication  of  being  successful.  Never  in  the 
whole  course  of  history  has  there  been  a  better  illustration  of  the 
profound  truth  of  Edmund  Burke's  statement  that  "magnanimity 
in  politics  is  not  seldom  the  truest  wisdom." 


PART  I 
The  Land  and  the  People 

"From  the  cape  of  California,  being  the  uttermost  part  of 
Neuva  Espanna,  I  navigated  to  the  Islands  of  the  Philippinas 
hard  upon  the  coast  of  China;  of  which  countrey  I  have  brought 
such  intelligence  as  hath  not  bene  heard  of  in  these  parts.  The 
statelinesse  and  riches  of  which  countrey  I  feare  to  make  re- 
port of,  least  I  should  not  be  credited;  for  if  I  had  not  knowen 
sufficiently  the  incomparable  wealth  of  the  countrey,  I  should 
have  bene  as  incredulous  thereof,  as  others  will  be  that  have 
not  had  the  like  experience."  Thomas  Candish  to  Lord  Huns- 
don  (1588),  Hakluyt's  Principle  Navigations,  XI,  p.  Z76. 


CHAPTER  II 
The  Philippine  Archipelago 

Location — Number  and  Extent  of  the  Islands — Configuration — Character  of 
the  Coasts — Rivers — Underground  River — Mountain  Streams — The  Rainfall — 
Location  of  Cities — Mountains  and  Forests — Volcanoes — Earthquakes — Coast 
Line — Ocean  Currents — Fauna  and  Flora — Minerals — Fish  and  Fishing — 
Climate. 

At  some  remote  time  while  continents  were  in  the  making,  the 
long  eastern  coast  of  Asia  which  looked  out  upon  the  Pacific 
Ocean  was  crushed,  wrenched,  torn  and  flung  about  by  the  gi- 
gantic forces  of  nature.  After  the  cataclysm,  when  things  had 
settled  down,  turbulent  new  seas  were  washing  the  shores  of  the 
continent  and  the  ocean  was  held  at  bay  by  a  line  of  islands  which 
extended  from  the  far  north  southward  until  they  spread  fanlike 
toward  the  continent  of  Australia.  A  far-flung  line  of  defense 
had  been  created  along  the  entire  eastern  front  of  Asia.  But 
it  was  not  all  above  the  surface  of  the  sea.  There  were  depres- 
sions, and  elevations,  high  mountains  and  deep  channels.  Ever 
since  the  upheaval,  the  forces  of  nature  have  been  at  work  mold- 
ing and  shaping  the  crushed  and  broken  mass. 

The  islands  thus  formed  are  clustered  together  in  well-defined 
groups.  The  northern  and  central  have  become  the  home  of  an 
Asiatic  people  who  aspire  to  rival  the  Anglo-Saxons,  who  from 
their  seagirt  home  rule  over  one-fifth  of  the  earth  and  its  peo- 
ple. From  the  southernmost  point  of  the  Japanese  island  of  For- 
mosa can  be  seen,  on  a  clear  day,  the  northernmost  of  that  Phil- 
ippine group  of  islands  which  extends  far  to  the  southward 
where  they  cluster  about  the  northern  shores  of  Borneo  and  the 

63 


64  THE    PHILIPPINES 

Celebes,  which  with  Java  and  its  satellites  form  yet  another  ag- 
gregation. 

The  Philippine  Archipelago  thus  lies  north  of  the  Dutch  and 
British  island  of  Borneo  and  the  Dutch  island  of  Celebes,  south  of 
the  Japanese  island  of  Formosa,  and  east  of  French  Indo-China, 
the  British  colony  of  Hong  Kong,  and  the  southern  provinces  of 
the  quondam  Celestial  Republic  of  China.  It  extends  from  five 
degrees  north  latitude  to  twenty-two  degrees  north  latitude,  and  is 
thus  entirely  within  the  tropics.  An  isosceles  triangle  approxi- 
mately five  hundred  miles  on  its  base  and  a  thousand  miles  on  the 
sides  would  enclose  all  except  the  Sulu  Group  of  coral  islands, 
which  would  be  left  south  of  the  base  line  and  almost  within  sight 
of  the  fringes  of  Borneo.  Within  this  figure  there  are  about 
3,141  islands,  in  sizes  from  the  tiny  islet  inhabited  only  by  strange 
tropical  birds,  to  Luzon,  with  its  millions  of  inhabitants  and  area 
greater  than  the  state  of  Pennsylvania.  The  total  land  area  of 
the  Philippine  Archipelago  is  115,026  square  miles,  thus  exceed- 
ing the  combined  area  of  the  states  of  New  York,  New  Jersey, 
Pennsylvania  and  Delaware  and  being  seven  thousand  square 
miles  larger  than  Great  Britain.  Two  of  the  islands  combined 
are  greater  than  all  of  New  England  with  the  states  of  New  York 
and  New  Jersey  added.  Luzon  in  the  north  contains  40,969 
square  miles.  Mindanao  is  reported  to  contain  36,292  square 
miles,  although  recent  surveys  suggest  the  possibility  that  it  is 
larger  than  Luzon.  Nine  islands,  Luzon,  Mindanao,  Samar, 
Negros,  Cebu,  Panay,  Leyte,  Bohol,  Mindoro,  and  Masbate,  each 
contains  more  than  ten  thousand  square  miles,  or  six  million  four 
hundred  thousand  acres.  Twenty  of  the  islands  each  contains 
between  one  hundred  and  one  thousand  square  miles.  Seventy- 
three  islands  each  contains  between  ten  and  one  hundred  square 
miles,  262  islands  between  one  and  ten  square  miles,  and  2,775 
islands,  or  seven-eighths  of  all,  contain  less  than  one  square  mile 
each.  That  is,  seven-eighths  of  all  the  islands  are  so  small  that 
each  one  contains  less  than  640  acres  of  land.  When  the  1905 
Philippine  census  was  published  1,668  of  the  islands  had  received 
names,  while  1,473  had  not  yet  attained  to  that  dignity. 


THE   PHILIPPINE    ARCHIPELAGO  65 

Jhree  partially  submerged  isthmuses  join  the  Philippine  Archi- 
pelago to  Borneo  and  Celebes.  On  the  west  the  connection  is 
between  the  northwest  coast  of  Borneo  and  the  southernmost 
point  of  the  long  narrow  island  of  Palawan.  The  strait  of  Bal- 
abac  which  lies  between  Palawan  and  Borneo  is  full  of  reefs  and 
islands.  The  central  connection  runs  from  the  northern  coast 
of  Borneo  through  the  Tawi-Tawi,  Jolo  and  Basilan  groups  to 
the  southwestern  point  of  Mindanao  near  Zamboanga.  Between 
these  connections  lies  the  Sulu  Sea  with  an  average  depth  of 
six  thousand  feet.  Farther  east,  a  third  isthmus  extends  from 
Celebes  through  the  SanguU  group  to  the  southeast  point  of  Min- 
danao near  the  gulf  of  Davao,  thence  northward  in  a  great  curve 
through  Leyte,  Samar,  and  southern  Luzon.  Between  the  east- 
ern and  western  connections  lies  the  deep  Celebes  Sea.  On  these 
submerged  connections  there  are  many  coral  reefs  which  often 
lie  dangerously  near  the  surface  of  the  warm  shallow  waters. 

The  Philippines  face  the  setting  stm  and  the  shore  of  Asia 
from  which  they  were  torn.  During  the  greater  part  of  the  year 
equatorial  currents  and  trade  winds  pile  the  waters  of  the  Pa- 
cific on  the  bold  and  inhospitable  eastern  coast,  rendering  the 
few  harbors  dangerous  and  useless.  The  western  coast  is  broken 
by  inlets,  bays  and  harbors.  Between  the  coast  line  and  the 
verdure  covered  mountains  in  the  hazy  distance,  lie  long  stretches 
of  fertile  level  country  shaded  by  cocoanut  palm  and  banana 
trees,  beneath  which  are  many  villages  teeming  with  brown  peo- 
ple. White  convent  buildings  and  church  steeples  rise  above  the 
verdure  and  suggest  life  and  civilization  to  the  voyager  whose 
ship  day  after  day  skirts  the  island  shores. 

Numerous  rivers  find  their  sources  in  the  mountains,  and  after 
rushing  through  narrow  gorges,  meander  slowly  across  the  plains 
and  fall  sluggishly  into  the  sea.  These  short  streams  form  in- 
valuable highways  for  the  transportation  in  small  boats  of  the 
produce  of  the  country.  The  Cagayan  River  in  northern  Luzon, 
the  Father  Nile  of  the  Philippines,  flows  into  the  Pacific  at  Apirri 
and  is  navigable  for  large  steamers  to  the  upper  reaches  where 
grows  most  of  the  tobacco  for  which  the  island  is  famous.  Sixty 


66  THE   PHILIPPINES 

miles  from  its  mouth  this  river  is  as  wide  as  the  Mississippi  at 
St.  Louis,  but  it  is  comparatively  shallow  and  requires  the  con- 
stant attention  of  a  large  and  expensive  dredge  boat. 

The  Rio  Grande  de  Mindanao  or  Cotabatu,  in  southern  and  the 
Agusan  in  northern  Mindanao  are  large  rivers  each  more  than  two 
hundred  miles  in  length.  The  Pampanga  in  Luzon  carries  much 
commerce.  The  Agno  and  Abra  find  their  sources  in  the  moun- 
tains of  Benguet  and  wander  through  various  and  changing 
channels,  across  the  plains  of  Pangasinan  to  the  sea.  During  the 
dry  season  these  rivers  seem  insignificant,  but  the  engineer  who 
is  attempting  to  dam  and  confine  them  within  their  proper  chan- 
nels and  the  official  who  is  required  to  find  the  money  for  such 
conservation  proceedings  never  cross  their  dry  beds  without  a 
feeling  of  exasperated  respect  for  a  worthy  but  troublesome 
opponent.  When  the  torrential  rains  come,  these  modest  rivers 
are  suddenly  transformed  into  rushing  torrents.  Inconceivable 
volumes  of  water  come  roaring,  pitching  and  tossing  down  the 
mountain  gorges,  and  spread  wooden  bridges  and  structural  iron 
work  all  over  the  valleys.  In  such  times  the  rivers  disdain  to 
follow  their  recognized  and  legitimate  courses  to  the  sea  and 
treat  with  contempt  the  carefully  executed  engineering  works 
designed  to  prevent  the  wearing  away  of  banks  and  the  destruc- 
tion of  villages  and  haciendas.  They  often  cut  new  channels  and 
occasionally  leave  concrete  bridges  standing  in  lonesome  dignity 
miles  from  any  water.  They  make  of  old  highways  in  the  rear 
of  the  towns  new  channels  through  which  they  thereafter  for  a 
time  placidly  flow  while  the  carefully  constructed  and  expensive 
docks,  ripraps  and  warehouses  face  sadly  out  upon  dry  sandy 
wastes^ 

The  Bued  River  rises  in  the  mountains  near  Baguio  and  travels 
about  twenty  miles  through  deep  and  picturesque  gorges,  which 
in  places  are  not  more  than  one  thousand  feet  wide,  before  it 
reaches  the  plains.  In  that  distance  it  falls  about  five  thousand 
feet. 

Soon  after  the  United  States  Commission  took  charge  of 
Philippine  affairs  it  was  decided  to  build  a  sanatorium  in  the 


THE   PHILIPPINE   ARCHIPELAGO  67 

mountains  in  order  that  overheated,  weary,  workwom  civil  gov- 
ernors, commissioners  and  other  pubhc  officials  might  find  rest 
and  health.  The  beautiful  plateau  where  the  Igorots  had  built 
a  village  which  they  called  Baguio,  which  translated  means  ty- 
phoon, was  selected.  But  it  was  five  thousand  feet  up  to  Baguio, 
and  a  road  had  to  be  constructed.  The  place  was  near  the  head 
waters  of  the  Bued  River,  and  for  reasons  which  neither  gods  nor 
men  have  been  able  to  fathom  the  road  was  located  along  the 
river  bank  in  the  bottom  of  the  long  gorge.  The  first  location 
was  elsewhere.  The  construction  was  commenced  at  Baguio, 
and  the  work  continued  for  several  miles  along  the  ridge  on  a 
good  level  grade.  Then  suddenly  it  became  necessary  to  drop 
over  a  cliff  to  the  valley  about  two  thousand  feet  below.  Appar- 
ently no  one  had  previously  observed  this  cliff,  so  the  work  and 
the  route  were  abandoned  and  work  commenced  anew  at  the 
other  end  of  the  river.  As  completed  the  road  follows  the  river 
bed  until  within  a  short  distance  of  Baguio  when  it  rises  some 
two  thousand  feet  by  a  series  of  zigzags  and  lands  among  the 
pine  trees  and  cool  breezes  of  a  glorious  new  climate.  It  is 
one  of  the  most  picturesque  mountain  roads  outside  of  Switzer- 
land. One  can  hardly  believe  that  engineers  advised  the  con- 
struction of  the  Benguet  road  in  a  tropical  country  along  the 
bottom  of  a  long  mountain  gorge  where  it  was  absolutely  certain 
to  be  seriously  damaged  or  destroyed  every  rainy  season.  But 
it  was  commenced  and  in  time  completed,  and  no  one  in  power  has 
ever  found  a  good  opportunity  or  possessed  sufficient  moral 
courage  to  abandon  it.  Every  rainy  season  has  left  it  badly  dam- 
aged, and  the  expenses  of  maintenance  and  repair  have  been  so 
great  that  the  road  is  popularly  supposed  to  have  been  surfaced 
with  gold  dust. 

In  the  autumn  of  1911  forty  inches  of  water  fell  at  Baguio 
in  twenty-four  hours.  The  mountains  slid  into  the  gorge.  The 
Bued  River  rose  sixty  feet  and  when  order  had  been  restored 
the  lower  reaches  had  been  scoured  clean  of  road,  concrete  walls 
and  bridges.     Emerging  from  the  gorge,  the  torrent  met  the 


68  THE   PHILIPPINES 

railroad,  and  so  great  was  the  propulsive  power  that  the  wits 
said  that  for  weeks  thereafter  the  structural  iron  belonging  to 
the  Benguet  Road  and  the  Manila  Railroad  Company  was  being 
picked  up  by  thrifty  Celestials  across  the  sea  on  the  coast  of 
China.  Nor  did  it  sound  entirely  improbable  to  those  who  were 
familiar  with  the  effectiveness  of  mountain  rivers  under  the  in- 
fluence of  torrential  tropical  rain-storms. 

On  the  western  coast  of  the  island  of  Palawan  there  flows  into 
the  sea  from  what  looks  like  the  entrance  to  an  abandoned  coal 
mine  in  the  hills  of  Ohio  or  Pennsylvania,  an  underground  river 
which  is  one  of  the  physical  wonders  of  the  world.  From  whence 
it  comes  no  one  as  yet  knows.  To  the  few  natives  of  the  remote 
and  desolate  coast  the  cave  has  an  evil  reputation.  Ghosts  and 
such  like  evil  and  undesirable  things  have  made  it  their  abiding 
place  for  ages  past,  and  Moro  pirates  who  disappeared  through 
its  jagged  entrance  were  seen  no  more.  Until  recently  nothing 
was  known  of  this  remarkable  natural  phenomenon.  The  first 
partial  exploration  was  made  by  Lieutenant  Miller  while  acting 
as  governor  of  Palawan.  In  the  spring  of  1912  the  river  was 
further  explored  and  surveyed  by  a  party  under  my  direction. 
After  passing  up  the  river  for  a  distance  of  three  miles,  the 
boats  were  stopped  by  a  huge  mass  of  rock  which  an  earthquake 
had  shaken  from  overhead.  The  boulders  filled  the  channel  to 
the  height  of  probably  sixty  feet.  The  climb  over  the  slimy  rocks 
into  the  unknown  cavity  was  difficult  and  rather  awe-inspiring  for 
amateur  explorers.  Beyond  the  rocks  there  was  a  bowl-shaped 
depression  the  bottom  of  which  seemed  to  be  on  a  level  with  the 
lower  river  bed.  The  roof  overhead  was  like  an  inverted  bowl, 
thus  creating  almost  a  round  cave. 

After  passing  through  a  kind  of  tunnel  for  several  hundred 
feet  the  river  was  again  located.  The  cavern  or  tube  through 
which  it  came  was  about  the  same  size  as  that  below  the  cave-in 
and  there  appeared  to  be  nothing  to  prevent  an  exploring  party 
from  continuing  if  a  boat  could  be  carried  over  the  rock  pile. 
But  as  neither  canoes  nor  canvas  boats  were  available  further 
progress  was  impossible; 


THE   PHILIPPINE   ARCHIPELAGO  69 

The  river  throughout  its  entire  course  averages  about  thirty- 
feet  in  width  and  probably  fifteen  feet  in  depth.  In  places  the 
ceiling  of  the  cave  is  so  low  that  it  is  necessary  to  lower  the 
head  in  passing,  while  elsewhere  it  expands  into  a  good-sized 
chamber,  from  one  hundred  to  one  hundred  fifty  feet  in  height. 
There  is  very  little  variation  in  the  size  of  the  stream 
until  the  obstruction  is  reached.  The  water  is  fresh,  clear  and 
cool  and  flows  with  a  steady  but  not  rapid  current.  The  air  is 
fresh  and  pure.  The  scenery  is  picturesque  and  extraordinarily- 
interesting. 

Having  ascertained  that  the  river  continued  above  the  cave-in 
and  not  having  the  necessary  equipment  for  proceeding  farther, 
we  began  the  return  journey  toward  daylight.  The  party  had 
been  under  the  mountain  for  about  five  hours.  The  Stygian 
darkness  was  but  slightly  affected  by  the  insufficient  lights.  The 
return  to  the  sea  was  a  memorable  journey.  The  soft  gliding 
water  made  no  sound.  There  were  no  waterfalls.  Only  the  oc- 
casional flutter  of  the  wings  of  a  bat,  the  dip  of  an  oar  and  the 
awed  ejaculations  of  surprise  and  appreciation  broke  a  silence 
which  was  that  of  the  ages.  The  novelty  of  the  situation  had 
somewhat  worn  away  and  the  details  of  the  rock  formations 
could  be  more  closely  observed.  Nothing  but  an  artist's  pencil 
could  tell  the  story.  Photographs  give  but  the  outlines,  and  con- 
vey no  adequate  conception  of  the  marvelous  detail  of  line  and 
color.  Nature's  sculpture  is  everywhere.  There  a  stain  like  a 
splotch  of  paint  from  the  brush  of  a  drunken  painter  suddenly 
assumed  the  form  of  a  huge  black  cat,  squat  upon  his  haunches, 
and  you  gazed  fascinated,  expecting  momentarily  to  hear  the 
cavern  echo  with  an  angry  yowl.  But  the  boat  glided  silently  by, 
leaving  the  fantastic  feline  to  his  darkness.  Looking  over  your 
shoulder  for  one  last  glance,  you  found  him  metamorphosed  into 
some  sprawling,  floundering  monster  without  a  name.  Another 
dark  splotch  on  the  high  wall  had  become  a  warrior  bold,  with 
drawn  sword,  in  the  dress  of  past  centuries.  The  illusion  was 
complete.  As  the  angle  of  light  changed  the  sword  came  slowly 
down  in  salute  to  the  passing  procession.    The  warrior,  too,  was 


70  THE    PHILIPPINES 

left  to  meditate  upon  the  strange  scene  of  ghostly  boats  gliding 
slowly  by,  amid  the  uncertain  light  of  flickering  torches,  filled 
with  mystic  figures,  bound  seaward. 

Again  the  scene  changes.  Here  the  note  is  of  ancient  Egypt. 
Carved  by  Time  itself,  unaided  by  the  hand  of  man  there  reposes 
a  complete  and  finished  griffin,  or  is  it  a  sphinx  resting  solitary 
as  amid  the  sands  of  the  desert?  Between  stately  stone  pillars 
rise  a  series  of  steps  leading  from  the  water  to  some  temple 
within.  It  all  belongs  on  the  banks  of  the  Nile.  Stalactites  in 
myriad  numbers,  carved  into  forms  of  fruit,  flowers  and  vegeta- 
bles, are  everywhere.  Along  the  roof  extends  the  perfect  keel 
of  a  yacht.  Then  the  cavern  stretches  away,  an  almost  perfect 
rectangle,  with  walls  and  ceiling  decorated  with  many  colors — 
surely  the  deft  work  of  an  artistic,  designing  hand.  A  sharp 
turn  of  the  way  and  a  huge  stalactite  hangs  glittering  like  a  chan- 
delier from  the  ceiling  of  some  great  ballroom.  Another  has 
been  cut  by  silent  creeping  waters  into  the  form  of  a  huge  bunch 
of  banana  leaves.  Here  hang  dark  brown  leaves  of  curing  to- 
bacco while  there  the  rocks  are  folded  and  convolved  into  a  great 
artichoke. 

Suddenly  the  boats  glided  into  a  great  chamber,  resplendent 
with  color  and  decorations,  like  a  stage  set  for  a  scene  in  some 
grand  opera  or  spectacular  drama.  The  chiseled  stones  catch 
and  break  the  light  into  myriad  glistening  particles.  All  these 
and  a  thousand  more  wonderful  things  are  there  three  miles  in- 
ward from  the  sea  and  four  thousand  feet  beneath  the  roots  of 
the  great  forest  trees  which  cover  the  mountains  above. 

As  the  boat  neared  the  exit  a  certain  eagerness  to  reach  day- 
light became  apparent  which  evidenced  the  strain  inevitable  to 
such  a  journey.  The  air,  although  comparatively  pure,  lacked 
vitalizing  power.  We  turned  suddenly  to  the  left,  and  the  en- 
trance flashed  into  view.  The  brilliant  yellow  sunlight  seemed  to 
be  crowding  and  surging  against  the  jagged  saw  teeth  cavities 
like  the  surf  of  the  sea  beating  upon  a  rocky  shore.  The  op- 
pressive silence  gave  place  to  the  sound  of  life  and  being.     So 


THE    PHILIPPINE   ARCHIPELAGO  71 

sudden  the  change  that  we  seemed  to  hear  "the  roar  of  sap  in 
bough  impregnated  and  the  deafening  rumor  of  tlie  grass." 

Manila  is  situated  at  the  mouth  of  the  Pasig  River  which  flows 
into  a  great  bay  twenty-five  miles  in  diameter,  over  the  narrow 
entrance  of  which  the  great  fortress  of  Corregidor  stands  guard. 
The  traveler  in  the  Philippines  is  impressed  by  the  fact  that  the 
towns  and  cities  are  badly  located.  They  are  seldom  on  the 
coast.  Even  Manila  is  twenty-five  miles  from  tlie  entrance  to 
Manila  Bay.  It  would  have  been  better  for  the  modems  if  Le- 
gaspi  had  located  the  city  at  or  near  Maravales  at  the  entrance  to 
the  bay,  where  there  is  a  good  protected  natural  harbor  lying 
under  the  guns  of  Corregidor.  Such  a  location  would  have  had 
many  advantages  over  the  present  one.  Nature  there  has  fur- 
nished good  water,  and  perfect  drainage.  From  their  residences 
on  the  mountainsides,  the  inhabitants  would  have  enjoyed  the 
cool  invigorating  breezes,  and  a  view  such  as  poets  seldom 
imagine  and  painters  never  dare  paint. 

But  the  cities  and  towns  of  the  Philippines  are  centuries  old 
and  their  original  locations  were  determined  largely  by  reasons 
of  defense.  From  the  very  earliest  times  the  coasts  were  har- 
ried by  sea  rovers.  First  came  the  Dutch  and  the  Portuguese, 
then  the  Malay  pirates  from  Borneo,  and  ever  after  the  Moros 
from  the  southern  islands.  The  towns  and  villages  shrank  back 
from  the  shore  in  order  to  find  protection  from  tliese  ocean  raid- 
ers. From  the  north  of  Luzon  to  the  far  south  the  coasts  bear 
the  marks  of  the  long  contest  with  the  Moros.  On  many  stra- 
tegic points  the  Spaniards  and  Filipinos  constructed  the  stone 
watch  towers  which  still  stand  gray  and  picturesque  amid  the 
green  foliage  and  entangled  vines.  For  two  and  one-half  cen- 
turies a  substantial  stone  fort,  built  by  the  natives  under  the 
direction  of  a  Spanish  friar,  on  a  cliff  jutting  into  the  sea,  has 
guarded  the  entrance  to  the  beautiful  little  harbor  of  Romblon. 
It  was  built  of  the  white  stone  found  on  the  island  and  stands  to- 
day an  interesting  and  picturesque  memorial  of  the  time  when 
pirates'  craft  and  sea  marauders  were  as  common  as  now  are 
merchant  vessels  and  tourists. 


72  THE    PHILIPPINES 

The  entire  Archipelago  is  mountainous,  with  broad  valleys  be- 
tween the  ranges  and  along  the  shores,  and  occasional  high  table- 
lands in  the  interior.  The  general  trend  of  the  mountains  is  north 
and  south.  Ordinarily  the  height  Is  not  great  enough  to  be  very 
imposing,  but  what  is  lacking  in  grandeur  and  impressiveness 
is  supplied  by  beauty  of  form  and  coloring.  The  tropical  forests 
mass  about  the  foothills  and  roll  up  the  mountainsides  like  green 
waves  on  a  sloping  beach  until  they  crown  the  summits  with 
verdure.  There  is  little  of  the  ruggedness  of  the  mountains  of 
temperate  climes.  The  soft  warm  mists  hang  about  them. 
Strange  animals  live  in  their  shadowy  depths,  and  stranger  men. 
Primitive,  timid  little  people  build  their  habitations  in  the 
branches  of  the  great  trees,  hidden  amid  the  entanglement  of 
vines  and  parasitic  growths.  Unseen  waterfalls  splash  and  tin- 
kle amid  the  silence.  To  climb  the  slopes  of  one  of  these 
mountain  ranges  beneath  the  great  trees  through  whose  inter- 
lacing tops  the  sun  never  penetrates,  is  to  realize  the  meaning  of 
the  forest  primeval. 

In  the  interior  the  mountains  rise  often  to  grandeur.  Mount 
Apo  in  Mindanao  is  more  than  ten  thousand  feet  in  height,  while 
many  others  run  from  five  to  eight  thousand  feet.  The  scenery 
in  the  Benguet  mountains  is  very  beautiful  and  impressive.  From 
the  observatory  on  Mount  Mirador  the  plains  of  Pangasanan 
unroll  toward  the  great  Gulf  of  Lingayan  and  the  China  sea. 
From  the  rest  house  on  the  summit  of  Santa  Tomas  on  a  clear 
night,  the  lights  of  Manila,  one  hundred  fifty  miles  away,  glow 
dully  against  the  sky.  About  twenty  of  the  mountains  are  vol- 
canic and  many  others  bear  the  marks  of  early  activity.  About 
a  dozen  have  been  in  active  eruption  within  historic  times,  while 
scores  of  others  are  quiescent  or  extinct. 

Mount  Mayon  in  Albay  is  one  of  the  most  beautiful  moun- 
tains in  all  the  world.  A  perfect  cone,  with  a  base  eighty  miles 
in  circumference,  it  rises  in  the  midst  of  a  rich  cultivated  plain 
to  the  height  of  eight  thousand  feet.  Smoke  and  steam  float 
about  the  summit  in  lazy  grandeur.  Amid  the  memories  of 
many  beautiful  tropical  scenes,  none  stands  out  more  distinctly 


THE   PHILIPPINE   ARCHIPELAGO  73 

in  my  mind  than  a  ride  over  the  splendid  road  which  runs  en- 
tirely around  the  base  of  the  mountain.  A  few  miles  from  the 
base  are  the  ruins  of  the  old  city  of  Daraga.  The  top  of  the 
church  and  convent  only  show  above  the  ground  to  tell  the  story 
of  the  eruption  in  the  early  years  of  the  last  century. 

Taal  volcano,  forty  miles  from  Manila,  rises  from  the  center 
of  a  lake  to  a  height  of  a  few  hundred  feet.  It  is  the  most  active 
volcano  in  the  Archipelago.  The  eruption  of  1873  did  much 
damage.  That  of  1903  was  not  so  bad,  but  in  1910  Taal 
eclipsed  all  previous  records.  More  than  a  thousand  people  who, 
despite  warnings,  continued  to  live  in  a  village  at  its  base, 
lost  their  lives.  Much  damage  was  done  to  the  neighboring 
country.  The  initial  explosion  brought  half  the  people  of  Manila, 
forty  miles  away,  out  of  their  beds  to  see  one  of  the  most  won- 
derful and  impressive  spectacles  which  the  world  has  to  offer. 

Coral  animals  have  aided  volcanic  action  in  building  the 
islands.  Volcanism  has  raised  the  land  through  the  warm  waters 
and  formed  thousands  of  islands  fringed  about  with  coral  reefs. 

Serious  damage  has  often  been  done  by  earthquakes.  In  1645 
many  churches,  monasteries  and  public  buildings  in  Manila 
were  destroyed.  The  governor-general  had  to  be  extricated  from 
the  ruins  of  his  palace.  In  1865  Manila  was  again  badly  dam- 
aged. During  certain  months  of  the  year  slight  quakes  and 
tremors  are  so  common  that  the  people  become  accustomed  to 
them  and  pay  them  little  attention. 

Although  the  islands  are  of  volcanic  origin,  there  are  large 
areas  of  northern  Luzon  which  are  underlaid  with  granite,  chists 
and  the  like,  and  several  islands  like  Cebu  and  Bohol  are  covered 
with  a  thin  layer  of  limestone.  The  elevated  lakes,  marshes, 
waterfalls  and  beach  lines  which  are  so  common  show  that  many 
changes  of  level  have  occurred  within  times  which  are,  geolog- 
ically speaking,  recent. 

The  coast  line  is  more  than  double  that  of  the  United  States 
proper.  The  coasts  are  sinuous  and  intricate;  the  currents  un- 
certain and  unaccountable;  the  channels  dangerous  and  tides 
variable.    The  navigator  who  strays  from  the  beaten  paths,  un- 


74  THE   PHILIPPINES 

less  very  familiar  with  the  waters,  takes  serious  chances  of  land- 
ing his  craft  upon  some  submerged  coral  reef.  Even  the  most 
experienced  navigators  may  go  astray. 

One  evening  when  traveling  from  Sandakan,  in  British  North 
Borneo,  across  the  dangerous  Sulu  Sea  to  Siassi,  my  attention 
was  called  to  a  statement  in  the  official  sailing  directions  of  the 
experience  of  an  English  ship,  which  had  laid  a  course  for  two 
miles  south  of  a  small  island,  and  in  the  morning  found  itself 
ten  miles  to  the  north  of  its  objective  point.  It  had  been  car- 
ried twelve  miles  sidewise  as  it  were  by  the  current.  We  laid 
the  exact  course  of  the  English  ship,  making  allowance  for  the 
current.  The  night  was  perfect  and  the  sea  quiet.  At  daylight 
our  ship  was  several  miles  south  of  the  island  in  a  nest  of  reefs, 
the  current  having  run  from  exactly  the  opposite  point  from 
which  it  was  expected.  A  few  months  later  the  same  navigator, 
going  to  the  same  island,  laid  a  course  which  he  considered  a  fair 
average,  and  struck  the  low  island  at  full  speed.  Such  are  the 
uncertainties  of  navigation  in  the  Sulu  Sea.  At  times  the  cur- 
rents seem  to  flow  without  law  or  reason  as  the  wind  blows 
where  it  listeth. 

The  animal  life  in  the  Archipelago  resembles  that  of  the  sur- 
rounding regions,  but  shows  nevertheless  remarkable  differences. 
There  are  fewer  mammalia  than  in  the  neighboring  islands  of 
Borneo  and  Java.  There  are  but  two  species  of  monkey,  three 
of  the  carnivora,  and  but  six  of  the  deer  tribe — the  most  interest- 
ing being  the  tiny  mouse  deer,  which  is  no  larger  than  a  little  rat 
terrier.  Small  rodents  are  very  scarce,  but  there  are  not  less 
than  thirty  species  of  bat.  The  great  fruit  bat,  which  is  found 
in  many  of  the  southern  islands,  has  a  body  as  large  as  that  of  a 
good  sized  cat,  with  a  spread  of  wings  measuring  as  much  as 
five  feet.  The  carabao  and  timarau  are  the  only  large  mammalia. 
The  latter  lives  in  Mindora,  where  it  is  the  ambition  and  the 
terror  of  all  hunters.  The  mountains  and  foothills  abound  in 
wild  boar  and  deer.  Monkeys  are  quite  common,  and  travelers 
in  the  remote  districts  soon  become  familiar  with  them.^ 


1  In  a  Historia  de  Mindanao  y  Jolo  (1667),  by  Francisca  Combes,  a  work 


THE    PHILIPPINE   ARCHIPELAGO  75 

Certain  animals  are  found  on  certain  islands  and  not  else- 
where. Thus  the  timarau  lives  in  Mindora,  the  porcupine  in 
Palawan  and  the  Calamianes  Islands,  and  numerous  other  ani- 
mals live  within  very  restricted  districts. 

Some  unpleasant  animals  inhabit  the  waters.  Crocodiles  are 
often  to  be  seen  basking  in  the  sun  along  the  banks  of  the  large 
rivers,  and  furnish  rare  target  practise  from  passing  steamers. 
But  they  are  not  always  in  evidence.  I  once  spent  a  night  and 
part  of  two  days  in  a  Moro  vinfa  traveling  through  marshes  and 
rivers  to  reach  Lake  Buluan  under  the  shadow  of  Mount  Apo, 
where  crocodiles  were  popularly  supposed  to  feed  only  on  ambi- 
tious hunters,  but  the  day's  hunt  revealed  not  one  crocodile. 
However,  on  the  return  journey  through  the  marshes,  four  guns 
brought  down  from  above  more  than  five  hundred  fine  ducks  of 
various  species. 

Lizards  are  common  and  in  sizes  to  suit  all  tastes.  The  little 
chirping  house  lizard  is  a  sort  of  cricket  who  lives  on  the  ceiling 
instead  of  the  hearth,  and  earns  the  friendship  and  gratitude  of 
his  hosts  by  eating  an  astonishing  quantity  of  flies,  and  other 
such  pests.  Of  snakes  there  must  be  a  reasonable  number,  al- 
though in  my  travels  about  the  islands  I  was  never  so  fortunate  as 
to  see  even  a  little  one.  However,  I  was  not  looking  for  snakes. 
Pythons  must  exist  because  they  can  be  seen  in  the  museums, 
and  many  narrations  of  desperate  encounters  with  them  have 
been  written.  But  they  seem  to  belong  generally  to  the  prehis- 
toric or  the  late  Empire  period,  after  the  war  had  become  un- 
interesting and  while  the  home-land  appetite  for  stories  of  adven- 
ture remained  unsatiated.  House  snakes  are  also  traditional, 
but  few  moderns  have  seen  them.  Formerly  it  is  said  that  they 
were  sold  on  the  streets  like  parrots  and  canaries,  for  pets.^ 

which  Blumentritt  says  has  "always  been  considered  one  of  the  most  valuable 
pearls  of  Philippine  literature,"  it  is  said  that  wild  elephants  were  then  found 
on  the  islands. 

*  "In  view  of  the  number  of  species  known,  it  is  a  matter  of  some  surprise 
that  snakes  are  so  seldom  encountered  by  those  whose  business  leads  them 
into  the  forests  or  through  the  high  grass;  in  fact  the  majority  of  people 
seem  to  believe  that  very  few  snakes  exist  here."  E.  L  Griffin,  "Poisonous 
Snakes  in  the  Philippines."    Phil.  Jour,  of  Sci.,  January,  1909,  sec.  B. 


76  THE    PHILIPPINES 

Insects  are  too  numerous  for  the  comfort  of  other  than  nat- 
uralists, but  fewer  than  one  is  led  to  expect.  The  number  of 
species  is  said  to  be  great,  but  the  amount  of  insect  Hfe  is  sur- 
prisingly small.  Common  house  flies  are  comparatively  few  and 
mosquitoes,  while  always  present,  are  scarcely  anywhere  such 
pests  as  in  certain  sections  of  the  United  States.  In  the  large 
cities  they  have  been  almost  exterminated  by  the  modern  crusade 
against  the  carriers  of  fever  bacilli.  Ants  of  various  kinds  and 
locusts  are  numerous,  the  former  eating  everything  but  the  cor- 
rugated iron  roofs  of  the  wooden  houses  and  the  latter  often 
desolating  the  fields. 

Cockroaches  furnish  material  for  some  hysteria  among  the 
ladies  and  not  a  little  profanity  from  the  men.  They  are  of  stu- 
pendous size  according  to  the  ordinary  home  standard  for  cock- 
roaches. Three  inches  In  length  with  an  expanse  of  wing  suffi- 
cient to  suggest  a  bat  is  about  the  average.  They  are  a  very  great 
nuisance,  as  they  eat  everything  from  boots  to  bookbinding. 

The  general  features  of  the  flora  are  Malayan,  resembling  that 
of  Java,  Borneo  and  the  Celebes.  In  northern  Luzon  the  plants 
resemble  those  of  China.  But  the  differences  are  such  as  to  give 
the  flora  of  the  Philippines  marked  individuality.  In  769  in- 
stances there  are  differences  sufficient  to  make  distinct  species. 

On  Mount  Apo  In  Mindanao  there  are  birds  which  are  said  to 
be  found  nowhere  else  In  the  world.  The  number  of  species  is 
about  the  same  as  In  the  United  States,  but  birds  are  not  so 
common.  Of  286  species  found  in  Luzon  fifty-one  do  not  exist 
on  any  other  island.  The  avifauna  of  Samar  and  Leyte  contain 
twenty-two  species  not  found  elsewhere,  and  seventeen  are  pe- 
culiar to  Mindora  and  Palawan.  Cebu,  a  near  neighbor  of 
Negros,  on  one  side  and  Bohol  on  the  other,  contains  nine  species 
of  land  birds  not  found  elsewhere.  The  islands  contain  three 
hundred  species  of  land  birds,  more  than  are  found  in  Java. 
Snipe,  plover,  pigeons,  ducks  and  geese  abound.  But  there  are 
many  important  genera  found  In  other  Malay  Islands  which  are 
not  found  in  the  Philippines.  Flocks  of  white  parrots  give  a 
touch  of  color  to  the  somber  forests  of  Mindanao. 


THE   PHILIPPINE   ARCHIPELAGO  77 

Flowers  are  common,  although  not  as  a  rule  very  striking. 
The  Philippines  have  been  described  as  a  land  where  the  birds 
have  no  song  and  the  flowers  are  without  perfume,  but  this  is  a 
libel  on  both  birds  and  flowers.  The  night  air  is  heavy  with  the 
fragrance  of  the  dama  de  nocJie  and  the  flower  of  the  famous 
ilang-ilang.  Orchids  in  great  variety  are  common.  At  certain 
seasons  the  entire  foliage  of  large  trees  turns  to  flaming  red, 
purple  or  violet.  Long  avenues  in  Manila  are  lined  with  the 
so-called  fire  trees  which  during  the  month  of  July  blaze  with 
their  gorgeous  foliage. 

The  mountains  are  shot  with  minerals,  but  for  reasons  mainly 
economic  mining  has  never  been  very  profitable.  Gold  has  al- 
ways been  produced  and  marketed.  The  mountain  people  bring 
gold  dust  to  the  towns  for  exchange  and  sale.  Coal  is  found  in 
good  quantities,  but  the  quality  is  poor,  as  the  islands  are  not  yet 
old  enough  to  produce  a  very  good  grade.  The  operator  who 
holds  on  to  his  claim  until  the  proper  geological  period  arrives 
will  undoubtedly  gain  great  wealth.  There  is  also  copper  on  the 
upper  waters  of  the  River  Abra  which  has  been  crudely  mined  by 
Spaniards  and  natives  in  the  past.  Marble  exists  on  the  island 
of  Romblon,  but  inconsiderate  earthquakes  have  wrenched  and 
twisted  the  deposits  and  made  it  difficult  to  find  large  unbroken 
slabs.  There  is  also  some  iron,  and  the  prospects  for  petroleum 
are  said  to  be  good. 

The  coast  waters  teem  with  fish,  which  form  an  important 
element  in  the  food  of  the  Filipino  people.  Trout  and  bass  do 
well  in  the  mountain  streams,  although  the  torrential  rains  are 
liable  to  wash  them  down  into  the  valleys,  where  they  perish 
in  the  warm  waters.  After  the  streams  near  Baguio  were 
stocked  with  bass,  the  Igorots  developed  remarkable  skill  in  catch- 
ing them  with  their  hands.  The  warm  waters  of  the  tropical  sea 
are  filled  with  curiously  shaped  and  vividly  colored  fish.  I  have 
seen  Moros  frying  goldfish  for  supper.  I  am  not  an  ichthyologist 
and  can  not  speak  with  authority,  but  venture  the  assertion  that 
there  is  not  a  fish  in  the  Naples,  Honolulu  or  other  aquaria  which 
is  not  found  in  Philippine  waters.     The  aquarium  at  Manila  is 


78  THE   PHILIPPINES 

a  unique  structure  built  into  the  ancient  city  walls  and  can  easily 
be  made  the  most  complete  in  the  world. 

Until  very  recently  it  was  asserted  that  no  game  fish  lives  in 
Philippine  waters.  But  the  difficulty  was  in  the  absence  of  game 
fishermen.  It  is  commonly  said  that  the  fish  are  too  lazy  to  bite, 
but  this,  like  similar  statements  with  reference  to  the  people,  is 
a  perverted,  exaggerated  statement  of  the  facts.  It  is  the  fish- 
ermen who  are  generally  too  languid  to  undergo  the  necessary 
exertion.  There  are  no  finer  fishing  grounds  in  the  world.  Bar- 
racuda, tanguingui  (Spanish  mackerel),  pompano,  bonito,  lapu- 
lapM  (groupers),  snappers,  Sargent  fish,  tuna,  tarpon  (probably) 
and  many  others  abound  and  furnish  satisfactory  sport  for  the 
most  seasoned  and  experienced  sportsman. 

The  various  characterizations  of  the  climate  of  the  Philippines, 
ranging  from  "delightful"  to  "deadly"  are  all  correct  when 
proper  consideration  is  given  time,  place  and  personality.  It 
varies  in  different  islands  and  localities,  depending  upon  latitude, 
altitude,  the  relative  distribution  of  land  and  water,  the  size  and 
configuration  of  the  island,  the  proximity  of  mountain  ranges, 
the  composition  of  the  soil,  the  vegetation,  the  ocean  currents  and 
various  other  matters.^ 

According  to  the  thermometer  the  heat  is  seldom  excessive,  but 
individuals  measure  by  other  standards.  So  great  is  the  humid- 
ity that  a  reasonable  degree  of  heat  is  trying  to  the  temper  and 
the  linen.  But  while  a  "wet  heat"  is  uncomfortable  it  is  seldom 
deadly.  The  situation  is  saved  by  the  fact  that  the  extremes  of 
heat  and  humidity  never  coincide.  During  May  the  thermom- 
eter will  often  register  ninety  degrees  Fahrenheit,  but  the  humid- 
ity is  low  and  the  nights,  with  few  exceptions,  cool  and  re- 
freshing. 

The  highest  recorded  temperature  at  Manila  is  103  degrees 
Fahrenheit  in  May,  1871,  and  101  degrees  Fahrenheit  in  May, 
1912.  The  average  temperature  during  the  years  from  1885  to 
1912  was:  January,  76.8;  February,  77.5;  March,  79.9;  April, 

3  "Climate,"  by  Rev.  Jose  Algue,  Censtu  of  the  Phil.  (1906),  p.  87  et  seq^ 


THE    PHILIPPINE    ARCHIPELAGO  79 

82.8;  May,  83.3;  June,  82.2;  July,  80.8;  August,  80.8;  Sep- 
tember, 80.4;  October,  80.2 ;  November,  78.6;  December,  77.4. 

April  and  May  are  the  hottest,  August  and  September  the  most 
humid  months.  On  the  west  coast  the  rains  begin  in  June  and 
continue  through  November.  From  December  to  June  there  is 
little  rain,  and  by  March  the  country  is  dry  and  parched.  On  the 
west  coast  these  conditions  are  reversed  and  in  the  southern 
islands  it  rains  at  all  times  of  the  year. 

By  ascending  the  mountains  one  can  always  find  relief  from 
the  heat  of  the  plains.  Pine  trees  grow  at  Baguio  and  a  fire 
is  always  comfortable  in  the  evenings.  But  it  never  freezes  al- 
though the  thermometer  occasionally  drops  to  the  line  of  a  gentle 
frost.  Personality  and  temperament  play  an  important  part  in 
the  health  and  comfort  of  individuals.  There  is  truth  in  the 
statement  that  "it  is  your  human  environment  that  makes  cli- 
mate." Irritable,  fidgety  persons  who  insist  that  things  should 
be  exactly  as  they  were  at  home,  are  seldom  happy  in  the  tropics. 
The  well-balanced,  equable  and  reasonable  adjust  their  habits  to 
the  conditions,  learn  from  the  natives,  recognize  the  limitations 
in  their  activities  and  live  happily  and  comfortably  ever  after, 
or  at  least  until  time  for  the  long  vacation  in  some  land  of  frost 
and  snow.  When  that  energetic  uplift  worker,  Mrs.  Jellyby,  was 
asked  about  the  climate  of  Borrioboola  Gha,  she  replied: 

"The  finest  in  the  world." 

"Indeed,  ma'am?" 

"Certainly.    With  precautions/* 

Science,  sanitation,  and  knowledge  of  the  laws  of  health  have 
rendered  life  almost,  if  not  quite,  as  safe  and  comfortable  in 
the  tropics  as  elsewhere — Tjuith  precautions. 


CHAPTER  III 

The  Native  Peoples 

I 

NON-CHRISTIANS   AND   FILIPINOS 

Varieties  of  Peoples — "East  Is  East  and  West  Is  West" — Extent  to  Which 
This  Statement  Is  True — Classification  of  the  Inhabitants — Aborigines  and 
Malays  and  Subdivisions  of  Each — The  Negritos — Various  Tribes  of  Wild 
Men — Head-Hunting — The  Beginnings  of  Civilization — The  Filipinos — ^The 
Seven  Groups — ^Various  Opinions  as  to  Their  Characteristics. 

The  great  variety  of  peoples,  with  their  different  languages, 
customs,  habits,  religions  and  degrees  of  culture,  have  made  the 
Philippine  Archipelago  a  sort  of  happy  hunting-ground  for  stu- 
dents of  ethnology.  It  has  now  become  almost  as  interesting 
to  students  of  social  and  political  conditions. 

It  has  been  assumed  very  generally  that  the  people  of  the  East 
are  incompetent  racially  to  develop  on  Western  lines  or  to  acquire 
Western  civilization;  that  there  are  inherent  differences,  mental 
and  physical,  which  require  the  white  man  and  yellow  man  to  be 
educated  and  governed  on  different  principles  and  to  develop 
on  distinct  lines. 

The  colonial  policy  of  the  United  States  is  based  on  the  as- 
sumption that  the  Filipinos,  so  far  as  desires  and  inherent  capac- 
ities are  concerned,  do  not  differ  materially  from  white  men  and 
that  they  are  capable  of  being  educated  and  trained  to  govern 
themselves.  It  assumes  that  the  principles  of  good  government 
will  be  recognized  and  accepted  by  all  men  and  that  an  Eastern 
people  with  a  fair  degree  of  development  may  successfully  con- 
duct a  popular  form  of  government  and  that  such  a  government 
is  the  best  for  them. 

The  fact  that  the  attempt  is  being  made  to  apply  this  theory 

80 


THE   NATIVE   PEOPLES  81 

in  the  Philippines  adds  greatly  to  the  general  interest  in  the  char- 
acter of  the  native  people.  Although  the  Philippines  are  in  the 
East,  they  are  not  entirely  of  the  East  as  the  word  is  commonly 
used.  The  Filipinos  are  Malays,  who  for  more  than  three  cen- 
turies were  governed  by  Europeans  and  subjected  to  the  in- 
fluence of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church.  During  that  period  the 
great  majority  of  them  became  Christians,  many  sincere  and  de- 
vout, others  mere  technical  adherents.  The  nature  of  their 
contact  with  Europeans  has  differed  from  that  of  any  other 
Oriental  people.  It  was  not  until  comparatively  recent  times 
that  they  were  brought  under  the  influence  of  Western  theories 
of  life.  The  Christian  civilization  under  which  they  and  their 
ancestors  were  trained  was  that  of  Spain  in  the  days  of  the  relig- 
ious revival,  which  is  known  as  the  Catholic  Reaction.  The 
spirit  of  modernism  which  in  Europe  and  America  influenced 
the  Catholic  Church  like  all  other  institutions,  never  reached  the 
Philippines,  and,  of  course,  the  independent  spirit  of  Protest- 
antism was  never  known  there. 

With  few  exceptions  writers  who  philosophize  about  Eastern 
matters  assert  that  East  and  West  are  antithetic  terms,  connoting 
moral  and  intellectual  conditions  separated  by  an  almost  impassa- 
ble gulf.  This  view  is  accepted  by  almost  all  European  residents 
in  the  Orient  and  by  most  of  those  who  have  come  in  close  con- 
tact with  the  people.^  It  is  crystallized  in  Kipling's  oft  quoted 
lines : 

"Oh,  East  is  East  and  West  is  West  and  never  the  twain 
shall  meet, 

Till  Earth  and  Sky  stand  presently  by  God's  great  judg- 
ment seat." 


1  See  Townsend,  Asia  and  Europe,  Qiap.  23 ;  Cromer,  Modem  Egypt, 
I,  Introduction. 

''Those  who  have  been  in  the  East  and  have  tried  to  mingle  with  the 
native  population  know  well  how  utterly  impossible  it  is  for  the  European  to 
look  at  the  world  with  the  same  eyes  as  the  Oriental.  For  a  while,  indeed, 
the  European  may  fancy  that  he  and  the  Oriental  understand  one  another,  but 
sooner  or  later  a  time  comes  when  he  is  suddenly  awakened  from  his  dream, 
and  finds  himself  in  the  presence  of  a  mind  which  is  as  strange  to  him  as 
would  be  the  mind  of  an  inhabitant  of  Saturn."  Sayce,  The  Higher  Criticism 
and  the  Monuments,  p.  558. 


82  THE   PHILIPPINES 

This  alleged  inherent  social  and  racial  difference  is  supposed 
to  be  so  great  and  of  so  permanent  a  nature  as  to  render  impos- 
sible any  real  comprehension  of  the  people  of  one  part  of  the 
world  by  those  who  have  developed  under  a  different  environ- 
ment. 

In  philosophizing  about  the  East,  people  think  of  India  and 
China;  the  Malay  race,  with  the  exception  of  the  Japanese  is 
included  by  implication  only.  It  seems,  however,  that  even  the 
Chinese  are  not  such  mysterious  and  incomprehensible  beings  as 
we  have  been  led  to  believe.^ 

There  is  a  growing  disposition  to  question  the  common  theory 
of  an  inherent  difference  between  the  people  of  East  and  West 
and  to  treat  what  is  called  the  literary  interpretation  of  the  Orient 
with  scant  respect.  According  to  Doctor  Reinsch,  "The  conven- 
tional and  vulgar  antithesis  of  the  Orient  to  the  West  with  its 
short  delineation  of  contrasts  has  been  altogether  misleading." 
He  believes  that  there  is  no  evidence  of  any  distinct  racial  differ- 
erences  which  render  the  people  permanently  antagonistic,  but 
that  by  profoundly  influencing  each  other  they  will  both  con- 
tribute their  share  in  developing  the  ideal  of  an  "all  human  civil- 
ization of  the  future." 

In  a  recent  book,  Professor  E.  H.  Ross  says  that  "to  the 
traveler  who  appreciates  how  different  is  the  mental  horizon 
that  goes  with  another  stage  of  culture  or  another  type  of  social 
organization  than  his  own,  the  Chinese  do  not  seem  very  puz- 
zling.    Allowing   for   differences   in   outfit   of  knowledge   and 

2  Our  conceptions  of  these  strange  people  have  really  not  been  much  more 
just  and  accurate  than  were  theirs  of  the  Westerners.  We  have  been  taught 
that  China  is  a  "sort  of  fantastic,  topsy  turvy  land ;  a  land  of  pagodas  and 
pigtails  and  porcelain ;  where  the  people  ate  birds*  nests,  and  chow  dogs ; 
where  merchants  and  missionaries  struggle  eternally  with  illusive  man- 
darins against  a  background  of  willow  pattern,  serenity  chequered  by  periodic 
cataclasms"  Bland,  Recent  Events  and  Present  Policies  in  China  (1913),  p.  4. 

This  is  not  much  more  accurate  than  the  old  Chinese  idea  of  the  people  of 
the  outer  world. 

"The  barbarians  [all  other  than  Chinese]  are  like  beasts  and  are  not  to  be 
ruled  by  the  same  principles  as  natives  [Chinese].  Were  any  one  to  attempt 
controlling  them  by  the  great  maxims  of  reason,  it  would  tend  to  nothing  but 
confusion.  The  ancient  Kings  well  understood  this  and  accordingly  ruled 
barbarians  by  misrule."  Quoted  in  Foster,  American  Diplomacy  in  the 
Orient,  p.  44. 


THE   NATIVE   PEOPLES  83 

fundamental  ideas,  they  act  much  as  we  should  act  under  the 
same  circumstances.  The  theory,  dear  to  literary  interpreters  of 
the  Orient,  that  owing  to  diversity  of  mental  constitution,  the 
yellow  man  and  the  white  man  can  never  comprehend  or  sympa- 
thize with  one  another,  will  appeal  little  to  those  who  from  their 
comparative  study  of  societies  have  gleaned  some  notion  of  what 
naturally  follows  from  isolation,  the  acute  struggle  for  existence, 
ancestor  worship,  patriarchal  authority,  the  subjection  of  women 
and  the  ascendency  of  scholars." 

It  is  very  certain  that  recent  events  in  the  East  have  forced 
the  Western  world  to  adrpit  that  all  things  being  equal,  the 
Oriental  will  act  very  much  like  other  people.'  The  move- 
ment is  the  answer  of  the  yellow  race  to  the  questions  put 
by  the  Jew.  Have  we  not  "hands,  organs,  dimensions,  senses, 
affections,  passions?  Fed  with  the  same  food,  hurt  with  the 
same  weapons,  subject  to  the  same  diseases,  healed  by  the  same 
means,  warmed  and  cooled  by  the  same  summer  and  winter  as  a 
Christian  is?  If  you  prick  us  do  we  not  bleed?  If  you  tickle 
us  do  we  not  laugh?  If  3^ou  poison  us  do  we  not  die?  If  you 
wrong  us  shall  we  not  revenge?" 

A  belief  in  the  essential  unity  of  the  human  race  and  the  ca- 
pacity of  all  men  for  progress  and  development,  does  not  require 
one  to  believe  that  the  people  of  the  East  and  West  are  at  pres- 
ent so  alike  that  they  should  be  required  to  live  under  the  same 
form  of  government  and  be  subject  to  the  same  kind  of  laws. 
Ages  of  racial  life  in  different  environments  have  developed  dif-    [ 
ferences  which  for  all  practical  purposes  may  be  regarded  as    f 
inherent  traits  of  character.    The  Western  people  have  great  con-    | 
fidence  in  the  curative  and  regenerating  force  of  Western  meth- 
ods, education  and  ideas.     But  neither,  nor  all  combined,  have 
been  able  so  far  to  show  substantial  results  in  proportion  to  the 
amount  of  effort  put  forth. 

The  attempt  to  infect  these  ancient  civilizations  with  the  germs 


'  There  may  be  something  in  Mr.  Bland's  suggestion  that  the  appearance 
in  China  of  dynamiters,  suffragists,  and  other  evidences  of  mankind's  com- 
mon instincts  and  common  destiny  has  helped  to  modify  our  views. 


84  THE    PHILIPPINES 

of  Western  life  has  not  been  very  successful;  at  most  it  is  but 
encouraging.  To  continue  the  biological  simile,  the  "cultures" 
generated  in  that  strange  compound  of  Christian  ethics,  Pagan 
philosophy  and  commercial  dishonesty  which  is  called  Western 
civilization,  have  not  been  able  to  destroy  those  already  in  pos- 
session of  the  Eastern  body  politic.  The  bacilli  resident  in  the 
ancient  organization  have  generally  been  able  to  repel  the  in- 
vaders. There  is  evidence,  however,  that  although  the  battle  is 
still  on,  the  newcomers  have  at  last  got  the  upper  hand. 

The  truth  as  to  the  nature  and  character  of  the  people  lies  as 
usual,  about  midway  between  the  extreme  views.  The  Oriental 
is  unlike  the  Westerner  but  not  at  all  so  unlike  as  we  have  been 
taught  to  believe.  The  difference  is  mostly  in  his  outlook  on  life, 
and  in  his  estimate  of  values.  It  is  psychological  rather  than 
biological.  The  point  of  view  is  different,  and  also  the  mental 
processes.*  As  said  by  Sir  Bamplylde  Fuller  in  an  interesting  ad- 
dress at  the  Royal  Colonial  Institute,'  the  phrase,  East  is 
East  and  West  is  West  has  something  real  behind  it.  It  ex- 
presses a  vital  distinction  between  the  view  which  Eastern  and 
Western  people  take  of  the  purpose  of  life.  In  both  East  and 
West  the  object  is  to  obtain  satisfaction.  The  East  endeavors  to 
satisfy  itself  simply  and  directly  by  appealing  to  the  emotions, 
by  developing  such  feelings  as  affection,  loyalty,  devotion  and 
self-esteem.  The  West  aims  at  satisfaction  less  directly.  It  is 
concerned  rather  with  its  environment  than  with  itself,  and  in- 
fluences its  feelings  largely  by  changing  and  complicating  the  cir- 


*"No  casual  visitor,"  says  Lord  Cromer,  "can  hope  to  obtain  much  real 
insight  into  the  true  state  of  native  opinion.  Divergence  of  rehgion  and 
habits  of  thought;  in  my  own  case,  ignorance  of  the  vernacular  language.  The 
reticence  of  Orientals  when  speaking  to  any  one  in  authority;  their  tendency 
to  agree  with  any  one  to  whom  they  may  be  talking ;  the  want  of  mental  sym- 
metry and  precision,  which  is  the  chief  distinguishing  feature  between  the 
illogical  and  picturesque  East  and  the  logical  West,  and  which  lends  such 
peculiar  interest  to  the  study  of  Eastern  life  and  politics;  the  fact  that  re- 
ligion enters  to  a  greater  extent  than  in  Europe  into  the  social  life  and  laws 
and  customs  of  the  people;  and  the  further  fact  that  the  European  and  the 
Oriental,  reasoning  from  the  same  premises,  will  often  arrive  at  diametrically 
opposite  conclusions — all  these  circumstances  place  the  European  at  a  great 
disadvantage,  when  he  attempts  to  guage  Eastern  opinion."  Modern  Egypt, 
I,  p.  7. 

5  United  Empire,  IV  (N.  S.),  No.  1,  p.  19. 


THE   NATIVE   PEOPLES  85 

cumstances  of  life.  In  the  West  life  is  a  cinematographic  enter- 
tainment that  results  from  the  variety  of  the  material  objects 
around  us;  and  since  these  objects  admit  of  endless  changes  and 
each  change  modifies  our  conceptions,  there  is  a  constant  change 
and  development  of  ideas.  In  the  East  change  is  limited  by  the 
simplicity  and  directness  of  the  outlook;  man  searches  for  his  in- 
terests in  himself 

As  Hazlitt  obser\^es :  "Man  is  the  only  animal  that  laughs  and 
weeps,  for  he  is  the  only  animal  that  is  struck  with  the  difference 
between  what  things  are  and  what  they  ought  to  be."  The  man  of 
the  East,  says  Sir  Bamplylde  Fuller,  not  only  observes  this  but 
accepts  it  as  a  finality.  He  accepts  his  environment  as  he  ac- 
cepts death  itself;  as  a  thing  over  which  he  has  little  control. 
According  to  his  theory  of  life,  nature  should  be  propitiated,  not 
controlled.  His  attitude  toward  his  physical  environment  is 
thus  passive,  while  in  the  West,  the  conflict  with  nature  is  re- 
garded as  the  most  interesting  if  not  the  noblest  in  which  man  can 
engage. 

The  Oriental  regards  evil  as  being  indissolubly  connected  with 
the  world.  He  is  content  that  his  growth  shall  be  cramped  by 
his  physical  surroundings;  he  never  attempts  to  adapt  his  sur- 
roundings to  his  desires.  The  passive  acceptance  of  environ- 
ment means  crystallization  into  immobility;  the  struggle  for 
change  means  constant  development. 

In  fact,  the  extent  to  which  the  people  of  the  East  are  dis- 
satisfied with  their  physical  surroundings  and  conscious  of  a 
will  to  change  the  same  is  the  measure  of  their  progress  toward 
modernism.  And  here  is  where  the  Filipino  has  advanced  be- 
yond the  Chinese,  or  any  other  Oriental  people  but  the  Japanese. 
The  great  physical  changes  which  have  taken  place  in  India, 
Egypt  and  China,  have  been  affected  very  largely,  if  not  en- 
tirely, on  the  initiative  of  Europeans.  In  the  Philippines,  more 
rapid  progress  in  this  respect  has  been  made  than  in  any  other 
part  of  the  East,  and  in  the  work  the  Filipinos  have  not  only 
willingly  furnished  the  necessary  money,  but  also  a  share  of  the 
initiative  and  active  direction  of  the  work. 


86  THE   PHILIPPINES 

Before  the  coming  of  the  Americans  two  attempts  at  systematic 
classification  of  the  natives  of  the  Archipelago  had  been  made; 
one  by  Blumentritt  in  1890,  and  the  other  by  the  Jesuits.®  The 
former  was  published  in  the  Zertschrift  der  Gesellschaff  fur 
Erdkunde  zu  Berlin,  and  in  a  translation  by  the  Smithsonian  In- 
stitution in  1899.  The  work  of  the  Jesuit  Fathers  formed  the 
basis  of  the  elaborate  Atlas  of  the  Philippines  prepared  by 
Father  Jose  Algue  and  published  by  the  United  States  Coast  and 
Geodetic  Survey.  More  recent  investigations  under  the  direction 
of  the  government  of  the  Philippines  have  greatly  reduced  the 
number  of  tribes.  In  this  way  the  eighty-two  tribes  of  Blumen- 
tritt and  the  sixty-seven  tribes  of  the  Jesuits  have  been  reduced 
to  twenty-seven,  including  the  seven  groups  of  Christianized 
people. 

Who  are  the  people  of  the  Philippines?  Numerous  theories, 
many  of  them  very  fanciful,  have  been  advanced  as  to  their  origin, 
but  the  authorities  now  very  generally  agree  that  with  the  ex- 
ception of  the  Negritos,  they  are  all  of  Malayan  stock. 

For  administrative  purposes  the  Spaniards  divided  the  na- 
tives into  Christians,  non-Christians  and  Moros,  and  this  classi- 
fication has  been  retained  by  the  American  government.  It  is 
needless  to  say  that  the  classification  is  not  determined  entirely 
by  theological  considerations.  The  Christians  include  the  seven 
groups  of  people  who  are  properly  known  as  Filipinos,  who  in- 
habit the  Christian  provinces  and  are  subject  to  the  legislative 
power  of  the  Philippine  legislature.  The  Moros  are  the  Moham- 
medans who  make  up  the  mass  of  the  population  of  the  southern 
islands. 

The  non-Christians,  including  the  wild  men  and  the  Moros, 
constitute  approximately  one-eighth  of  the  population  of  about 
nine  million  and  are  scattered  over  about  one-half  of  the  territory. 

According  to  race  and  origin,  the  people  fall  into  two  groups, 
the  Malays  and  the  aboriglnes.'^  The  former  include  the  Filipinos, 

6  See  Rept.  (Schurman)  Phil.  Com.  (1900),  III,  p.  330. 

"^  Certain  people  who  are  found  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Gulf  of  Davao  and 
Mount  Apo  in  eastern  Mindanao  have  been  classified  by  Montano  and  others 
as  Indonesians.     For  a  time  this  designation  was  generally  accepted.     See 


THE    NATIVE    PEOPLES  87 

Moros  and  wild  men,  distinguished  by  religion  and  different 
stages  of  development ;  the  latter  are  the  few  Negritos  who  still 
linger  superfluous  on  the  stage.  We  find  then  ( 1 )  the  Negritos ; 
(2)  the  wild  men;^  the  Atas,  Bagohos,  Bilancs,  Biikidnons,  Bu- 
langancs,  Guiangas,  Ifngaos,  Igorots  of  Benguet,  Lepanto  and 
Amburayan,  Igorots  of  Bontoc,  Kalingas,  Ilongots,  Katabaganes, 
Mandayas,  Manguaguans,  Mangy ans,  Manobos,  Montcscs  (wild 
people  other  than  Negritos  who  inhabit  the  mountain  regions  of 
Panay  and  Negros),  Tingians;  (3)  the  Moros,  and  (4)  the  Fili- 
pinos, who  include  Visayans,  Bicols;  Tagalogs,  Pampangos,  Pan- 
gasines,  Ilocanos  and  Ibangs. 

The  Negritos,  known  in  different  parts  of  the  islands  as  Abun- 
lon,  Aetas,  Balugas,  Buquiles,  Dumagats  and  Bataks,  are  gen- 
erally considered  as  the  aborigines  of  the  Philippines.  They 
"are  racially  distinct  from  all  the  other  people  inhabiting  the 
Archipelago  which  have  not  intermarried  with  them."  "The 
number  of  problems  presented  to  the  ethnologist  by  these  little 
people,"  says  Professor  Jenks,*  "is  almost  bewildering.  Wliat 
place  have  they  in  the  evolution  of  man?  Their  identity  with 
the  Sakais  of  the  Malay  Peninsula  and  the  Mincopie  of  the 
Andaman  Islands  is  almost  certain ;  but  what  is  their  relation  to 
those  other  pygmies — the  long-headed  dwarfs  of  Central  Africa? 
And  further,  what  may  be  their  connection  with  the  true  negro 
race  of  Melanesia,  almost  contiguous  to  them?  The  geographic 
distribution  of  the  Negrito  is  such  that  it  must  be  concluded  that 
at  one  time  they  were  the  sole  possessors  of  the  Philippine  Archi- 
pelago." 


Rept.  (Schurman)  Phil.  Com.  (1900),  III,  p.  352.  German  writers,  including 
Blumentritt,  ignore  it,  and  Jenks  believes  that  it  will  disappear.  Keane,  a, 
recent  English  writer,  not  only  accepts  it,  but  includes  therein  the  mountain 
tribes  of  northern  Luzon. 

The  people  who  have  been  included  under  this  name  are  probably  physically 
superior  to  all  other  races  in  the  Philippines.  Some  of  them  are  quite  tall, 
are  well  developed,  have  high  foreheads,  narrow  aquiline  noses,  wavy  hair, 
and  often  abundant  beards.  They  are  much  lighter  in  color  than  any  other 
natives  of  the  islands.    Many  are  clever  and  intelligent,  and  all  are  pagans. 

8  See  Worcester,  "Head-Hunters  of  Northern  Luzon,"  Nat.  Geog.  Mag., 
Sept,  1912 ;  "The  Non-Christian  People  of  the  Philippine  Islands,"  Nat.  Geog. 
Mag.,  Nov.,  1913 ;  Ann.  Rept.  Gov.  Moro  Province,  1913,  p.  76. 

"  Native  Races,  Official  Handbook,  p.  156. 


88  THE   PHILIPPINES 

Recent  investigations  by  the  Ethnological  Survey  have  shown 
their  presence  in  several  hitherto  unrecorded  regions.  "It  is 
probable,"  says  Mr.  D.  C.  Worcester/**  "that  they  originally  occu- 
pied every  island  of  any  size  in  the  group;  but  at  present  they 
occur  only  in  northeast  Mindanao,  Samar,  central  Negros,  cen- 
tral Panay,  north  central  Palawan,  a  few  isolated  points  in 
southern  Luzon,  the  mountains  of  Bataan,  and  Zambales,  where 
they  are  relatively  numerous;  Abra,  where  there  remain  but  a 
few  individuals  of  mixed  descent;  Apayao,  Cagayan,  Isabela  and 
Tayabas.  The  great  forested  and  almost  unexplored  area  ex- 
tending from  the  northernmost  point  of  Luzon  to  the  vicinity  of 
Casiguran  and  Baler  is  to-day  the  one  remaining  Negrito  strong- 
hold and  in  many  parts  of  this  region  it  is  quite  impossible  to  get 
into  touch  with  them  for  they  flee  at  the  approach  of  strangers." 

The  Negritos  are  among  the  smallest  people  of  the  group.  Al- 
though their  color  and  hair  are  negroid,  they  have  neither  the 
small  facial  angle  and  large  cranio- facial  angle,  nor  the  long  head 
of  the  African  and  Malanesian.  They  are  true  savages.  They 
have  no  villages,  no  permanent  houses.  About  A.  D.  1250,  Chao 
Ju-Kuo,  a  Chinese  geographer,^^  wrote  of  them:  "They  build 
their  nests  in  the  tree  tops  and  in  each  nest  lives  a  family,  which 
only  consists  of  from  three  to  five  persons.  They  travel  about 
in  the  densest  thickets,  of  the  forests,  and  without  being  seen 
themselves,  shoot  their  arrows  at  the  passer-by.  For  this  rea- 
son they  are  much  feared.  If  the  trader  throws  them  a  small 
porcelain  bowl  they  will  stoop  down  to  catch  it  and  then  run 
away  with  it,  shouting  joyfully." 

Their  characteristics  have  not  greatly  changed  since  that  time. 
They  still  wander  through  the  mountains  in  small  groups  of  a  few 
families  each.  They  are  fleet  of  foot  and  travel  with  great 
speed.  Fish,  roots,  fruit,  rice,  and  the  products  of  the  chase  con- 
stitute their  principal  food.    Their  usual  weapons  are  a  lance  of 


i<>*The  Non-Christian  People  of  the  Philippines,"  Nat.  Geog.  Mag.,  Nov., 
1913.    See  Meyer,  Distribution  of  Negritos  (1899),  Reed,  Negritos  of  Zam- 
bates  (1904),  Chap.  1,  and  particularly  p.  14,  note  2,  where  the  authorities 
are  collected;  Wallaston,  Pigmies  and  Papuans  (1912),  Appendix  B,  p.  303. 
"  B.  &  R.,  XXXIV,  p.  183. 


THE    NATIVE   PEOPLES  89 

bamboo  and  a  quiver  of  poisoned  arrows  which  are  used  with 
deadly  effect.  They  have  some  knowledge  of  agriculture,  but  it 
does  not  extend  much  beyond  scratching  the  earth  with  a  stick, 
throwing  in  the  seed,  and  trusting  nature  for  the  result.  They 
use  as  ornaments,  bamboo  combs,  feather  head-dresses,  rings, 
and  bracelets  of  brass  or  copper,  and  braided  leg  bands  of  hog 
bristles.  They  scarify  the  body,  and  the  scars  are  their  most 
highly  prized  adornments.  For  household  utensils  they  use 
cocoanut  cups  or  seashells.  Their  trade  consists  in  exchanging 
certain  forest  products  for  rice,  tobacco  and  trinkets  with  the 
inhabitants  of  neighboring  places.  There  are  probably  twenty- 
five  thousand  of  these  people  left.  The  best  opinion  is  that  they 
are  incapable  of  civilization,  and  that  they  will  disappear. 

"The  paths  are  rough,  the  trails  are  blind. 

The  Jungle  People  tread ; 
The  yams  are  scarce  and  hard  to  find 

With  which  our  folks  are  fed. 

We  suffer  yet  a  little  space 

Until  we  pass  away. 
The  relics  of  an  ancient  race 

That  ne'er  has  had  its  day."^^ 

It  is  now  generally  conceded  that  the  various  tribes  and  people 
of  the  Archipelago  other  than  the  Negritos  are  of  Malayan 
ancestry.  But  Malay  as  a  descriptive  term  is  not  very  definite. 
"We  are  not  wise  enough,"  says  Le  Roy,  "to  say  just  who 
or  what  the  Malay  is.  He  is  the  typical  brown  man  of  the 
Asiatic  Seas  and  their  confines,  and  the  name  brings  to  mind, 
because  of  the  faithful  labor  of  English  descriptive  and  scien- 
tific writers,  dealing  with  the  regions  lying  southwestward  of 
the  Philippines,  a  water  man  par-excellence;  a  pirate  through 
a  mixture  of  enterprise  and  of  an  indisposition  for  effective  po- 
litical organization  in  law  and  order  on  any  general  scale,  and 
more  commonly  a  Mohammedan  on  whom  the  tenets  of  that  re- 


**  The  Song  of  the  Last  Semangs,  by  Hugh  CliflFord. 

In  the  Malay  Peninsula  the  Negritos  are  called  Semangs. 


i 


90  THE   PHILIPPINES 

ligion  lie  much  more  lightly  than  they  do  further  westward  to- 
ward the  spiritual  center  of  that  faith."*' 

These  people  are  supposed  to  have  come  to  the  Archipelago 
in  three  waves.  Long  before  the  arrival  of  the  Portuguese,  in 
the  Southwest,  in  their  little  sharp-prowed  and  out-rigged  water 
craft,  they  pushed  their  way  from  island  to  island  until  they 
reached  the  Philippines.  The  earliest  wave  probably  extended 
even  to  the  north  of  Luzon,  Formosa  and  Japan.  These  early 
comers  have  been  called  pre-Malays.  They  were  no  doubt 
followed  by  others  of  the  same  kind,  who,  having  been  for 
a  long  period  subjected  to  certain  influences,  were  more  advanced 
in  civilization  than  their  predecessors.  There  is  a  Sanscrit  ele- 
ment in  their  language  which  suggests  the  time  when  their  an- 
cestors were  subjected  to  the  influence  of  the  Buddhists,  who 
came  from  India,  and  for  generations  ruled  Java  and  the  neigh- 
boring islands.  When  the  Spaniards  arrived,  the  Malays  who 
represented  this  second  wave  were  considerably  more  advanced 
than  the  people  of  the  hills  and  forests. 

A  last  wave  carried  the  Mohammedan  Malays,  who  became 
known  as  Moros.  Being  warlike  and  virile,  they  soon  proselyted 
their  predecessors  in  the  southern  islands  and  even  succeeded  in 
making  a  Mohammedan  city  of  Manila. 

Properly  to  describe  and  distinguish  the  various  tribes  of  wild 
men  who  are  supposed  to  represent  the  first  arrivals  would  re- 
quire a  volume  and  the  expert  knowledge  of  the  specialist.  A 
brief  reference  to  a  few  of  the  leading  tribes  and  their  character- 
istics must  suffice. 

In  the  south  the  Bagobos,  Manobos,  Mandayas  and  the  Bukid- 
nons  invite  special  attention.**  The  Bagobos,  of  whom  there  are 
at  least  twenty-five  thousand,  are  a  fairly  strong  and  good  sized 
people  who  live  in  the  Davao  hinterland,  near  Mount  Apo.  Their 
dress  is  made  of  a  cloth  woven  of  dyed  hemp  fiber,  elaborately 


13  Le  Roy,  The  Philippine  People,  p.  19. 

i*The  last  report  of  the  governor  of  the  Moro  Province  (1913)  gives  the 
number  of  pagans  in  the  province  as  103,358,  distributed  as  follows :  Suba- 
nons,  35,000;  Mandayas,  16,500;  Bilanes,  8,114;  Manobos,  10,545;  Bagobos, 
25,500;  Tirurays,  4,435;  Atas,  3,264. 


THE    NATIVE   PEOPLES  91 

ornamented  with  bead  and  mother-of-pearl  work.  Their  war- 
knives  are  carried  in  curious  double-pointed  sheaths  ornamented 
with  bead  work  and  horsehair  plumes.  They  live  in  small  vil- 
lages ruled  over  by  chiefs  called  datus.  They  occasionally  in- 
dulge in  human  sacrifice.*' 

The  Manobos  occupy  the  lower  Aguson  Valley  and  a  few  other 
parts  of  Mindanao.  Many  of  them,  like  the  Negritos,  live  in 
houses  built  in  the  treetops.  Like  the  Bagobos,  they  are  fond  of 
music  and  dancing.  The  passion  is  still  strong  for  what  they 
call  mangayaos — killing  expeditions.  The  Mandayas  live  about 
the  upper  waters  of  the  Aguson  River  and  along  the  east  coast 
of  Mindanao.  The  Jesuits  described  their  complexion  as  "ashy 
gray."  Men  and  women  wear  their  hair  long.  They  are  skilled 
metal  workers,  good  fighters  and  experienced  slavers. 

The  Bukidnons,  of  whom  there  are  about  thirty  thousand,  are 
a  very  promising  people  who  inhabit  the  subprovince  of  the  same 
name  in  northern  Mindanao.  They  "are  naturally  a  peaceful 
and  very  industrious  agricultural  people,  but  in  self-defense  have 
been  compelled  to  stand  off  the  neighboring  more  warlike  tribes 
of  the  interior  and  their  Christian  Filipino  neighbors  as  well."" 
They  are  making  considerable  progress  in  the  ways  of  civilized 
life.  Nearly  all  the  Bukidnon  villages  have  "well  attended  schools 
and  are  connected  with  telephone  lines  which  are  freely  used.  The 
people  are  converting  their  beautiful  and  naturally  fertile  coun- 
try into  a  checkerboard,  with  roads  and  trails  for  dividing  lines. 
They  are  giving  up  their  picturesque  native  costumes  so  rapidly 
that  typical  native  garments  are  even  now  hard  to  obtain."*'^ 

In  the  north  the  most  important  are  the  Igorots,  Ifugaos, 
Ilongots,  Kalingas  and  Tingians.  The  Ifugaos  to  the  number  of 
one  hundred  twenty-five  thousand  live  in  the  central  part  of 
northern  Luzon.  They  are  warlike  and  in  times  past  were  fa- 
mous head-hunters.    They  seem  to  be  natural  stonemasons  and 

18  See  The  Wild  Tribes  of  the  Davao  District,  by  Fay-Cooper  Cole,  Pub. 
Field  Museum,  1913. 

18  Worcester,  "Non-Christian  People  of  the  Philippines,"  Nat.  Ceog.  Mag., 
Nov.,  1913.  p.  1160. 

"/6fd.,  p.  1193. 


92  THE   PHILIPPINES 

have  constructed  marvelous  terraces  with  walls  of  dry  stone  on 
the  steep  mountainsides  on  which  the  growing  rice  is  irrigated 
by  water  brought  in  ditches/®  They  are  very  good  farmers, 
raising  rice,  beans,  onions,  gabi  and  some  cotton  on  their  ter- 
races. They  have  pigs  and  chickens,  but  no  cattle.  Their  table 
manners  are  said  to  be  superior  to  those  of  their  neighbors,  as 
each  person,  be  he  ever  so  poor,  carries  a  wooden  spoon.  They 
are  now  very  friendly  to  the  Americans  and  under  their  direction 
are  building  roads,  trails  and  substantial  buildings.  They  have 
furnished  recruits  for  a  company  of  constabulary,  who  are  ex- 
cellent soldiers  and  expert  marksmen. 

•  The  Ilongots,  who  occupy  a  part  of  the  province  of  Nueva 
Viscaya,  number  about  six  thousand.  They  are  of  a  rather  low 
order  and  have  not  made  much  progress. 

The  Kalingas,  to  the  number  of  about  seventy  thousand,  live  in 
north  central  Luzon.  They  are  a  good-sized,  well-developed, 
cleanly  people  and  famous  for  the  gaudiness  of  their  dress.  They 
have  been  inveterate  head-hunters,  but  their  crimes  of  violence  are 
now  comparatively  rare.  They  are  kindly  disposed  toward  the 
Americans,  who  travel  with  safety  through  all  parts  of  their 
country. 

The  Tingians  may  be  divided  into  civilized  and  uncivilized. 
The  former,  in  number  about  fourteen  thousand,  live  mostly  in 
the  province  of  Abra.  Naturally  pacific,  they  are  industrious 
farmers.  They  "are  a  kindly  gentle  people,  and  the  immaculate 
cleanliness  of  their  persons  and  of  their  homes  promptly  com- 
mend them  to  the  average  American." 

The  wild  Tingians,  numbering  probably  fifty  thousand,  live  in 
the  subprovince  of  Apayao.  They  are  inveterate  head-hunters 
and,  like  the  Igorot,  are  very  fond  of  dog  as  an  article  of  diet. 
They  have  been  only  partially  brought  under  government  control. 

The  Igorots  are  the  best  known  of  all  the  wild  men,  as  they 
live  in  the  vicinity  of  the  summer  capital.  They  fall  into  two 
groups,  one  living  in  Bontoc  and  the  other  in  the  provinces  of 
Benguet,  Lepanto  and  Amburayan.    There  are  about  eighty-nine 

18  See  the  pictures  in  Nat.  Geog.  Mag.,  Sept.,  1912. 


THE   NATIVE   PEOPLES  93 

thousand  of  the  latter  and  seventy-six  thousand  of  the  for- 
mer. They  are  a  vigorous  people  addicted  very  generally  to  la- 
bor and  truth  telling,  A  few  of  them  have  accumulated  con- 
siderable wealth.  They  are  peaceful  industrious  agriculturists 
who  generally  have  a  hard  time  to  make  extremes  meet.  From 
miles  about  they  come  to  the  Baguio  market,  marching  in  single 
file  with  huge  baskets  on  their  heads,  laden  with  camotes  and 
other  products  of  their  poor  farms.  Like  the  Bontoc  Igorots 
and  Ifugaos,  they  terrace  the  mountainside  for  rice  fields.  The 
men  wear  no  superfluous  clothing  but  the  women  ordinarily  keep 
their  bodies  fully  clothed.  The  Benguet  Igorots  alone  keep 
horses.  The  types  of  house  run  all  the  way  from  grass  huts  to 
good  modern  structures  with  galvanized  iron  roofs  and  Ameri- 
can furniture.  The  Benguet  and  Lepanto  Igorots  are  the  only 
native  miners  in  the  islands.  They  have  never  been  head-hunters. 
Many  of  the  children  are  now  attending  school  and  some  of  the 
young  men  are  able  to  serve  as  town  treasurers  and  secretaries. 

The  Bontoc  Igorots  are  a  strong  warlike  tribe  of  head-hunters 
who  have  shown  much  capacity  for  development.^^  They  live  in 
large  villages,  and  depend  on  their  fighting  men  for  protection. 
The  villages  are  divided  into  wards,  in  each  of  which  there  are 
club-houses  in  which  live  apart  the  unmarried  of  each  sex.  They 
have  an  interesting  system  of  trial  marriages.  In  building  rice 
terraces  they  are  excelled  by  the  Ifugaos  only.  They  manufac- 
ture head  axes,  earthen  ware,  salt,  cotton  blankets,  and  other  arti- 
cles.   The  Igorots,  like  the  Ifugaos,  are  spirit  worshipers. 

The  patient  and  tactful  work  of  the  American  administrators 
with  the  non-Christian  tribes  is  beginning  to  produce  appreciable 
results.  They  have  succeeded  in  getting  into  sympathetic  rela- 
tions with  them  and  satisfying  them  of  their  desire  to  deal  justly 
and  improve  their  hard  conditions.  The  Spaniards  never  to  any 
great  extent  pacified  or  conquered  the  mountain  people.  To  the 
Filipinos  of  the  low  lands  the  mountains  were  ever  the  abiding 

i»  For  a  special  study  of  these  people,  see  "The  Bontoc  Igorot,"  by  Dr.  A. 
E.  Jenks,  Phil.  Ethog.  Survey  Pubs.,  Vol.  I. 


94  THE   PHILIPPINES 

place  of  mystery  and  death ;  the  unsafe  refuge  of  the  man  who  for 
crime  or  misconduct  had  been  driven  out  of  the  community. 

Along  the  foothills  there  was  of  course  some  mingling  of  the 
people.  Occasionally  the  wild  man  ventured  down  in  search 
of  work  to  earn  a  few  pesos  with  which  to  eke  out  the  products 
of  his  rocky  abiding  place.  Occasionally  he  ventured  plain- 
ward  to  the  market,  where  he  was  carefully  and  skilfully  cheated 
out  of  his  property.  In  return  the  Filipino,  who  with  misplaced 
confidence  fled  to  the  mountains  to  escape  the  Guardia  Civil,  the 
taskmaster,  or  simply  from  the  almost  equally  dreaded  neces- 
sity for  labor,  was  very  fortunate  if  he  did  not  lose  his  head. 

The  ancient  custom  of  head-hunting  has  been  generally  aban- 
doned, and  the  number  of  heads  now  taken  within  a  year  is 
probably  less  than  the  number  of  murders  committed  among  the 
same  number  of  people  in  many  civilized  communities.  If  head- 
hunting were  as  effective,  as  a  means  to  desirable  ends,  as  it  was 
supposed  to  be,  these  people  might  almost  have  been  justified  in 
their  practises.  Marriage,  abundant  harvests,  bravery  and  man- 
liness, exultation  in  the  minds  of  descendants,  increased  wealth, 
abundance  of  game  and  fish,  general  health  and  activity,  favor  at 
the  hands  of  women,  slaves  In  the  future  life,  and  many  other  de- 
sirable things  were  supposed  to  come  to  the  successful  taker  of 
heads.^"  To  some  extent  head-hunting  was  looked  on  as  a 
game  in  which  the  young  men  satisfied  their  sportsmanlike  in- 
stincts and  won  a  reputation  for  skill  and  courage.  In  the  au- 
tumn after  the  crops  were  gathered,  the  lusty  young  men  required 
amusement  and  an  opportunity  to  display  their  prowess.  The 
maidens  turned  their  eyes  away  from  the  brave  who  had  no 
trophy  to  his  credit.  The  specimens  which  ornamented  the  door- 
way or  front  yard  of  the  elders  as  do  the  antlered  trophies  the 
civilized  hunter's  hallway,  shamed  them.  A  head  ax  was  sent 
to  a  neighboring  village,  and  if  the  challenge  was  accepted  the 
game  was  on.     And  the  game  was  to  take  and  carry  away  the 


20  See  Worcester,  "Head-Hunters  of  Northern  Luzon,"  Nat.  Geog.  Mag., 
Sept.,  1912 ;  Roth.  Natives  of  Sarawak  and  North  Borneo,  Vol.  I,  p.  163 ; 
Goames,  The  Diaks  of  Borneo;  Jenks,  The  Bontoc  Igorot,  Chap.  6. 


THE   NATIVE   PEOPLES  99 

heads  of  their  competitors.  There  was  no  mahce,  or  at  feast,  no 
more  than  between  two  rival  American  colleges.  When  a  rea- 
sonable number  of  heads  had  been  taken,  the  game  was  called 
off  until  another  season. 

The  individual  who  needed  a  head  to  qualify  for  some  situa- 
tion was  sometimes  forced  to  resort  to  methods  which  were  not 
approved  by  the  community.  A  young  woman  scorned  the  hand 
of  a  suitor  who  was  trophy  less,  and  in  desperation  he  left  the 
home  village  vowing  not  to  return  without  a  head  taken  under 
circumstances  which  would  establish  his  prowess.  The  next 
morning  he  returned  with  a  trophy  and  was  received  with  favor. 
He  told  a  hairlifting  story  of  how  in  the  dead  of  night  he  had 
crawled  into  a  village  and  from  the  midst  of  his  sleeping  enemies 
brought  away  a  head — of  a  woman  to  be  sure,  but  in  the  game 
a  head  is  a  head.  And  so  they  were  married.  But  alas!  the 
truth  came  out.  The  hero  was  no  hero.  He  had  not  gone  bravely 
into  danger;  he  had  merely  met  his  own  grandmother  near  the 
home  village  and  taken  the  old  lady's  head. 

The  village  turned  against  him.  His  wife  could  not  forgive 
the  deception.  The  young  man  was  driven  forth.  The  natural 
inference  would  be  that  he  was  censured  for  killing  his  grand- 
parent, but  that  would  be  an  error.  That  circumstance  was  re- 
garded as  a  mere  incident.  It  was  recognized  as  bad  form,  but 
the  head  and  front  of  his  offending  was  in  lying  about  the  risks 
he  had  encountered.  Neither  was  taking  the  head  of  his  grand- 
mother considered  as  involving  sufficient  danger  to  justify  the 
reputation  for  heroism  upon  which  he  had  won  a  bride. 

Thus  it  all  depends  upon  the  point  of  view.  The  Igorot  has 
his  own  code  of  morals.  He  attaches  little  importance  to  human 
life,  but  his  pledged  word  is  sacred.  A  few  years  ago,  four 
Igorots,  Laoyan,  Guay,  Dalocdoc  and  Udcusan,  ventured  into 
the  valley  and  solicited  work  from  a  Filipino  planter  named 
Rufino  Ancheta  and  were  informed  that  there  was  no  work 
available.  But,  said  Ancheta,  just  beyond  the  river  lies  my 
cousin  Tiburcio,  who  is  in  possession  of  a  farm  which  by  right 
should  be  mine.    He  has  a  carabao  and  in  his  house  are  forty 


96  THE   PHILIPPINES 

pesos  in  silver.  Go  and  kill  my  cousin,  and  you  shall  divide  the 
pesos  and  the  carabao,  and  I  shall  secure  the  farm.  "Beside  all 
that,"  testified  Laoyan,  "Rufino  Ancheta  said  that  Tiburcio  was 
the  son  of  one  hundred  fathers;  and  then  he  gave  us  five  chick- 
ens and  we  found  out  from  the  galls  that  it  was  all  right;  that 
it  was  a  good  time  to  kill  a  man."    And  so  the  contract  was  made. 

The  following  day  the  Igorots  returned  and  explained  that  they 
had  visited  Tiburcio  but  found  him  sitting  with  his  back  to  the 
wall  within  easy  reach  of  an  effective-looking  bolo.  The  occa- 
sion not  being  propitious,  they  came  away  and  asked  to  be  re- 
leased from  the  agreement.  "Why  did  you  eat  my  chickens  if 
you  are  not  going  to  do  what  I  told  you  to  do  ?"  asked  the  indig- 
nant employer,  and  he  ordered  them  to  return  and  kill  Tiburcio, 
which  they  did  and  received  their  reward.  In  time  the  Igorots 
were  convicted  of  murder.  The  story  told  by  them  in  court 
reads  like  a  chapter  from  some  ancient  chronicle,  and  is  ex- 
tremely interesting  as  an  illustration  of  the  wild  man's  code  of 
morals.  Being  asked  why  they  returned  and  killed  the  man, 
Udcusan  replied  that  it  was  because  they  had  agreed  to  do  so. 
The  prosecuting  attorney  asked,  "Suppose  you  had  been  told  to 
kill  me,  would  you  do  so?"  "Certainly,  if  we  had  agreed  to  do 
so.    We  would  have  to  keep  our  word."^^ 

But  the  old  customs  are  beginning  to  disappear.  The  wild  men 
have  learned  that  civilization  has  material  advantages  which 
appeal  to  them.  Life  has  been  hard  with  them.  The  mountain- 
sides are  not  very  productive.  The  white  man  pays  good  wages, 
and  the  Igorots  live  in  a  temperate  climate  and  are  willing  work- 
ers. Many  now  work  on  the  streets  and  other  public  works  in 
Baguio  and  carry  their  scanty  products  and  manufactures  over 
weary  miles  to  the  city  market.  During  one  year  nearly  two 
thousand  of  them,  worked  for  good  wages  on  a  railway  which 
was  being  constructed  into  their  country. 

Remarkable  work  is  being  accomplished  by  the  health  authori- 
ties through  the  hospitals  that  are  being  established  in  the  moun- 
tains as  rapidly  as  money  for  the  purpose  is  available.    At  first  it 

21 U.  S.  vs.  Ancheta,  15  Ph.  Rep.  470. 


THE   NATIVE   PEOPLES  97 

was  difficult  to  induce  the  people  to  submit  to  medical  treatment. 
In  the  old  school-book  we  used  to  read  of  the  poor  dog  who,  after 
having  his  broken  leg  repaired  by  the  kind-hearted  surgeon,  re- 
turned the  next  day  bringing  with  him  a  canine  friend  who  had 
met  with  a  similar  accident.  When  a  hospital  was  first  established 
among  the  wild  people,  the  doctor  induced  an  Igorot  who  was 
suffering  from  a  very  serious  disease  to  submit  himself  for  treat- 
ment. The  man  rapidly  improved,  but  one  night  he  disappeared, 
and  the  doctor  mourned  the  loss  of  the  patient,  whom  he  had 
hoped  to  use  as  an  example.  But  after  about  a  week  the  lost  pa- 
tient returned,  bringing  with  him  a  startling  collection  of  lame, 
blind  and  halt  specimens  of  humanity  which  he  had  picked  up 
among  the  mountains. 

Among  the  things  which  contact  with  civilization  is  elim- 
inating is  the  Igorot's  appetite  for  dog;  not  nice  fat  dog,  but  lean 
curs  of  the  commonest  back-yard  variety.  Once  a  week  that  part 
of  the  Baguio  market  assigned  to  natives  is  crowded  with  yelp- 
ing curs  brought  from  the  lowlands  to  sell  to  the  Igorots.  Dur- 
ing the  night  preceding  market  day  the  roads  diverging  on 
Baguio  are  alive  with  packs  of  dogs  so  tied  together  as  to  pre- 
vent them  from  biting  their  drivers.  To  one  who,  in  a  less  lit- 
eral sense,  is  fond  of  dogs,  it  is  rather  a  pitiful  sight  to  see  them 
on  the  way  to  the  sacrifice.  But  after  all,  it  is  merely  a  matter 
of  taste  and  training.  If  you  have  a  taste  for  dog,  there  seems 
to  be  no  reason  in  the  nature  of  things  why  you  should  not  eat 
dog,  and  a  dog  has  no  more  inherent  right  to  be  immune  from 
being  eaten  than  a  lamb  or  any  other  animal.  But  it  is  said  that 
the  Igorots  who  visit  Baguio  are  beginning  to  sense  the  fact  that 
among  white  people  it  is  considered  not  quite  the  proper  thing 
to  use  dogs  for  food. 

Many  of  the  Igorot  boys  are  attending  school,  and  some  of 
them  do  good  work  in  the  trade  schools.  They  make  good  serv- 
ants and  readily  adapt  themselves  to  the  habits  of  civilized  Fili- 
pinos. But  the  Igorot  has  one  very  strong  prejudice.  He  will 
wear  a  coat,  a  high  collar,  a  silk  hat,  and  a  red  necktie  even,  but 
only  force  or  moral  intimidation  can  induce  him  to  wear  the 


98  THE    PHILIPPINES 

trousers  of  civilization.  My  first  sight  of  a  Christian  Igorot 
boy,  with  sack-coat,  breech-clout,  standing  collar,  brilliant  neck- 
tie and  smoothly  combed  hair,  but  without  the  rest  of  the  apparel 
usually  considered  proper  for  a  complete  gentleman,  passing  the 
plate  in  Bishop  Brent's  church  at  Baguio,  will  long  be  remem- 
bered. The  constabulary  soldiers  recruited  from  the  wild  people 
wear  all  the  uniform  except  the  trousers,  in  lieu  of  which  they 
wear  the  gee-string  and  a  heavy  copper  bracelet  just  above  the 
ankles. 

This  disinclination  to  wear  clothes  led  to  an  amusing  incident 
at  the  Exposition  in  Manila.  *  It  was  arranged  that  each  province 
should  have  a  certain  section  In  which  to  exhibit  its  manufac- 
turing processes.  Some  of  the  wild  people  manufacture  very 
useful  and  attractive  articles,  and  it  was  decided  that  a  number 
of  these  workmen  should  be  brought  to  the  fair.  The  Filipinos 
are  very  sensitive  about  the  appearance  of  the  wild  people  in 
public,  as  they  believe  they  are  a  reflection  upon  the  "culture"  of 
the  population  generally.  When  it  became  known  that  the 
tribesmen  were  to  be  at  the  Exposition,  a  protest  was  filed  against 
what  they  feared  would  be  a  shocking  exhibition  of  wild  men 
w'ithout  modern  clothing.  The  governor-general  was  induced 
to  issue  an  order  that  all  the  strangers  should  wear  pajamas,  and 
these  useful  articles  were  duly  supplied  at  public  expense.  It  was 
like  clothing  the  statuary  in  an  art  museum.  The  stalwart 
bronzed  men  accustomed  to  go  clad  only  in  a  breech-clout,  known 
locally  as  a  gee-string,  were  each  furnished  with  a  pair  of  striped 
trousers.  In  the  mountains,  they  always  travel  in  single  file,  and 
on  their  first  appearance  in  public  at  the  Exhibition,  about  fifty 
of  them  started  to  walk  solemnly  along,  each  observing  the 
proprieties  by  carrying  his  trousers  carefully  folded  over  his 
left  arm. 

The  wild  people  of  the  mountains  and  the  Mohammedans  of 
the  south  are  extremely  picturesque  and  much  more  interesting  to 
travelers  than  the  ordinary  so-called  Christian  Filipinos.  The 
average  person  feels  about  as  did  the  English  traveler  who  on 
seeking  official  assistance  in  traveling  about  the  islands  said,  "I 
want  particularly  to  meet  your  interesting  wild  tribes.     The 


THE   NATIVE   PEOPLES  99 

Christians  I  care  little  about."  This  perfectly  natural  feeling 
has  been  catered  to  by  writers,  lecturers  and  showmen.  An  or- 
dinary citizen  of  Manila,  Dagupan,  or  Loag,  clothed  like  an 
American  or  Englishman,  spending  his  days  in  merchandising, 
practising  a  profession,  superintending  the  operation  of  a  farm, 
editing  a  newspaper,  or  running  for  the  Legislature,  is  far  less 
interesting  than  an  Igorot  statue  in  bronze,  enveloped  in  the 
restricted  folds  of  a  highly-colored  gee-string,  with  an  ambig- 
uous reputation  for  eating  dog  and  gathering  sporting  trophies 
from  among  the  heads  of  his  neighbors.  A  game  of  baseball  in 
which  this  kind  of  native  dives  skilfully  to  base  between  the  legs 
of  an  athletically  inclined  governor-general  amply  justifies  a 
magazine  article.  But  there  is  no  such  inspiring  publicity  for 
patient  Juan  de  la  Cruz,  who  toils  in  the  rice  paddy  or  sugar  field. 
He  and  his  kind  are  very  prosaic,  and  as  material  for  a  lantern 
slide  it  must  be  conceded  that  the  wild  man  is  much  his  superior. 
The  Igorots  have  been  so  frequently  exhibited  at  world's  fairs 
and  other  such  places  that  many  people  in  the  United  States  and 
Europe  understand  that  they  are  fair  samples  of  the  Filipinos 
who  are  so  vociferously  asserting  their  capacity  for  self-govern- 
ment, and  crying  for  independence. 

The  Moros,  because  of  their  religion  and  peculiar  character- 
istics, and  the  Igorots  and  other  wild  men,  because  of  their  pic- 
turesqueness,  have  thus  possibly  absorbed  more  than  their  share 
of  public  attention. 

The  picturesque  eighth  of  the  Inhabitants,  who  are  known  col- 
lectively as  non-Christians,  have  not  advanced  much  beyond  the 
condition  of  savagery.  They  represent  a  very  low  stage  of  cul- 
ture and  have  shown  little,  if  any,  capacity  for  development  from 
within.  What  Impulse  for  improvement  they  have  felt  has  come 
from  without  and  a  few  of  them  have  responded  in  a  way  which 
is  very  encouraging.  The  government  of  the  wild  people,  with 
the  exception  of  the  Moros,  Is  a  comparatively  simple  matter,  as 
they  are  entirely  free  from  the  ambitions  and  aspirations  which 
complicate  conditions  In  the  Christianized  provinces.  The  real 
difficulty  has  been  to  gain  their  confidence,  and  this  has  been 


100  THE   PHILIPPINES 

accomplished  by  a  policy  of  nicely  adjusted  firmness  and  gentle- 
ness. The  simplest  forms  of  government  only  have  been  intro- 
duced among  them  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  order  and 
opening  the  country  by  the  construction  of  roads  and  trails. 
The  beginning  of  an  educational  system  has  been  made  and  the 
conditions  under  which  the  people  live  have  been  greatly  im- 
proved. 

The  other  seven-eighths  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  Archipelago, 
who  are  known  as  Filipinos,  occupy  substantially  all  the  culti- 
vated parts  of  the  country  north  of  Mindanao.  They  now  num- 
ber about  eight  milHons  and  represent  nearly  every  stage  of 
race  culture.  They  are  divided  into  seven  groups,  commonly 
called  tribes,  the  Tagalogs,  Visayans,  Bicols,  Ilocanos,  Pam- 
pangos,  Pangaslnes  and  Ibangs.  They  are,  however,  developed 
far  beyond  the  stage  to  which  the  word  tribe  applies.  Indeed, 
the  use  of  the  word  in  this  connection  suggests  the  character  in 
one  of  Anthony  Trollop's  novels  of  English  clerical  life  who 
divided  all  people  into  "Methodists,  Baptists  and  other  savage 
tribes." 

The  Tagalogs  and  Visayans  constitute  the  majority  of  the 
civilized  Filipinos.  The  former  occupy  the  central  part  of  Luzon ; 
the  latter,  Cebu,  Panay,  Negros,  and  the  other  islands  of  the 
central  group.  The  Ilocanos  live  along  the  northwest  coast  of 
Luzon;  the  Pampangos  and  Pangaslnes  on  the  great  plains  be- 
tween Manila  and  the  Gulf  of  LIngayan;  the  Bicols  in  the  ex- 
treme south  of  Luzon ;  and  the  Ibangs  in  the  Cagayan  Valley  in 
the  northeast  of  Luzon. 

These  people  speak  different  dialects  and  have  many  differ- 
ent habits,  customs  and  characteristics,  but  their  lack  of  homo- 
geneity has  been  greatly  exaggerated.  The  things  in  which  they 
are  alike  are  much  more  vital  and  important  than  those  in  which 
they  differ.  The  former  are  racial  characteristics,  and  the  latter 
the  result  of  Isolation  and  environment.  They  are  all  Malays 
with  typical  Malayan  traits.  When  the  Spaniards  arrived,  they 
found  them  occupying  the  coast  line  plains  and  valleys,  having 


THE   NATIVE   PEOPLES  101 

driven  their  predecessors  into  the  mountains.  At  that  time  they 
numbered  about  six  hundred  fifty  thousand  and  have  thus  multi- 
plied about  fourteen  times  in  three  centuries. 

Recent  investigations  have  reduced  the  dialects  which  are 
spoken  by  the  Filipinos  from  sixty  to  sixteen,  and  these  contain 
so  many  common  words  as  to  suggest  their  development  from 
a  common  ancestral  language.  While  differing  widely  in  their 
vocabularies,  they  have  a  common  Malayan  origin  and  a  uniform 
structural  basis.  Early  contact  with  the  Hindu  civilization 
which  once  flourished  in  Java  and  built  the  marvelous  temples 
which  may  yet  be  seen  in  the  midst  of  the  tropical  jungles,  left  a 
mark  upon  the  language.  It  is  probable  that  it  was  from  this 
source  that  the  people  who  came  with  the  last  wave  of  emigration 
acquired  their  knowledge,  such  as  it  was,  of  writing  and  the 
other  arts  which  elevated  them  above  the  people  of  their  own  race 
that  they  drove  into  the  mountains. 

Once  established  in  the  Philippines,  the  Malays  seem  to  have 
lost  their  roving  habits  and  acquired  the  strong  attachment  for 
place  which  is  such  a  noted  characteristic  of  the  present  people. 
Pocketed  in  particular  localities  with  water  or  mountain  boun- 
daries, they  soon  became  strangers  and  the  enemies  of  their  neigh- 
bors. The  natural  order  of  development  was  inverted.  Local 
life  was  petty,  intensive  and  ingrown.  No  large  political  life 
was  developed.  Neither  the  Tagalogs  nor  Visayans  were  ever 
organized  as  a  political  unit.  Each  represented  merely  a  certain 
number  of  people  who  spoke  a  common  dialect,  occupied  contig- 
uous territory  and  had  a  sort  of  community  feeling  of  superiority 
over  their  neighbors.  The  barangay  was  the  most  important 
political  body  which  the  Filipinos  were  ever  able  to  develop. 
Each  cell  of  what  normally  should  have  united  into  a  body 
politic  continued  to  live  its  own  insignificant  life.  Nothing  was 
united,  nothing  coordinated.  Living  thus  in  almost  complete 
isolation,  each  little  community  developed  local  peculiarities  and 
added  local  words  to  its  dialect. 

This  inability  to  form  political  combinations  and  thus  influence 
and  control  large  masses  of  men  seems  to  be  an  inherent  weakness 


102  THE   PHILIPPINES 

of  thie  Malay  character.  The  people  of  the  Malay  Peninsula, 
Sumatra,  Java,  Borneo  and  the  islands  to  the  west  have  never 
united  in  any  great  numbers  for  the  pursuit  of  a  common  politi- 
cal aim  and  never  at  all,  except  when  dominated  by  a  religious 
motive  such  as  is  supplied  by  Islamism.  In  the  Philippines  only 
the  Moros  ever  recognized  allegiance  to  a  chief  of  more  than 
local  importance.  In  1565  the  royal  officers  at  Cebu  wrote  to 
Philip  II  that  the  natives  "recognize  no  ruler,  therefore  if  their 
chiefs  try  to  force  them  they  will  do  nothing  else  than  go  to 
another  island."  According  to  Andres  de  Mirandaola  they  were 
"a  race  who  lived  without  any  respect  for  rulers."  In  1569  Mar- 
tin de  Rada  wrote  to  the  viceroy  of  Nueva  Espana  that  the  peo- 
ple of  the  Philippines  had  no  king  or  sovereign  and  were  a  race 
"the  most  arrogant  that  was  ever  seen  and  the  slaves  were  the 
freest  that  can  be  imagined  for  they  do  only  what  they  wish."^'* 
Such  a  people  without  organization  could  offer  no  effective  re- 
sistance to  the  Spaniards. 

A  great  deal  has  been  written  about  the  customs,  manners, 
superstitions  and  characteristics  of  the  Filipinos,  i  Scientists, 
travelers,  officials  civil  and  military,  churchmen,  old  residents 
and  casual  tourists  have  published  the  results  of  their  observa- 
tions. Since  the  American  occupation  many  such  books  and  arti- 
cles have  appeared,  written  by  travelers,  soldiers,  sailors  and 
newspaper  men — a  few  carefully  and  conscientiously  prepared, 
but  the  greater  number  apparently  the  work  of  the  impressionist 
or  cubist  schools. 

Notwithstanding  the  influence  of  the  Spaniards  and  the  Chris- 
tian religion,  it  is  remarkable  how  little  the  Filipinos  have 
changed  during  the  time  from  the  arrival  of  the  Spaniards  in 
1560  until  their  departure  in  1898.  The  ordinary  Filipino  of 
pure  blood  seems  to  have  retained  nearly  all  of  his  racial  charac- 
teristics. The  old  savage  customs  have  been  abandoned,  but  the 
writings  of  the  early  narrators,  such  as  Pigafetta  and  Morga, 
describe  very  accurately  the  provincial  people  of  to-day.     It  is 

22~B  &  R.,  XXXIV,  pp.  201.  214. 


THE   NATIVE    PEOPLES  103 

only  during  the  last  decade  that  any  radical  changes  have  become 
apparent. 

The  conflicting  opinions  expressed  by  travelers  ian'd  residents  as 
to  the  merits  and  demerits  of  the  Filipinos  are  remarkable.  The 
value  of  the  narratives  are  determined  not  so  much  by  the  date 
of  publication  as  by  the  relation  in  which  the  writers  stood  to 
the  country  and  its  people.  The  Spanish  officials  were  almost 
always  contemptuous,  patronizing  and  depreciatory  of  the  In- 
dians. Disinterested  travelers  generally  extolled  their  good  qual- 
ities. The  friars,  while  not  indiscriminate  in  their  praise,  were 
generally  kindly  and  appreciative  until  they  became  the  objects 
of  political  attack.  Thereafter  they  were  bitter  and  denuncia- 
tory. The  value  of  modern  estimates  depends  almost  entirely 
upon  the  personal  equation  and  the  political  predilections  of  the 
writers.  The  party  in  the  United  States  that  has  constantly  op- 
posed the  Philippine  policy  of  the  government  has  drawn  the 
picture  of  the  Filipinos  in  very  high  colors,  and  some  of  the 
books  published  have  not  been  entirely  honest.  The  Filipinos 
painted  by  these  writers  are  not  recognized  by  Americans  or 
Europeans  who  have  dealt  with  and  worked  among  the  real 
people.  The  estimates  of  foreigners  like  Blumentritt,  whose 
personal  observations  were  confined  to  a  few  choice  specimens 
of  the  race  like  Rizal  and  the  Lunas,  are  often  grotesquely 
erroneous.  Nor  are  the  statements  of  those  who  have  systemati- 
cally written  the  people  down  for  political  effect  or  because  of 
race  prejudice  entitled  to  any  greater  respect. 

In  the  midst  of  it  all  the  Filipinos,  who  are  really  pretty  fair 
ordinary  specimens  of  mankind,  have  fared  rather  badly.  From 
authentic  writings  it  is  easy  to  prove  that  they  are  totally  incom- 
prehensible people  who  will  fit  any  description  whatever,  be- 
tween ignorance  and  enlightenment,  intellectual  capacity  or  inca- 
pacity, virtue  and  vice,  treachery  and  fidelity,  cowardice  and 
courage,  lying  and  truthfulness,  the  thief  and  the  honest  man. 

It  must  be  conceded  that  the  Filipinos  are  not  easy  to  under- 
stand, and  it  is  not  surprising  that  even  honest  observers  have 


104  THE   PHILIPPINES 

reached  different  conclusions  as  to  their  character.  "Dealing 
3^rith  such  an  enigma/'  says  Foreman/^  "the  most  eminent  physi- 
ognomists would  surely  differ  in  their  speculations  regarding  the 
Philippine  native  of  the  present  day.  That  Catonian  figure,  with 
placid  countenance  and  solemn  gravity  of  feature,  would  readily 
•deceive  any  one  as  to  the  true  mental  organism  within." 

The  first  description  of  the  Filipinos  is  found  in  a  narrative 
written  by  the  Chinese  geographer,  Chao  Ju-Kuo,  about  the  year 
1250.  He  gives  a  very  favorable  account  of  the  inhabitants  of 
Ma-yi  [the  Chinese  name  for  Luzon],  particularly  of  their  hon- 
esty. The  Chinese  traders  he  wrote  deliver  their  goods  to  the 
Indians  "and  although  the  bearers  are  often  unknown,  none  of 
the  goods  are  ever  lost  or  stolen.  The  savage  traders  carry  these 
goods  to  other  islands,  and  then  nine  or  ten  months  pass  until 
they  have  obtained  other  goods  of  value  equivalent  to  those  that 
have  been  received."^* 

For  three  hundred  years  thereafter  we  have  no  record  of  what 
occurred  in  the  Philippines.  The  Venetian  Pigafetta,  in  his  nar- 
rative of  Magellan's  expedition,  described  the  habits,  customs 
and  modes  of  living  of  the  people  of  the  central  islands  with 
considerable  minuteness.  His  description  of  the  native  houses 
is  as  applicable  to-day  as  it  was  in  1560.  From  the  way  the  In- 
dians handled  their  rude  instruments  Pigafetta  was  convinced 
that  they  possessed  musical  ability.  He  also  found  that  they 
loved  ease  and  quiet  and  to  live  In  accordance  with  justice.  The 
custom  of  cockfighting  was  already  well  established. 

An  invader  and  conqueror  seldom  has  a  good  opinion  of  a 
conquered  people  who  fail  to  show  gratitude  and  consideration 
for  their  conqueror.  Legaspl,  after  having  been  In  the  Philip- 
pines four  years,  reached  the  conclusion  that  the  natives  were 
"a  crafty  and  treacherous  race  and  understand  everything 
.  .  .  They  are  naturally  of  a  cowardly  disposition  and  dis- 
trustful, and  if  one  has  treated  them  ill  they  will  never  come 
hack.     .     .    .    They  are  a  people  extremely  vicious,  untruthful, 

23  The  Philippine  Islands,  p.  167. 

24  B.  &  R.,  XXXIV,  p.  183. 


THE   NATIVE   PEOPLES  105 

and  full  of  other  superstitions.  No  law  binds  relative  to  relative, 
parent  to  children,  or  brother  to  brother.  No  person  favors  an- 
other unless  it  is  to  his  own  interest.  On  the  other  hand,  if  a 
man  in  some  time  of  need  shelters  a  relative  or  a  brother  in  his 
house,  supports  him  and  provides  him  with  food  for  a  few  days, 
he  will  consider  that  relative  as  his  slave  from  that  time  on,  and 
is  served  by  him." 

Martin  de  Roda,  who  was  a  companion  of  Legaspi,  was  of  the 
opinion  that  the  natives  other  than  Moros  could  easily  be 
converted,  because  they  were  "rather  like  monkeys,  very  desir- 
ous of  imitating  our  dress,  speech  and  other  peculiarities." 

Francisco  de  Sande,  who  was  governor  from  1575  to  1580, 
wrote  to  Philip  IV  that  the  natives  "were  greatly  addicted  to 
licentiousness  atid  drunkenness.  They  are  all  usurers,  lending 
money  for  interest,  and  go  even  to  the  point  of  making  slaves  of 
their  debtors,  which  is  the  usual  way  of  obtaining  slaves.  .  .  . 
They  do  not  understand  any  kind  of  work  unless  it  be  to  do  some- 
thing actually  necessary,  such  as  to  build  their  houses,  which  are 
made  of  stakes  after  their  fashion,  to  fish  according  to  their  meth- 
ods, to  row  and  perform  the  duties  of  sailors,  and  to  cultivate  the 
land.  .  .  .  The  natives  are  all  very  idle.  .  .  .  Nevertheless, 
all  know  how  to  raise  cotton  and  silk,  and  everywhere  they  know 
how  to  spin  and  weave  for  clothing.  They  are,"  he  adds,  "af- 
flicted by  no  poverty  and  only  seek  to  kill  one  another,  consider- 
ing it  a  great  triumph  to  cut  off  one  another's  heads  and  take 
captives."" 

In  Antonio  de  Morga's  book  on  the  Philippine  Islands,  pub- 
lished in  1609,  the  inhabitants  of  the  southern  part  of  Luzon 
were  said  to  be  "of  a  clever  disposition  for  anything  they  under- 
take, sharp  and  choleric,  and  resolute." 

The  Augustinian  friar,  Caspar  de  San  Augustin,  whp  wrote 
one  hundred  years  after  Morga,  had  a  very  poor  opinion  of 
the  natives.  He  regarded  them  as  generally  Inconstant,  dis- 
trustful, malicious,  sleepy,  idle,  timid,  envious,  ill-bred  and  im- 
pertinent.    As  servants  "in  convents  and  houses,  they  break 

*'  This  evidently  refers  to  the  motintain  people. 


106  THE   PHILIPPINES 

enougli  plates  to  ruin  their  masters."  They  were  bold  and  inso- 
lent even  to  the  extent  of  demanding  one  hundred  dollars  for 
four  eggs.  It  mattered  little,  however,  as  "they  are  just  as  well 
pleased  when  they  fail  as  when  they  succeed."  They  showed  great 
indifference  to  danger  and  would  not  "move  out  of  the  way  of 
a  restive  horse,  nor  if  in  a  small  boat  give  place  to  a  large  one. 
In  the  river  if  they  see  crocodiles  approaching  they  take  no  no- 
tice and  adopt  no  precautions."  Worst  of  all,  they  did  "not 
object  to  rob  Spaniards,  not  even  the  ministers  of  religion." 

Exactly  a  century  later  another  Augustinian  friar,  Joaquin 
Martinez  de  Zuiiiga,  wrote  that  the  Indians  the  Spaniards  found 
in  the  islands  "all  possessed  some  description  of  government, 
better  or  worse,  and  each  nation  was  distinguished  by  a  different 
name;  but  a  similarity  of  their  dress  and  manners  proves  that 
the  origin  of  all  of  them  is  the  same." 

Writing  in  1820,  Tomas  de  Comyn  expressed  the  opinion  that 
the  natives  were  credulous,  superstitious,  cunning,  of  weak  ca- 
pacities, addicted  to  robbery,  piracy,  acts  of  private  and  public 
revenge,  fond  of  external  show  and  pomp,  and  of  a  very  litigious 
spirit.  He  attributed  these  social  defects  largely  to  their  igno- 
rance, want  of  civilization,  the  bad  administration  of  justice  and 
the  defective  system  of  government  under  which  they  lived. 

Dr.  Paul  de  la  Gironiere,  a  French  surgeon  who  lived  in  the 
Philippines  for  twenty  years,  wrote  a  very  discriminating  account 
of  the  people,  particularly  of  the  Tagalogs.  In  his  opinion  they 
could  be  ruled  only  by  strict  justice  and  judicious  severity.  They 
are  great  children  and  should  be  trained  as  such.  The  Indian's 
hospitality  is  unselfish  and  disinterested.  The  stranger  who  en- 
ters his  cabin  at  mealtime  is  sure  of  an  invitation  to  a  seat  at  the 
board.  When  an  old  man  who  can  no  longer  work  finds  him- 
self destitute  he  takes  up  his  quarters  in  a  neighbor's  house, 
where  he  is  free  to  remain  until  his  death.  The  Tagal,  as  de- 
scribed in  1854,  "is  gay  and  pleasant.  He  is  very  fond  of  music 
and  dancing;  he  is  ardent  in  love,  cruel  with  his  enemies,  and 
revenges  himself  with  the  poniard,  which,  like  the  kris  with  the 
Malays,  is  his  favorite  weapon.     He  keeps  his  word,  is  passion- 


THE   NATIVE   PEOPLES  107 

ately  fond  of  gambling,  is  a  good  husband  and  father,  jealous 
of  the  honor  of  his  wife,  but  careless  of  that  of  his  daughters, 
whose  youthful  errors  in  no  way  prevent  their  finding  husbands. 
His  sobriety  is  admirable.  Water,  a  little  rice,  and  salt  fish,  sat- 
isfy him.  He  venerates  old  age.  In  a  family,  at  all  periods  of 
life,  the  younger  obey  the  older."  Elsewhere  the  same  writer 
says :  "The  moral  portrait  of  these  natives  of  the  Philippines  is 
curious  to  sketch,  still  more  curious  to  read.  The  Indian  keeps 
his  word,  and  is  yet  a  liar;  anger  he  holds  in  horror,  comparing 
it  to  madness  and  deeming  it  worse  than  drunkenness,  which  he 
nevertheless  despises.  To  avenge  an  injury  he  scruples  not  to 
use  his  dagger;  what  he  will  least  support  is  abuse,  even  when 
deserved.  You  may  flog  him  when  he  has  committed  a  fault 
and  he  will  not  complain,  but  at  hard  words  he  is  indignant.  He 
is  brave,  generous,  a  fatalist.  The  life  of  a  robber  pleases  him 
by  reason  of  its  liberty  and  excitement,  not  on  account  of  the 
wealth  he  may  acquire  by  leading  it.  .  .  .  They  dislike  cow- 
ards and  readily  attach  themselves  to  the  man  who  is  brave 
enough  to  court  danger.  Their  ruling  passion  is  play.  They  are 
fond  of  fights  between  animals,  especially  cockfights."  ' 

An  English  merchant  named  Robert  MacMicking  wrote  in 
1851  that  "the  native  Indians  appear  to  have  a  good  ear  for 
music  and  execute  many  of  the  finest  operas  with  spirit  and 
taste.  .  .  .  They  appear  to  possess  a  superior  degree  of  vigor 
or  freshness  of  mind  to  those  bom  in  Europe  or  in  old  and  thickly 
inhabited  countries."  He  found  in  the  character  of  the  natives 
many  good  points,  the  most  noticeable  being  "their  hospitality, 
good  nature  and  bonhommie."  They  "never  appeared  as  ag- 
gressors; and  it  has  only  been  when  the  white  men,  despising 
their  dark  skins,  have  ventured  on  unjustifiable  conduct,  that  I 
have  heard  of  their  hands  being  raised  to  avenge  it.  When 
they  know  that  they  are  in  the  wrong,  however,  should  the 
harshest  measures  be  used  toward  them,  I  have  never  known  or 
heard  of  their  having  had  recourse  to  the  knife,  and  I  have  fre- 
quently seen  them  suffer  very  severe  bodily  chastisement  for  very 
slight  causes  of  offense.    They  are  easily  kept  in  order  by  gen- 


108  THE    PHILIPPINES 

tleness,  but  have  spirit  enough  to  resent  ill  treatment  if  unde- 
served. Their  general  character  is  that  of  a  good-natured  and 
merry  people,  strongly  disposed  to  enjoy  the  present  and  caring 
little  for  the  future." 

Jagor  wrote  that,  "They  imitate  everything  that  passes  before 
their  eyes  without  possessing  the  intelligence  to  appreciate  it. 
It  is  this  which  makes  both  themselves  and  their  artistic  produc- 
tions wearisome,  devoid  of  character  and,  I  may  add,  unnatural, 
in  spite  of  the  skill  and  patience  they  devote  to  them.  These  two 
peculiarities,  moreover,  are  invariably  to  be  found  amongst  na- 
tions whose  civilization  is  but  little  developed." 

Sir  John  Bowring,  who  visited  the  Philippines  in  1858, 
found  that  the  natives  were  very  credulous,  showed  much  def- 
erence to  everything  aristocratic  among  them,  and  were  not 
much  distinguished  for  intellectual  superiority.  They  had  some 
knowledge  of  mechanical  arts,  appreciated  music,  had  little  am- 
bition, few  wants,  concerned  themselves  little  with  the  affairs  of 
their  neighbors,  were  strongly  imitative,  sober,  economical  and 
much  given  to  display  when  desirous  of  honoring  a  guest.  But 
the  Filipino  was  idle,  fond  of  gambling,  and  his  affection  for  his 
gamecock  resembled  that  of  an  Arab  for  his  horse. 

William  Gifford  Palgrave,  who  was  British  consul  at  Manila 
from  1876  to  1878,  found  the  natives  distinguished  for  an  "in- 
bred courtesy,  equally  diffused  through  all  classes  high  or  low, 
unfailing  decorum,  prudence,  caution,  quiet,  cheerfulness,  ready 
hospitality,  a  correct  though  not  an  inventive  tact,  and  a  marked 
tendency  to  ancestral  worship." 

In  his  Social  History  of  the  Races  of  Mankind,  Mr.  Feather- 
man  says  that,  "The  Tagalogs  of  the  higher  classes  of  the  interior 
have  preserved  many  noble  traits  of  character.  They  are  kind 
and  even  generous  in  their  social  intercourse.  They  are  grateful 
for  benefits  received,  and  are  faithful,  calm  and  considerate. 
They  are  very  hospitable  and  consider  it  a  high  honor  to  receive 
a  stranger,  and  they  make  every  possible  sacrifice  to  manifest 
their  high  regard  for  their  guest." 

Mr.  John  Foreman,  Mr.  Dean  C.  Worcester  and  Mr.  Frederic 


THE    NATIVE    PEOPLES  109 

H.  Sawyer,  in  books  published  about  the  time  of  the  departure 
of  the  Spaniards,  give  very  full  and  detailed  descriptions  of  the 
natives.  According  to  Mr.  Foreman,  the  Filipino  "is  fond  of 
gambling,  profligate,  lavish  in  his  promises,  but  Idche  in  the  ex- 
treme as  to  their  fulfilment.  He  will  never  come  frankly  for- 
ward to  make  a  clean  breast  of  his  fault  committed,  or  even 
a  pardonable  accident,  but  will  hide  it  until  it  is  found  out.  In 
common  with  many  other  non-European  races,  an  act  of  gen- 
erosity or  a  voluntary  concession  of  justice  is  regarded  as  a  sign 
of  weakness."^^ 

It  is  no  more  possible  to  praise  than  to  indict  a  whole  people. 
Generalizations  deal  with  masses,  not  individuals;  with  con- 
stants, not  variants.  The  exceptional  Filipino,  whether  because 
of  excellence  or  inferiority,  is  not  the  type  of  the  race.  In  fact, 
he  may  be  neglected,  almost,  in  estimating  the  value  of  the  race 
for  the  purpose  of  development  along  modern  lines.  It  is  what 
we  may  call  the  upper  average  which  counts.  The  extremes  may 
serve  as  an  inspiration  or  a  horrible  example,  but  not  as  material 
from  which  to  draw  working  conclusions  as  to  the  characteristics 
and  qualities  of  the  whole  people. 

The  Filipinos  are  anxious  to  own  land  and  much  of  the  coun- 
try is  divided  into  small  farms,  but  they  are  a  gregarious  people 
who  dislike  the  isolation  of  a  country  life  and  prefer  to  live  in 
the  towns  to  which  they  return  after  the  day's  work  on  the  farm. 
The  result  is  that  a  country  which  is  highly  cultivated  often  looks 
unoccupied.  Much  of  the  work  is  done  by  laborers  who  sleep 
during  the  hot  hours  of  the  day.  Highways  which  are  deserted 
during  the  day  are  often  crowded  during  the  night  by  vehicles 
carrying  produce  to  the  market  towns.  • 

Village  life  is  gay  and  joyous.  The  people  are  good-natured 
and  kindly,  and  welcome  the  stranger  with  hospitality  which  is 
sometimes  oppressive.  The  banqucte  and  the  baile  play  a  large 
part  in  their  lives.  They  delight  in  music  and  dancing  and  every 
village  has  its  gorgeously  uniformed  band,  which  turns  out  on 

28  The  foregoing  and  many  other  estimates  of  the  Filipinos  are  collected  in 
Census  of  the  Philippine  Islands  I,  pp.  493-531. 


110  THE   PHILIPPINES 

the  slightest  provocation.  Fiestas  and  hoHdays  are  so  numerous 
as  seriously  to  affect  the  labor  problem.  In  the  rural  communi- 
ties the  cockpit  is  still  the  center  of  social  life  although  it  is  being 
crowded  from  its  preeminence  by  the  baseball  field. 

Family  affection  is  strong  and  relatives  of  remote  degree  find 
a  home  with  the  moderately  prosperous.  It  is  almost  impossible 
to  induce  laborers  to  remain  long  away  from  their  homes  and 
during  railway  construction  times  it  was  found  necessary  to  build 
temporary  villages  where  the  laborers  might  be  joined  by  their 
families.  An  American  householder  must  exercise  eternal  vigi- 
lance to  avoid  supporting  all  the  parientes  of  his  house  servants. 
Periodical  inspection  of  servant  quarters  is  necessary  to  clear  out 
these  distant  relatives  who  fasten  themselves  on  the  working 
representatives  of  the  group.  It  is  not  unusual  for  a  clerk  in  a 
government  bureau,  on  a  salary  of  thirty  dollars  a  month,  to  sup- 
port father,  mother  and  innumerable  brothers  and  sisters,  in  idle- 
ness, and  it  is  done  with  perfect  willingness  and  evident  uncon- 
sciousness of  the  imposition. 

The  women  are  In  all  respects  the  social  equals  of  the  men  and 
they  are  much  more  ambitious.  As  a  rule  they  control  the  family 
purse.  Most  boys  of  twenty  are  married  and  when  employed  as 
house  servants  the  wife  generally  calls  and  collects  the  wages. 
The  women  are  employed  as  laundresses  and  seamstresses  only. 

The  Chinese  attempt  to  monopolize  the  business  of  cooking, 
although  a  trained  Filipino  cook  is  the  equal  of  a  Chinaman. 
The  Chinese  cooks  are  thoroughly  organized  and  as  they  learned 
how  to  cook  during  the  Ming  dynasty,  or  some  other  remote 
period,  and  have  no  intention  of  changing  their  methods,  the 
American  mistress  soon  throws  up  her  hands  in  despair.  When 
given  his  instructions  the  cook  blandly  says,  "Yes,  missie,"  and 
proceeds  as  usual.  But  the  Filipino  is  anxious  to  learn  new  ways 
and  in  time  makes  as  good  a  cook  as  the  Chinaman.  Servants 
are  inclined  to  be  shiftless,  but  they  are  easily  trained,  and,  for 
a  judicious  mistress  who  remembers  the  servant  problem  at  home, 
housekeeping  in  Manila  Is  one  long  period  of  solemn  joy. 

For  the  average  servant  a  falsehood  is  an  ever-present  help  in 


THE   NATIVE   PEOPLES  111 

time  of  trouble,  and,  when  necessary  or  convenient,  he  will  pre- 
varicate freely  and  fluently  without  apparent  consciousness  of 
wrong-doing.  In  this  respect  he  is  like  a  normal  child ;  he  simply 
moves  along  the  line  of  least  resistance.  The  desire  to  please,  to 
avoid  offense,  to  give  the  answer  he  thinks  you  wish,  leads  to 
many  departures  from  strict  truth.  The  political  class  and  the 
journalists  pay  little  regard  to  the  truth  when  dealing  with  their 
opponents  and  are  greatly  surprised  when  called  on  to  prove  their 
charges  in  court.  The  Anglo-Saxon  theory  of  the  sacredness  of 
abstract  truth  is  made  workable  by  liberal  mental  reservations. 
The  Oriental  claims  more  individual  liberty  in  determining  when 
a  lie  is  justifiable,  and  it  must  be  conceded  that  he  is  less  of  a 
hypocrite  than  his  Anglo-Saxon  brother.  He  frankly  recognizes 
exceptions  to  the  general  rule.  Thus  in  the  Mahabharata  it  is 
said :  "There  is  nothing  higher  than  to  tell  the  truth,  yet  it  is  bet- 
ter to  speak  what  is  beneficial  than  to  speak  the  truth."  Also  that 
it  is  permissible  to  lie  "on  an  occasion  of  marriage,  or  of  love,  or 
when  life  is  In  danger,  or  when  one's  entire  property  is  about  to 
be  taken  away,  or  for  the  sake  of  a  Brahman." 

In  theory  the  Westerner  makes  no  exceptions  to  the  rule;  in 
practise  he  is  often  quite  liberal.  The  Filipino  is  an  Oriental 
who  professes  the  theory  taught  him  by  the  Church  while  prac- 
tising that  of  the  Mahabharata  with  stress  on  the  five  exceptions, 
modifying  the  fourth  by  striking  out  the  superfluous  word 
entire.^'^ 

Competent  observers  agree  that  testimony  offered  in  the  Phil- 
ippine courts  must  be  carefully  scrutinized.  In  parts  of  Burma 
there  are  said  to  be  licensed  practitioners  of  the  gentle  art  of 
perjury,  and  in  the  Philippines,  as  In  America,  there  are  many 
experts  who  practise  the  art  without  a  license.^' 

27  Lord  Curzon  brought  the  hornets  about  his  ears  by  telling  the  students 
of  the  University  of  Calcutta  that  "the  highest  ideal  of  truth  is  to  a  large 
extent  Western."  The  statement  was  true  enough,  but  all  over  India  the  cry 
went  up  that  the  Anglo-Saxon  is  a  hypocrite  who  pays  lip  service  only  to  a 
general  principle.    Speeches  of  Lord  Curson,  I,  p.  126. 

28  The  naivete  with  which  a  Filipino  witness  sometimes  testifies  is  very 
amusing.  In  one  instance  a  witness,  after  describing  an  accident  in  great 
detail,  and  standing  successfully  a  severe  cross-examination,  volunteered  the 
information  that  he  was  not  present    When  asked  for  an  explanation  be 


112  THE    PHILIPPINES 

Dissimulation,  deceit  and  servility  in  people,  as  in  children,  are 
founded  in  fear  and  hope.  They  are  seldom  inherent  or  per- 
manent traits  of  character  of  any  people  and  when  they  have  been 
acquired  they  ordinarily  disappear  with  the  removal  of  the  in- 
ducing causes. 

It  has  often  been  said  that  the  Filipinos  are  lazy,  treacherous 
and  cruel,  as  well  as  ignorant  of  the  meaning  of  the  word  truth. 
The  charge  is  grossly  untrue.  It  must  be  remembered,  however, 
that  Anglo-Saxon-Puritan  standards  are  not  accepted  by  all  the 
world  as  laws  of  nature  and  that  the  Filipinos  are  not  of  English 
or  New  England  origin.  As  business  men  the  Filipinos  are 
probably  less  reliable  than  the  Chinese,  but  more  honest  than  the 
Japanese.  The  common  people  arei  like  those  of  similar  social 
and  economic  station  in  other  countries, — simple-minded,  good- 
hearted,  and  generally  honest,  with  a  sufficient  number  of  excep- 
tions to  necessitate  the  maintenance  of  a  police  system. 

Like  all  people  who  live  in  the  tropics,  the  Filipinos  are  natu- 
rally indolent.  Activity  for  its  own  sake  has  no  charm  for  them. 
The  restless  energy  of  the  Americans  seems  to  them  mere  fool- 
ishness,— ^like  jumping  up  and  down  for  the  sake  of  doing  some- 
thing. Their  necessities  are  the  exact  measure  of  their  energies, 
and  the  necessities  of  life  in  the  tropics  are  few  and  easily  sup- 
plied. With  banana  and  papaia  trees  growing  in  the  back  yard,  a 
Filipino  who  can  borrow"  a  ladder  need  not  worry  about  the  sup- 
port of  his  family.  The  people  subscribe  cheerfully  to  the  biblical 
doctrine  that  labor  is  a  curse,  to  be  avoided  when  possible.  En- 
ergy and  activity  are  unnatural  In  such  a  climate.  The  tendency 
Is  downward  to  the  standard  which  nature  has  fixed  for  the 
tropics,  and  even  American  and  European  born  residents  can 
avoid  the  inevitable  languor  only  by  constant  vigilance  and  active 
exercise. 

Personal  dignity,  reserve  and  pride  are  common  to  all  Fil- 
ipinos as  to  all  members  of  the  Malay  race.  They  are  sensitive, 
courteous,  hospitable  and  quick  to  take  offense  at  any  discourtesy, 

replied :  "I  was  not  there.  My  friend  saw  the  accident,  but  he  had  to  work 
in  the  rice-fields  to-day  so,  as  an  accommodation,  I  came  to  do  the  testifying 
for  him." 


THE   NATIVE    PEOPLES  113 

slight,  or  lack  of  consideration.  They  are  offended  by  the  brusk 
directness  of  a  certain  type  of  American  who  regards  courtesy 
as  undemocratic.  Their  sense  of  what  is  due  to  an  individual 
is  shocked  by  disregard  of  the  requirements  of  formal  courtesy. 
They  have  little  sense  of  humor  and  detest  boisterousness  and  all 
sorts  of  horse  play. 

In  speaking  of  the  characteristics  and  habits  of  the  Filipinos 
the  reader  must  constantly  bear  in  mind  that  no  characterization 
applies  to  all  individuals  or  even  to  all  classes.  It  is  possible  to 
generalize  only  with  reference  to  the  great  body  of  the  common 
people.  As  we  have  seen,  there  is  great  diversity  of  opinion  as 
to  their  merits  and  demerits. 


CHAPTER  IV 
The  Native  Peoples 

II 

THE   MOROS 

A  Special  Problem — The  Designation  Moro — The  Different  Tribes — Their 
Warlike  Character — Running  Amok — Weapons — Moro  Forts — The  Lan- 
guage and  Books — Varying  Habits — Physical  Characteristics — Dress  and 
Ornaments — Temperate — The  Betel  Nut  Habit — Houses — Polygamy — Tribal 
Government — Slavery — Schools — Their  Religion — Burial  Customs — Their  In- 
dustries— Power  of  Datus — The  Moro  Laws  and  Courts — Penalties — Old 
Customs  Slowly  Being  Abandoned. 

The  tribes  which  inhabit  the  island  of  Mindanao  and  the 
Sulu  and  lesser  groups  at  the  extreme  southwest  extremities 
of  the  Archipelago  have  attracted  much  attention  because 
of  their  warlike  character  and  their  distinction  as  the  only  Mo- 
hammedan wards  of  the  United  States.  As  a  governmental  fac- 
tor they  are  most  embarrassing.  The  wild  men  are  good  raw 
material,  and  the  Filipinos  are  easily  influenced  in  favor  of  good 
government,  but  the  Moros,  encased  in  the  armor  of  Islamism, 
present  a  much  more  difficult  problem.  After  a  decade  of  Amer- 
ican control,  although  intertribal  wars  and  the  worse  vices  of 
slavery  have  disappeared,  they  remain  in  character  substantially 
as  the  Spaniards  left  them.  Nevertheless  those  most  familiar 
with  the  situation,  while  not  enthusiastic,  are  hopeful  of  the  fu- 
ture. Their  regeneration  will  be  a  matter  of  generations,  not  of 
decades.  General  John  J.  Pershing,  who  has  had  much  experience 
with  the  Moros,  in  his  last  annual  report  as  governor  of  the  prov- 
ince, says :  "Relatively  there  has  been  great  progress,  but  in  reality 

114 


THE    NATIVE    PEOPLES  115 

the  people  are  yet  in  dense  darkness  and  only  the  merest  begin- 
ning has  been  made  toward  their  enlightenment.  The  main  thing 
to  record  is  that  we  have  a  solid  foundation  for  the  future,  in 
that  the  wild  people  and  the  Moros  have  come  to  look  upon  the 
Americans  as  their  true  friends.  They  have  learned  that  they 
dare  ask  and  that  they  will  receive  protection.  They  have  found 
Americans  just  and  unselfish,  and  they  regard  us  as  their  de- 
fenders against  their  own  countrymen  who  would  keep  them  in 
ignorance  for  exploitation  or  seize  upon  them  and  sell  them  into 
slavery."  However,  unless  "he  can  be  induced  to  relinquish  some 
of  his  most  vicious  customs,  and  unless  he  can  be  protected  from 
exploitation  at  the  hands  of  his  datu,  the  Moro  faces  the  future 
with  very  little  of  promise.  He  can  not  progress  far  while  he  is 
bound  down  by  the  chains  of  polygamy  and  female  slavery.  A 
code  which  recognizes  plurality  of  wives  and  authorizes  concubi- 
nage can  not  prevail  against  civilized  standards  of  morality.  Its 
baneful  influence  encourages  sensuality  and  lust  with  all  their 
degrading  effect  upon  Moro  character.  Neither  can  the  Moro 
advance  under  datu  rule,  the  very  foundation  of  which  is  laid 
in  ignorance  and  strengthened  by  superstition.  The  moral  sense 
is  generally  lacking  in  these  datu  leaders,  and  as  a  consequence 
even  to  a  greater  degree  is  the  conscience  of  the  common  Moro 
befogged."* 

The  Moro  is  not  a  subject  for  ordinary  missionary  work,  but 
the  medical  missionary  can  reach  him,  and  it  is  safe  to  predict 
that  the  work  along  that  line  recently  commenced  under  the  di- 
rections of  Bishop  Brent  will  be  more  effective  than  anything 
heretofore  attempted. 

The  religion  of  Mohammed  regulates  the  lives,  government 
and  customs  as  well  as  the  beliefs  of  its  followers.  Hence  a 
change  of  government,  to  some  extent,  necessarily  interferes 
with  their  religion.  With  this  in  mind  the  difficulties  in  the  way 
of  imposing  a  new  system  of  government  will  be  appreciated. 

To  the  Spaniards  all  the  followers  of  Islamism  were  known  as 
Moors  or  Moros,  and  the  name  has  been  perpetuated  in  the 

^Annual  Report  of  Governor  of  the  Moro  Province,  1913. 


116  THE    PHILIPPINES 

islands  as  descriptive  of  all  the  Mohammedan  tribes.^  There  are 
six  separate  and  distinct  tribes  of  Moros,  and  five  or  six  groups 
which  hardly  rise  to  the  dignity  of  tribal  entities,  so  nearly  do 
they  resemble  one  or  another  of  the  greater  divisions  or  merge 
their  identity  with  that  of  some  one  of  the  wholly  pagan  peoples. 
While  possibly  not  the  most  numerous,  the  Jolo  Moros,  because 
of  their  fierce  and  intractable  natures,  their  continuous  successful 
defiance  of  Spanish  and  American  control,  and  their  fanatical 
religious  traits,  are  the  most  important  and  widely  known  of  the 
Mohammedan  peoples.  The  most  of  them  live  on  the  island  of 
Jolo,  a  few  miles  southwest  of  Mindanao,  where  they  have  for 
centuries  fought  their  fierce  and  sanguinary  battles.  They  are 
found  also  throughout  the  Jolo  group  on  the  Siassi  and  Tawi- 
Tawi  Islands,  which  stretch  away  to  the  coast  of  Borneo,  and  on 
the  Cagayan  de  Sulu  Islands  to  the  north.  Many  of  them  have 
emigrated  to  Zarnboanga,  where  they  now  form  no  inconsider- 
able element  in  the  population. 

The  Sultan  of  Jolo  has  always  been  regarded  as  the  head  of 
the  Moslem  church  in  the  Archipelago.  The  island  of  Jolo  is 
the  political  and  commercial  center  of  the  Philippine  Moros. 
The  Joloanos,  in  striking  contrast  with  all  the  other  Moros,  pre- 
sent a  type  very  closely  approaching  the  original  Malay,  from 
whom  they  sprang,  having  mingled  their  blood  with  none  of  the 
other  peoples  of  the  Philippines  and  only  to  a  slight  extent  with 
the  Arab  traders  and  missionaries  who  first  brought  them  into 
the  fold  of  Islam.  These  latter,  though  never  present  among 
them  in  any  considerable  numbers,  invariably  held  high  political 
rank  and,  practising  the  polygamy  permitted  by  the  Koran,  left 
traces  of  their  blood  among  the  Moros  of  rank  and  wealth  which 
are  still  easily  discernible. 

From  the  boundaries  of  the  Cotabatu  district  west  along  the 
coast  and  for  thirty  or  forty  miles  inland,  to  the  Zamboanga  dis- 
trict line,  live  the  Maguindanao  tribesmen,  approximately  fifty 

2  The  Moros  call  themselves  Tau  sa  Islam  or  The  People  of  Islam  as  dis- 
tinguished in  their  tongue  from  the  Tau  sa  Pilipino  or  Christian  Filipinos. 


THE   NATIVE   PEOPLES  117 

thousand  in  number,  less  warlike  than  any  of  their  neighbors,  an 
agricultural  and  pastoral  people,  firmly  attached  to  their  Moham- 
medan faith,  but  more  or  less  completely  reconciled  to  the  pres- 
ent stable  and  peaceful  government. 

The  Lanao  Moros,  or  more  properly,  and  as  they  call  them- 
selves, the  Maranao,  or  lake  people,  occupy  the  great  plateau  ly- 
ing about  Lake  Lanao  in  north  central  Mindanao,  the  entire  coun- 
try surrounding  Iligan  Bay  and  the  fertile  valleys  and  grassy 
plains  which  extend  to  the  southeast  of  the  lake.  Originally 
savage  and  warlike,  they  are  fast  losing  these  traits  and  becom- 
ing successful  tillers  of  the  soil,  valued  and  dependable  laborers 
on  roads  and  public  improvements  throughout  the  province  and, 
in  a  crude  and  uneconomic  manner,  rather  remarkable  workers 
in  brass,  copper  and  silver. 

The  Yakan  Moros  inhabit  almost  alone  the  island  of  Basilan, 
across  the  straits  from  Zamboanga.  They  are  probably  the  best 
farmers  in  Mindanao,  but  have  suffered  much  from  contact  with 
the  Joloano  trouble  makers. 

The  latest  comers  of  the  Mohammedans  are  probably  the  Sa- 
mal  Moros — the  "Sea  Gipsies  of  the  East" — whose  migration 
from  Johore  was  of  relatively  recent  date.  They  are  found  in 
Mindanao,  invariably  close  to  the  water's  edge.  Great  numbers 
of  them  live  their  entire  lives  aboard  their  boats.  They  were 
formerly  pirates  and  slave  catchers,  who  in  many  regions  domi- 
nated their  less  energetic  co-religionists.  But  American  rule  has 
put  an  end  to  their  lawless  activities  and  they  are  to-day  occupied 
almost  wholly  in  fishing,  leaving  their  boats  only  to  obtain  sup- 
plies ashore  in  exchange  for  their  sea  produce.  Considerable 
numbers  of  these  people  now  live  in  Jolo  and  on  Basilan,  but  the 
most  of  them  still  build  their  rude  houses  on  poles  over  the  water 
and  close  to  the  shore,  or  wander  from  place  to  place  along  the 
coast  of  the  Zamboanga  Peninsula  in  their  vintas.^ 

Of  the  less  important  Moro  tribes  may  be  mentioned  the  Kali- 

8  The  real  Samals  are  confined  to  the  Samals  group  of  islands.  They  are 
not  wanderers  of  the  Jolanese  type. 


118  THE    PHILIPPINES 

bugan,  a  mixed  people  of  Moro  and  Subano  blood,  and  the  Bajau 
and  llanos.* 

By  instinct,  tradition  and  training  the  Moro  is  fierce  and  war- 
like, exhibiting  all  the  cruelty  toward  his  enemies  which  is  cus- 
tomary with  savages.  Ready  and  eager  to  shed  blood,  inde- 
pendent and  jealous  by  nature,  he  goes  to  war  on  the  slightest 
provocation.  Formerly  every  man  when  outside  his  house  or 
away  from  home  was  armed  either  with  a  kris  or  a  barong,  the 
two  weapons  of  warfare.^  He  is  not  open  and  fair  in  fight,  and 
frequently  resorts  to  what  white  men  regard  as  improper  meth- 
ods of  attack.  Being  by  birth  and  tradition  a  fighter  he  makes 
an  excellent  soldier  and  has  been  largely  employed  in  that 
capacity  by  the  government.  Two  companies  of  the  Philippine 
Scouts  and  a  dozen  or  more  of  the  Philippine  Constabulary  are 
enlisted  from  the  Moros,  and  very  gallant  and  valuable  soldiers 
they  have  proved  to  be.  They  take  readily  to  a  strict  discipline, 
show  great  powers  of  endurance  and  fight  cheerfully  and  bravely 
against  their  own  people  under  the  leadership  of  white  officers. 

Occasionally  they  carry  spears  and  a  species  of  war-club  shaped 
like  a  boomerang.  The  barong  is  a  cutting  weapon,  with  a 
blade  twelve,  fifteen  or  eighteen  inches  long,  with  front  and  back 
oval  shaped,  meeting  at  an  acute  angle  at  the  point.  Krises  are 
of  two  varieties,  wavy  and  straight,  and  are  used  for  both  cut- 
ting and  thrusting.  They  are  often  prized  for  their  service  in 
having  killed  a  great  number  of  persons,  and  the  selling  price  is 
established  accordingly.  Individuals  have  an  uncomfortable 
habit  of  getting  into  a  religious  frenzy  and  running  amok  among 
Christians.  A  Moro  who  goes  juramentado  and  runs  amok  often 
finds  many  victims  before  he  is  killed. 

The  kampilan,  another  favorite  weapon,  is  a  long  two-handed 

*  According  to  the  most  recent  estimate  there  are  325,000  Moros  divided 
among  the  leading  tribes,  as  follows : 

Magindanaos 90,000  Sulus  65,000 

Malanaos    78,000  Yakans 17,000 

Samals  75,000 

Kept.  Gov.  Moro  Province,  1913,  p.  52. 

5  They  have  now  been  generally  disarmed.  The  Lanao,  Magindanao  and 
Samal  Moros  make  the  best  soldiers.    The  Yakans  are  the  pacifists. 


THE    NATIVE    PEOPLES 

sword,  widening  toward  the  point  and  sharp  on  one  side.  Dag- 
gers and  knives  of  many  shapes  and  sizes  are  commonly  used. 

The  Moros  fortify  their  homes  and  villages,  surrounding 
them  with  thick  stone  or  earthen  walls  and  conceal  these  forts,  or 
cotas,  by  planting  bamboo  on  or  just  outside  the  parapets. 
The  cotas  are  usually  deeply  ditched,  and  entrance  is  effected  by 
means  of  a  narrow  bamboo  bridge  consisting  of  a  single  pole  and 
hand  rail  leading  to  a  narrow  gateway  in  the  wall.  From  these 
cotas,  in  which  they  often  make  desperate  and  stubborn  resist- 
ance to  their  foes,  there  are  always  secret  means  of  ultimate 
escape,  usually  underground. 

The  Moro  languages  are  of  Malayan  origin,  with  a  large  ad- 
mixture of  Arabic.  Although  derived  from  a  common  source, 
the  dialects  differ  so  as  to  make  intercourse  between  the  tribes 
impossible  without  an  interpreter.  They  have  some  written 
books,  other  than  the  Koran  and  the  Codes,  but  they  are  mostly 
genealogical  and  do  not  rise  very  high  in  the  scale  of  literature. 
Considerable  has  been  done  by  American  army  officers  in  the 
way  of  formulating  the  grammars  of  the  different  dialects.  The 
Moro  languages,  however,  remain  quite  rudimentary  and  unde- 
veloped.' 

The  various  tribes,  having  reached  different  stages  of  civiliza- 
tion, differ  to  some  extent  In  their  habits,  customs,  modes  of  life 
and  belief,  and  no  description  of  habits  and  customs  is  applicable 
to  all  the  tribes.  A  few  who  live  near  the  coast  are  quiet  and 
peaceful  and  carry  on  a  little  farming  and  primitive  manufacture, 
in  connection  with  the  universal  fishing.  They  are  generally 
quite  prosperous,  but,  living  as  they  do  in  a  land  of  great  fertility, 
where  the  climate  offers  but  slight  encouragement  to  either  energy 
or  ambition,  they  make  no  effort  to  better  the  conditions  into 
which  they  were  bom.    They  are  not  thrifty,  are  fond  of  gam- 


«  A  Grammar  of  the  Maguindanao  Tongue,  by  Father  J.  Juanmarti,  trans- 
lated by  Captain  C.  C  Smith,  U.  S.  A.  (1906). 

A  Phrase  Book  and  Vocabularx  of  the  Lanao  Moro  Dialect,  by  Lieut 
Charles  Winslow  Elliott,  U.  S.  A.  (1913). 

The  Moros  now  publish  a  small  newspaper  at  Jolo,  and  several  school 
text-books  are  issued  in  the  Moro  script  by  the  Department  of  Education. 


120  THE    PHILIPPINES 

bling,  and,  as  a  rule,  squander  their  substance  without  much 
thought  of  the  future. 

The  men  are  assisted  in  the  outside  work  by  the  women  and 
boys,  who  plow  the  fields,  go  on  various  expeditions  and  engage 
in  fishing.  Those  who  are  particularly  skilled  in  the  things  inci- 
dent to  their  daily  life  acquire  a  reputation  among  their  neigh- 
bors. Thus  one  man  becomes  noted  for  sailing  the  fastest  boat, 
another  for  making  the  best  barong  and  kris  handles  and  scab- 
bards, a  third  as  an  expert  catcher  of  crabs  and  crayfish,  another 
as  a  diver,  and  so  on  through  all  the  various  native  occupations. 

The  Moros  of  pure  blood  have  the  usual  characteristics  of  the 
Malay  race.  The  complexion  is  olive  brown,  the  hair  straight 
and  black.  They  are  somewhat  taller  than  the  average  Filipino, 
straight  and  well  formed,  and  often  strong  and  stockily  built. 
The  feet  are  particularly  broad  at  the  toes,  which  are  generally 
widely  separated,  due  to  the  habit  of  going  barefooted.  In  many 
of  their  daily  occupations  they  use  their  toes  as  other  people 
use  their  fingers.  Thus,  in  climbing  a  tree  a  Moro  will  grasp  the 
climbing  rope  with  his  toes,  and  in  sailing  a  boat  he  will  wind  the 
sheet  around  the  great  toe,  and  in  riding  the  stirrup  strap  is 
passed  between  the  toes. 

The  different  tribes  are  easily  distinguished  by  their  dress. 
Generally  that  of  both  the  men  and  women  is  quite  simple.  For 
the  former  it  often  consists  of  nothing  except  a  sarong,  a  long 
piece  of  cloth  joined  at  the  ends  and  folded  around  the  waist. 
A  breech-clout  is  sometimes  worn,  and  upon  special  occasions 
a  costume  consisting  of  a  tight  jacket  and  close-fitting  trousers, 
buttoned  to  the  ankle  and  full  in  the  seat.  These  garments  are 
often  made  in  brilliant  colors  and  ornamented  with  bright  but- 
tons. In  the  folds  of  the  sarong  the  wearer  usually  carries  a 
short  dagger,  or  if  a  man  of  high  rank,  a  kris. 

Woman's  ordinary  clothing  is  limited  to  the  sarong,  a  strip  of 
brightly-colored  cotton  cloth  about  four  feet  wide  and  ten  feet 
long,  while  her  more  elaborate  dress  is  usually  a  close-fitting 
jacket  and  loose  trousers.  Shoes  or  sandals  are  unknown  to  the 
common  people  of  either  sex.     The  favorite  head-dress  is  a 


THE   NATIVE    PEOPLES  121 

brightly-colored  scarf,  which  the  men  twist  into  a  turban.  Occa- 
sionally straw  or  wooden  hats  of  domestic  manufacture  and 
enormous  size,  adorned  with  tin  or  silver  spikes,  are  worn  by 
the  men.    But  the  turban  is  more  popular. 

Children  wear  little  or  no  clothing  in  their  homes,  but  fre- 
quently appear  in  public  adorned  with  a  sarong.  It  is  not  un- 
usual to  see  Moro  women  ornamented  with  rings  and  bracelets, 
the  work  of  native  smiths,  who  are  skilful  in  molding  brass  and 
precious  metals.  The  hair  is  usually  worn  long  by  the  men,  while 
the  women  grease  it  with  cocoanut  oil  and  knot  it  upon  the  head 
in  more  or  less  fantastic  fashion.  The  umbrella  is  universally 
popular  and  is  carried  by  the  well-to-do  on  all  occasions. 

The  Moros  bathe  frequently,  spending  a  gjeat  deal  of  time  in 
the  water,  but  as  the  use  of  soap  is  unknown  they  can  not  truth- 
fully be  said  to  be  a  cleanly  race.  Their  houses  and  surround- 
ings are  often  in  a  very  filthy  condition.  They  fall  very  short 
of  the  standard  of  Mohammed,  with  whom  cleanliness  was  said 
to  be  the  foundation  of  religion.  The  teeth  are  filed  and  black- 
ened and  the  edges  so  shaped  as  to  give  them  an  outward  curve. 
This  process,  which  is  very  painful,  is  begun  by  both  men  and 
women  in  their  youth  and  continued  for  several  years.  The 
front  teeth  are  sometimes  filled  with  copper,  not  for  the  purpose 
of  preventing  decay,  but  for  ornament.  Artificial  teeth  of  horn 
are  sometimes  inserted,  but  they  are  entirely  useless.  The  dye 
for  the  teeth  is  compounded  from  lemon  juice,  charcoal,  rusty 
iron,  or  a  certain  vegetable  sap. 

Tobacco  is  used  for  chewing  in  connection  w^ith  the  betel  nut 
and  generally  for  smoking.  Like  all  Mohammedans,  the 
Moros  are  temperate  in  the  use  of  alcoholic  liquors.  They 
use  opium,  however,  to  a  certain  extent.  The  habit  of  chewing 
the  betel  nut  has  a  firm  hold  on  all  the  people,  men,  women,  and 
even  children.  It  is  supposed  to  aid  digestion,  preserve  the  teeth 
and  act  as  a  stimulant  on  the  body.  A  betel  nut  outfit  consists 
of  a  small  brass  box,  a  knife,  a  mixing  pestle,  a  small  package  of 
shell  lime,  a  few  betel  nuts  from  the  areca  palm,  tobacco  and  a 
roll  of  buyo  leaves. 


122  THE    PHILIPPINES 

The  people  of  all  stations  in  life  build  their  houses  very  mudi 
alike.  They  are  raised  on  poles  from  three  to  ten  feet  above  the 
ground  and  are  often  built  near  or  over  the  water.  The  timbers 
are  lashed  together  and  held  in  place  with  bejuco  or  rattan.  The 
roofs  are  usually  thatched  with  cogon  grass,  sometimes  with  nipa, 
or  some  other  variety  of  palm,  and  the  walls  made  of  salaga,  a 
species  of  palm  leaf  sewed  together.  The  floors  are  made  of  strips 
of  bamboo.  These  structures  are  practically  waterproof  and  af- 
ford shelter  from  the  sun,  and  also  withstand  the  frequent  earth- 
quake shocks.  The  houses  of  the  better  class  are  often  large,  well 
built,  and  the  outside  joists  elaborately  carved  and  colored.  The 
Bajaus,  or  sea  gipsies,  live  in  boats.  Those  who  do  not  spend  all 
their  time  at  sea  build  huts  on  the  shore  over  the  water.  Samal 
settlements  are  compactly  built  along  the  coasts,  while  those  of 
the  Yakans  are  scattered,  the  people  living  in  small  rancherias 
with  houses  far  removed  from  one  another.  Generally  the  Moros 
proper  live  farther  inland  than  do  the  Samal  Laut. 

The  house  furnishings  are  not  elaborate,  but  sufficient  for  the 
needs  of  the  occupants.  Chairs  and  tables  are  not  required,  as 
the  people  sit  on  the  floor.  A  few  shelves,  perhaps,  are  used  for 
pottery  and  the  kitchen  utensils,  all  of  which  are  primitive,  con- 
sisting of  brass  bowls  and  jars,  dried  gourds,  cocoanut  shells, 
banana  leaves  and  crude  baskets.  Mats  are  used  for  sleeping, 
except  in  the  homes  of  datus,  where  bedsteads,  curtained  with 
colored  cloth  hangings  and  provided  with  pillows  and  mattresses, 
may  be  found.  Among  the  wealthier  people  the  walls  are  deco- 
rated with  krises  and  lances,  while  tom-toms,  called  agongs,  and 
other  alleged  musical  instruments  are  among  the  prized  family 
possessions.  Artificial  light,  when  needed,  is  obtained  from  a 
slender  torch-like  bundle  of  resin,  wrapped  in  a  green  leaf,  or 
from  a  dish  of  cocoanut  oil  in  which  floats  a  wick.  The  tiny 
kerosene  lamps  sold  by  the  Chinese  traders  are  much  used.'' 

^  But  civilization  is  getting  its  grasp  on  the  Moro.  Once  on  a  visit  of 
inspection,  I  was  shown  through  the  establishment  of  a  wealthy  datu.  In 
the  large  living-room  were  two  cheap  but  gaudy  "Morris  chairs,"  which  it 
was  easy  to  see  were  regarded  by  tlie  proprietor  as  the  conclusive  evidence 
of  his  "culture."  But  this  was  not  all.  As  a  special  favor,  I  was  shown  the 
women's  apartment  and  the  chair  which  conjugal  affection  had  provided  for 
the  favorite  wife.    It  was  a  second-hand  dental  chair. 


THE   NATIVE    PEOPLES  123 

Polygamy  is  common  among  the  Moros  and  is  sanctioned  by 
their  religion,  a  man  having  as  many  wives  as  he  cares  to  support 
The  Koran  permits  four  legal  wives,  but  frequently  all  except 
one  are  slaves,  whose  children  do  not  inherit  land  and  titles. 
Wives  are  practically  bought,  the  suitor  paying  an  agreed  amount 
to  the  family  of  the  bride.  Marriage  ceremonies  are  performed 
by  the  priests  and  are  often  quite  elaborate,  followed  by  feast- 
ing, music  and  dancing.  The  Moros  have  many  children,  and  the 
family  ties  are  close.  The  women  carry  the  children  on  their 
hips,  as  is  customary  among  Filipinos.  The  proportion  of  ille- 
gitimate births  is  small.  The  marriageable  age  for  women  is 
thirteen  years.  Among  Malanao  Moros  divorce  is  easy.  Hus- 
band and  wife  separate  on  mutual  agreement,  the  woman  return- 
ing to  her  people,  taking  with  her  all  presents  received  from  her 
husband  during  wedded  life.  If  a  man  finds  himself  too  poor 
to  support  all  his  wives  he  may  send  one  or  more  back  to  their 
former  homes.  The  position  of  women  among  the  Moros  is 
rather  high,  in  that  they  receive  kindly  treatment  and  often  affec- 
tion from  their  husbands,  and  are  consulted  in  matters  pertain- 
ing to  the  family  and  property.  Parents  are  fond  of  their  chil- 
dren, and  the  punishment  of  the  latter  by  whipping  is  rare. 

The  tribal  government  is  patriarchal,  the  most  prominent  mem- 
ber of  the  order  being  a  chief,  generally  called  a  datu,  although 
sometimes  known  as  sultan,  rajah,  or  by  some  other  title.  But 
whatever  his  title,  his  authority  is  always  recognized  by  the  mem- 
bers of  his  clan,  and  he  has  extensive  power  over  his  followers. 
The  office  is  usually  hereditary,  descending  to  the  oldest,  or  some- 
times to  the  most  capable  son.  The  number  of  a  chief's  follow- 
ers varies,  running  from  half  a  dozen  to  perhaps  ten  thousand, 
but  the  importance  of  a  chief  is  not  determined  entirely  by  the 
size  of  his  following;  other  considerations,  such  as  noble  blood 
or  great  riches  are  frequently  taken  into  account.  There  seems 
to  be  a  tendency  toward  acknowledging  the  social  importance  of 
the  merely  rich  man,  which,  if  increased,  will  necessitate  consid- 
erable changes  in  the  social  stattts.  At  present  this  idea  has  not 
sufficiently  developed  to  threaten  the  position  of  the  datu,  who 


124  THE   PHILIPPINES 

generally  rules  by  right  of  blood  and  exercises  supreme  au- 
thority.® 

A  form  of  slavery  still  very  generally  prevails.  Moro  slavery 
differs  materially  from  the  institution  of  negro  slavery  as  it  for- 
merly existed  in  the  United  States,  and  in  many  cases  the  bond- 
age is  almost  nominal.  Sometimes  the  slave  is  from  an  alien 
tribe  or  is  a  captured  man  of  the  woods;  but  oftener  of  pure 
Moro  blood.  Master  and  slaves  often  live  in  the  same  house, 
eat  the  same  food  and  exist  upon  the  same  plane.  Their  simple 
wants  are  provided  for,  and  undoubtedly  many  bond  servants 
prefer  the  secure  and  easy  life  they  lead  In  the  household  of  a 
well-to-do  master,  who  always  has  enough  fish  and  rice,  to  the 
struggle  for  existence  that  would  follow  their  liberation.  The 
female  slave  often  occupies  a  position  of  considerable  impor- 
tance. 

The  slaves  are  obtained  as  captives  in  war,  as  punishment  for 
crime,  as  security  for  debts,  or  by  the  despotic  decree  of  some 
chief.  They  may  be  bought  or  sold.  A  man  desiring  to  borrow 
money  turns  over  as  security  some  relative  or  other  dependent, 
who  is  bound  to  servitude  until  the  debt  is  paid.  Persons  fail- 
ing to  pay  their  debts  are  liable  to  bondage,  and  because  of  high 
rates  of  interest  and  the  cost  of  their  maintenance  they  not  Infre- 
quently remain  In  servitude  for  the  rest  of  their  lives.  Often, 
however,  the  slavery  Is  temporary. 

The  Samal  Laut,  in  the  days  of  piracy,  obtained  an  abundance 
of  slaves  as  the'  result  of  their  expeditions.  Among  them  were 
Filipino  Christians,  pagans  and  Mohammedans.  Among  the 
Bajaus  slavery  Is  general  and  each  man  is  required  to  work  one 
or  two  days  each  week  for  his  chief.  On  account  of  the  extreme 
difficulty  of  obtaining  reliable  information  upon  the  subject,  no 
estimate  can  be  made  of  the  number  of  slaves. 

Slavery  has,  of  course,  been  sternly  interdicted  under  Ameri- 
can rule,  but  It  has  been  impossible  suddenly  to  terminate  so 
deeply  and  firmly  implanted  a  custom.  The  one  great  source  of 
supply  has  been  cut  off  since  the  raiding  expeditions  Into  the 

8  The  title  of  datu  may  be  won  by  personal  influence  or  by  conspicuous 
acts. 


THE   NATIVE   PEOPLES  125 

interior  and  constant  intertribal  warfare  have  ceased,  and  in 
time  the  system  will  die  a  natural  death.* 

Until  recently,  with  few  exceptions,  the  Mores  have  been  un- 
provided with  schools.  The  teachers  among  them  have  always 
been  the  priests,  or  panditas,  who  have  trained  a  sufficient  num- 
ber of  the  young  people  to  read  and  write  to  insure  the  perpetua- 
tion of  their  own  class.  Books,  being  made  laboriously  by 
hand,  are  scarce  and  confined  to  the  Koran,  the  Luwaran  or 
Book  of  Laws,  and  a  few  genealogical  works.  Some  of  the  latter 
are  very  old  and  beautifully  written  in  many  colored  inks.  Among 
the  children  of  the  datus  and  sultans,  reading  and  writing  are 
commonly  taught,  but  as  few  except  the  priests  have  any  use  for 
these  arts  they  are  quickly  forgotten.  Boys  are  raised  for  the 
priesthood  by  being  taken  directly  into  the  families  of  the  pan- 
ditas, where  they  remain  for  several  years  in  the  capacity  of 
servants  and  pupils. 

Many  of  the  Moros  have  made  the  pilgrimage  to  Mecca,  and 
on  their  return  are  treated  with  great  respect  and  veneration. 
These  pilgrimages  are  organized  perennially  by  the  Arabic  had- 
jis,  who  wander  about  the  country  and  make  all  the  arrangements 
with  steamship  companies  through  their  agents  in  Jolo  and  Zam- 
boanga. 

Nearly  all  the  heads  of  families  and  men  of  consequence 
among  the  Lanao  Moros  are  able  with  more  or  less  difficulty  to 
write  and  read  their  own  dialect,  using  the  Arabic  characters, 
and  in  most  families  of  any  means  a  boy  or  two,  and  occasionally 
a  girl,  will  be  found  who  are  proficient  in  these  simple  accom- 
plishments. The  books  used  by  the  panditas  in  teaching  their 
pupils  are  written  on  old  sheets  of  printed  paper  and  sometimes 
on  thin  boards  of  soft  wood. 

In  recent  years  education  among  the  Moros  has  received  seri- 

®  General  Pershing  says,  "Slavery  has  always  been  a  part  and  parcel  of 
Mohammedanism,  and  prior  to  American  occupation  was  practised  openly  by 
Moros,  pagans,  and  even  Filipinos.  Since  the  enactment  by  the  Legislative 
Council  of  the  law  of  1903,  prohibiting  slavery  in  the  Moro  Province,  its 
existence  has  been  generally  denied,  although  to  some  extent  it  has  been  car- 
ried on  under  the  pretense  of  retainer,  follower,  sacope,  or  concubine."  Report 
Gov.  Moro  Province^  1913, 


126  THE   PHILIPPINES 

ous  consideration  by  the  provincial  authorities.  Pandlta  schools 
were  first  established.  These  schools  are  organized  in  the  Moro 
settlements  under  the  patronage  of  some  influential  datu  and 
conducted  by  the  local  pandita  or  priest.  The  building  and 
teacher  are  provided  by  the  Moros  themselves,  while  the  prov- 
ince furnishes  books,  paper,  blackboards  and  other  necessary  sup- 
plies. The  instruction  given  is  necessarily  limited  almost  en- 
tirely to  reading  and  writing  the  native  dialect.  Primary  and 
Industrial  schools  are  being  established  under  American  direc- 
tion, and  the  work  is  making  some  progress.  When  in  1913 
the  Moro  Province  was  reorganized  as  the  Department  of  Min- 
danao and  Sulu,  the  administration  of  the  schools  was  taken 
over  by  the  Bureau  of  Education.^** 

The  Moros  are,  according  to  Christian  standards,  unprogres- 
sive.  The  Koran  is  everywhere  regarded  with  great  reverence, 
but  the  people  are  as  a  rule  ignorant  of  its  teachings  and  are  not 
steadfast  in  the  practises  of  the  Mohammedan  faith.  Aside  from 
a  few  rites  and  abstention  from  the  use  of  pork  and  liquor,  the 
Moros  can  scarcely  be  said  to  abide  by  the  laws  of  Mohammed- 
anism. They  pay  their  priests  a  nominal  respect,  but  are  not 
particularly  prompt  In  paying  the  tithes  expected  of  them.  Very 
few  observe  the  five  daily  hours  of  prayer.  There  are  but  few 
houses  of  worship,  and  these  are  modest  mosques,  or  chapels 
(generally,  nipa  shacks),  where  services  are  held  on  Friday,  the 
Sabbath  of  the  Mohammedan.^^  The  priests  read  selections 
from  the  Koran,  in  Arabic  or  Malay,  which  are  not  understood 
by  the  average  listener.  In  many  villages  there  are  no  places  of 
worship.  The  religion,  however,  permits  of  home  worship,  and 
doubtless  many  Moros  are  devout  and  loyal  to  their  faith.     In 


^^  Rept.  Dir.  of  Ed.,  1914,  p,  54.  The  Moros  asked  for  teachers  competent 
to  instruct  their  children  in  the  tenets  of  their  religion. 

11  At  Sagiaran,  near  Lake  Lanao,  the  powerful  and  influential  datu  Amai- 
Kerut  has  built  a  large  mosque  of  sawed  lumber,  and  adorned  it  with  a  cor- 
rugated iron  roof.  The  best  mosque  is  at  Jalukoaugan.  Of  course  there  are 
many  sincere  Mohammedans  among  the  Moros,  and  it  is  easy  to  underesti- 
mate the  attachment  of  the  people  to  their  religion.  See  "The  Mohammedan 
Problem  in  the  Philippines,"  by  Lt,  Col.  John  P.  Finley,  in  The  Journal  of 
Race  Development,  V,  No.  4,  April,  1915. 


THE   NATIVE   PEOPLES  127 

cases  of  sickness  a  priest  is  often  called  in  to  repeat  a  formula 
over  a  glass  of  water,  which  is  then  drunk  by  the  patient. 

*The  Moro  religion  in  many  of  its  aspects  is  largely  a  govern- 
mental affair,  a  sort  of  state  church,  and  acts  committed  in  its 
name  are  respected.  The  Spanish  converted  to  Christianity  a 
few  Moros,  who  are  scattered  along  the  coast  in  the  vicinity  of 
Zamboanga. 

Respect  for  the  dead  is  general  among  the  Moros,  and  they 
provide  a  suitable  burial,  attended  by  more  or  less  religious  cere- 
mony. The  Malanao  tribe  celebrates  the  death  of  a  datu  or  other 
important  person  with  considerable  pomp.  The  body  is  kneaded 
to  remove  all  impurities  and  is  then  wrapped  in  cloth,  a  process 
which  is  repeated  imtil  it  becomes  heavily  encased.  It  is  then 
buried  with  prayers  by  the  panditas.  Graves  are  covered  with 
heaps  of  stone  and  often  marked  with  a  long  pole  from  which 
are  suspended  colored  banners  and  painted  figures  of  grotesque 
birds  or  animals.  At  the  conclusion  a  feast  is  spread,  to  which 
all  friends  of  the  deceased  are  invited.  The  burial  ceremony  is 
followed  by  a  period  of  mourning. 

Among  the  Samal  Laut,  at  the  approach  of  death  a  priest  is 
called  in  to  read  from  the  Koran  or  to  intone  prayers.  The 
corpse  is  carefully  washed  and  wrapped  in  white  cloth;  or,  if  the 
family  is  poor,  cloth  of  some  other  color,  or  even  matting,  may  be 
used.  The  body  is  then  placed  in  a  wooden  coffin  and  is  buried 
with  the  eyes  open  and  the  face  toward  Mecca.  A  simple  cere- 
mony consisting  of  prayers  and  selections  from  the  Koran  is  held 
at  the  grave,  which  is  sometimes  sprinkled  with  sandalwood  wa- 
ter. The  place  is  usually  marked  by  a  modest  canopy  of  cloth 
supported  by  low  posts.  Returning  home,  the  family  of  the  de- 
ceased is  expected  to  devote  several  nights  to  mourning  for  the 
dead  and  to  reading  the  Koran. 

Although  they  live  almost  entirely  in  boats  and  wander  from 
place  to  place,  the  Bajaus  never  bury  their  dead  at  sea,  but  al- 
ways on  a  particular  island,  regardless  of  the  distance  they  may 
have  to  travel  to  reach  the  burying-ground.    Everything  belong- 


128  THE    PHILIPPINES 

ing  to  a  Bajau,  including  money,  is  buried  with  him.  Even  his 
boat  is  cut  up  and  buried. 

The  aggregate  of  Moro  industry  is  not  large,  although  it  has 
been  considerably  increased  during  recent  years.  The  tools,  by 
the  aid  of  which  everything  else  is  produced,  are  largely  home- 
made. Here,  however,  as  elsewhere  in  the  Moro  economy,  much 
ingenuity  is  often  wasted  in  trying  to  fit  one  tool  to  many  uses 
instead  of  devising  implements  suitable  for  the  work  at  hand. 
Even  with  the  Moros  there  has  been  some  little  specialization  of 
function;  thus  not  all  men  are  smiths  or  woodworkers.  There 
has  also  been  some  recognition  of  the  necessity  for  trades  and 
craftsmen  in  even  the  small  division  of  labor  which  their  social 
organization  affords.    But  this  tendency  is  not  marked. 

Although  the  Moros  are  primarily  farmers  or  fishermen,  some 
of  them  acquire  mechanical  trades.  The  ironworkers  or  smiths 
are  the  most  skilful  among  these  semi-tradesmen.  Their  equip- 
ment is  primitive,  but  shows  considerable  ingenuity,  and  their 
workmanship  is  often  excellent.  They  obtain  iron  and  steel 
from  Chinamen  by  barter,  and  forge  the  numerous  krises,  bolos, 
knives,  daggers  and  spears  in  which  the  people  take  great  delight. 
The  occupation  of  smith  is  held  in  high  honor  among  them. 

Another  important  home  industry  is  the  building  of  boats. 
The  Moros  are  semi-amphibious,  and  when  they  are  not  actually 
immersed  in  water  are  frequently  to  be  found  upon  its  surface 
in  small  canoes.  Practically  every  family  possesses  at  least  one 
boat  and  often  several.  Although  the  demand  is  consequently 
large,  it  has  not  developed  a  special  class  of  boat  builders.  Each 
man  is  competent  to  construct  some  kind  of  a  craft  for  his  per- 
sonal use.  It  requires  about  three  weeks'  time  for  a  man  to  make 
an  ordinary  canoe  twenty  feet  in  length,  as  the  tools  employed  are 
crude  and  unsatisfactory.  Many  a  huge  vinta  has  been  labori- 
ously hollowed  from  an  immense  tree  trunk  with  no  other  tool 
than  a  mallet  and  a  rough  chisel. 

The  making  of  pottery  is  common  but  not  general.  A  pot- 
ter's wheel  of  a  rude  pattern  is  used.    The  material  is  a  black 


THE   NATIVE   PEOPLES  129 

volcanic  mud  obtained  from  the  sediment  of  streams.  It  is  not 
apparently  rich  in  clay,  but  holds  together  quite  well  after  bak- 
ing. The  pottery  is  fired  by  being  put  directly  into  an  ordinary 
fire,  where  a  good  deal  of  it  is  ruined,  but  the  rest  emerges  hard- 
ened and  toughened  sufficiently  for  household  use.  The  firing 
kiln  is  unknown. 

Some  of  the  more  ingenious  artisans,  -particularly  among  the 
Lanao  people,  work  in  brass,  hammering  or  molding  a  variety 
of  ornamental  articles.  The  ability  to  do  this  work  is  confined 
to  a  few  localities  and  families.  Few  articles  are  made  except 
"chow  pots,"  betel  boxes,  ornaments  and  handles  for  krises. 
Some  brass  workers  are  able  to  work  in  silver,  but  their  skill 
does  not  equal  that  of  the  Navajo  and  other  American  Indians. 

The  women  weave  cloth  of  good  quality,  the  usual  articles 
made  being  the  sarong  and  large  handkerchief,  which  constitute 
the  ordinary  dress  of  both  sexes.  This  work  is  executed  upon 
primitive  looms  and  is  often  artistic  in  addition  to  being  skilfully 
woven.  But  little  use  is  made  of  twills,  diagonals  and  other  fancy 
weaves.  Considerable  diversity  in  appearance  is  obtained  by  the 
manipulation  of  many-colored  threads.  The  thread  is  obtained 
from  the  Chinese,  the  women  having  small  knowledge  of  spin- 
ning. The  dyeing  is  done  at  home  with  colors  that  are  generally 
lasting,  extracted  from  barks,  roots  and  flowers. 

A  small-eared,  low-growing  corn  is  raised,  principally  because 
it  IS  immune  from  the  attacks  of  locusts.  It  receives  little  care 
other  than  numerous  weedings,  and  the  quality  of  the  seed  is  so 
poor  that  the  resulting  crop  is  far  from  satisfactory.  Sweet  po- 
tatoes form  a  never-failing  crop,  growing  apparently  from  year 
to  year  without  replanting,  but  the  quality  could  be  improved  by 
the  introduction  of  fresh  stock  and  the  employment  of  modem 
agricultural  methods.  The  banana  is  prolific,  but  can  scarcely  be 
classed  as  a  cultivated  product.  Although  great  groves  are  to 
be  seen  everywhere,  they  receive  no  attention.  Cocoanut  trees 
abound  near  the  coast,  and  the  natives  find  them  of  use  in  many 
.ways,  the  oil  being  an  important  article  of  food.    Tobacco  is 


130    ^^  fTHE   PHILIPPINES 

raised  for  family  consumption,  also  a  small  quantity  of  sugar 
cane,  from  jvhidi  brown  sugar  is  manufactured  in  a  crude 
fashion. 

The  Moros  in  the  vicinity  of  Lake  Lanao  raise  excellent  coffee, 
and  all  who  live  on  the  island  of  Mindanao  collect  large  quanti- 
ties of  gutta-percha,  rubber  and  hemp. 

The  establishment  throughout  the  province,  by  the  American 
government,  of  the  Moro  Exchanges  has  proved  a  great  stimu- 
lant to  trade  among  them,  as  well  as  a.  civilizing  influence. 
Through  these  exchanges  the  Moros  have  been  brought  into 
peaceful  commercial  relations  with  one  another  and  with  the  wild 
pagan  peoples  of  the  interior.^^ 

All  datus,  and  especially  those  of  importance,  strive  to  keep  iii 
immediate  attendance  upon  their  persons  a  number  of  armed 
fighting  men,  who  not  only  act  as  a  body-guard,  but  also  exer- 
cise functions  of  a  governmental  nature.  The  personal  power 
of  the  datu  is  greatly  increased  by  the  existence  of  this  class  of 
retainers,  for  they  derive  their  authority  from  him  and  are  re- 
sponsible to  him  alone  for  the  way  in  which  it  is  exercised.  The 
personal  despotism  of  the  datu  is  tempered  in  practise  by  the 
great  deference  paid  by  all  members  of  the  community,  himself 
included,  to  custom.  Not  only  is  there  a  written  code  of  law 
governing  the  people,  but  there  are  Moro  customs,  the  reputed 
usages  of  their  ancestors,  in  the  observance  of  which  they  are 
quite  strict  and  of  which  they  are  very  tenacious.  Precedent  is 
the  great  law  giver  and  court  of  last  resoriE.  It  would  not  occur 
to  a  datu  to  institute  new  laws  in  the  governing  of  his  people, 
and  progress  that  would  have  to  be  based  upon  such  action  would 
meet  with  general  disapproval.  The  Moros  have  no  comprehen- 
sion of  the  word  government.  They  recognize  only  a  personal 
central  power.  When  the  census  of  1903  was  being  taken  they 
frequently  asked  by  whom  It  had  been  ordered,  and  when  told 
by  the  government,  were  at  a  loss  to  understand  what  the  work 


*2At  one  time  tlie  Moro  Exchanges  in  the  districts  of  Zamboanga,  Jolo 
and  Cotabatu  did  a  business  of  one  million  pesos  annually. 


THE   NATIVE   PEOPLES  131 

meant.  .When  told,  however,  that  the  governor  nad  decreed  it, 
they  were  satisfied. 

All  real  authority  is  vested  in  the  datu,  who  presumably  acts 
in  the  interests  of  his  subjects.  By  him  war  is  declared  and  car- 
ried on  and  peace  made.  As  he  is  not  always  competent  to  lead 
in  war,  it  frequently  becomes  necessary  to  select  a  war  chief. 
The  office  of  war  chief  is  comparatively  unimportant  imder  the 
peaceful  conditions  of  the  last  few  years. 

The  administration  of  justice  is  a  guarded  prerogative  of  the 
datu,  who  either  holds  court  in  person,  or  determines  all  ques- 
tions on  appeal.  If  the  case  presents  unusual  difficulties,  he  may 
confer  with  his  panditas,  who  are  presumed  to  know  the  written 
law — the  Koran  and  the  Luwaran — and  the  elders  among  his  per- 
sonal following. 

The  title  to  all  land  occupied  by  the  tribe  is  vested  in  the  datu. 
The  occupancy  of  it  by  the  people  is  either  with  his  permission 
or  by  his  sufferance,  but  in  practise  tenants  enjoy  all  the  advan- 
tages of  ownership,  including,  in  a  majority  of  cases,  perma- 
nency of  tenure. 

Among  the  Malanao  Moros,  sultans  and  datus  are  often 
elected.  In  matters  of  importance  a  sultan  usually  acts  with  the 
advice  and  consent  of  his  subordinate  officials.  The  title  sultan 
is  commonly  applied  to  a  leader  having  several  datus  under  his 
authority.  He  may,  however,  have  none,  and  a  datu  at  times 
may  have  more  wealth  and  influence  than  his  sultan.  A  datu 
does  not  necessarily  obey  the  sultan,  although  he  is  liable  to  pun- 
ishment if  the  chief  ruler  is  powerful  enough  to  wage  war  against 
him. 

The  Moros,  under  American  rule,  are  governed  largely  by 
their  ancient  laws,  which  are  administered  through  the  tribal 
and  ward  courts.  An  effort  is  being  made  to  deprive  the  datus 
of  their  personal  jurisdiction,  but  no  great  results  have  been  so 
far  accomplished.  The  laws  of  the  Maguindanao  and  Sulu 
Moros  were  long  ago  collected  into  a  Code  written  in  Arabic, 
known  as  the  Luwaran.  The  authority  of  this  Code  is  universally 
accepted  by  the  people  of  this  tribe,  although  the  datus  use  con- 


132  THE   PHILIPPINES 

siderable  discretion  in  applying  its  provisions.  As  customary 
law  prevails  very  generally,  there  is  much  variety  throughout  the 
Moro  country  in  the  methods  of  administering  native  justice  and 
in  the  laws  applied." 

Among  the  Samal  Laut  of  Zamboanga,  a  dispute  between  two 
persons  of  the  same  village  is  disposed  of  by  the  local  headman 
in  conference  with  all  interested  parties.  If  the  accused  and 
the  leader  do  not  agree,  the  case  is  carried  to  the  next  in  rank, 
such  as  a  secondary  datu,  and  again  discussed.  If  the  results 
are  still  unsatisfactory,  it  goes  by  appeal  to  the  ranking  datu  of 
the  region,  whose  decision  is  final. 

If  the  difficulty  involves  people  of  different  villages,  the  re- 
spective headmen  take  it  under  consideration,  and  the  case  is 
subject  to  appeal  in  a  similar  manner  as  stated  above.  The  su- 
preme authority  or  over-lord  has  power  to  reverse  any  previous 
decision.    Minor  matters  are  usually  settled  without  appeal. 

Adultery  in  women  must  be  proved  by  at  least  two  witnesses, 
and  the  punishment  inflicted  is  a  heavy  fine  to  be  paid  by  herself 
or  her  family  to  her  husband,  which  amount  he  shares  with  the 
datiis  or  headmen  who  conduct  the  trial.  If  unable  to  pay,  the 
woman  becomes  a  slave  and  her  husband  is  at  liberty  to  sell  her. 
A  woman  can  not  secure  divorce  on  the  ground  of  her  husband's 
adultery.  A  man  convicted  of  adultery  is  subject  to  a  fine  twice 
as  heavy  as  that  exacted  from  a  woman.  This  money  goes  to 
the  injured  husband,  who  divides  with  the  headmen.  If  unpaid, 
the  offender  becomes  a  slave  and  is  sold.^* 

A  convicted  thief  must  pay  the  victim  twice  the  amount  of  the 
theft,  in  addition  to  a  fine,  which  goes  to  the  headmen.  If  the 
case  comes  before  a  datu,  he  receives  the  entire  fine,  but  is  ex- 
pected to  divide  with  the  headmen  assisting  in  its  conduct.  Fail- 
ure to  pay  means  enslavement  of  the  condemned,  who,  however, 


13  Saleeby,  Studies  in  Moro  History,  Law,  and  Religion  (1905),  pp.  64 
et  seq. 

i*The  different  tribes  have  different  punishments  for  adultery.  The 
Yakans  tie  the  parties  together  and  throw  them  into  the  sea.  The  Maguin- 
danaos  give  the  injured  husband  the  right  to  kill  the  man  and  w^oman  if  he 
acts  within  a  reasonable  time. 


THE    NATIVE    PEOPLES  133 

often  substitutes  one  of  his  children,  who  in  this  manner  sinks 
into  slavery  for  life. 

Murder  is  usually  punished  by  a  heavy  fine  divided  between  the 
family  of  the  victim  and  the  men  who  try  the  case,  a  datu  receiv- 
ing an  extra  share.  If  a  man  commits  a  crime  when  intoxicated, 
the  case  is  investigated  to  see  whether  he  was  in  that  condition 
voluntarily  or  whether  others  were  partly  to  blame,  and  this  fact 
is  taken  into  consideration  in  the  infliction  of  punishment. 

The  customary  laws  of  these  people  thus  allow  money  to  be 
paid  in  settlement  for  almost  all  crimes.  In  fact,  this  was  the 
usual  practise  among  the  Malays  of  the  Philippine  Islands.  With 
the  Samal  Laut  particularly  this  method  is  the  natural  one,  in  view 
of  the  fact  that  not  only  the  somewhat  unsettled  and  roving  life 
of  the  tribe  is  unfavorable  to  devising  means  for  guarding  pris- 
oners, but  especially  because  the  system  of  fines  is  a  source  of 
income  to  the  headmen. 

The  Maguindanao  Moros  have  but  few  criminals  and  generally 
deal  summarily  with  them.  Ordinarily  a  fine  is  imposed,  but  in 
rare  cases  offenders  are  sentenced  to  confinement,  and,  in  the 
absence  of  jails  or  other  strong  buildings,  are  secured  by  attach- 
ing a  huge  block  of  wood  to  the  ankle. 

Among  the  Sulu  tribes,  the  sultan  appoints  a  judge  before 
whom  all  cases  are  tried.  The  fine  for  murder  is  two  hundred 
ten  pesos  for  each  person  killed..  In  default  of  payment  for  a 
crime,  the  culprit  is  sentenced  to  slavery.  According  to  the  rules 
of  evidence,  the  accused  can  not  testify  in  his  own  behalf.  He 
may  be  convicted  upon  the  testimony  of  a  single  witness,  which 
fact,  together  with  the  custom  of  giving  half  the  fine  to  the  com- 
plaining witness,  often  makes  the  prisoner  the  victim  of  revenge. 
What  has  been  written  refers  generally  to  the  conditions  exist- 
ing at  the  time  of  the  American  occupation. 

Many  of  these  customs  and  laws  are  slowly  giving  way  before 
the  system  of  government  inaugurated  and  maintained  in  the 
Moro  country  by  the  Americans.  The  tribesmen,  particularly 
the  Malanaos  and  Maguindanaos,  are  realizing  more  and  more 
the  value  of  a  stable  government,  of  just  courts  and  of  the 


134  THE    PHILIPPINES 

sympathetic  and  unprejudiced  attitude  of  their  American  gov- 
ernors. Hundreds  of  cases,  disputes  which  formerly  were  settled 
solely  by  the  datus  themselves,  are  now  regularly  brought  to  the 
district  capitals  and  submitted  to  the  white  governors  and  judges 
for  adjudication.  The  old  warlike  and  predatory  tendencies  are 
slowly  but  surely  dying  out,  as  the  Moro  begins  to  appreciate 
the  meaning  of  a  peaceful  and  quiet  agricultural  existence  with 
a  swift  and  relentless  justice  ever  at  hand  to  punish  the  evildoer. 
This  does  not  apply  to  the  datus,  who  naturally  object  to  being 
deprived  of  their  ancient  authority.  Practically  all  the  non-reli- 
able and  outlaw  chiefs,  who  until  about  1913  made  necessary  the 
presence  of  considerable  bodies  of  American  and  native  troops  in 
the  Moro  Province,  have  now  been  hunted  down  and  disposed  of, 
and  the  balance  of  the  datus  and  sultans,  with  that  fatalism  char- 
acteristic of  Islam,  show  a  disposition  to  accept  the  new  order 
and  to  turn  from  war  to  agriculture  and  peace. 

The  Moros  have  never  been  on  good  terms  with  the  Filipinos. 
The  attempt  to  bring  them  into  closer  relations  by  establishing 
agricultural  colonies  composed  of  members  of  both  races  is  still 
in  the  experimental  stage. 


PART  II 
The  Historical  Background 

"In  the  light,  then,  of  impartial  history  raised  above  race  prej- 
udice and  religions  prepossessions,  after  a  comparison  of  the 
early  years  of  the  Spanish  Conquest  in  America  as  with  the  first 
generation  or  two  of  the  English  settlements,  the  conversion  and 
civilisation  of  the  Philippines  in  the  forty  years  following  Le- 
gaspi's  arrival  must  he  pronounced  an  achievement  without  par- 
allel in  history."    Edward  G.  Bourne. 


I 


CHAPTER  V 
Discovery  and  Conquest 

A   HALF-CENTURY   OF   ACCOMPLISHMENT 

Route  to  the  East — Struggle  Between  Spain  and  Portugal — Appeal  to  the 
Pope — The  Demarcation  Bulls — Treaty  of  Tordesillas — Ferdinand  Magellan 
— Extension  of  Demarcation  Line  around  the  Globe — The  Circumnavigation 
of  the  Globe — Discovery  of  tht  Philippine  Islands — The  Junta  of  Bandajos 
and  the  Treaty  of  Saragossa — Voyage  of  Villalabos  and  the  Naming  of  the 
Islands — Andreas  de  Urdaneta — Expedition  under  Legaspi — Mohammedism 
in  the  Philippines — Conquest  of  Luzon  and  Founding  of  Manila — Death  of 
Legaspi — Expedition  of  Salcedo — Limahong's  Expedition  Against  Manila — 
Expedition  to  Borneo — The  Conquest  Completed  and  Government  Established 
— Missionary  Character  of  the  Enterprise — Proprietary  Government — Salazar 
and  the  Appeal  for  Reform — Sanchez  Sent  to  Spain — Reorganization  of 
Affairs — Salazar  the  First  Archbishop — The  End  of  the  Constructive  Era. 

The  discovery  of  the  Philippine  Archipelago  by  Ferdinand 
Magellan  was  one  of  the  immediate  results  of  the  attempt  of 
Pope  Alexander  VI  to  reconcile  the  conflicting  claims  of  Por- 
tugal and  Spain  in  the  newly  discovered  and  to  be  discovered 
parts  of  the  world. 

The  overland  road  to  the  Far  East  was  obstructed  by  the  Egyp- 
tians and  Turks.  Somewhere  in  that  half  mythical  region  were 
the  famed  islands  where  grew  the  prized  nutmegs,  cloves,  cin- 
namon, ginger,  pepper  and  other  spices. 

"Here  see  o'er  Oriental  seas  bespread 

Infinite  island  groups,  and  alwhere  strewed; 

Tidore,  Ternate  view,  whose  burning  head 
Lanceth  the  wary  flame  and  fiery  flood ; 

There  see  the  groves  the  biting  clove  bud  shed. 
Bought  with  the  price  of  Portuguese  blood. 

Here  dwell  the  golden  fowls,  whose  home  is  air  ' 

And  never  earthward  save  in  death  may  fare."* 


iCamoens'  The  Lusiads,  Canto  XII,  p.  407  (Burton). 

137 


138  THE   PHILIPPINES 

Could  an  all-sea  route  to  these  islands  be  discovered  then  would 
the  fabled  wealth  of  India  and  far  Cathay  fall  into  the  lap  of 
Europe  without  tribute  paid  to  the  robber  Turks. 

The  struggle  for  the  discovery  and  conquest  of  new  lands  was 
then  between  Spain  and  Portugal.  England,  the  mother  to  be 
of  empires,  had  not  yet  awakened  to  the  possibilities  of  the  fu- 
ture. The  seas  that  washed  her  island  home  still  formed  her 
boundaries.  For  the  spacious  times  of  great  Elizabeth,  with  its 
bold  buccaneer  leaders,  she  was  yet  to  wait  for  half  a  century. 

In  the  meatime  Prince  Henry  the  Navigator  was  devoting 
his  energies  to  the  extension  of  geographical  knowledge  and  the 
development  of  the  commerce  of  Portugal.*  The  navigators 
,who  were  soon  to  sail  to  the  East  and  West  Indies  and  lay  the 
foundations  of  a  great  colonial  system  were  being  trained  and 
developed  in  the  trade  on  the  coast  of  Africa. 

Jhe  discoveries  of  Columbus  placed  a  new  world  in  the  pos- 
session of  the  Spaniards.  Before  the  end  of  the  sixteenth  cen- 
tury the  people  of  two  small  countries  on  the  Iberian  Peninsula, 
.through  whose  veins  flowed  the  vigorous  blood  of  youth,  had 
extended  their  sway  over  all  the  newly- found  lands  of  the  globe. 
Conflict  between  them  had  become  inevitable.  Portugal  was 
watchful  of  her  monopoly  of  the  African  trade,  and  Spain  was 
dreaming  of  a  world-wide  colonial  empire. 

Both  appealed  to  the  accepted  arbitrator,  and  Pope  Alexander 
VI  generously  divided  the  waters  and  new  lands  of  the  universe 
between  the  two  ambitious  claimants.  The  famous  demarcation 
bulls  drew  a  line  from  pole  to  pole  through  the  Atlantic  Ocean. 
The  existing  rights  of  Portugal  to  the  east  of  the  line  were  con- 
firmed, while  Spain  was  authorized  to  take  possession  of  all 
unknown,  unoccupied  heathen  lands  to  the  west  thereof. 

The  future  of  the  Philippines  was  determined  by  these  papal 
bulls  and  the  subsequent  Treaty  of  Tordesillas.  Had  not  the  bulls 
been  issued  the  islands  would  inevitably  have  fallen  into  the 


2  See  the  life  of  this  remarkable  prince  by  C.  Raymond  Beasley  (London 
and  New  York,  1895)  ;  and  an  article  by  Prof.  Bourne,  entitled,  "Prince  Henry 
the  Navigator,"  in  Annual  Rept.  Am.  Hist.  Ass'n  (1893),  p.  112. 


DISCOVERY    AND    CONQUEST  139 

hands  of  the  energetic  Dutch.  The  voyage  of  Magellan  and  the 
discovery  of  the  new  islands  were  the  logical  results  of  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  demarcation  lines. 

Several  bulls  were  issued  during  the  year  following  the  dis- 
covery of  America  by  Columbus,  the  apparent  purpose  being  to 
secure  to  Spain  the  new  lands  which  her  enterprise  had  found, 
while  reserving  to  Portugal  the  rewards  of  her  enterprise  in  the 
East.  The  world  of  waters,  islands  and  lands  were  to  be  di- 
vided between  the  faithful  sons  of  the  Church,  Ferdinand  of 
Castile  and  John  of  Portugal. 

By  the  first  of  three  bulls'  the  Pope  granted  to  Spain  the  coun- 
tries which  Columbus  had  recently  discovered  and  such  as  her 
navigators  hoped  to  discover  in  the  West.  And  this  was 
done  "because  of  all  works  the  most  agreeable  to  divine  Majesty 
is  that  the  Christian  religion  should  be  exalted  and  spread  every- 
where; that  the  salvation  of  the  human  soul  should  be  secured 
in  all  countries,  and  that  barbarous  nations  should  be  subjugated 
and  converted  to  the  Catholic  faith." 

On  the  same  day  there  was  issued  a  sort  of  abridgment  of  this 
bull  which  recited  the  same  matter  more  clearly  and  concisely. 
The  previously  granted  rights  of  Portugal  in  her  discoveries  were 
carefully  protected  and  the  rights  of  Spain  in  her  new  lands  were 
defined  in  the  same  terms.  It  has  been  suggested,  Harrisse  thinks 
with  good  reason,  that  something  thereupon  happened  in  diplo- 
matic circles,  as  on  the  following  day  another  bull  was  issued 
which  determined  the  Spanish  and  Portuguese  rights  by  drawing 
a  line  north  and  south  through  the  Atlantic  Ocean  one  hundred 
leagues  west  and  south  of  the  Azores  and  of  Cape  Verde.  All 
new  unoccupied  lands  to  the  west  and  south  of  this  line  were  to 
belong  to  Spain.* 

But  as  it  was  possible  that  while  voyaging  toward  the  west 
or  south  the  Spanish  captains  might  land  or  touch  in  eastern 
waters  and  there  discover  islands  or  mainlands  that  belonged 

«  Dated  May  3,  1493. 

*  These  bulls  and  the  Treaty  of  Tordesillas  are  printed  in  full  in  B.  &  R., 
I,  pp.  97  et  seq.  See  also  Harrisse's  Dip.  Hist,  of  America,  and  Bourne's 
Essays  in  Historical  Criticism,  p.  13. 


140  THE    PHILIPPINES 

to  India,  the  Pope,  as  further  evidence  of  his  good  will,  by  a 
bull  dated  September  25,  1493,  extended  the  Spanish  grant  so 
that  it  included  "all  islands  and  mainlands  whatsoever  that  are 
found  and  to  be  found,  discovered  and  to  be  discovered,  that  are 
or  were,  or  seem  to  be  in  the  route  by  sea  or  land  to  the  west 
or  south  but  are  now  recognized  as  being  in  the  waters  of  the 
west  or  south  and  east  and  India." 

King  John  of  Portugal  was  much  dissatisfied  with  the  arrange- 
ment effected  by  the  various  papal  bulls.  According  to  his  inter- 
pretation of  the  existing  treaty  between  Spain  and  Portugal,  the 
former  had  resigned  to  Portugal  the  entire  field  of  oceanic  dis- 
covery, excepting  only  the  Canary  Islands.  A  boundary  line  only 
one  hundred  leagues  west  of  the  Azores  did  not  seem  to  him  to 
allow  sufficient  sea  room  for  the  Portuguese  sailors  who  were 
engaged  in  African  voyages. 

The  Pope  declined  to  make  any  further  changes  and  war 
seemed  imminent.  But  Spain  was  disposed  to  make  reasonable 
concessions,  particularly  as  Columbus  had  estimated  the  distance 
from  the  Canary  Islands  to  the  new  islands  as  nine  hundred 
leagues.  The  principle  of  the  papal  bull  was  accepted  by  the 
rivals,  but  it  was  thought  that  a  line  drawn  half-way  between 
the  Cape  Verde  Islands  and  the  islands  newly  discovered  by 
Columbus  would  effect  a  fair  division  of  the  waters  and  lands 
which  were  to  be  exploited  and  Christianized.  The  result  was 
the  Treaty  of  Tordesillas,  whereby  the  line  of  demarcation  was  by 
agreement  drawn  three  hundred  and  seventy  leagues  west  of  the 
Cape  Verde  Islands,  and  this  was  duly  ratified  and  confirmed  by 
Pope  Julius  II  in  a  bull  promulgated  July  24,  1506. 

In  neither  the  papal  bulls  nor  the  Treaty  of  Tordesillas  is  there 
anything  to  suggest  that  the  demarcation  line  was  intended  to 
extend  around  the  globe.  The  line  was  drawn  north  and  south 
through  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  and  Spain  was  given  a  free  field 
to  the  west  and  Portugal  to  the  east  thereof.  Should  they  meet 
on  the  other  side  of  the  globe  it  was  evidently  the  intention  that 
the  usual  rule  of  priority  of  discovery  should  detemine  owner- 


DISCOVERY   AND   CONQUEST  141 

ship.*  The  idea  that  the  Pope  when  he  estabhshed  the  demarca- 
tion line  intended  to  divide  the  world  like  an  orange  does  not 
seem  to  have  prevailed  until  a  generation  later. 

The  Portuguese  reached  India  in  1498  and  thirteen  years  later 
Malacca,  in  the  Golden  Chersonese,  the  great  entrepot  of  the 
spice  trade,  was  occupied.  The  Moluccas  Islands  from  whence  the 
spices  came  were  not  discovered  until  1512.  It  has  been  claimed 
that  Magellan  visited  these  islands  with  a  Portuguese  expedi- 
tion, but  it  is  more  than  probable  that  he  obtained  his  informa- 
tion about  them  and  the  inspiration  for  his  voyage  from  a  certain 
Captain  Serrao,  who  wrote  enthusiastically  to  Magellan  of  a 
"world  larger  and  richer  than  that  discovered  by  Vasco  da 
Gama."  It  is  possible  that  Serrao  by  exaggerating  the  distance 
from  Malacca  to  the  Spice  Islands  suggested  to  Magellan  the 
idea  that  these  islands  must  be  beyond  the  line  of  demarcation 
and  hence  within  the  Spanish  portion  of  the  globe.  They  could 
be  reached  therefore  by  sailing  westward  according  to  the  origi- 
nal idea  of  Columbus. 

Ferdinand  Magellan  had  been  badly  treated  by  his  sovereign. 
He  is  said,  on  doubtful  authority,  to  have  joined  the  Portuguese 
fleet  which  sailed  for  India  in  1505,  to  have  been  present  at  the 
siege  of  Malacca  and  to  have  accompanied  an  expedition  which 
discovered 

"...    the  Isles 

Of  Ternate  and  Tidore,  whence  merchants  bring 

Their  spicy  drugs."" 

It  is  more  than  probable  that  he  secured  his  information  with 
reference  to  the  Moluccas  from  his  friendly  correspondent.  He 
had  served  in  the  wars  in  Africa  and  received  a  wound  that  ren- 
dered him  permanently  lame.  Unfriendly  persons  secured  the 
ear  of  the  king  and  made  him  believe  that  Magellan  was  sham- 
ming lameness.  Having  lost  the  royal  favor  and  seeing  no  pros- 
pect for  employment,  Magellan  formally  renounced  his  allegi- 
ance to  Portugal  and  became  a  naturalized  Spaniard.    He  now 

'  Harrisse,  Diplomatic  History,  p.  64.    Bourne,  B.  &  R.,  I,  p.  24. 
^Paradise  Lost,  Book  II. 


142  THE   PHILIPPINES 

appealed  to  Charles  for  aid  in  the  enterprise  which  was  to  "force 
a  passage  such  as  fancy  ne'er  conceived."^ 

The  importance  of  the  idea  that  the  demarcation  line  extended 
around  the  globe,  and  that  the  Moluccas  were  within  the  Spanish 
limitations,  was  perfectly  clear  to  Magellan  and  also  to  Haro, 
who  was  his  financial  backer.  Transylvanus  says  that,  "They 
showed  Caesar  that  though  it  was  not  yet  quite  sure  whether 
Malacca  was  within  the  confines  of  the  Spaniards  or  the  Portu- 
guese, because  as  yet  nothing  of  the  longitude  had  been  clearly 
proved,  it  was  quite  plain  that  the  great  gulf  and  the  people  of 
SInae  lay  within  the  Spanish  boundary.  This  was  held  to  be 
most  certain — ^that  the  islands  which  they  called  the  Moluccas, 
from  which  all  spices  are  produced  and  are  exported  to  Malacca, 
lay  within  the  Spanish  western  division,  and  that  it  was  possible 
to  sail  there ;  and  that  spices  could  be  brought  then  to  Spain  more 
easily  and  at  less  expense  than  they  came  direct  from  their  na- 
tive place." 

Las  Casas,  who  was  about  the  court  when  Magellan  presented 
his  plan  to  the  king,  gives  a  graphic  account  of  what  occurred. 
Magellan,  he  says,®  "had  a  well-painted  globe  on  which  the  whole 
world  was  depicted,  and  on  it  he  indicated  the  route  he  proposed 
to  take,  saving  that  the  strait  was  left  purposely  blank  so  that 
none  should  anticipate  him.  And  on  that  day  and  at  that  hour 
I  was  in  the  office  of  the  High  Chancellor  when  the  Bishop 
brought  it  and  showed  the  High  Chancellor  the  voyage  which 
was  proposed;  and  speaking  with  Magellan,  I  asked  him  what 
way  he  planned  to  take,  and  he  answered  that  he  intended  to  go 
by  Cape  Saint  Marry,  which  we  call  the  Rio  de  la  Platte,  and 
from  thence  to  follow  the  coast  up  until  he  hit  upon  the  Strait. 
But  suppose  you  do  not  find  any  strait  by  which  you  can  go  into 
the  sea?  He  replied  that  if  he  did  not  find  any  strait  he  would 
go  the  way  the  Portuguese  took."    Las  Casas  adds^  "This  Ferda- 


'^"A  Luslan    .    .    . 
Who  being  greatly  by  his  King  agrieved 
Shall  force  a  passage  fancy  ne'er  conceived." 

Camoens'  The  Lusiads,  Canto  X. 
8  B.  &  R.,  I,  p.  28. 


DISCOVERY    AND    CONQUEST  143 

nando  de  Magalhaes  must  have  been  a  man  of  courage  and  val- 
iant in  his  thoughts  and  for  undertaking  great  things,  although  he 
was  not  of  imposing  presence,  because  he  was  small  in  stature 
and  did  not  appear  in  himself  to  be  much." 

The  contract  with  the  king  provided  for  the  distribution  of 
the  profits  of  the  voyage  and  required  Magellan  to  limit  his 
operations  to  "the  dominions  which  belong  to  us  and  are  ours 
in  the  Ocean  Sea,  within  the  limits  of  our  demarcation."  He  was 
directed  "not  to  discover  or  do  anything  within  the  demarcations 
and  limits  of  the  most  serene  King  of  Portugal."  Magellan  was 
given  the  title  of  cavalier,  invested  with  the  habit  of  St.  James, 
and  granted  the  hereditary  government  of  all  the  islands  he 
might  conquer. 

The  expedition  which  was  to  bring  the  Philippines  to  the  atten- 
tion of  the  world  sailed  from  Seville,  September  20,  1519.* 
While  still  on  the  eastern  coast  of  South  America  the  terrors  and 
hardships  already  encountered  led  to  a  mutiny  of  the  crew,  but 
Magellan's  courage  and  tact,  together  with  the  swift  punishment 
of  the  leaders,  finally  gained  him  control.^ °  The  strait  which  now 
bears  the  name  of  the  intrepid  navigator  was  discovered  a  year 
later.  Jhirty-eight  days  were  consumed  in  threading  its  sinuosi- 
ties and  ninety-eight  days  more  in  crossing  the  lonely  Pacific. 

After  stopping  at  an  island  where  the  natives  were  such  skilful 
thieves  that  they  stole  the  nails  out  of  the  side  of  one  ship  and 
the  rudder  from  another,  thus  winning  for  the  group  the  name 
of  the  Ladrones,  the  fleet  reached  the  great  Archipelago,  which 
Magellan,  in  honor  of  the  saint  on  whose  day  he  arrived,  called 
the  Islands  of  Saint  Lazarus,  but  which  later  were  to  be  known 
as  the  Philippines.  During  the  same  month  he  visited  the  island 
of  Homonlion,  near  Surigao,  and  the  island  of  Limasagua.  After 


»B.  &  R.,  I,  p.  250. 

10  "Magellan,  who  could  only  hound  his  crew 
Onward  by  threats  of  death,  until  they  turned 
In  horror  from  the  Threat  that  lay  before. 
Preferring  to  be  hanged  as  mutineers 
Rather  tlian  venture  farther." 

Alfred  Noyes.    Drake,  An  English  Epic. 


144  THE    PHILIPPINES 

stopping  at  Leyte  and  a  few  small  islands  he  finally  reached  the 
large  island  of  Cebu. 

The  people  were  suspicious  and  assembled  to  oppose  the  land- 
ing of  the  strangers,  but  good  relations  were  soon  established 
and  a  treaty  of  friendship  was  ratified  under  the  forms  of  the 
blood  covenant.  A  chapel  was  constructed  on  the  shore  and  mass 
was  there  duly  celebrated  for  the  first  time  in  the  Archipelago, 
which  for  so  many  generations  thereafter  was  to  remain  loyal 
to  the  Church  of  Rome.  We  are  told  "that  the  royal  family  of 
Cebu,"  anxious  to  observe  the  manners  and  customs  of  the  visit- 
ors, attended  the  celebration  and  were  so  much  impressed  by  the 
sight  that  they  sought  baptism,  became  Christians  and  took  the 
oath  of  allegiance  to  the  king  of  Spain,  and  that  their  good  ex- 
ample was  followed  "to  a  great  extent  by  the  nobles  and  people 
of  Cebu."  Thus  was  the  Christian  form  of  faith  and  the  sym- 
bolic cross  planted  by  the  Spaniards  in  the  Antipodes. 

But  Magellan,  after  accomplishing  so  much,  was  destined  to 
lose  his  life  in  a  petty  skirmish  with  the  enemies  of  his  Cebuan 
friends.  The  great  navigator,  as  a  modem  poet  with  excusable 
license  says, 

"...     with  Hell  all  around  him,  in  the  clutch 
Of  devils,  died  upon  some  savage  isle. 
By  poisonous  black  inchantment." 

It  was  on  the  small  island  of  Mactan,  which  lies  near  by  across 
the  Cebu  Strait,  that  he  met  his  death.  There  visitors  from  the 
far-away  land  which  now  holds  sovereignty  over  the  Archipelago, 
and  which  then  had  but  recently  been  discovered,  may  see  a  small 
monument*^  which  marks  the  spot  where  the  great  navigator  is 
supposed  to  have  fallen.  A  more  imposing  memorial  to  his  mem- 
ory stands  on  the  south  bank  of  the  Pasig  River  within  the  city 
of  Manila. 

After  the  death  of  Magellan  the  natives  began  to  be  trouble- 
some. His  successor,  Barbosa,  and  twenty-six  of  his  men  were 
murdered  while  attending  a  banquet  given  by  their  native  hosts, 

^^  Also  near  by,  an  extensive  manufacturing  plant. 


DISCOVERY    AND    CONQUEST  145 

and  the  others,  hearing  the  disturbance,  sailed  away,  treacher- 
ously leaving  a  number  of  their  comrades  to  a  miserable  fate. 
Only  Captain  El  Cano  succeeded  in  taking  his  ship,  the  Victoria, 
to  the  port  from  which  three  years  before  he  had  sailed. 

El  Cafio  was  thus  the  first  navigator  actually  to  circumnavigate 
the  globe,  although  the  project  was  that  of  Magellan  to  whom 
the  world  has  given  credit.  But  El  Cafio  was  rewarded  by  knight- 
hood, a  life  pension  and  the  right  to  use  on  his  escutcheon  a  globe 
bearing  the  motto,  primus  circumdedit  me.  A  second  expedi- 
tion under  the  command  of  Loaisa  and  El  Cafio  sailed  in  1525 
and  visited  Mindanao  and  the  Moluccas,  where  it  went  to  pieces, 
Loaisa  and  El  Caiio  losing  their  lives. 

Magellan's  theory  was  justified  by  the  facts.  A  western  route 
to  the  Spice  Islands  had  been  discovered,  and  if  the  line  of  demar- 
cation was  to  be  extended  around  the  globe  they  were  clearly  on 
the  Spanish  side. 

Portugal  showed  no  disposition  to  relinquish  any  of  her  claims 
in  the  East,  and  Charles  V  was  in  greater  need  of  ready  money 
than  of  new  islands.  An  attempt  to  settle  the  controversy  by 
diplomacy  was  unsuccessful.  Plenipotentiaries,  accompanied  by 
a  full  complement  of  astrologers,  scientific  experts  and  lawyers, 
met  on  a  bridge  over  the  River  Caya,  which  formed  the  boundary 
line  between  Spain  and  Portugal.  But  nothing  was  accom- 
plished. Neither  the  lawyers  nor  the  experts  could  agree  upon 
even  a  starting  point  for  negotiations.  The  Junta  of  Badojis 
was  a  failure.  A  street  boy  jeered  at  the  great  men  who  were 
engaged  in  dividing  the  world.  And,  says  Hakluyt,  "what  wise 
men  seeth  not  that  God  by  that  childe  laughed  them  to  scorne 
and  made  them  ridiculous  and  their  partition  in  the  eyes  of  the 
world."" 


12  That  the  demarcation  bulls  were  a  reasonable  and  proper  exercise  of 
conceded  power,  see  Harrisse's  Dip.  Hist,  of  Am.,  Chap.  5,  p.  40. 

"Men  now  smile  when  they  read  or  hear  of  the  attempt  of  Alexander  the 
Sixth  to  divide  the  undiscovered  world  between  Spain  and  Portugal,  but  what 
single  act  of  any  Pope  in  the  history  of  the  Church  has  exercised  directly  and 
indirectly  a  more  momentous  influence  on  human  affairs  than  this  last  re- 
minder of  the  by-gone  world  sovereignty  of  the  Holy  See?"  Bourne,  Essays 
in  Hist.  Criticism,  p.  217. 


146  *  THE   PHILIPPINES 

The  Portuguese  and  Spaniards  were  already  fighting,  but  both, 
monarchs  desired  peace,  as  their  houses  had  recently  been  united 
by  marriage,  and  in  the  end  Spain,  in  consideration  of  the  pay- 
ment of  three  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  ducats,  relinquished 
her  claim  to  the  Moluccas.  This  arrangement  was  assumed 
to  be  in  the  nature  of  a  compromise,  and  it  was  provided  that 
should  the  contemplated  scientific  determination  of  the  line  show 
that  the  disputed  territory  belonged  to  Portugal  the  money  should 
be  returned.  It  is  needless  to  say  that  Portugal  never  saw  the 
ducats  again. 

As  long  as  Spain  held  her  possessions  on  the  western  conti- 
nent she  regarded  the  Philippines  as  a  part  thereof.  They,  to 
her,  were  the  Western  Islands,  and  not  until  1844  were  they 
transferred  to  the  Eastern  Hemisphere  and  a  day  dropped  from 
the  calendar  at  Manlla.^^ 

The  new  Archipelago  of  St.  Lazarus  was  not  mentioned  in  the 
treaty,  but  as  it  lay  well  to  the  west  of  the  Moluccas  it  was  clearly 
renounced  to  Portugal.  Nevertheless,  Spain  in  1542 — against 
the  protest  of  the  Portuguese,  who  asserted,  without  any  justifi- 
cation, that  they  were  introducing  Christianity  into  Mindanao — 
despatched  another  expedition  from  Mexico  under  the  command 
of  Lopez  de  Villalabos.  This  fleet  was  wrecked  on  the  coast  of 
Samar,  and  the  Spanish  returned  to  Spain  by  way  of  the  Moluc- 
cas. Villalabos  is  remembered  principally  because  he  gave  the 
name  Filipinas  to  the  islands  in  honor  of  the  Prince  of  Asturias, 
known  to  history  as  the  somber  Philip  II  of  Spain. 

After  this  potent  monarch  came  to  the  throne  a  new  and 
better  equipped  expedition  was  prepared  for  the  conquest  and 
colonization  of  the  Archipelago.  Philip  did  not  question  the 
right  of  Portugal  to  the  Moluccas  under  the  treaty  of  Saragossa, 
but  he  determined  to  ignore  the  fact  that  the  treaty  applied  also 
to  the  new  islands  which  were  to  bear  his  name. 

There  was  then  at  the  court  an  Augustinlan  friar  named 
Andres  de  Urdaneta,  who  was  destined  to  win  fame  by  his  part 
in  the  early  history  of  the  Philippines.    While  yet  a  layman  and 

^3  See  Guillemard,  Magellan,  p.  227. 


DISCOVERY   AND    CONQUEST  147 

a  sailor  he  visited  the  Moluccas  as  captain  of  one  of  the  ships  of 
the  ill-fated  expedition  of  Loaisa  and  acquired  considerable  gen- 
eral and  scientific  knowledge  of  the  country.  He  had  earnestly 
and  persistently  urged  Charles  to  send  another  expedition  to  the 
Far  West,  but  the  emperor  had  grown  weary  of  the  world  and 
was  contemplating  his  abdication.  Urdaneta,  discouraged  also, 
retired  to  Mexico  and  became  an  Augustinian  monk.  Philip 
placed  him  in  charge  of  the  missionaries  who  were  to  accompany 
the  new  expedition,  but  Urdaneta  believed  that  the  Philippines 
belonged  to  Portugal  and  protested  against  going  there  unless,  as 
he  told  the  king,  *'some  legitimate  and  pious  reason  for  the  expe- 
dition shoidd  he  assigned,  such  as  the  rescue  of  the  sailors  who 
had  been  lost  on  the  islands  on  previous  expeditions  and  the  de- 
termination of  the  longitude  of  the  demarcation  line." 

But  Philip  took  the  bolder  course,  and  in  the  first  despatch 
sent  by  him  to  Mexico  relative  to  the  expedition  announced  that 
it  should  not  go  to  the  Moluccas  but  "to  the  other  islands  which 
are  in  the  same  region  as  are  the  Philippines  and  others  that  were 
outside  the  said  contract  but  within  our  demarcation,  that  are 
said  to  produce  spices."  With  characteristic  caution  he  wrote 
to  the  viceroy  of  New  Spain^*  directing  him  to  provide  "what 
seems  best  for  the  service  of  God,  our  Lord  and  ourselves,  and 
with  the  least  possible  cost  to  our  estate,  for  the  recovery  of  the 
Western  Islands  toward  the  Moluccas." 

The  expedition  was  placed  under  the  command  of  Miguel  Lo- 
pez de  Legaspi,  who,  with  the  title  of  Adelantado,  was  appointed 
governor  and  captain-general  for  life  over  all  the  islands  that 
he  might  discover,  occupy  and  colonize.  Urdaneta,  who  believed 
that  the  king  had  been  impressed  by  his  pious  representations 
and  that  the  expedition  was  destined  for  New  Guinea,  accom- 
panied the  fleet  as  spiritual  guide  and  general  adviser.  When  on 
the  high  seas  Legaspi  opened  the  instructions  which  had  been 
given  him  by  the  royal  audiencia  of  Mexico  he  discovered  that 
the  objective  point  was  the  Philippines  and  not  New  Guinea. 
Urdaneta  and  the  unhappy  friars  complained  bitterly  that  they 

"  September  24,  1559. 


148  THE   PHILIPPINES 

had  been  deceived  by  the  king,  but  as  he  could  not  conveniently 
abandon  the  voyage  at  that  stage,  Urdaneta  consented  to  guide 
the  fleet  to  the  Philippines  by  the  most  expeditious  route. 

"The  religious  in  the  fleet  were  very  sorry  at  this,  giving  out 
that  they  had  been  deceived;  and  had  they  known  while  yet 
ashore  that  such  a  route  was  to  be  pursued,  that  they  would  not 
have  accompanied  the  expedition."  But  "they  expressed  their 
willingness  to  make  the  expedition  now  for  the  service  of  God, 
the  Holy  Catholic  faith,  and  the  increase  of  the  kingdom  and 
the  general  good  of  the  fleet."" 

Legaspi  was  instructed  to  avoid  the  Moluccas,  and  as  soon  as 
the  fleet  reached  the  Philippines  to  send  Urdaneta  to  establish  a 
route  to  Mexico  and  report  to  the  king.  After  stopping  at  Guam 
and  other  islands,  the  fleet  reached  the  island  of  Cebu  on  April 
27,  1565."  Here  houses  and  a  fort  were  constructed,  and  a  ship 
in  command  of  Urdaneta  was  despatched  on  the  return  trip  to 
Mexico. 

At  Cebu,  Legaspi  found  the  people  who  had  destroyed  Magel- 
lan, and  the  task  of  establishing  friendly  relations  with  them  was 
difficult.  To  add  to  his  troubles  a  Portuguese  fleet  appeared  and 
served  notice  that  the  Spaniards  were  trespassing  on  Portuguese 
territory,  but  as  Portugal  had  never  taken  actual  possession  of  the 
islands,  and  was  now  at  peace  with  Spain,  no  serious  attempt, 
other  ,than  such  as  was  involved  in  a  lengthy  correspondence, 
was  made  to  prevent  the  Spaniards  from  establishing  their  col- 
ony.^'' 

The  missionaries  entered  enthusiastically  upon  the  work  of 
converting  the  natives.  For  eight  strenuous  centuries,  without 
a  year  of  peace,  the  people  of  the  Iberian  Peninsula  had  been 
engaged  in  a  desperate  struggle  with  the  Moors.  During  that 
period  there  was  developed  a  virile  race  which,  when  its  energies 
were  released,  created  the  Spanish  monarchy  which  for  genera- 
tions dominated  Europe  and  the  greater  part  of  America.    The 

«  B.  &  R.,  Vol.  II,  p.  105. 
i«  Relation  of  Legaspi,  B.  &  R.,  II,  p.  212. 

1^  For  the  negotiations  between  Legaspi  and  Pereira,  the  commander  of 
the  Portuguese  fleet,  see  B.  &  R.,  II,  pp.  245  et  seq. 


DISCOVERY   and:   CONQUEST  149 

ifierceness  of  the  religious  war  with  the  Moors  burned  the  Chris- 
tian faith  into  the  very  natures^*  of  the  Spaniards  and  made  them 
so  loyal  to  the  Church  that  they  and  the  State  itself  became  its 
slaves  and  failed  to  catch  steps  with  the  onward  marching  world. 
The  last  battle  with  the  Moors  was  won  at  Granada  the  year 
Columbus  discovered  America.  The  long  struggle  was  over. 
The  Crescent  recrossed  into  Africa  never  again  to  appear  in 
Spain.  Turning  now  to  the  west,  Spain  half-way  around  the 
world  discovered  new  islands,  and  strange  to  relate  there  found 
herself  again  facing  her  old  antagonist,  the  Mohammedans. 

As  early  as  1276  Mohammedan  missionaries  had  reached  Ma- 
lacca, and  in  1415  their  converts  were  found  in  the  Spice  Islands. 
The  inhabitants  of  the  Sulu  group  of  islands,  and  of  Mindanao, 
the  largest  of  the  southern  islands  of  the  Philippine  group,  had 
been  converted,  and  many  Moros,  as  they  were  called,  were 
already  in  Luzon,  far  north  of  Manila,  which  itself  was  a  Mo- 
hammedan city. 

A  contemporary  Augustinian  chronicler**  says  that  "so  well 
rooted  was  the  cancer  that  had  the  arrival  of  the  Spaniards  been 
delayed  all  the  people  would  have  become  Moors,  as  are  all  the 
islanders  who  have  not  come  under  the  government  of  the  Phil- 
ippines." The  sons  of  the  men  who  fought  at  Granada  may 
have  fought  at  Manila.  Thus  within  the  span  of  one  human  life 
Spain  broke  the  power  of  Islamism  in  the  peninsula  and  checked 
its  advance  on  the  other  side  of  the  world. 

One  of  the  first  natives  to  be  baptized  was  the  niece  of  Tupas, 

18  "La  catholique  Espagne,  qui  venait  d'achever  sa  longue  croisade  centre 
les  Maures,  dans  I'exaltation  de  I'esprit  religieux,  avail  appris  a  confondre  en 
un  sentiment  unique  le  zele  pour  la  foi  et  Tamour  de  la  patrie.  Toute 
conquete  pour  la  couronne  devait  etre  aussi  une  conquete  pour  la  chretiente. 
La  propagande  religieuse  fut  des  I'origine  I'un  des  motifs  principaux  des 
establissements  d'outre-mer.  Dans  I'esprit  mystique  de  Colomb,  dans  I'ame 
picuse  d'Isabelle,  comme  dans  les  imaginations  plus  rudes  et  plus  incultes  des 
Cortez  et  des  Pizarre,  I'idee  de  proselytisme 'catholique  ne  cessa  de  s'allier  a 
Tambition  terrestre.  Ca  ete  I'un  des  principaux  merites  de  la  grande  et  belle 
histoire  de  Prescott  de  mettre  en  lumiere  I'influence  que  le  sentiment  religieux 
exerqa  sur  la  fondation  et  I'administration  des  colonies  espagfnoles  en 
Amerique."    Leroy-Beaulieu  De  La  Colonisation,  etc.,  I,  p.  3. 

1^  Grigolva,  quoted  by  Bourne,  B.  &  R.,  I,  Int.,  p.  34,  and  citing  to  the 
same  effect  Retana's  Zuiiiga,  II,  p.  222,  Montero  y  Videl,  Historia  de  Fili~ 
pinas,  I,  p.  60. 


150  THE    PHILIPPINES 

the  petty  ruler  of  Cebu,  and  the  new  convert  was  soon  thereafter 
married  to  a  Greek  who  was  one  of  Legaspi's  crew.  Later  Tupas 
himself  was  baptized  and  given  the  name  of  Felipe,  after  his 
"cousin  of  Spain,"  and  the  prospect  for  amicable  relations  be- 
tween the  natives  of  Cebu  and  the  Spaniards  and  the  extension 
of  the  true  faith  looked  very  bright  indeed.^** 

But  the  great  island  of  Luzon  had  not  yet  been  explored, 
and  Martin  de  Goite  and  Juan  de  Salcedo,  the  grandson  of 
Legaspi,  with  a  small  force  of  arquebusiers  and  sailors,  sailed 
for  the  north.  At  the  mouth  of  the  Pasig  River,  in  the  village 
of  "Maynila,"  on  the  spot  where  now  stands  Fort  Santiago,  the 
headquarters  of  American  military  power  in  the  Orient,  they 
found  the  natives  strongly  entrenched  behind  breastworks  upon 
which  were  mounted  brass  cannon  such  as  the  Moros  call  Lan- 
takos.  The  defense  was  brave  and  vigorous,  but  the  natives 
were  finally  routed  and  the  Spaniards  took  possession  of  the 
town. 

Legaspi,  being  much  impressed  by  Salcedo's  account  of  the 
location  and  advantages  of  the  place  which  he  had  conquered, 
organized  a  government  for  Cebu  and  with  a  considerable  force 
proceeded  to  Manila. 

The  Spaniards  after  capturing  the  fort  at  Manila  had  re- 
turned to  the  island  of  Panay.  When  the  natives  saw  another 
army  approaching  they  set  fire  to  their  houses  and  fled.  With- 
out opposition  Legaspi  took  possession  of  the  place,  and  on 
June  24,  1572,  formally  founded  and  established  what  Philip 
later  designated  as  the  "Distinguished  and  ever-loyal  city"  of 
Manila  in  the  "New  Kingdom  of  Castilla."^^ 

The  land  was  immediately  divided  among  the  religious  persons 
and  other  Spaniards  in  order  that  each  person  could  build  a 
house  within  the  city.  The  adventurers  exercised  great  tact  and 
much  good  judgment,  and  in  a  short  time  the  local  rulers  of 
the  neighborhood  were  won  over.    The  Raja  Solimon,  who  ruled 


20  See  Legaspi's  Relation,  B.  &  R.,  11,  pp.  140-1. 

21  See  the  document  in  B.  &  R.,  Ill,  p.  250.    For  an  account  of  the  con- 
quest of  Luzon,  see  B.  &  R.,  Ill,  p.  141. 


DISCOVERY   AND    CONQUEST  151 

in  Manila,  when  approached  by  Legaspi  with  a  tender  of  friend- 
ship, had  replied,  "Not  until  the  sun  is  cut  in  two,  not  until  I 
seek  the  hatred  instead  of  the  love  of  women,  will  I  be  the  friend 
of  a  Spaniard."  But  he  soon  saw  the  light  and  was  baptized, 
and,  like  the  head  of  the  "royal  family"  of  Cebu,  was  honored 
with  the  patronymic  of  his  new  sovereign. 

The  missionaries  began  immediately  to  teach  the  catechism  to 
the  natives,  who  accepted  the  new  religion  passively  if  not  enthu- 
siastically. Great  care  was  taken  to  avoid  antagonizing  the  peo- 
ple, and  the  laws  and  proclamations  were  carefully  framed  for 
that  purpose.  Thus  the  Laws  of  the  Indias,  in  contemplation  of 
such  conditions,  had  provided  for  the  use  of  the  word  pacification 
instead  of  conquest o  when  referring  to  the  possession  or  occu- 
pancy of  such  new  countries. 

Legaspi  died  in  1572.  His  figure  stands  in  high  relief  in  the 
history  of  the  Philippines.  He  was  of  noble  birth,  and  after 
practising  as  a  notary  became  the  mayor  of  the  city  of  Mexico. 
His  reputation  for  justice  and  loyalty  secured  for  him  the  favor 
of  the  king  and  the  command  of  the  expedition  which  was  to 
establish  Spain  in  the  East.^^  Legaspi  was  succeeded  by  the 
treasurer,  Guido  de  Lavezares,  who  ruled  for  three  years. 

The  youthful  Juan  de  Salcedo,  the  Cortez  of  the  Philippines, 
continued  the  conquest  of  the  country.  With  but  forty-five  men 
he  overran  and  conquered  the  most  of  northern  Luzon  and  in- 
duced the  people  to  submit  to  the  Spanish  rule.  In  fact,  he 
appears  to  have  taken  possession  of  all  the  reasonably  accessible 
parts  of  the  island — all  that  the  Spanish  ever  actually  controlled. 

Salcedo  had  the  honor  also  of  saving  the  city  of  Manila  from 
destruction  by  the  Chinese,  who  in  1574,  under  the  command  of 
the  famous  Limahong,  made  a  descent  upon  Manila  and  came 
near  destroying  the  Spaniards.  This  leader  of  the  Chinese  cor- 
sairs, who  out  of  deference  to  the  customs  of  the  Western  world 
should  probably  be  described  as  a  sea-faring  man  out  of  favor 
with  the  home  government,  was  a  bold  and  daring  adventurer,  a 


22  J.  A.  Robertson,  Legaspi  and  Philippine  Colonisation  (1909),  also  in 
Rept.  Am.  Hist.  Assft.  1907,  I,  p.  145. 


I 


152  THE   PHILIPPINES 

sort  of  Celestial  Sir  Francis  Drake,  who  saw  visions  of  easy- 
wealth,  glory  and  empire  in  a  country  which  had  surrendered 
with  so  little  effort  to  a  handful  of  Spaniards. 

Limahong  organized  a  formidable  force  of  four  thousand  men 
and,  accompanied  by  women  and  artisans,  with  supplies  of  all 
kinds,  crossed  the  turbulent  China  Sea  with  the  intention  of 
founding  an  empire  in  the  Philippines.  Fortunately  Salcedo, 
who  was  then  at  Vigan,  learned  of  the  expedition  and  hastened 
southward  with  his  troops.  The  Chinese  force  landed  where  all 
invaders  have  landed,  near  Paraiiaque,  and  under  the  command 
of  a  Japanese  adventurer,  marched  upon  the  city  over  the  exact 
road  through  the  suburb  of  Malate  which  was  followed  three 
hundred  years  later  by  the  American  troops.  They  succeeded 
in  entering  the  city,  but  were  finally  forced  to  retire.  While  the 
Chinese  were  preparing  for  another  attack,  Salcedo  arrived  with 
fresh  troops  and  took  command.  In  the  second  attack  the  inva- 
ders penetrated  into  the  fort  and  only  after  a  most  desperate 
hand  to  hand  fight  were  they  finally  routed  and  forced  to  take 
refuge  on  their  boats. 

Of  Salcedo  it  was  said  that  he  was  "unlucky  because  fate  had 
placed  him  where  oblivion  must  needs  bury  the  most  valiant 
deeds  that  a  knight  ever  wrought." 

Limahong  now  abandoned  all  hope  of  taking  Manila,  but  he 
had  no  intention  of  returning  to  China,  where  he  was  very  much 
persona  non  grata  with  the  authorities.  Sailing  northward  he 
landed  in  the  province  of  Pangasiman  and  established  what  he 
intended  should  be  his  capital  city,  near  the  mouth  of  the  River 
Agno.  There  he  built  a  small  fort,  dwellings  for  his  people,  and 
a  pagoda.  But  the  Chinese  authorities  sent  a  war-ship  after  him, 
and  in  cooperation  with  the  Spaniards  such  a  formidable  force 
was  raised  that  resistance  was  impossible. 

The  wily  Celestial  sent  a  part  of  his  soldiers  to  make  a  feigned 
attack  on  the  approaching  Spaniards  while  he,  with  the  main 
body,  passed  out  through  one  of  the  many  mouths  of  the  river  and 
sailed  away  out  of  Philippine  history,  leaving  the  attacking  de- 


DISCOVERY   AND    CONQUEST  153 

tachment  to  make  its  escape  to  the  mountains  of  Benguet,  where 
they  affiliated  with  and  were  ultimately  absorbed  by  the  Igorots.*^ 

Having  conquered  the  island  of  Luzon,  Governor  Sande  sent 
an  expedition  to  Borneo,  where  he  hoped  to  enter  into  an  alli- 
ance with  one  of  the  various  local  sultans.  On  account  of  sick- 
ness and  the  lack  of  supplies  the  expedition  was  obliged  to  return, 
having  accomplished  nothing  more  important  than  the  destruc- 
tion of  a  fleet  of  Malay  praus.  Sande  organized  the  first  of  the 
many  expeditions  against  the  Moros,  which  roused  the  Moham- 
medan pirates  to  fury  and  led  to  the  many  retaliatory  expeditions 
that  during  succeeding  years  harried  the  coasts  from  Zamboanga 
to  Apairi. 

Within  twenty-five  years  after  the  landing  of  Legaspi  the 
Spaniards  were  in  complete  possession  of  the  Philippines.  The 
native  people  had  been  unable  to  make  any  serious  resistance  to 
the  enterprise.  Without  unity,  political  organization  or  ade- 
quate leadership  they  had  been  easily  conquered  and  were  soon 
gathered  within  the  fold  by  the  Spanish  missionaries. 

The  work  of  the  first  period  of  Spanish  occupation  was  sub- 
stantially accomplished  by  the  end  of  the  sixteenth  century. 
Legaspi  carried  with  him  the  system  of  colonial  government 
which  had  been  carefully  worked  out  and  introduced  in  the  Span- 
ish American  colonies.  The  Laws  of  the  Indias  were  simply 
extended  to  the  new  possessions  in  what  was  then  called  the 
Western  Islands.  As  fast  as  the  country  was  conquered  the  or- 
ganization was  extended  over  it  and  the  missionaries  took  up 
the  work  of  gathering  the  people  within  the  sound  of  the  bells. 

The  energy  and  enthusiasm  displayed  during  this  constructive 
period  of  Spanish  rule  were  remarkable.  A  complete  executive 
government  was  instituted,  a  Royal  audiencia  erected  in  Manila, 
the  land  and  the  people  thereon  granted  in  encomiendas,  the  eccle- 
siastical system  and  the  monastic  orders  thoroughly  organized 
and  a  complete  body  of  laws  for  the  government  of  the  country 


2' For  Limahong's  attack,  see  Govenor  Sande's  Relation  (June  2,  1576)' 

in  B.  &  R.,  IV,  p.  24. 


154  THE   PHILIPPINES 

and  the  protection  of  the  natives  instituted.  Substantial  progress 
was  made  in  the  work  of  estabHshing  schools  for  the  education 
of  the  Spaniards,  and  a  surprising  amount  was  done  toward  the 
establishment  of  hospitals  and  other  protective  institutions. 

Most  of  the  problems  and  difficulties  about  which  Philippine 
history  centered  during  the  three  hundred  years  of  Spanish  rule 
originated  and  were  clearly  defined  during  this  early  period. 
The  ecclesiastical  and  secular  authorities  were  already  quarrel- 
ing, the  people  were  protesting  against  the  restrictions  placed 
upon  their  trade,  the  missionaries  were  charging  the  secular 
authorities  with  maladministration,  cruelty  to  the  natives,  ig- 
noring the  laws  designed  for  their  protection,  and  the  nest  of 
stinging  Mohammedans  to  the  south  was  injudiciously  stirred  up. 

The  key  to  the  early  history  of  the  Philippines  is  found  in  the 
missionary  character  of  the  enterprise.  The  country  was  never 
really  a  colony;  it  was  a  mission.  The  main  object  of  the  con- 
quest was  declared  to  be  the  extension  of  the  true  faith.  The 
king  and  the  missionaries  at  least  took  these  statements  literally 
and  insisted  that  all  other  matters  should  be  subordinated  and 
when  necessary  sacrificed  to  the  conversion  of  the  Indians.  It 
was  for  that  purpose  that  the  king  paid  the  expenses  of  the  en- 
terprise and  the  annual  deficits  of  the  government.  The  laws 
were  designed  to  protect  the  natives  from  oppression,  and  with- 
out exception,  apparently,  the  king  sustained  the  ecclesiastics 
in  their  frequent  appeals  on  behalf  of  the  natives  against  the 
secular  officials.  The  number  of  missionaries  was  increased  as 
rapidly  as  possible.  The  Jesuits  arrived  in  1581.  The  Augustin- 
ians,  Franciscans,  Dominicans  and  Recollectos  followed  in  con- 
siderable numbers.  Not  content  with  the  spiritual  conquest  of 
the  Philippines  these  zealous  workers  soon  began  to  seek  other 
fields  for  their  activities.  For  them  the  islands  were  to  be  merely 
outposts  from  which  to  carry  the  Gospel  to  the  entire  East. 
China,  Japan,  Formosa  and  Cambodia  seemed  to  offer  boundless 
fields  for  missionary  work. 

Soon  after  the  arrival  of  Governor  Sande  in  1575  the  agents 


DISCOVERY   AND    CONQUEST  155 

•who  had  been  sent  to  China  returned  and  reported  that  while  the 
Chinese  were  willing  to  take  goods,  wares  and  merchandise  from 
the  Europeans  they  were  satisfied  with  their  own  religion.  Nev- 
ertheless missionaries  soon  reached  both  China  and  Japan,  where 
they  were  persecuted  and  often  put  to  death  for  attempting  to 
proselyte  the  people  in  violation  of  the  local  laws  and  customs. 
Their  labors  resulted  in  nothing  more  than  the  exasperation  of 
the  Asiatics  against  the  Europeans,  and  finally  the  king  prohib- 
ited all  but  the  Jesuits  from  sending  missionaries  from  the  Phil- 
ippines to  any  other  Asiatic  country. 

The  religious  character  of  the  conquest  and  the  support  given 
the  ecclesiastics  by  the  king  induced  the  latter  to  magnify  their 
own  importance  at  the  expense  of  the  secular  authorities.  The 
powers  vested  in  the  governor  were  always  subject  to  the  impli- 
cation that  they  should  be  exercised  in  aid  of  the  primary  purpose 
of  the  enterprise — the  conversion  of  the  Indians.  In  this  work 
the  ecclesiastics  were  the  immediate  agencies,  and  as  they, 
through  their  own  intermediaries,  had  the  ear  of  the  king,  they 
were  from  the  first  in  practical  control  of  the  colony.  It  was 
only  natural,  under  the  circumstances,  that  they  should  attempt 
to  dictate  in  secular  affairs. 

The  policy  of  appointing  proprietary  governors,  which  was 
soon  adopted,  also  tended  to  cause  friction  between  the  secular 
and  ecclesiastical  officials  by  cultivating  a  sense  of  importance  in 
the  governors  while  not  in  the  least  increasing  their  power.  In 
1584  Ronquilla  proposed  to  the  king  that  if  appointed  governor 
of  the  Philippines  for  life  and  given  the  concessions  then  usual 
for  the  discoverers  and  colonizers  of  new  lands,  he  would  go 
out  at  his  own  expense  and  take  with  him  six  hundred  colonists. 
Philip,  who  was  already  weary  of  the  financial  burden  imposed 
upon  the  royal  treasury  by  his  various  colonial  enterprises,  gladly 
accepted  the  offer.  The  governors  were  thereafter  interested 
primarily  as  proprietors  rather  than  as  officers  of  the  king  and 
were  unable  to  see  eye  to  eye  with  the  missionaries,  who  as  yet 
were  free  from  the  influence  of  mercenary  considerations. 


156  THE   PHILIPPINES 

The  Spanish  kings  must  be  given  credit  for  entire  sincerity 
in  their  efforts  to  secure  the  well-being  of  the  natives.  They 
prohibited  their  enslavement,  much  to  the  disgust  of  the  officials. 
The  laws,  ordinances  and  decrees  commanded  the  utmost  consid- 
eration for  their  physical  as  well  as  spiritual  welfare.^*  All 
sorts  of  checks  and  restraints  were  imposed;  but  they  did  not,  it 
is  to  be  feared,  seriously  restrain  the  high-handed  and  arbitrary 
officials  who  had  interests  to  serve  which  were  in  no  way  con- 
nected with  the  saving  of  souls. 

This  farming  out  of  the  colony  meant  the  exploitation  of  the 
natives,  who  were  required  to  supply  the  wealth.  The  lands  and 
the  natives  thereon  were  granted  in  encomiendas  as  rewards  for 
services,  real  or  imaginary,  to  persons  who  were  charged  with 
the  collection  of  the  tribute  and  the  care  of  the  people.  The 
tributes  were  of  course  collected,  but  the  natives  were  neglected 
and  often  cruelly  oppressed. 

All  the  proteges  and  parasites  of  the  governors  had  to  be  pro- 
vided with  places  which  would  enable  them  to  live  and  prosper. 
Before  the  arrival  of  Ronquilla,  Manila  had  managed  to  struggle 
along  with  four  magistrates ;  but  as  the  new  governor  had  seven- 
teen deserving  friends  to  provide  for  the  magistracies  were  in- 
creased to  seventeen.  As  Bishop  Salazar  wrote,  these  people 
came  out  poor  and  were  granted  scant  salaries  so  "they  deprive 
the  natives  of  the  rice  from  the  fields  and  of  all  the  other  har- 
vesting products  that  they  can  get." 

Salazar,  who  was  the  first  Bishop  of  the  Islands,  has  been 
called  "the  Las  Casas  of  the  Philippines."  He  was  an  authorita- 
tive and  rather  arbitrary  person,  who  made  himself  the  advocate 
of  reforms  and  the  special  champion  of  the  natives.  Many 
abuses  had  already  grown  up  in  the  local  administration.  Sala- 
zar wrote  long  letters  to  the  King  denouncing  the  cruelties  of  the 
encomenderos  and  the  secular  authorities,  and  praying  for  the 
reform  of  the  administration.  The  dissatisfaction  with  condi- 
tions was  so  general  that  in  1586  a  junta,  in  which  all  the 
estates  were  represented,  met  in  Manila  and  prepared  a  memorial 

2*  Lea,  "The  Indian  Policy  of  Spain,"  Yale  Review,  August,  1899. 


DISCOVERY   AND    CONQUEST  157 

setting  forth  the  requirements  of  the  colony,  which  was  carried 
to  the  king  by  a  priest  named  Sanchez.*'' 

The  envoy,  who  really  represented  Bishop  Salazar,  arrived  at 
Seville  in  1587,  and  while  waiting  for  his  audience  with  the  king 
took  an  active  part  in  the  controversy  which  was  raging  between 
the  factions  over  the  proper  way  to  conduct  missionary  work. 
One  party  was  contending  that  the  propaganda  of  the  faith  ought 
to  be  purely  apostolic;  that  the  doctrines  of  poverty  and  humility 
should  prevail ;  that  violence  should  never  be  resorted  to,  and  that 
those  who  rejected  the  true  religion  should  be  left  to  their  folly. 
The  other  regarded  such  methods  as  useless  and  held  that  the 
true  religion  should  be  forced  upon  the  unwilling  and  recalcitrant 
by  persuasion  if  possible,  by  force  of  arms  if  necessary.  Father 
Sanchez  cast  his  lot  with  the  belligerent  faction. 

Finally  the  king,  after  careful  consideration  of  the  memorial, 
determined  to  reorganize  the  Philippine  service.  The  decree 
which  was  issued  determined  the  amount  of  tribute  which  should 
be  paid  by  the  natives  and  its  apportionment  among  the  Church, 
treasury  and  army;  the  amount  of  customs  duties  to, be  charged 
and  the  number  of  troops  to  be  maintained.  It  made  provision 
for  the  prompt  payment  of  salaries;  the  payment  of  the  balance 
of  the  debt  incurred  at  the  time  of  the  original  occupation  of  the 
islands;  the  fortification  of  Manila,  the  construction  of  peniten- 
tiaries and  the  foundation  of  separate  hospitals  for  Spaniards 
and  Indians.  The  governor  and  bishop  were  recommended  to 
consider  the  matter  of  establishing  refuges  for  young  women 
and  dowries  for  native  women  who  married  Spaniards.  The 
offices  of  secretary  and  notary  were  no  longer  to  be  sold,  and  the 
governor  was  thereafter  to  make  grants  of  land  to  those  only 
who  had  been  three  years  in  the  islands  and- would  actually  im- 
prove the  lands  granted.     All  previous  grants  which  had  been 


25  For  the  Memorial,  see  B,  &  R.,  VI,  p.  157.  After  Sanchez  had  sailed  the 
cabildo  of  Manila  caused  another  document  to  be  prepared  and  ordered  it  sent 
to  him.  It  was  lost  when  the  Santa  Ana  was  captured  by  Thomas  Candish 
oflf  the  California  coast.  A  copy  was  furnished  Bishop  Salazar  and  incorpo- 
rated in  his  description  of  conditions  in  the  Philippines.  See  B.  &  R.,  VII, 
pp.  32-51. 


158  THE    PHILIPPINES 

made  to  their  relatives  by  governors  and  magistrates  were  di- 
rected to  be  canceled. 

More  Augustinian  friars  were  to  be  sent  to  the  islands,  and 
they  were  to  be  followed  by  missionaries  from  the  other  orders. 
Of  the  expenses  of  the  outgoing  friars  one-half  of  the  passage 
money  was  to  be  paid  by  the  king  and  one-half  by  the  clergy 
out  of  the  funds  accruing  from  their  share  of  the  tribute.  Slaves 
held  by  Spaniards  were  to  be  immediately  set  free,  and  natives 
thereafter  bom  were  declared  free.  Provision  was  also  made 
for  the  ultimate  freedom  of  all  natives  then  held  in  bondage. 
The  audiencia,  which  had  been  established  in  1583,  and  which  had 
not  proved  satisfactory  to  the  ecclesiastical  authorities,  was  abol- 
ished and  a  sort  of  advisory  council  provided  for  the  governor. 

Apparently  at  the  instance  of  Sanchez,  Gomez  Perez  Desma- 
rifias  was  sent  out  as  governor,  with  authority  to  name  his  son 
as  his  successor,  and  the  changes  and  reforms  were  included  in 
his  instructions.  In  the  meantime  Governor  Ronquillo  had  died 
and  the  senior  magistrate  of  the  audiencia  was  acting  as  governor. 

Desmarifias  proved  to  be  a  strong  and  energetic  man ;  but  as  he 
would  admit  no  ecclesiastical  partnership  in  the  administration 
of  the  secular  government  he  was  soon  at  cross  purposes  with 
Bishop  Salazar.  He  sailed  in  personal  command  of  an  expedi- 
tion against  the  Dutch  in  the  Moluccas  and  was  murdered  by  his 
Chinese  crew,  who  mutinied  and  took  possession  of  the  fleet,  thus 
bringing  the  enterprise  to  a  disastrous  end.  According  to  one 
of  the  contemporary  chroniclers,  Desmarifias  was  *'the  only  Gov- 
ernor who  held  office  during  the  first  quarter  of  the  seventeenth 
century  who  was  fitted  for  his  position,  and  did  more  for  the  hap- 
piness of  the  natives  in  three  years  than  all  his  predecessors  and 
successors." 

Bishop  Salazar,  after  quarreling  with  the  new  governor,  as  he 
had  done  with  his  predecessor,  began  to  long  for  the  days  when 
the  audiencia  had  been  there  to  share  his  troubles.  Notwith- 
standing his  extreme  old  age,  the  bishop  determined  to  journey 
to  far-away  Spain  and  lay  his  claims  and  grievances  before  the 
king  in  person.    His  influence  was  very  great  and  the  visit  re- 


DISCOVERY    AND    CONQUEST  159 

suited  in  the  reestablishment  of  the  audiencia  and  the  raising  of 
the  See  of  Manila  to  an  Archbishopric.  Salazar  was  appointed 
as  the  first  Archbishop  of  Manila,  but  died  before  his  investiture 
was  officially  authorized  by  the  Pope,  leaving  in  Philippine  his- 
tory the  reputation  of  a  sincere  friend  of  the  native  people. 

In  the  year  1606  Doctor  Antonio  de  Morga,  who  had  been  the 
senior  magistrate  of  the  audiencia,  published  an  elaborate  de- 
scription of  conditions,  from  which  it  appears  that  the  Spaniards 
had  by  that  time  substantially  completed  their  constructive  work 
in  the  Philippines.  The  situation  changed  but  little  thereafter 
until  near  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century. 


CHAPTER  VI 
Two  and  One-Half  Centuries  of  Stagnation 

Loss  of  Energy — Quarrels  of  Officials — Character  of  Governors — Financial 
Difficulties — Governor  Corcuera  and  Archbishop  Guerrero — Salcedo  and  Po- 
bleta — Vargas  and  Pardo — Difficulties  of  Reformers — Ferdinand  de  Busta- 
mente — Capture  of  Manila  by  British — ^Archbishop  Roja  and  Simon  de  Anda 
— The  Indemnity  and  the  Dishonored  Drafts — ^A  Friar's  Opinion  of  Governor 
Torre — Chinese  Uprisings  and  Massacres — Moro  Raids — The  Obras  Pias — 
An  Enterprising  Governor — ^The  Liberal  Movement  in  Spain — Representation 
-a  the  Cortes — Discontent — Description  of  Conditions  by  Mas  and  Matta. 

There  is  little  of  general  interest  in  the  history  of  the  Phil- 
ippines during  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries.  It 
was  a  long  dreary  period  filled  with  the  eternal  quarrels  of  gov- 
ernors, audiencias  and  ecclesiastics,  enlivened  by  occasional  Moro 
raids  and  massacres  of  Chinese.  The  spirit  seemed  to  have  gone 
out  of  Spanish  rule.  The  State  felt  that  its  work  was  done,  and 
the  people  were  left  for  the  Church  to  educate  and  civilize.  Iso- 
lated and  its  activities  restricted  by  a  narrow  commercial  policy, 
the  beautiful  land  simply  marked  time  while  the  world  moved  on 
its  way.  Once,  for  a  few  months,  it  was  drawn  within  the  influ- 
ence of  world  forces.  The  unexpected  appearance  of  a  British 
fleet  in  the  bay  for  a  while  galvanized  the  community  into  un- 
wonted activity;  but  Manila  was  only  a  pawn  in  the  European 
game  and,  unfortunately  for  the  country,  the  conquerors  sailed 
away,  leaving  it  to  take  up  anew  its  droning  life. 

It  would  be  an  unprofitable  task  even  to  name  all  the  men  who, 
each  for  a  few  years,  ruled  over  the  colony.^  Many  of  them  were 
corrupt,  seeking  only  ways  and  means  to  repair  their  own  broken 
fortunes. 


^  A  complete  list  of  Spanish  governors  with  a  brief  summary  of  the  events 
of  each  administration  is  printed  in  B.  &  R.,  XVII,  p.  285  et  seq. 

160 


CENTURIES    OF    STAGNATION  161 

"O  que  triste  el  alma  mia 
Hasta  que  la  parte  vea*'* 

A  few  very  honest  gentlemen  tried  to  do  their  duty  under 
evil  conditions.  Occasionally  an  energetic  governor  like  Enrile 
attempted  to  rouse  the  land  from  its  lethargy.  Fortunate  indeed 
were  the  ones  who  escaped  unscathed  from  the  mob,  the  Holy 
Inquisition,  or  the  residencia.  Those  who  were  sufficiently  tact- 
ful to  avoid  friction  with  the  ecclesiastical  authorities  earned 
thereby  consideration  for  piety. 

The  ordinary  Spanish  civil  official  was  there  to  accumulate  a 
fortune,  and  from  this  he  did  not  propose  to  be  diverted  by  any 
religious  or  fanciful  scruples  with  reference  to  the  rights  of  the 
natives.  Under  such  conditions  more  than  royal  mandates  were 
necessary  to  secure  good  government  in  a  far-away  colony  where 
public  opinion  did  not  exist,  and  that  of  the  home  land  was  inef- 
fective. The  public  revenues  were  of  course  mismanaged.  They 
seemed  to  dissolve  on  the  way  from  the  taxpayer  to  the  treasury, 
and  even  what  reached  the  treasury  was  too  often  misappropri- 
ated or  wasted  on  dishonest  projects.  Hence,  the  financial  condi- 
tion of  the  colony  was  always  deplorable.  During  the  early  years 
it  was  natural  that  the  expenses  of  the  government  should  be 
greater  than  any  income  which  could  be  raised  without  exploiting 
the  natives,  but  as  time  passed  and  the  government  became  more 
settled  it  seemed  reasonable  to  the  authorities  in  Spain  that  the 
colony  should  become  self-supporting. 

About  thirty  years  after  the  death  of  Legaspi  we  find  the 
Manila  procurator  soliciting  financial  aid  from  Spain  to  meet  the 
deficits  created  by  official  misconduct.  A  Royal  Commission, 
after  a  full  investigation  of  the  conditions  in  the  Philippines, 
reported  that  owing  to  the  constant  disputes,  ill  feeling  and  gen- 
eral bad  government  the  islands  were  and  would  continue  to  be 
unproductive  and  unprofitable,  and  recommended  that  they  should 
be  abandoned.  But  for  the  opportune  presence  of  a  missionary 
named  Morga  it  is  probable  that  the  king  would  have  approved 

*  **A!as,  how  sad  a  soul  I  bear 
Until  I  see  what  is  my  share." 


162  THE    PHILIPPINES 

this  report.  Morga  protested  energetically  against  the  abandon- 
ment of  the  work  of  the  Church  and  induced  the  king  to  an-i 
nounce  that  "even  though  the  maintenance  of  the  colony  should 
exhaust  the  Mexican  treasury  his  conscience  would  not  allow  him 
to  consent  to  the  perdition  of  souls  which  had  been  saved  and  the 
hope  of  rescuing  far  more  in  the  distant  region." 

Brief  reference  to  a  few  of  the  bitter  controversies,  some  of 
them  tragic  and  bloody,  will  give  an  idea  of  the  difficulties  and 
obstacles  which  obstructed  the  growth  and  progress  of  the  coun- 
try. Governor  Corcuera,^  who  ruled  with  a  high  hand,  quarreled 
with  Archbishop  Guerrero.  The  friars,  he  declared,  "were  law- 
less people ;"  he  "would  rather  fight  the  Dutch  in  Flanders  than 
them."  After  a  stormy  period,  during  which  the  churches  were 
closed,  the  archbishop  was  overcome,  imprisoned,  fined  and  ban- 
ished to  Corregidor.  But  the  governor's  triumph  was  only  tem- 
porary, as  his  successor,  after  inquiring  into  his  conduct,  caused 
him  to  be  imprisoned  for  five  years.* 

Diego  de  Salcedo,  who  was  governor  from  1663  to  1668,  car- 
ried on  a  constant  quarrel  with  Archbishop  Pobleta,  who  by  the 
ill-advised  courtesy  of  the  preceding  governor  had  been  conceded 
the  privilege  of  vetoing  all  his  official  acts.  Archbishop  Pobleta 
refused  to  obey  certain  decrees  of  Governor  Salcedo  and  was 
finally  banished  to  Marivales.  Ultimately  the  archbishop  was 
compelled  to  pay  a  heavy  fine,  and  when  he  died  the  governor 
prohibited  the  de  profundis  mass  on  the  groimd  that  its  observ- 
ance would  interfere  with  the  feasts  by  which  he  proposed  to 
celebrate  the  archbishop's  demise.  But  Salcedo's  triumph  was 
also  temporary.    He  was  soon  in  the  hands  of  the  Inquisition, 

*  1635  to  1644.  Corcuera  was  an  energetic  governor  who  reorganized  all 
the  departments  of  the  government  and  quarreled  indiscriminately  with  friars, 
bishops  and  civilians.  His  reports  to  the  king  are  interesting.  See  Reot.  for 
1636,  B.  &  R.,  XXVI,  p.  60  et  scq.  For  his  account  of  the  trouble  with  the 
ecclesiastical  authorities,  B.  &  R.,  XXVI,  p,  60. 

*  Lea,  The  Inquisition  in  the  Spanish  Dependencies,  p.  309.  After  Corcuero 
was  out  of  office  the  Augustinians  prosecuted  him  for  removing  one  of  their 
buildings  while  constructing  the  defensive  city  walls.  They  secured  a  judg- 
ment against  him  for  $2,500,  which  he  was  unable  to  pay — a  very  good  evi- 
dence of  his  honesty  while  in  office.  On  his  liberation  Philip  IV  appointed 
him  governor  of  the  Canary  Islands. 


CENTURIES    OF    STAGNATION  163 

and  after  years  of  imprisonment  died  while  on  his  way  to  Mex- 
ico for  trial. 

During  the  reign  of  Governor  Vargas,  Archbishop  Pardo  was 
banished  from  Manila."  When  restored  to  his  See  after  the  re- 
tirement of  Vargas,  he  proceeded  to  equalize  matters  by  imposing 
the  severest  penalties  possible  upon  all  of  his  enemies.  He  or- 
dered the  governor  to  adjure  his  past  acts,  to  "wear  a  penitent's 
garb,  to  place  a  rope  about  his  neck,  and  to  carry  a  lighted  candle 
to  the  doors  of  the  Cathedral  and  churches  of  Parion,  San  Ga- 
briel, and  San  Binondo  on  every  feast  day  during  the  four 
months." 

Vargas  claimed  privilege  on  the  ground  that  he  was  a  Cavalier 
of  the  Military  Order  of  St.  James,  but  the  archbishop  refused 
to  recognize  the  privilege  and  desisted  only  when  the  new  gov- 
ernor threatened  to  send  him  again  into  banishment.  Many 
other  such  instances  might  be  cited.  * 

After  a  corrupt  system  of  government  has  been  thoroughly 
established  the  way  of  the  reformer  is  difficult  and  dangerous. 
The  beneficiaries  of  the  system  feel  that  they  have  vested  rights. 
By  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century,  financial  abuses  in 
all  parts  of  the  government  of  the  Philippines  had  become  so 
general  as  to  make  the  work  of  reform  extremely  difficult.  IMost 
of  the  prominent  officials  were  involved.  To  the  interested  the 
mass  of  corruption  was  sacrosanct,  and  woe  to  him  who  assumed 
to  touch  it  with  irreverent  hands. 

Ferdinand  de  Bustamente'  was  the  victim  of  an  attempt  to 
protect  the  public  treasury.  While  neither  tactful  nor  consid- 
erate, nor  always  right,  he  seems  in  a  large  way  to  have  had  the 
good  of  the  colony  at  heart.  Having  discovered  irregularities 
in  the  management  of  the  public  funds,  he  caused  the  delinquents, 
some  of  them  of  high  degree,  to  be  imprisoned  and  prosecuted. 
The  monastic  orders  furnished  refuge  in  the  churches  to  the 

"^For  an  account  of  Pardo's  controversy  with  the  audiencia,  see  B.  &  R., 
XXXIX,  p.  149. 

^  1717  to  1719.  For  an  account  of  his  government  and  death,  see  B.  &  R- 
XLIV,  p.  148. 


164  THE    PHILIPPINES 

enemies  of  the  governor.  Certain  influential  men,  including 
many  advocates,  signed  a  statement  which  denied  the  right  of 
the  governor  to  arrest  a  certain  notary  who  had  taken  refuge 
in  the  Cathedral.  Bustamente  thereupon  lost  his  head  and  inju- 
diciously threw  the  archbishop  and  the  lawyers  into  jail.  The 
feelings  of  the  people  were  outraged  by  the  imprisonment  of 
the  archbishop.  The  refugees  came  out  of  the  churches  and 
joined  a  mob  which  marched  against  the  palace.  The  soldiers, 
when  ordered  to  fire  on  the  rioters,  lowered  their  arms  before 
the  crucifixes  and  images  of  the  saints  w^hich  were  carried  by 
the  friars  before  the  advancing-  mob.  The  ill-fated  governor 
and  his  son  met  the  attack  almost  alone  on  the  stairway  of  the 
palace,  and  both  fell  mortally  wounded. 

After  his  death  every  effort  was  made  to  blacken  the  character 
of  Bustamente.  So  many  charges  were  filed  during  the  period 
of  his  residencia  that  the  commission  was  overwhelmed  and 
never  made  a  report. 

The  capture  of  Manila  by  the  British  during  the  Seven  Years' 
War  was  but  an  incident  of  that  memorable  struggle,  but  it 
might  well  have  changed  the  course  of  history  in  the  Orient. 
Had  England  retained  possession  of  the  Archipelago  the  new 
era  would  have  opened  at  least  a  century  earlier  than  it  did.'' 
The  orders  as  originally  issued  directed  General  William  Draper 
to  capture  Manila  and  then  establish  a  permanent  settlement  in 
the  island  of  Mindanao  "which  could  be  kept  after  peace."  The 
news  of  the  capture  did  not  reach  Europe  until  after  the  signing 
of  the  definitive  treaty,  Manila  was  therefore  not  mentioned 
in  that  instrument,  and  was  returned  to  the  Spaniards  without 
any  compensation.  The  king  of  Spain  dishonored  the  drafts 
drawn  by  the  authorities  at  Manila  to  cover  part  of  the  indem- 
nity.    It  is  probable  that  had  the  news  of  the  capture  reached 


'^  In  a  manifesto  issued  by  the  Filipino  junta  at  Hong  Kong  about  the 
time  the  American  fleet  sailed  for  Manila,  the  iollowing  appears  in  their  list 
of  grievances :  "We  were  compelled  to  spill  our  blood  by  Simon  de  Anda 
against  the  English,  who  in  any  case  would  have  made  better  rulers  than  the 
Spaniards." 


CENTURIES    OF   STAGNATION^  165 

Europe  at  an  earlier  date,  Mindanao,  at  least,  would  have  re- 
mained British  territory. 

There  is  a  striking  resemblance  between  the  methods  followed 
by  the  British  in  the  seventeenth  century  and  by  the  Americans 
more  than  one  hundred  years  later.  Had  the  latter  withdrawn 
their  troops  after  suppressing  the  native  revolt,  the  resemblance, 
barring  the  sacking  of  the  city  by  the  British,  would  have  been 
even  greater.  In  both  instances  events  followed  almost  the 
same  course. 

On  September  23,  1762,  just  a  week  after  the  fall  of  Habana, 
thirteen  ships  with  about  two  thousand  troops  under  the  com- 
mand of  General  William  Draper  entered  Manila  Bay  and  de- 
manded the  surrender  of  the  city.  The  Spaniards  had  not  yet 
learned  of  the  existence  of  war  between  England  and  Spain  and 
were,  as  usual,  unprepared  for  defense.  The  governor  was 
absent  and  Archbishop  Rojo  was  in  charge.  -  After  the  sur- 
render of  the  city  the  usual  controversy  arose  as  to  who  was 
responsible  for  its  unprepared  condition.  One  of  the  ecclesi- 
astics wrote  to  Madrid  that  "Manila  well  deserved  it,  not  indeed 
because  of  its  total  lack  of  Christian  procedure,  but  singularly 
because  of  its  cursed  neglect  of  politics,  as  if  the  whole  world 
had  to  respect  and  fear  us  because  of  our  boasting  that  we  are 
Spaniards."' 

Archibishop  Rojo  should  not  be  blamed  for  the  situation 
which  the  British  found  in  Manila.  The  city  was  not  properly 
fortified  or  manned  for  defense  against  an  attack  by  an  European 
power.  It  was  a  short-sighted  policy,  but  it  was  the  policy  of 
Spain  and  not  of  the  individual  who  was  so  unfortunate  as  to 
hold  power  at  the  time  of  the  invasion.  La  Gentil  says  that  the 
garrison  was  composed  of  Mexicans  whom  he  described  as  good 
enough  indeed  but  of  little  skill  in  the  military  art,  "as  they  had 
never  fired  a  gun." 


''Baltasar  Vela  to  Antonio  Gonzales  in  Madrid,  July  24,  1764,  B.  &  R., 
XLIX,  p.  288.  That  Spain  continued  to  rely  on  the  terror  of  her  name  ap- 
pears from  the  history  of  the  Spanish-American  War.  After  that  war  the 
usual  controversy  arose  as  to  who  was  responsible  for  the  lack  of  prepara- 
tion for  the  defense  of  Manila. 


166  THE   PHILIPPINES 

The  archbishop  has  been  severely  criticized  for  his  anxiety 
to  surrender  the  city.  It  should  be  remembered  that  he  was  an 
ecclesiastic,  not  a  soldier.  If  we  may  rely  upon  the  narrative 
and  journal  kept  by  him  at  the  time,  it  appears  that  he  took 
advantage  of  all  available  means  of  defense.  One  faction,  more 
anxious  to  protect  property  than  honor,  criticized  the  arch- 
bishop-governor for  not  surrendering  the  city  earlier,  thus  saving 
it  from  sack  and  pillage.  Simon  de  Anda  Salazar,  an  energetic 
magistrate  of  the  audiencia,  placed  himself  at  the  head  of  the 
faction  which  was  determined  to  resist  to  the  end,  and  with  a 
single  servant  escaped  to  the  provinces,  where  he  raised  the 
standard  of  revolt  against  the  archbishop's  authority  and  policy. 

While  preparing  for  an  attack  on  the  city,  the  British  had  the 
good  fortune  to  intercept  and  capture  one  of  the  galleons  which 
was  arriving  from  Mexico,  thereby  securing  several  millions 
of  specie  which  "were  being  imported  for  the  support  of  the  gov- 
ernment and  the  use  of  Manila  merchants. 

Although  there  were  no  adequate  means  for  defending  the 
city,  the  garrison  made  a  brave  defense.  After  some  very  severe 
fighting,®  the  city  capitulated,  and  on  October  6,  the  British  flag 
was  raised  over  Fort  Santiago.^" 

The  terms  granted  required  the  payment  of  an  indemnity  of 
four  million  pesos,  of  which  one-half  was  to  be  paid  at  once  and 
the  balance  in  bills  drawn  on  Madrid.  It  was  soon  found  that 
so  much  money  could  not  be  raised  in  Manila.  Much  property 
had  been  destroyed  and  many  valuables  had  been  removed  to 
the  provinces.  The  heavy  contributions  levied  on  the  people, 
together  with  the  silver  plate,  church  ornaments,  and  even  the 
archbishop's  ring  and  breast  cross,  produced  but  one-half  of 
the  required  amount.    An  arrangement  was  then  made  by  which 

^  For  fhe  details  of  the  attack,  etc,  see  Draper's  Journal,  B.  &  R.,  XLIX,  pp. 
81-101.  For  the  Spanish  account  of  the  capture,  see  Rojo's  Journal,  ihid., 
pp.  105-132;  Rojo's  Narrative,  ibid.,  pp.  177-261.  "The  Indians,  though  armed 
with  bows  and  lances,  flung  themselves  with  desperate  valor  on  our  lines,  and 
died  by  scores,  biting  the  bayonets  hke  wild  beasts.  But  their  valor  was  ill 
supported."    Lord,  The  Lost  Possessions  of  England,  p.  175. 

1°  The  demand  was  for  the  cession  to  his  Britannic  Majesty  of  Manila  and 
of  the  island  of  Luzon  and  the  recognition  of  the  British  sovereignty  unti^ 
the  peace  between  France  and  England  should  decide  the  fate  of  the  islands. 


CENTURIES   OF  STAGNATION  167 

the  British  were  to  receive  on  account  the  cargo  of  another  galleon 
which  was  daily  expected  to  arrive,  providing  that  it  had  not 
been  captured  by  their  forces  before  the  date  of  capitulation. 
But  this  galleon  was  not  destined  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  the 
British,  as  its  treasure  had  already  been  landed  on  the  northern 
coast  and  carried  inland  and  delivered  to  Anda, 

The  archbishop  had  great  difficulty  in  compelling  the  friars 
to  deliver  their  money  and  treasure,  and  in  the  end  the  British 
became  exasperated  and  overran  the  country  north  and  south  of 
Manila.  In  the  meantime  the  redoubtable  Anda,  who  claimed  to 
be  governor  and  captain-general,  by  legal  right,  as  the  archbishop 
and  the  other  magistrates  were  prisoners  of  war  and  in  the  eye  of 
the  Spanish  law  civilly  dead,  supported  by  the  Jesuits,^'  had 
raised  a  considerable  force  in  the  provinces. 

The  natives  were  willing  to  accept  Anda  as  the  representative 
of  Spanish  authority,  but  an  assembly  convened  at  Manila  at  the 
instance  of  the  British  commander  proclaimed  him  a  seditious 
person  who  deserved  the  death  penalty.  In  the  fight  which  fol- 
lowed, the  natives  were  severely  punished,  but  the  British  were 
forced  to  reduce  their  outposts  and  practically  to  withdraw 
within  the  limits  of  the  city  of  Manila.  The  British  commander 
who  insisted  that  the  archbishop  should  be  recognized  as  the 
real  representative  of  Spanish  authority,  now  offered  a  reward 
for  the  head  of  Anda,  and  proclaimed  his  troops  as  "canaille  and 
robbers."  Anda  responded  promptly  in  kind  and  for  a  time 
belligerent  operations  were  confined  to  abusive  proclamations. 

In  the  meantime  Anda's  actions  had  been  approved  by  the 
king.  The  friars  now  came  to  his  assistance  and  the  position 
of  the  British  was  far  from  pleasant  Fortunately  in  January 
a  frigate  arrived  with  the  news  of  an  European  armistice  and 
in  August  the  terms  of  the  preliminaries  of  peace  were  received. 
General  Draper,  acting  under  secret  instructions  from  the  king, 
had  already  handed  the  country  over  to  a  Mr.  Dawson  Drake, 
of  the  Honorable  East  India  Company's  service,  and  returned 
to  England,  where,  like  most  of  the  men  who  have  won  territory 

^^  This  was  one  of  the  grounds  for  the  expulsion  of  the  Jesuits  in  1768. 


168  THE    PHILIPPINES 

for  England,  he  spent  his  declining  years  defending  his  ac- 
tions. 

The  fighting  flow  ceased.  .  The  much-troubled  archbishop 
broke  down  under  the  strain  and  died.  Soon  thereafter  Anda 
received  direct  news  of  peace  by  way  of  China.  The  ministry 
of  Lord  Bute  had  carelessly  tossed  an  empire  away  without 
compensation.  The  treaty  merely  provided  in  effect  that  Manila, 
if  captured,  should  be  restored.  A  new  governor-general  ad 
interim  now  arrived,  but  considerately  feigned  illness  and  per- 
mitted Anda  to  receive  the  city  from  the  departing  British. 

On  his  return  to  Spain,  Anda  was  received  with  favor  by  the 
king,  and  later  was  appointed  governor  and  captain-general 
of  the  Philippines.  His  administration  was  far  from  peaceful, 
as  he  seems  to  have  been  tactless  and  disposed  to  revenge  him- 
self on  his  enemies.  After  six  years  of  strife  and  friction,  he 
retired  to  Cavlte^  where  he  died,  as  one  contemporary  says, 
"much  to  the  relief  of  his  adversaries."  He  was  a  vigorous 
magistrate,  who,  after  being  deserted  by  the  Spanish  element, 
with  the  aid  of  native  soldiers  succeeded  in  confining  the  Eng- 
lish to  the  vicinity  of  Manlla.^^  Posterity  has  recognized  his 
services  for  the  Philippines  and  a  monument  to  his  memory 
stands  in  front  of  Fort  Santiago  at  the  end  of  the  Malecon  Drive 
in  the  city  of  Manila.'^ 

Spain  refused  to  pay  the  bills  which  had  been  drawn  for  the 
deferred  part  of  the  ransom  money  on  the  grounds  that  the  au- 
thorities at  Manila  had  no  right  to  draw  such  bills,  that  they  were 
induced  to  do  so  by  force,  and  that  the  British,  in  violation  of 
the  terms  of  the  capitulation,  had  given  over  the  city  to  sack  and 
plunder.  The  first  two  reasons  were  manifestly  absurd,  as  ran- 
som Is  never  paid  or  agreed  to  be  paid  except  under  duress. 
Doctor  von  Ruvllle,  the  German  author  of  a  life  of  the  Earl  of 


12  Le  Roy  (The  American  in  the  Philippines,  I,  p.  19)  says  that  Anda 
thus  "probably  saved  the  Archipelago  for  Spain  at  the  making  of  the  Treaty 
of  Paris."    In  fact  he  had  no  influence  on  the  treaty. 

13  For  the  friar  account  of  Anda  and  his  work,  see  Zufiiga,  Estadismo  de 
Islas  Filipinos  (Madrid,  1893).  For  Anda's  own  statement,  see  B.  &  R., 
XLIX,  pp.  263,  269,  An  English  translation,  with  notes  by  Dr.  Pardo  de 
ITavera,  was  published  at  Manila  in  1899. 


CENTURIES    OF    STAGNATION  169 

Chatham,**  intimates  that  Spain  was  justified  in  refusing  to  pay 
the  bills  but  advances  no  reason  for  his  opinion.  It  was  a  clear 
case  of  dishonoring  a  draft  drawn  by  a  duly  authorized  agent. 
General  Draper,  abandoned  by  a  pusillanimous  ministry,  pub- 
lished an  indignant  defense  of  his  conduct,  in  which  he  showed 
quite  conclusively  that  no  plundering  was  authorized  after  the 
capitulation,  although,  as  in  other  such  cases,  there  were  un- 
doubtedly many  outrages  and  much  destruction  of  property.  The 
weight  of  the  evidence  sustains  Draper's  claim  that  he  took  all 
possible  means  to  protect  the  city  and  that  the  excesses  which 
occurred  were  only  such  as  in  that  age  were  inevitable  when  a 
city  was  taken  by  storm  by  a  body  of  miscellaneous  troops  such 
as  he  commanded.*' 

After  the  departure  of  the  British  matters  soon  fell  into  the 
old  routine.  The  ravages  of  war  were  repaired  as  rapidly  as  the 
means  available  would  permit,  and  Moro  raids  and  Chinese  up- 
risings became  again  the  matters  of  most  vital  interest. 

According  to  a  contemporary,"  Torre,  the  new  governor,  was 
"the  most  detestable  robber  ever  seen  in  the  East  or  West  Indies, 
a  man  without  shame  or  trace  of  Christianity.  All  this  might 
be  tolerated  if  he  took  any  care  of  the  Indians;  but  he  has  wholly 
abandoned  the  fields  of  Christendom,  saying  that  a  cornucopia 
of  the  islands  is  given  to  him,  and  that  the  King,  our  sovereign, 
will  abandon  them  or  give  them  to  the  French.  Thereupon  he 
has  given  himself  over  to  a  libertine  life,  so  far  as  his  morals 
are  concerned.  He  looks  after  nothing  else  than  selling  the 
offices  dear  and  robbing  the  king  and  vassals." 

After  deploring  the  conditions,  the  indignant  ecclesiastic  ex- 
claims, "May  Cjod  bring  us  a  Governor,  may  God  bring  us  a  few 
judges,  who  shall  recognize  and  appreciate  the  defense  of  the 
Catholic  religion  and  of  the  poor  Indians." 


"Albert  von  Ruville,  William  Pitt,  Earl  of  Chatham  (London,  1907), 
III,  p.  67. 

15  For  Draper's  defense,  see  B.  &  R.,  XLIX,  p.  309. 

**  Bernardo  Pazuengos,  the  Philippine  provincial,  to  Joaquin  Mesquida, 
procurenr-general,  Madrid,  June  7,  1765,  B.  &  R.,  XLIX,  p.  Z37.  Due  allow- 
ance must  be  made  for  the  animus  of  the  writers  of  such  letters. 


170  THE   PHILIPPINES 

During  the  time  of  the  British  occupation,  the  Chinese  were 
charged  with  plotting  against  the  Spaniards.  It  would  not  be 
surprising  if  they  looked  with  satisfaction  upon  the  prospect 
of  the  British  taking  over  the  islands.  The  Spaniards  always 
feared  but  could  not  do  without  the  Chinese.  When  they  in- 
creased in  number  beyond  a  certain  point,  they  were  either  ex- 
pelled from  the  islands  or  massacred,  and  a  new  start  was  made. 
When  they  were  able,  the  Chinese  retaliated  in  kind. 

The  visit  of  a  number  of  Chinese  mandarins  to  Manila  in 
,1603  on  what  was  considered  a  silly  errand,  greatly  frightened 
the  Spaniards,  who  imagined  it  to  be  the  forerunner  of  an  im- 
pending invasion.  The  active  measures  taken  to  prepare  the 
colony  for  defense  produced  a  feeling  of  restlessness  and  fear 
iamong  the  Chinese.  The  Spaniards  circulated  rumors  that  the 
Chinese  intended  to  rise  and  prepare  the  way  for  the  coming 
of  their  friends  from  China.  The  Chinese  were  as  badly  fright- 
iened  as  the  Spaniards,  and  fearing  that  they  would  be  massacred 
took  measures  for  their  defense.  Two  badly  frightened  parties 
easily  get  to  fighting.  The  Chinese  struck  the  first  blow,  but  in 
the  end  they  were  annihilated.  The  number  killed  reached 
twenty-five  thousand.^'' 

"Some  say,"  says  Argensola,^*  "that  the  number  of  Sangleys 
killed  was  greater,  but  in  order  that  the  illegality  in  admitting 
so  many  into  the  country  contrary  to  royal  prohibition  might 
not  be  seen,  the  officials  concealed  or  diminished  the  number  of 
those  that  perished."  Morga  says,  "The  Captains  were  occupied 
in  this  finishing  the  enemies  for  twenty  days,  and  with  it  the 
war  was  ended.  Very  few  merchants  were  left  in  Manila."  In 
1639  there  was  another  massacre  in  which  twenty-two  thousand 
>vere  killed,  and  in  1662  this  was  repeated.^® 


i^Morga's  Sucesos,  in  B.  &  R.,  XV,  p.  273.  For  documents  relating  to 
the  mandarins  and  the  insurrection,  see  B.  &  R.,  XII,  p.  142.  _ 

As  a  punishment  for  their  actions  the  governor  arbitrarily  increased  the 
amount  the  Sangleys  must  pay  for  licenses  to  do  business  and  used  the  pro- 
ceeds to  strengthen  the  fortifications.  The  fiscal  published  a  pamphlet  pro- 
testing against  the  action  as  illegal.    B.  &  R.,  XXXV,  p.  185. 

18  Argensola's  Conquista.  B.  &  R.,  XVI,  p.  295. 

^^  Events  in  Philippines,  B.  &  R.,  XXIX,  p.  141. 


CENTURIES    OF   STAGNATION  171 

After  the  British  departed,  the  Spaniards  and  natives  com- 
bined against  the  Chinese  and  slaughtered  them  without  mercy. 
None  were  left  alive  in  the  provinces  and  only  those  in  Manila 
who  had  become  Christians  or  who  were  in  the  process  of  being 
converted. 

The  Moros  have  been  an  important  factor  in  Philippine  history. 
During  the  entire  Spanish  regime  their  presence  in  the  southern 
islands  was  a  constant  menace  to  the  colony.  The  injudicious 
activity  of  the  early  governors  laid  the  foundation  for  an  im- 
placable warfare,  which  continued  without  cessation  until  the  era 
of  steam  vessels  made  it  possible  to  pursue  and  destroy  the 
raiders.  Spain  never  conquered  the  I^Ioros.  Her  settlements  in 
Mindanao  and  Jolo  were  merely  military  outposts. 

It  is  difficult  to  overestimate  the  depressing  effect  of  the  More 
raids  on  the  Spaniards  and  natives  in  the  northern  and  central 
island.  The  cost  of  the  numerous  military  expeditions  was  a 
serious  drain  on  the  never  too  well  supplied  treasury.^"  For  more 
than  two  and  one-half  centuries  their  war  vintas  ravaged  the 
coasts,  appearing  at  times  even  in  Manila  Bay.  For  protection  the 
people  constructed  many  forts  and  picturesque  war  towers  along 
the  coast.  Their  towns  were  built  well  inland  and  many  people 
abandoned  their  homes  near  the  coasts  and  settled  in  the  inland 
valleys,  where  they  were  comparatively  safe  from  the  marauders. 
Churches  near  the  coast,  even  in  northern  Luzon,  were  often 
constructed  like  fortifications. 

Many  of  the  expeditions  against  the  Moros  were  led  by  the 
governors  in  person,  and  titles  and  military  honors  were  cheaply 
won  for  inconclusive  victories.  Numerous  treaties  were  made 
with  the  various  sultans,  but  the  Moro  country  was  never  really 
conquered  until  the  Americans  arrived  and  adopted  othei; 
methods. 

The  wealth  which  was  accumulated  by  the  monastic  orders  id 
various  ways  made  them  important  factors  in  tlie  commercial 
life  of  the  islands.     They  were  the  largest  planters  and  eni 


^''For  detailed  account  of  numerous  Moro  raids  compiled  from  varioui 
sources,  sec  B.  &  R„  XLI,  pp.  277-324. 


172  [THE   PHILIPPINES 

gaged  in  raising  rice  and  all  sorts  of  agricultural  products. 
They  loaned  money  and,  indirectly  at  least,  engaged  in  banking. 
The  way  in  which  the  affairs  of  business  and  religion  w^ere  inter- 
woven in  that  curious  community  is  well  illustrated  by  the  his- 
tory of  the  Ohras  Pias,  the  Pious  Works.  About  the  year  1759 
an  enterprising  governor-general  who  had  managed,  out  of  a 
small  salary  during  a  five-year  term  of  office,  to  save  a  quarter 
of  a  million  pesos,  left  that  amount  for  pious  purposes.  This 
fund  was  thereafter  from  time  to  time  added  to  by  further  dona- 
tions from  those  who  felt  the  need  of  some  form  of  expiation, 
and  also  by  some  worthy,  charitably  inclined  people.  Prior  to 
1819  the  fund  was  administered  by  a  board  representing  the 
religious  orders.  Thereafter  it  was  to  some  extent  under  the 
control  of  the  secular  government.  In  1850  the  government 
required  the  entire  fund  to  be  transferred  to  an  institution  which 
was  then  chartered,  called  the  Banco-Espafiol-Filipina,  by  which 
it  was  subsequently  loaned  for  purposes  which  had  been  desig- 
nated by  the  donors.  The  bank  was  thereafter  a  sort  of  part- 
nership between  the  government  and  the  Church.  Until  the  Ohras 
Pias  became  simply  the  capital  of  a  commercial  bank  two-thirds 
of  the  fund  had  been  loaned  "to  stimulate  trade"  and  the  other 
one-third  reserved  to  cover  losses.  During  the  days  of  the 
galleon  trade  the  most  of  this  fund  was  invested  in  that  com- 
merce, although  it  was  common  for  Spaniards  who  had  been 
appointed  alcaldes  or  governors  of  provinces  to  borrow  from 
it  sufficient  money  to  enable  them  to  engage  in  business  in  con- 
nection with  their  official  duties.  When  the  Americans  took 
possession  it  was  found  very  difficult  to  determine  the  legal  status 
of  the  fund,  as  it  was  claimed  by  the  State  and  by  the  Church. 

The  liberal  movement  which  made  so  much  progress  in  Spain 
(luring  the  Napoleonic  times  exerted  considerable  influence  on 
the  colonies.  The  ambitious  scheme  which  was  entertained  by 
some  of  the  leaders  of  consolidating  all  the  Spanish  possessions 
into  a  single  unified  empire  with  a  legislative  body  sitting  in  the 
Peninsula,  with  representatives  from  all  the  colonies,  resulted  in 
a  decree  under  which  the  Philippines  were  given  representation 


CENTURIES    OF    STAGNATION  173 

in  the  Cortes  of  1810.  The  scheme  was  wholly  impracticable 
because  of  the  great  distance  from  the  Philippines  to  Spain.  All 
the  objections  which  Burke  urged  against  representation  by  the 
American  colonies  in  the  British  parliament  applied  with  more 
than  double  force  to  this  plan. 

In  the  first  session  of  the  new  Cortes,  the  Philippines  were 
represented  by  "acting  deputies"  selected  by  the  minister  from 
residents  of  Manila,  who  happened  then  to  be  in  Spain.  The 
municipality  of  Manila  chose  a  merchant  named  Ventura  de  los 
Reyes,  who  seems  to  have  taken  quite  an  active  part  in  the  work 
of  the  Cortes. 

In  the  sessions  of  1820  to  1823  the  colony  managed  to  send 
four  of  the  seventeen  deputies  to  which  it  was  entitled,  and  upon 
being  censured  for  not  sending  the  full  number  pleaded  poverty. 
During  that  session  Delegate  Camba  served  with  distinction  on 
the  Committee  on  Etiquette.  Delegates  were  also  sent  to  the 
Cortes  in  1837,  but  before  they  arrived  a  new  constitution  had 
been  adopted  under  which  the  colonies  were  to  be  governed  by 
special  laws.  The  withdrawal  of  the  privilege  of  representation 
created  much  dissatisfaction  and  some  serious  disturbances  in 
the  islands.  The  reform  party  continued  to  demand  the  priv- 
ilege down  to  the  end  of  the  Spanish  rule. 

The  political  and  social  organization  was  not  favorable  to  the 
economic  and  industrial  development  of  the  country.  Neither 
Spaniards  nor  natives  were  by  nature  endowed  with  the  qualities 
essential  for  trade  and  commerce  on  a  large  scale.  They  were 
not  trading  people,  like  the  Dutch  and  English.  The  ecclesiastical 
atmosphere  which  enveloped  the  country  was  unfavorable  to 
material  and  political  growth.  The  priests  were  content  if  they 
were  able  to  preach  and  pray  to  a  docile  and  submissive  people. 
What  energy  and  ambition  the  European  people  carried  out  with 
them  soon  evaporated  under  the  influence  of  the  tropical  sun. 
The  officials,  not  overburdened  with  work,  lived  a  languid  in- 
active life.*^ 


*^  "With  very  few  exceptions  all  the  government  offices  in  Manila  were 
closed  to  the  public  during  one-half  the  ordinary  working  day,  the  afternoon, 
and  many  of  the  Civil  Service  officials  made  their  appearance  at  their  de^s 


174  .THE    PHILIPPINES 

Trade  and  commerce  were  subject  to  so  many  restrictions  that 
expansion  was  impossible.  The  export  trade  was  in  the  hands 
of  foreigners.  The  Spanish  and  native  merchants,  with  a  few 
exceptions,  were  httle  more  than  tiende  keepers.  There  were 
few  opportunities  for  growth  and  probably  few  persons  with  the 
inclination  more  than  to  exist. 

Occasionally  a  new  governor-general  created  a  diversion  by 
trying  to  rouse  the  colony  out  of  its  lethargy,  but  the  ineffective- 
ness of  all  efforts  soon  became  apparent  and  the  community  re- 
lapsed into  its  normal  state.  It  was  always,  probably,  as  it  is 
to-day,  a  great  place  for  schemes  and  reform  organizations,  so- 
cieties to  effect  this  and  associations  to  accomplish  that. 

In  the  early  part  of  the  nineteenth  century  some  very  cred- 
itable public  works  were  designed  and  even  constructed.  Gov- 
ernor-General Aguilar  built  highways  and  paved  and  lighted 
the  streets  of  Manila.  The  same  enlightened  governor  gave 
much  attention  to  the  development  of  the  domestic  industries  to 
which  the  country  and  the  people  are  so  well  adapted. 

Pascuel  Enrile,  who  became  governor-general  in  1830,  seems 
to  have  been  a  zealous,  energetic  and  intelligent  executive  who 
was  ambitious  to  improve  the  condition  of  agriculture.  In  com- 
pany with  an  engineer  he  traveled  about  the  island  making  new 
maps,  surveying  the  bays  and  rivers  and  designing  roads  and 
bridges,  many  of  which  he  caused  to  be  constructed. 

Enrile  induced  the  officials,  merchants  and  planters  to  organize 
the  famous  Economic  Society  of  Friends  of  the  Country,  which 
continued  to  exist  until  1890.  But  these  scientific  engineering 
studies  and  bursts  of  energy  produced  no  lasting  effects,  because 
neither  the  people  nor  their  leaders  had  the  tenacity  of  purpose 
nor  the  persistence  in  well-doing  that  was  necessary  for  success. 

There  are  two  contemporaneous  narratives  which  give  a  fair 
and  accurate  description  of  conditions  in  the  country  just  before 
the  opening  of  the  last  period  of  Spanish  control.     Like  the 


about  ten  o'clock  in  the  morning,  returning  shortly  after  midday  when  they 
had  smoked  their  habitual  number  of  cigarettes."  Foreman,  Philippine 
Islands,  p.  219. 


CENTURIES    OF   STAGNATION  175 

narrative  of  Morga,  which  described  conditions  at  the  end  of  the 
constructive  period,  they  are  critical  and  rather  pessimistic  in 
tone. 

The  first  is  an  extremely  interesting  report  by  Sinibaldo  de 
Mas,  on  political  conditions  in  the  Philippines  in  1842.-^  It  was 
intended  for  official  use  only  and  but  a  few  copies  were  printed, 
and  they  were  distributed  with  care. 

According  to  Mas,  if  Spain  intended  to  continue  her  control 
she  must  take  prompt  measures  to  reduce  the  white  populution, 
subordinate  the  natives,  and  reform  the  administration.  The 
whites  encourage  independence.  The  island-born  Spaniards  re- 
gard the  country  as  theirs  and  have  no  affection  for  Spain.  They 
are  lazy  and  ignorant  and  concerned  only  with  getting  govern- 
ment positions,  of  which  there  are  but  four  hundred  for  more 
than  one  thousand  applicants.  They  object  to  the  appointment 
of  real  Spaniards.  Spain  must  either  decide  to  keep  the  islands 
permanently,  neglect  them  absolutely,  or  emancipate  them.  As 
the  second  alternative  is  not  to  be  considered,  he  considers  only 
the  other  two. 

Only  single  men  should  be  sent  to  the  islands,  and  they  should 
be  returned  to  Spain  after  twenty  years*  service,  with  the  option 
of  returning  in  ten  years.  They  would  probably  marry  native 
women  and  take  their  families  back  to  Spain  with  them,  thus 
reducing  the  white  population.  No  women  should  be  sent  from 
the  Peninsula.  All  boys  should  be  sent  to  Spain  at  the  age  of 
sixteen  years  and  educated  there  at  the  expense  of  the  Phihppine 
treasury.  Separation  from  Spain  would  probably  mean  the  dis- 
appearance of  the  whites  by  absorption.  The  whites  and  natives 
will  not  work  together.  The  salvation  of  the  natives  is  agricul- 
ture, but  they  are  too  lazy  for  such  work.  A  system  of  indus- 
trial servants  would  enable  them  with  the  help  of  the  Chinese 

22  This  review  13  in  the  third  volume  of  Mas'  Report,  B.  &  R.,  LIT. 
p.  29  et  seq.  "This  document,  while  containing  many  things  which  are  general 
in  nature,  and  which  even  appear  childish  and  visionary,  is  in  many  other 
things  clear  sighted,  and  shows  deep  and  keen  observation."  B.  &  R.,  LII, 
Preface,  p.  14.  It  is  probable  that  Mas  purposely  so  framed  the  statement  of 
measures  necessary  to  preserve  the  Filipinos  in  order  to  strengthen  his  argu- 
ment in  favor  of  preparing  the  country  for  independence. 


176  ^      THE   PHILIPPINES 

and  captive  Moros  to  work  their  fields.  A  certain  number  of 
Chinese  could  be  safely  admitted  to  work  on  the  plantations. 

Greater  respect  for  the  whites  must  be  secured.  To  that  end 
the  education  of  the  natives  should  be  restricted,  and  the  colleges 
at  Manila  closed.  Natives  should  not  be  taught  Spanish  nor 
should  soldiers  be  allowed  to  rise  above  the  rank  of  corporal. 
The  native  priests  should  be  reduced  in  number  and  be  allowed 
to  act  only  as  assistants  to  the  regulars.  The  laws  of  the  Indies 
he  considered  were  too  favorable  to  the  natives  who  were  becom- 
ing impudent  and  arrogant  and  would  soon  drive  the  Spaniards 
out  of  the  country.  They  should  be  required  to  wear  a  distinctive 
dress,  salute  all  Spaniards,  and  be  forbidden  to  use  the  title  of 
Don.  They  should  not  be  allowed  to  learn  how  to  cast  artillery 
or  make  firearms  or  powder.  In  fact,  the  powder  factory  should 
be  suspended. 

Only  men  of  good  character  should  be  appointed  to  office  in 
the  islands,  and  then  they  should  be  paid  liberal  salaries  and  be 
required  to  spend  their  money  liberally.  As  religion  is  the  main- 
stay of  the  islands,  the  regular  cures  must  be  given  as  much  power 
as  possible  and  officials  must  work  in  harmony  with  them.  They 
should  have  the  power  of  intervening  in  the  meetings  of  the 
principalias. 

The  friars  should  abstain  from  trade,  live  morally,  and  not 
meddle  in  temporal  affairs.  They  should  all  be  Spaniards,  and 
in  order  to  enable  them  to  maintain  the  respect  of  the  natives, 
the  government  should  collect  marriage  and  burial  fees,  in  the 
form  of  a  specific  tax,  and  thus  relieve  them  from  this  disagree- 
able duty.  The  whites  also  should  pay  more  attention  to  their 
religious  duties,  thus  setting  a  good  example. 

It  would  be  well,  he  thought,  to  farm  out  the  work  of  collecting 
the  taxes  to  natives,  as  it  is  odious  work  which  engenders  much 
hatred  and  ill  will.  Hatred  between  the  Chinese  and  the  Fili- 
pinos should  be  cultivated.  The  former  were  the  richer  and  abler 
and  if  the  country  was  left  to  itself,  would  soon  control  every- 
thing. There  should  be  a  respectable  Spanish  force  in  the  coun- 
try to  prevent  the  native  troops  from  mutinying. 


CENTURIES    OF   STAGNATION  177 

It  was  also  necessary  that  steam  vessels  should  be  furnished  in 
order  to  enable  the  authorities  to  repel  the  Moros  and  suppress 
uprisings  among  the  natives.  Newspapers  under  proper  censor- 
ship should  be  allowed,  and  the  priests  should  translate  suitable 
articles  into  the  native  dialects.  Foreigners  living  in  the  islands 
should  be  carefully  watched.  The  administration  of  the  govern- 
ment was  honeycombed  with  laxity  and  graft  and  should  be 
completely  reformed.  It  should  be  centralized  and  vested  in  a 
regency  of  three  men,  the  president  being  a  Spanish  grande, 
which  should  exercise  the  powers  of  the  governor-general  and 
the  audiencia,  with  a  council  of  state.  The  judiciary  should  be 
made  independent  of  the  other  government  departments.  All 
power  in  the  provinces  should  be  in  a  chief  who  should  be  sent 
from  Spain.  The  treasury  methods  should  also  be  completely 
changed  so  as  to  prevent  graft. 

But  if  Spain  decided  to  give  the  Philippines  their  independence 
a  system  diametrically  the  opposite  should  be  adopted.  It  should 
be  so  devised  as  to  avoid  bloodshed  and  provide  for  good  rela- 
tions in  the  future.  Mas  then  outlines  a  procedure  which  is 
startlingly  similar  to  that  which  later  was  adopted  by  the  United 
States.  If  future  emancipation  Is  the  ultimate  end,  public  in- 
struction, he  thought,  should  be  encouraged,  and  newspapers 
established  in  Manila.  The  barriers  which  separate  the  races 
should  be  broken  down.  The  Spanish,  Chinese  and  Filipinos 
should  be  admitted  on  terms  of  equality  to  the  military  corps. 
The  present  service  tax  should  be  abolished  or  an  equal  and  gen- 
eral tax  imposed  on  all.  To  encourage  cross-marriages,  dowries 
should  be  paid.  Some  Filipinos  and  mestizo  alcaldes-may  ores 
should  be  appointed.  It  should  be  ordered  that  when  a  Filipino 
chief  goes  into  the  house  of  a  Spaniard  he  should  be  received  as 
an  equal.  In  a  word,  by  these  and  other  means,  the  idea  that 
they  and  the  Castilians  are  two  people  of  distinct  races  should  be 
erased  from  the  minds  of  the  natives,  and  the  families  should 
become  so  related  by  marriage  that  when  free  of  the  Castilian 
dominion,  should  Filipinos  try  to  expel  or  enslave  the  Spanish, 


178  THE   PHILIPPINES 

they  would  find  them  so  interlaced  with  their  own  people  that 
the  plan  would  be  practically  impossible. 

After  some  years  "when  this  population  was  sufficiently 
trimmed  off"  an  assembly  of  deputies  should  be  formed  from 
the  people,  in  order  that  they  may  hold  sessions  in  Manila,  for 
two  or  three  months  every  year,  when  they  may  discuss  public 
affairs,  especially  those  relating  to  taxes  and  budgets.  After 
a  period  of  political  education  the  Spanish  government  could  be 
withdrawn,  fixing  first  the  kind  of  government  to  be  established, 
probably  some  constitutional  form  analogous  to  those  of  Europe 
with  a  royal  Spanish  prince  at  its  head. 

Mas  favored  this  plan  of  emancipation.  Spain,  he  argued, 
had  received  no  benefit  from  her  colonies.  The  true  interest  of 
a  state  is  in  a  dense,  well  educated  population — that  general  edu- 
cation which  makes  each  one  perfect  in  his  trade ;  that  education 
which  makes  a  cabinet  maker,  a  weaver,  or  a  blacksmith. 

Colonies  may  be  useful  to  the  mother  country  because  they  in- 
crease her  income,  supply  a  place  for  the  emigration  of  surplus 
population,  and  a  market  for  the  products  of  the  home  manu- 
factures.^^ As  to  the  first,  the  Philippines  are  and  for  a  long  time 
will  remain  a  poor  country,  and  Spain  has  neither  surplus  popu- 
lation nor  manufactures.  The  trade  with  the  islands  amounts 
to  practically  nothing,  and  what  there  is  would  be  retained  if  the 
country  were  emancipated.    Spaniards  could  return  to  Spain. 

Mas  was  not  concerned  as  to  the  future  of  religion  in  the 
islands,  and  as  to  the  argument  that  the  country  would  fall  into 
the  hands  of  the  British,  Dutch  or  Chinese,  he  asked  why  should 
Spain  set  up  as  a  knight  errant,  a  kind  of  Don  Quixote  self- 
charged  with  the  protection  of  all  kinds  of  people?  As  to  the 
claim  that  as  Spain  had  spent  over  three  hundred  million  pesos 
in  the  islands,  she  should  be  reimbursed — she  had  spent  as  much 
on  the  Holy  Land  and  did  not  expect  to  be  reimbursed !  I  f  the 
Filipinos  had  to  pay  heavier  taxes  under  their  own  government, 


23  Lewis*  book  on  The  Government  of  Dependencies,  in  which  this  classi- 
fication was  made,  had  been  published  in  1841  and  Mas  was  evidently 
acquainted  with  it. 


CENTURIES    OF   STAGNATION  179 

tliat  was  their  concern.  "If,"  says  he,  in  language  which  sounds 
strangely  familiar,  "we  are  conserving  the  islands  for  love  of 
the  islanders,  we  are  losing  our  time  and  merit,  for  gratitude 
is  sometimes  met  with  in  persons,  but  never  can  he  hoped  for 
in  peoples.  Why  claim  liberty  for  ourselves,  and  yet  wish  to 
impose  our  law  on  remote  peoples?  Why  deny  to  others  the 
benefits  we  claim  for  ourselves?" 

However,  as  conditions  were  in  Spain,  he  believed  that  the 
colony  would  be  neglected.  None  of  the  measures  he  had  sug- 
gested would  be  adopted,  and  the  Indians  would  in  time  emanci- 
pate themselves.  It  would  be  easier  and  more  glorious  to  show 
generosity,  so  that  the  world  could  say,  "The  Spaniards,  crossing 
new  and  remote  seas,  extended  the  domain  of  geography  by 
discovering  the  Philippines.  They  found  anarchy  and  despotism 
there  and  established  order  and  justice;  they  destroyed  slavery 
and  established  political  equality;  ruled  the  natives  with  just 
laws;  Christianized  and  civilized  them;  defended  them  from 
the  Chinese,  from  Moro  pirates  and  European  aggressors.  They 
spent  much  gold  on  them  and  then  gave  them  their  liberty" 

How  different  the  course  of  Philippine  history  had  this  advice 
been  heeded ! 

About  the  same  time,  Don  Manuel  de  la  Matta,  the  intendent 
of  the  army  and  treasury,  made  a  confidential  report^*  to  the 
governor-general  on  the  conditions  which  existed  after  the 
trouble  with  Apolinario  and  the  mutiny  of  1843.  According  to 
this  report  the  situation  was  very  delicate,  in  fact,  about  as  bad 
as  it  could  be.  Radical  reforms  were  necessary.  A  condition 
approaching  anarchy  existed  and  the  army  was  demoralized.  He 
advised  that  the  laws  should  be  revised  to  suit  the  character  of 
the  natives ;  the  government  centralized ;  and  various  educational 
institutions  should  be  abolished,  because  they  were  "perpetual 
nurseries  of  corruption,  laziness,  and  subversive  ideas  as  contrary 
to  the  quiet  and  welfare  of  the  villages  as  to  Peninsular  interests." 
From  these  institutions  came  "the  swarms  of  ignorant  and 
vicious  secular  priests,  and  the  pettifogging  lawyers,  who  stir 

2*  Printed  in  B.  &  R.,  LII,  p.  91  et  scq. 


180  THE   PHILIPPINES 

up  so  much  trouble  among  the  natives,  and  cause  the  jprovincial 
chiefs  so  great  inconvenience.  Akhough  not  much  attention  is 
paid  to  this  class  they  are  the  most  vicious  and  worthless  in  the 
islands/'" 

In  the  place  of  these  colleges,  agricultural,  commercial  and 
trade  schools  should  be  established. 

The  residencia  should  be  abolished,  as  it  had  done  much  harm 
and  no  good.  Agriculture  must  be  developed  by  whites,  mestizos 
and  Chinese  who  will  be  loyal  to  the  government.  There  should 
be  extensive  military  and  police  reforms.  Schools  should  be 
established  where  the  Spanish  officers  could  learn  the  native 
dialects.  Peninsular-  and  Filipino-born  Spaniards  should  be  con- 
ciliated so  they  would  work  together.  Merit  only  should  deter- 
mine advancement  in  the  public  service. 


25  Lawyers  seem  always  to  have  been  unpopular  with  persons  officially  re- 
sponsible for  the  government  of  colonics.  Sir  John  Bowring  after  visiting 
Manila  wrote:  "As  far  as  my  experience  goes  lawyers  are  tlie  curse  of 
colonies.  I  remember  one  of  the  most  intelligent  of  the  Chinese  merchants, 
who  had  settled  at  Singapore,  after  having  been  long  estabUshed  at  Hong 
Kong,  telling  me  that  all  the  disadvantages  of  Singapore  were  more  than 
compensated  by  the  absence  of  the  profession,  and  all  the  recommendations 
of  Hong  Kong  more  than  counterbalanced  by  the  presence  of  gentlemen 
occupied  in  fomenting  and  recompensed  for  fomenting  litigation  and  quar- 
rels. Many  of  them  make  large  fortunes,  not  unfrequently  at  the  expense  of 
substantial  justice.  A  sound  observer  says  that  in  the  Philippines  truth  is 
swamped  by  the  superfluity  of  law  documents.  The  doors  opened  for  the 
protection  of  innocence  are  made  for  chicanery,  and  discussions  are  carried 
on  without  any  regard  for  the  decorum  which  prevails  in  European  courts." 
Bowring's  A  Visit  to  the  Philippine  Islands  (1859),  p.  187. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  tlie  efforts  which  have  been  made  to  exclude  law- 
yers from  colonies.  Heaps  {The  Spanish  Conquest  of  America,  IH,  p. 
17)  says  that  as  soon  as  any  colony  was  in  the  least  degree  established  in  the 
new  world,  the  colonists  almost  in  their  first  communication  with  the  sov- 
ereign were  sure  to  entreat  him  "to  prohibit  lawyers  from  coming  out."  He 
cites  numerous  illustrations  from  the  history  of  the  Spanish-American  col- 
onies and  adds :  "It  would_  almost  seem  as  if  each  colonist  had  undergone 
some  dreadful  experience  with  the  law  and  felt  ...  it  was  too  much  for 
a  man  who  had  to  fight  against  new  diseases,  noxious  animals,  a  trying 
climate,  and  surrounding  barbarians,  to  be  also  molested  by  the  cruel  frivoli- 
ties, the  fatal  forms,  the  needless  precautions  which  soon  became  snares,  the 
subtlety  appHed  to  verbiage  and  to  dialects  which  no  skill  can  securely  ar- 
range and  no  dialectics  can  disentangle,  and  all  the  vast  delay  which  belongs 
to  great  lawsuits  in  highly  civilized  communities.  These  things  can  only  be 
borne  when  the  rest  of  life  is  smooth." 

The  unfortunate  Jews  were  generally  classed  with  the  lawyers  and  also 
excluded.  Both  were  excluded  from  certain  of  the  New  England  colonies, 
and  to-day  no  lawyer  or  Jew  is  permitted  to  live  in  Sarawak,  the  land  of  the 
white  Rajah. 


CENTURIES    OF   STAGNATION  181 

These  two  reports  convey  a  clear  idea  of  conditions  in  the 
Philippines  about  the  end  of  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury.^* The  removal  of  trade  restrictions,  the  free  admission  of 
foreigners,  and  the  gradual  introduction  of  modern  liberal  ideas 
rendered  reforms  inevitable  and  the  blind  resistance  of  the  au- 
thorities led  to  insurrection  and  the  downfall  of  Spanish  power. 

20  When  Lord  Elgin,  returning  from  his  second  mission  to  China,  in  1861, 
visited  Manila,  he  found  conditions  very  satisfactory.  "They  (rulers  and 
natives)  are  not  separated  from  each  other  by  that  unpassable  barrier  of 
mutual  contempt,  suspicion,  and  antipathy  which  aUenates  us  (the  British) 
from  the  unhappy  natives  in  those  lands  where  we  settle  ourselves  among 
inferior  orders  of  men.  .  .  .  One  feels  a  little  softened  and  sublimated 
when  one  passes  from  Hong  Kong,  where  the  devil  is  worshiped  in  his  naked 
deformity,  to  this  place,  where  he  displays  at  least  some  of  the  feathers  which 
he  wore  before  he  fell.  .  .  .  The  natives  seem  to  have  a  great  deal  of  our 
dear  old  French  Canadian  hahitans  about  them,  only  in  a  more  sublime  stage 
of  infantile  simplicity."    Wrong,  The  Earl  of  Elgin,  p.  279. 


CHAPTER  VII 

The  Awakening  and  Revolt 

A  New  Era — Changing  Conditions — Attack  on  Monastic  Orders — Revolts  and 
Insurrections — The  Cavite  Revolt — Execution  of  Native  Priests — The  Move- 
ment for  Reforms — The  Propaganda  Abroad — ^Jose  Rizal — The  Idea  of  Inde- 
pendence— Insurrection  of  1896 — The  Katipunan — Execution  of  Rizal — The 
Pact  of  Biak-na-bato — Departure  of  the  Leaders. 

The  Opening  of  the  Suez  Canal  in  1869  brought  the  Philip- 
pines into  more  direct  relations  with  Europe.  Thereafter  they 
faced  toward  Spain  instead  of  Mexico.  After  the  early  adven- 
turers and  encomendcros  had  disappeared,  the  Spanish  in  the 
islands  other  than  the  officials  and  soldiers,  were  limited  to  the 
favored  merchants  of  Manila,  who  were  allowed  to  participate 
in  the  galleon  trade,  and  an  occasional  planter  in  the  provinces. 
The  small  army  was  composed  of  Mexicans  and  Filipinos  and 
the  officers  were  mostly  half-castes.  The  members  of  the  religious 
orders  constituted  the  largest  and  most  influential  element  in 
the  community.  Comyn  says  that  in  1810,  including  the  mes- 
tizos, there  were  not  more  than  four  thousand  Spaniards  of  all 
classes  in  the  Philippines.  The  loss  of  the  American  colonies 
brought  many  of  the  Spanish  officials  and  a  few  planters  from 
America  to  the  Philippines,  but  with  certain  notable  exceptions 
this  immigration  was  of  no  particular  benefit  to  the  community. 
In  1848  there  were  seven  thousand  five  hundred  forty- four 
Spaniards  and  mestizos  in  Manila  and  Tondo  and  two  hundred 
forty-two  in  the  provinces.  Of  these  probably  two  thousand 
were  officers  and  soldiers. 

In  1852  a  direct  line  of  steamers  was  established  between 
Barcelona  and  Manila,  and  in  the  same  year  the  first  regular 

182 


THE   AWAKENING   AND   REVOLT  183 

bank  >vas  opened  in  the  islands.*  "The  old  situation/'  wrote 
Jagor,  *'is  no  longer  possible  of  maintenance,  with  the  changed 
conditions  of  the  present  time.  The  colony  can  no  longer  be 
shut  off  from  the  outside.  Every  facility  in  communication 
opens  a  breach  in  the  ancient  system  and  necessarily  leads  to 
reforms  of  a  liberal  character.  The  more  that  foreign  capital 
and  foreign  ideas  penetrate  there,  the  more  they  increase  pros- 
perity, intelligence,  and  self-esteem,  making  the  existing  evils 
more  intolerable." 

The  general  restlessness  began  to  find  expression  in  political 
activity  which  in  part  was  a  reflection  of  the  revolutionary  move- 
ment in  Spain  that  was  to  lead  to  the  esablishment  of  the  short- 
lived republic.  A  new  governor-general  who  represented  Span- 
ish liberalism  was  sent  out,  but  the  doctrine  that  tlie  victors  have 
a  legitimate  claim  to  the  spoils  and  perquisites  of  office  which 
had  always  been  accepted  in  Spain,  was  now  applied  with  great 
thoroughness  in  the  Philippines.  The  change  of  administration 
brought  some  hope  of  better  things  and  some  reforms  were  ef- 
fected, but  the  Filipinos  were  impressed  principally  by  the  fact 
that  the  new  supply  of  officials  would  require  new  taxes  for 
their  support. 

The  friars  had  few  friends  left  among  the  Filipinos,  whom 
they  had  given  up  as  ungrateful  and  hopeless,  thus  completely 
stultifying  their  claim  to  great  accomplishments  in  the  islands. 
Of  the  old  missionary  spirit  only  the  dregs  of  bitter  controversies 
remained.  All  sympathy  and  kindliness  had  disappeared.  The 
Dominican  newspaper  in  Manila  continually  referred  to  the  Fili- 
pinos as  monkeys.  At  the  public  exercises  of  the  University  of 
Santo  Tomas,  an  official,  before  two  thousand  students,  recited 
a  poem  which  represented  the  native  people  as  mere  animals  who 
lived  like  the  beasts  of  the  field.  "These  verses,"  wrote  a  promi- 
nent friar  to  Minister  Monet,  in  1897,  "brilliantly  set  forth  the 
savage  instincts  and  the  bestial  inclinations  of  those  faithful  imi- 
tators of  apes.  ...  As  neither  Spain  nor  the  friars  can 
change  the  ethnological  character  of  the  race,  so  inferior  to  ours, 

1  The  Spanish  Filipino  Bank,  known  as  the  Bank  of  the  Philippines. 


184  THE    PHILIPPINES 

it  will  be  idle  to  apply  to  them  the  same  laws  as  to  us.  .  .  ► 
The  only  liberty  the  Indians  want  is  the  liberty  of  savages. 
Leave  them  to  their  cockfighting  and  their  indolence,  and  they 
will  thank  you  more  than  if  you  load  them  down  with  old  and 
new  rights."^ 

Many  of  the  liberal  officials  who  came  out  from  Spain  brought 
with  them  the  anticlerical  feeling  which  so  embittered  the  home 
politics.  They  became  temporarily  popular  with  the  Filipinos 
and  aided  in  destroying  what  remained  of  Spanish  prestige  by 
>veakening  the  racial  unity  upon  which  it  largely  depended.  The 
people,  including  the  Spaniards  born  on  the  islands  and  the  half- 
castes,  had  begun  to  feel  conscious  of  a  common  race  interest. 
A  sentiment  of  nationality  was  developing.  The  friars  were 
considered  as  foreigners  and  their  expulsion  was  demanded  on 
the  grounds  that  they  were  absorbing  the  wealth  of  the  land, 
stifling  the  intellectual  freedom  of  the  people,  and  excluding  the 
Filipino  priests  from  the  parishes.  The  friars  in  their  defense 
struck  savagely  and  for  the  time  effectively  at  their  enemies. 

During  the  long  years  of  Spanish  rule  there  had  been  many 
insurrections  and  local  uprisings  against  the  authorities,  but 
with  few  exceptions  they  had  been  caused  by  the  oppressive  acts 
of  local  authorities.'  Two  revolts  in  the  early  part  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  probably  resulted  from  discontent  with  general 
political  and  social  conditions.  The  Liberal  Spanish  Cortes  of 
1810  declared  that  "the  kingdoms  and  provinces  of  America  and 
Asia  are  and  ought  to  have  always  been  reputed  an  integral  part 
of  the  Spanish  monarchy,  and  for  that  reason  their  natives  and 
free  inhabitants  are  equal  in  rights  and  privileges  to  those  of 
the  Peninsula."  This  declaration  was  received  by  the  Filipinos 
with  much  satisfaction,  particularly  as  it  would,  if  made  effec- 
tive, relieve  them  from  the  burden  of  forced  labor  on  public 
works.  The  return  of  Ferdinand  in  1813  crushed  all  these 
hopes,  and  the  people  of  some  of  the  provinces  in  their  anger 

2Le  Roy,  I,  p.  62,  quoting  from  the  letter  In  La  Politica  de  Espana  eft 
Filipinos,  VII,  pp.  35-37. 

*For  an  accoimt  of  the  early  insurrections,  see  B.  &  R.,  XXXVIII,  p.  S7, 


THE   AWAKENING   AND    REVOLT  185 

began  destroying  churches,  public  property,  iand  particularly  the 
private  property  of  their  native  leading  citizens.  This  revolt 
was  against  the  social  order  which  was  sustained  by  Spanish 
rule. 

In  1823,  the  government  attempted  to  replace  the  Spanish- 
American  and  Philippine-bom  officers  of  the  army  with  Penin- 
sular-born Spaniards.  The  officers  who  were  deprived  of  their 
positions  led  a  revolt  of  native  troops,  and  gained  possession  of 
everything  within  the  walled  city  of  Manila  except  Fort  Santiago, 
before  they  were  overcome. 

A  much  more  serious  uprising  occurred  in  1841.  A  young 
Filipino  priest  named  Apolinario  who  had  developed  some  of 
the  qualities  of  leadership,  upon  being  denied  the  privilege  of 
establishing  a  native  brotherhood  in  honor  of  St.  Joseph  and 
the  Virgin,  launched  an  independent  church  with  himself  as 
Supreme  Pontiff,  and  raised  the  standard  of  revolt  against  the 
friars.  He  succeeded  in  securing  such  a  following  that  it  was 
necessary  to  fight  a  severe  battle  before  he  was  defeated  and 
killed. 

The  importance  of  an  outbreak  of  native  soldiers  in  Cavite 
in  1872  was  greatly  increased  by  the  way  in  which  the  authorities 
proceeded  to  suppress  it.  It  occurred  during  a  period  of  reaction 
from  the  sympathetic  policy  which  had  been  tried  by  Governor- 
General  de  la  Torre.  Even  the  Spanish  Liberals  had  gone  over 
to  the  reactionaries  and  were  favoring  a  "strong"  policy.  Gov- 
ernor-General Izquierdo  acted  vigorously,  but  very  unwisely. 
Many  natives  of  good  standing  in  the  capital,  who  in  the  past 
had  actively  but  peacefully  worked  for  reforms,  were  arrested 
and  charged  with  complicity,  and  three  priests,  Burgos,  a  Span- 
iard, Zamora,  a  Chinese  mestizo,  and  Gomez,  a  Filipino,  were 
executed. 

The  action  of  the  government  showed  the  utter  incapacity  of 
those  in  control  for  the  work  of  either  suppressing  a  revolt  or 
directing  the  reform  movement  in  the  islands.  They  could 
conceive  of  no  way  to  meet  the  issues  other  than  by  fiercely 


186  fTHE   PHILIPPINES 

destroying  their  opponents  and  all  who  sympathized  with  them. 
The  evidence  against  the  priests  was  submitted  to  a  court-mar- 
tial which  sat  in  secret,  and  the  record  was  never  made  public. 
The  idea  was  to  impress  the  imagination  of  the  people  by  the 
swiftness  of  the  punishment.  The  mystery  with  which  the  trial 
was  surrounded  merely  caused  them  to  believe  that  their  friends, 
though  innocent,  had  been  secretly  murdered  on  the  orders  of 
the  enemies  of  the  liberal  movement. 

This  is  the  universal  feeling  of  the  present-day  Filipinos.  In 
1877  their  side  of  the  story  was  told  in  an  article  in  the  Revue 
des  Deux  Mondes*'  by  a  Frenchman  named  Plauchut,  who  resided 
in  Manila  at  the  time  of  the  trial.  The  official  version  is  given 
by  Montero  y  Videl,  who  was  also  a  contemporary  resident.^ 

According  to  the  friars  the  Cavite  insurrection  had  the  same 
origin  and  was  "the  result  of  the  same  causes  as  those  of  France, 
Italy  and  Spain,  or  rather  of  Europe  and  America.  They  are 
all  the  fruit  of  the  corruption  of  the  intelligence  and  the  heart. 
Tell  man,  you  are  free  to  think  and  to  will,  because  reason  recog- 
nizes no  dependence  and  will  follows  reason,  and  you  have  put 
into  action  the  principle  of  disorder  and  anarchy  which  so  dom- 
inates society."* 

Soon  after  the  execution  of  these  priests,  Rizal,  who  was  him- 
self soon  to  join  the  goodly  army  of  martyrs,  dedicated  his 
political  novel.  El  Filihusterismo,  to  their  memory  in  the  follow- 
ing language : 

"The  Church  by  refusing  to  degrade  you  has  placed  in  doubt 
the  crime  which  had  been  attributed  to  you ;  the  government  by 
surrounding  your  case  with  mystery  and  shadows,  has  caused 
the  belief  that  there  was  some  error  committed  in  fatal  moments; 
and  all  of  the  Philippines  by  worshipping  your  memory  and  call- 

4May  IS,  1877. 

s  Plauchut's  version  is  denounced  by  the  friars,  but  in  an  article  published 
in  the  Philippine  Census,  I,  pp.  575-579,  it  is  approved  by  Dr.  Pardo  de 
Tavera.  In  the  unpublished  appeal  for  the  intervention  of  the  United  States 
presented  to  the  American  Consul-General  at  Hong  Kong  in  1897  there  is  an 
account  of  the  popular  understanding  of  the  Cavite  insurrection.  See  Le  Roy, 
The  Americans  in  the  Philippines,  I,  p.  58,  note. 

^The  Reseiia  of  Father  Casimiro  Herrero,  quoted  by  Le  Roy,  I,  p.  59, 
note. 


THE  AWAKENING   AND   REVOLT  187 

ing  you  martyrs  refuse  to  recognize  your  culpability.  .  .  . 
Let  these  pages  serve  as  a  tardy  wreath  of  dried  leaves  upon 
your  unknown  tombs,  and  let  it  be  understood  that  every  one 
who,  without  clear  proof,  attacks  your  memory  stains  his  hands 
in  your  blood." 

The  general  reform  movement  was  perfectly  legitimate,  and 
would  have  been  legal  had  it  been  carried  on  in  Spain  itself.  It 
was  seeking  necessary  and  reasonable  reforms  by  methods  which 
would  have  been  proper  in  any  free  country.  The  violent  re- 
pressive measures  by  which  it  was  opposed  led  to  an  outbreak 
of  race  hatred  and  war.  The  natives  had  at  last  gained  sufficient 
courage  to  assert  themselves  against  the  friars.  In  Malolos  and 
in  certain  .districts  of  Manila,  controversies  with  the  friars  over 
personal  tax  lists  were  appealed  to  the  civil  authorities.  This 
seems  to  have  been  an  unprecedented  proceeding.  The  tenants 
of  the  Colamba  friar  estate  publicly  aired  their  grievances  against 
their  Dominican  landlords,  and  for  their  boldness  a  number  of 
them  appear  later  to  have  been  deported  by  General  Weyler. 
Demonstrations  against  the  friars  and  the  archbishop  also  took 
place  in  Manila 

The  queen  regent  was  earnestly  petitioned  to  remove  the 
friars  from  the  islands,  but  the  aggressiveness  and  all-advised 
methods  of  the  Filipinos  produced  a  reaction  against  them  in 
Spain.  The  church  authorities  there  were  strong  enough  to 
have  the  provisions  relating  to  civil  marriage  and  registration, 
things  much  desired  by  the  reformers,  omitted  from  the  new 
civil  code  which  was  to  go  into  effect  in  the  Philippines  in  1889. 

But  the  policy  of  the  government  had  created  conditions  which 
enabled  the  reformers  to  get  a  hearing  before  the  world.  After 
the  Cavlte  mutiny  of  1872  many  prominent  Filipinos  were  sent 
into  exile  and  deportations  under  the  discretionary  power  of  the 
governor-general  and  on  the  instigation  of  the  friars  and  half- 
caste  sycophants  became  thereafter  very  common.  All  classes 
of  the  people  were  subjected  to  this  arbitrary  method  of  punish- 
ment. One  workman  was  deported  for  being  a  subscriber  to 
such  an  inflammatory  publication  as  the  Scientific  American.  The 


188  THE    PHILIPPINES 

more  active  and  intelligent  of  the  deportes  found  their  way  to 
Hong  Kong,  Singapore,  Paris,  London  and  Madrid,  where  by 
the  late  eighties  they  had  organized  a  very  extensive  propaganda 
for  the  extension  of  liberal  ideas  and  methods  in  the  Philippines. 

Most  of  these  propagandists  were  superficial  young  men  with- 
out adequate  capacity  or  training  for  such  work.  There  were, 
however,  some  effective  workers  among  them.  In  1888  Gra- 
ciano  Lopaz  Jaena,  a  Vizayan  from  Capiz,  founded  in  Madrid 
a  paper  called  La  Solidaridad,  which  became  their  organ.  Among 
its  contributors  were  Marcelo  del  Pilar,  Jose  Rizal,  the  Bo- 
hemian Ferdinand  Blumentritt,  and  certain  Spanish  Liberals. 
Pilar  was  a  lawyer,  who,  after  publishing  a  Tagalog  daily  in 
Manila,  was  sent  abroad  by  wealthy  Filipinos  to  aid  in  conduct- 
ing the  propaganda.  Pie  finally  became  discouraged  and  joined 
those  who  advocated  the  use  of  force. 

Jose  Rizal,  who  was  destined  to  become  the  Filipino  national 
hero,  was  the  son  of  common  people  who  were  tenants  on  the 
friar  Colamba  estate  near  Manila.^  It  is  commonly  said  that 
Rizal  was  a  pure  blood  Tagalog,  but  recent  investigations  have 
shown  that  he,  like  many  other  successful  Filipinos,  had  a  strong 
infusion  of  Chinese  blood  in  his  veins. 

Having  an  active  mind  Rizal  soon  exhausted  the  educational 
opportunities  of  Manila  and  with  the  aid  of  friends  was  en- 
abled to  continue  his  medical  studies  in  Europe.  After  a  short 
stay  in  Paris  he  went  to  Germany  and  studied  at  Heidelberg, 
Leipzig  and  Berlin,  where  he  made  many  friends  among  scien- 
tific men. 

His  first  political  novel.  Noli  me  Tangere,  published  at  Berlin 
in  1886,  when  Rizal  was  twenty-six  years  old,  was  "the  pas- 
sionate cry  of  a  Malay  who  felt  himself  the  equal  of  any  white 
man,  had  proved  himself  in  the  halls  of  learning,  and  was  so 
received  by  the  scholars  whom  he  met  in  Germany,  for  a  fair 
chance   for  his  race."     His  second  novel.  El  Filibusterismo, 

^Austin  Craig:  Lineage,  Life  and  Labors  of  Jose  Risal,  Manila,  1913. 
For  estimates  of  his  character  and  work,  see  articles  by  Sir  Hugh  Clifford  in 
Blackwood's  Magazine  for  Nov.,  1902,  and  by  Dr.  Blumentritt,  in  the  Popular 
Science  Monthly  for  July,  1902. 


THE   AWAKENING   AND   REVOLT  189 

.which  was  published  at  Ghent  in  1891,  was  a  powerful  appeal 
to  his  people  to  arouse  themselves  from  their  lethargy  and  pre- 
pare for  the  future. 

Rizal  consistently  opposed  the  use  of  force,  at  least  until  some 
indefinite  time  in  the  future,  when  the  Filipinos  should  have  been 
educated  and  developed  to  a  point  where  there  would  be  some 
reasonable  chance  for  success.  The  American  government  has 
encouraged  the  Filipinos  to  regard  him  as  their  great  man. 
As  President  Roosevelt  said:  "In  the  Philippines  the  Amer- 
ican government  has  tried,  and  is  trying,  to  carry  out  exactly 
what  the  greatest  genius  and  most  revered  patriot  ever  known 
in  the  Philippines,  Jose  Rizal,  steadfastly  advocated."  Judged 
by  American  and  European  standard  he  was  a  man  of  abil- 
ity, character  and  high  ideals.  He  taught  the  Filipinos  that 
only  by  raising  themselves  through  education  and  self-restraint 
to  a  higher  level  of  intelligence  could  they  hope  permanently  to 
improve  their  condition.  He  certainly  contemplated  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  islands  at  some  future  time,  which  in  an  in- 
definite way  he  set  half  a  century  away.  The  Liga  Filipina, 
which  he  organized  in  1891,  was  designed  according  to  the  in- 
strument of  its  creation  "to  raise  the  arts  and  sciences,*'  and  he 
may  have  contemplated  the  possibility  of  accomplishing  this 
laudable  purpose  by  means  which  it  was  not  then  necessary  to 
state  in  detail.  It  is  certain  that  they  had  not  been  raised  "to 
any  great  altitude  under  Spanish  domination." 

The  novels  of  Rizal,  the  newspaper  La  SoUdaridad  and  other 
publications  which  gradually  found  their  way  into  the  islands, 
produced  a  profound  impression  on  the  minds  of  the  more  in- 
telligent and  educated  Filipinos.  The  foundation  was  thus  laid 
for  the  organization  of  the  people.  The  Liga  Filipina  seems 
to  have  accomplished  very  little  in  its  original  form.  After  the 
exile  of  Rizal  it  disappeared  and  was  succeeded  by  the  secret 
organization  known  as  the  Katlpunan.  The  most  effective  work 
was  done  through  organizations  which  are  alleged  to  have  been 
Masonic  Lodges.  The  membership  of  what  was  called  the 
Spanish-Filipino  Association  of  Madrid,  was  almost  identical 


190  THE    PHILIPPINES 

with  that  of  certain  Masonic  Lodges.  Miguel  Morayta,  the 
editor  of  La  Solidaridad,  was  the  head  of  the  Grand  Lodge  of 
Madrid  called  the  Oriente  Espanol.  It  is  certain  that  the  Fili- 
pinos adopted  a  system  of  Masonic  secret  lodges  in  order  to 
carry  on  their  work.  Under  the  authority  of  the  Oriente  Espanol 
a  "Grand  Regional  Lodge"  was  organized  in  Manila  with  subor- 
dinate lodges  throughout  the  islands.  It  is  not  material  for 
present  purposes  whether  these  lodges  were  true  Masonic  bodies 
or  merely  political  secret  societies  organized  on  the  model  of 
Masonic  Lodges.  Whatever  their  character  they  were  agencies 
for  the  dissemination  of  revolutionary  ideas  among  the  Filipinos 
of  the  better  class.* 

In  1892,  with  the  consent  of  the  authorities,  Rizal  returned  to 
Manila  to  find  himself  the  hete  noir  of  the  friars  whom  he  had 
attacked  and  flouted  in  his  novels,  and  an  object  of  suspicion  to 
Governor-General  Despujol,  who,  although  not  a  protege  of  the 
friars,  was  much  under  their  influence.  While  in  Manila  at- 
tempting, without  concealment,  to  organize  the  Liga  Filipina,  he 
was  suddenly  ordered  deported  to  Dapitan,  a  small  village  on 
the  northeast  coast  of  Mindanao.  There  he  remained  for  four 
years  quietly  engaged  in  practising  his  profession  and  in  various 
:ways  improving  the  condition  of  the  people  of  the  village. 

For  some  time  before  Rizal's  return  to  the  Philippines  many 
of  the  leaders  of  the  propaganda  had  begun  to  feel  the  necessity 
for  an  organization  which  would  more  effectually  reach  the 
masses  of  the  people.    Del  Pilar,  although  naturally  a  conserva- 


^  It  is  claimed  that  these  lodges  were  all  spurious,  as  the  Grand  Lodge  of 
Spain  only  had  authority  to  represent  the  Freemasonry  of  England  and  Scot- 
land in  Spain  and  in  the  Spanish  possessions.  The  lodges  organized  in  the 
Philippines  under  its  authority  took  no  part  in  the  political  propaganda.  See 
a  pamphlet  by  Viriato  Diaz-Perex,  entitled  Los  Frailes  de  Filipinas  (Madrid, 
1904)  and  an  article  in  La  Epoca,  Aug.  15,  1896.  For  an  arraignment  of 
masonry,  see  Friar  Edouardo  Navarro's  Filipinas;  Estudios  de  algunos 
asuntos  de  actualidad  (Madrid,  1907)  ;  St.  Clair,  The  Katipunan,  or  The  Rise 
and  Fall  of  the  Filipino  Commune  (Manila,  1902). 

"Only  slight  familiarity  with  Filipino  character  and  history  is  needed  to 
comprehend  how  such  a  secret  organization,  with  its  signs,  symbols,  mysteries 
of  initiation,  etc.,  would,  even  were  its  special  aims  not  at  the  time  constantly 
in  the  minds  of  the  Filipino  leaders,  spread  with  exceeding  facility.  It  called 
into  play  certain  characteristics  and  propensities  for  secret,  one  might  almost 
say  blackhanded,  procedure  in  which  the  Filipinos  sometimes  seem  to  revel." 
Le  Roy,  The  Americans  in  the  Philippines,  Vol.  I,  p.  81. 


THE   AWAKENING   AND    REVOLT!  191 

tive  and  opposed  to  violence,  had  broken  with  Rizal  and  gone 
over  to  the  more  belligerently  inclined  faction,  which  was  at- 
tempting to  organize  a  popular  body  which  would  supplement  and 
if  necessary  supplant  the  Liga  Filipina. 

Immediately  after  Rizal's  exile  to  Dapitan  the  Supreme  Coun- 
cil of  the  Katipunan  was  organized  in  Manila  with  a  brother-in- 
law  of  Del  Pilar  at  its  head.  Designed  to  reach  the  lower  orders, 
the  Katipunan  soon  passed  under  the  control  of  one  of  that  class, 
Andres  Bonifacio,  a  porter  in  the  warehouses  of  a  German  ex- 
porting firm.  Bonifacio  was  a  Tagalog  who  seems  to  have  read 
considerably  in  the  literature  of  French  and  German  socialism  and 
political  philosophy. 

He  planned  to  organize  an  armed  revolt  against  the  Spanish 
government.  Rizal,  who  at  first  sympathized  with  and  probably 
joined  the  society,  refused  peremptorily  to  countenance  its  pro- 
gram, but  it  had  reached  the  popular  heart  and  was  encouraged 
by  certain  wealthy  Filipinos  who  had  long  been  contributing 
money  for  the  propaganda  and  were  beginning  to  look  for  re- 
sults. Rizal's  reply  to  the  request  for  his  support  was  suppressed 
and  the  work  of  organizing  subordinate  lodges  proceeded  so 
rapidly  that  the  society  soon  had  from  one  hundred  thousand 
to  four  hundred  thousand  members,  who  were  pledged  by  fearful 
oaths  and  bound  by  the  ancient  pacte  de  sangre,  or  blood  cov- 
enant. There  is  no  question  but  that  the  Katipunan  was  or- 
ganized for  the  purpose  of  rebellion  and  revolt,  and  Bonifacio  and 
the  great  mass  of  its  ignorant  members  intended  that  the  up- 
rising should  be  a  bloody  one.  While  it  can  not  justly  be  called  a 
mere  murder  society,  it  certainly  contemplated  a  secret  blow  at 
the  community  and  the  death  of  every  Spaniard  within  its  reach, 
just  as  a  few  years  later  the  leaders  of  the  revolt  against  the 
Americans  plotted  the  destruction  of  the  city  of  Manila  and  its 
white  residents.  The  ghastly  oaths  which  the  initiates  were  re- 
quired to  take  need  not  be  taken  too  seriously  by  those  who  are 
familiar  with  the  initiation  ceremonies  of  perfectly  innocent 
and  innocuous  secret  societies  in  other  countries.  Nevertheless, 
the  majority  of  the  impressionable  and  ignorant  members  un- 


192  THE    PHILIPPINES 

doubtedly  took  such  matters  seriously  and  supported  with  en- 
thusiasm a  plan  which  was  designed  "to  shake  off  their  masters, 
get  rid  of  the  whites,  and  divide  up  the  big  estates  not  only  of 
the  friars  but  of  Filipino  landlords  as  well." 

On  June  12,  1896,  the  Supreme  Council  of  the  Katipunan 
issued  an  order  which  contained  the  following  instructions .' 

"When  once  the  signal  of  H.  2.  Sep.  is  given,  every  brother 
will  fulfill  the  duty  which  this  Grand  Regional  Lodge  has  im- 
posed upon  him,  assassinating  all  the  Spaniards,  their  wives  and 
sons,  without  considerations  of  any  sort,  whether  relationship, 
friendship,  gratitude,  etc." 

Detailed  instructions  were  given  for  the  accumulation  of  the 
bodies  of  the  slain  on  Bagumbayan  field,  where  they  were  to  be 
buried  at  a  place  where  a  monument  should  in  the  future  be 
erected  in  honor  of  the  independence  of  the  country.^"  The  bodies 
of  the  friars  were  directed  to  be  burned.  This  document  is  prob- 
ably authentic,  although  the  original  seems  not  to  have  been  pro- 
duced. It  finds  confirmation  in  many  similar  documents  cap- 
tured during  the  subsequent  insurrection  against  the  United 
States. 

During  the  spring  and  summer  of  1896  rumors  of  plots  and 
uprisings  were  rife.  Governor-General  Blanco  sympathized  with 
the  legitimate  aspirations  of  the  people,  but  he  was  already  in 
the  bad  books  of  the  friars  and  was  unable  to  do  more  than 
steady  the  situation.  For  once  the  danger  was  real.  The  Kati- 
punan leaders  had  determined  to  resort  to  arms,  but  before  they 
were  ready  the  plot  was  discovered  by  one  Mariano  Gil,  the 
Augustinian  curate  of  the  Tondo  parish  of  Manila.    A  sister  of 


*  See  the  documents  in  full  in  Sastron,  p.  54,  and  in  Nozaleda's  Defense 
Ohligada,  Appendix  9;  Archive,  III,  No,  19,  Documentos  politicos  de  actu- 
alidad,  and  in  English  as  an  appendix  to  St.  Clair's  book  entitled  The  Katipu- 
nan, or  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Filipino  Commune  (Manila,  1902)  ;  Le  Roy 
(I,  p.  99,  note)  pronounces  this  work  utterly  unreliable,  even  questioning  the 
existence  of  such  a  person  as  "Arthur  St.  Clair,"  notwithstanding  the  accom- 
panying portrait  of  the  author.  It  will  be  understood  that  the  Filipinos  deny 
the  authenticity  of  this  document.  They  generally  claim  that  the  Katipunan 
was  an  innocent  patriotic  society  and  have  recently  erected  a  monument  to 
Bonifacio,  as  the  "hero  of  the  common  man." 

i<>The  Rizal  monument  erected  by  the  government  in  1913  stands  very 
near  the  place  selected  in  1896  by  the  Katipunan. 


THE   AWAKENING   AND    REVOLT  193 

one  of  the  members  of  the  society,  a  workman  in  the  government 
printing  office,  had  told  the  story  in  the  confessional.  The  gov- 
ernment struck  promptly.  On  August  thirtieth  martial  law  was 
declared  in  Manila  and  the  surrounding  provinces.  Many  arrests 
were  made,  five  hundred  in  Manila  on  the  first  day  after  the  dis- 
closure. Soon  the  prisons  of  Manila  were  crowded.  At  one 
time  over  four  thousand  prisoners  were  crowded  into  the  suffo- 
cating jails  awaiting  trial  before  the  military  tribunals.  When 
Blanco  resigned  early  in  December,  nearly  one  thousand  Filipinos 
had  been  deported  to  the  Mariana  Islands  and  the  Spanish  penal 
colonies  near  Africa. 

Bonifacio  had  received  timely  warning  and  escaped  to  Cal- 
loocan,  where,  notwithstanding  the  surprise  and  condition  of 
unreadiness,  he  ordered  hostilities  to  commence.  Fighting  of 
a  desultory  character  followed  in  the  vicinity  of  Manila  and  to 
some  extent  throughout  Luzon  and  elsewhere.  The  movement 
soon  centered  in  Cavite  Province,  where  it  developed  under  the 
leadership  of  an  active  young  Tagalog  named  Emilio  Aguinaldo. 
But  the  uprising  was  far  from  general.  It  was  confined  almost 
entirely  to  the  Tagalogs  and  many  of  their  leading  men  hastened 
to  assure  the  Spanish  authorities  of  their  loyalty.  "While  it  is 
beyond  question,"  says  Le  Roy,^^  "that  there  was  a  general  and  a 
natural  race  feeling  of  sympathy  for  the  insurgents,  it  is  also 
true  that  there  was  a  very  general  feeling  on  the  part  of  the  more 
conservative  and  capable  Filipinos,  of  practically  all  the  educated 
men  who  ought  in  any  national  movement  to  be  the  leaders,  that 
the  revolt  was  wholly  premature." 

At  the  time  of  the  uprising  there  were  about  fifteen  thousand 
regular  troops  scattered  throughout  the  Archipelago,  of  whom 
three  hundred  Spanish  artillerjrmen  and  two  thousand  five  hun- 
dred loyal  native  infantry  were  in  Manila.  In  addition  there 
were  about  four  thousand  of  the  Civil  Guard  who  constituted 
a  sort  of  constabulary  force.  Uncertainty  as  to  the  attitude  of 
the  native  troops  for  a  time  paralyzed  active  military  operations. 
During  the  period  when  an  effort  was  being  made  to  assimilate 

iiLe  Roy,  I,  p.  93. 


194  THE    PHILIPPINES 

the  Philippines  with  Spain  the  native  regiments  had  been  num- 
bered as  though  actually  incorporated  in  the  regular  Spanish  army. 
For  a  time  these  regiments  loyally  sustained  the  burden  of  the 
fighting,  and  some  of  them  remained  loyal  to  Spain  until  the 
end.  The  lack  of  tmanimity  of  opinion  in  support  of  the  in- 
surgents is  shown  by  the  ease  with  which  voluntary  military 
organizations  of  various  kinds  were  raised  throughout  the 
islands.  General  Blanco,  still  hoping  for  the  success  of  his 
policy  of  attraction  and  conciliation,  issued  on  October  eleventh  a 
circular  in  which  he  directed  the  provincial  governors  "to  take 
care  not  to  order  imprisonments  unless  they  are  justified  by 
serious  complications."  Upon  the  arrival  of  some  new  troops 
from  Spain,  General  Aquirre  led  them  through  the  towns  of 
Laguna  and  Batangas  for  the  purpose  of  participating  in  a  series 
of  balls  and  banquets  where  Spaniards  and  Filipinos  pledged 
undying  affection  and  loyalty.  This  evidence  of  a  desire  to  deal 
fairly  with  the  people  brought  upon  Blanco's  head  the  wrath  of 
those  who  were  demanding  the  full  penalty  of  death  and  confis- 
cation. On  December  9,  1897,  he  was  recalled  to  Spain,  where 
he  spent  much  of  the  time  during  the  succeeding  years  trying  to 
explain  why  he  had  not  crushed  the  rebellion  by  greater  severities. 

The  reign  of  his  successor.  General  Camilio  Polavieja,  was 
brief.  It  opened  inauspiciously  by  the  ill-advised  execution  of 
Rizal,  an  act  which  so  stirred  the  people  as  to  render  any  hope 
of  sincere  reconciliation  with  Spain  thereafter  impossible. 

Rizal,  with  the  consent  of  General  Blanco,  had  returned  from 
Dapltan  and  had  been  granted  permission  to  join  the  Spanish 
army  in  Cuba  as  a  surgeon.  Carrying  a  letter  from  Blanco  which 
exonerated  him  of  any  part  in  the  insurrection,  he  sailed  for 
Spain.  But  it  was  not  intended  that  he  should  escape.  At  Barce- 
lona he  was  arrested  and  returned  to  Manila,  where  he  was  held 
in  prison  until  after  Blanco  left  the  country.  A  military  com- 
mission, convened  on  December  twenty-sixth,  found  him  guilty  of 
rebellion,  sedition  and  illicit  associations,  and  sentenced  him  to 
death.  The  proceedings  as  far  as  form  and  record  are  concerned 
>v^ere  in  all  respects  legal  under  Spanish  laws,  but  the  secrecy  and 


THE   AWAKENING   AND    REVOLT  195 

lack  of  deliberation,  to  say  nothing  of  circumstances  which  sug- 
gest the  manipulation  of  the  evidence  against  him,  shocks  one's 
sense  of  fairness  and  justice.  Much  of  the  evidence  bears  the  ear- 
marks of  having  been  manufactured.  The  court  found  in  effect 
that  the  chief  object  of  the  Liga  Filipina  was  to  gather  money 
with  which  to  purchase  arms  to  secure  the  independence  of  the 
Philippines;  that  the  Katipunan  was  a  mere  offshoot  of  the  Liga 
Filipina  through  which  the  masses  were  prepared  for  rebellion; 
that  the  purpose  of  the  society  was  to  assassinate  all  Spaniards 
and  proclaim  independence,  and  that  Rizal  had  been  a  systematic 
and  persistent  rebel  from  the  time  when  in  early  childhood  he 
read  a  poem  about  the  "Fatherland,"  until  the  Katipunan  in- 
surrection. 

Evidence  which  was  favorable  to  Rizal  was  suppressed  or 
distorted  to  his  discredit.  It  is  certain  that  at  Dapitan  Rizal 
informed  Bonifacio's  agent  that  he  disapproved  of  and  would 
have  nothing  to  do  with  the  insurrection.  The  prosecution  used 
Rizal's  statement  to  his  injury,  arguing  that  when  he  should 
have  protested  against  the  principle  of  revolt  he  only  opposed 
its  expediency.  Having  advised  against  a  particular  rebellion, 
he  was  convicted  for  having  failed  to  advise  against  all  rebellions. 
While  Rizal  was  in  prison  awaiting  trial  he  wrote  and  proposed 
to  issue  a  manifesto  to  his  countrymen  in  which  he  said,  "Upon 
my  return  from  Spain,  I  have  come  to  know  that  my  name  has 
been  used  among  some  who  were  in  arms,  as  a  battle  cry.  The 
news  came  to  me  as  a  painful  surprise;  but  thinking  every- 
thing already  over,  I  kept  silent  before  a  circumstance  I  regarded 
impossible  of  setting  right.  .  .  .  From  the  first  that  I  had 
news  of  what  was  being  planned,  I  opposed  it,  I  fought  against 
it,  and  I  showed  its  absolute  impossibility.  ...  I  did  more. 
When,  later  on,  in  spite  of  my  advice,  the  outbreak  occurred, 
I  spontaneously  offered  not  only  my  services  but  my  life,  and  my 
name  as  well,  to  be  used  in  the  manner  they  thought  best  for  the 
purpose  of  stifling  the  rebellion;  .  .  .  I  have  given  proof  as 
much  as  has  any  of  desiring  liberties  for  my  country,  and  I 
continue  to  desire  them.    But  I  set  down  as  the  premise  the  edu«» 


196  THE    PHILIPPINES 

cation  of  the  people,  so  that,  through  instruction  and  labor,  it 
might  come  to  possess  its  own  personality,  and  might  be  worthy 
of  these  liberties.  In  my  writings  I  have  recommended  study, 
and  the  civic  virtues,  without  which  there  is  no  redemption,  I 
have  also  written  (and  my  words  have  been  repeated)  that  re- 
forms, to  be  fruitful,  must  come  from  above,  and  that  those  com- 
ing from  below  were  only  to  be  obtained  in  a  manner  which 
would  make  them  irregular  and  uncertain.  Nourished  upon 
these  ideas,  I  can  not  less  than  condemn,  and  I  do  condemn  that 
absurd  and  savage  outbreak,  plotted  behind  my  back,  which  dis- 
honors us  Filipinos  and  discredits  those  who  may  speak  in  our 
behalf.  I  abominate  its  criminal  proceedings,  and  I  disown  any 
sort  of  participation  in  it,  deploring  with  all  the  sorrow  of  my 
heart  the  ignorant  victims  of  deception.  Return  then  to  your 
houses,  and  may  God  pardon  those  who  have  acted  in  bad  faith." 

Upon  this  document  Auditor  Pefia  placed  the  following  en- 
dorsement: "With  Rizal  the  question  is  one  of  opportuneness, 
not  of  principles,  nor  of  purposes.  His  manifesto  might  be  con- 
densed into  these  words  *In  the  face  of  evidence  of  your  defeat, 
lay  down  your  arms,  countrymen;  afterwards  I  will  lead  you 
to  the  promised  land.'  It  is  of  no  benefit  in  behalf  of  peace,  and 
it  might  nourish  in  future  the  spirit  of  rebellion;  and  on  that 
account  its  publication  is  to  be  advised  against.  Instead,  it  might 
be  well  to  forbid  its  publication  and  to  send  these  records  to  the 
judge  advocate  of  the  case  being  prosecuted  against  Rizal,  to 
be  added  to  these  proceedings."^^ 

On  the  morning  of  December  30,  1896,  outside  of  the  old 
city  walls  near  the  pleasure  field  known  as  the  Luneta,  in  the 
presence  of  a  gay  and  laughing  crowd  of  Spanish  officials  and 
friars,  Rizal  was  shot."  The  night  before  his  execution,  he 
signed  the  following  statement : 

12  See  Le  Roy,  I,  p.  Ill,  note.  Craig,  Jose  Rizal,  p.  235.  Sastron,  pp. 
179-183.  For  Rizal's  teachings  see  his  novels,  Nole  me  Jangere  (An  Eagle's 
Flight,  New  York,  1900)  and  El  Filibusterismo  (The  Reign  of  Greed,  Ma- 
nila, 1912). 

""Turning  away,  sick  at  heart,  from  the  contemplation  of  this  bitter 
tragedy,  it  is  with  a  thrill  of  almost  vindictive  satisfaction  that  one  remem- 
bers that  less  than  eighteen  months  later  the  Luneta  echoed  to  the  sound  of  a 
mightier  fusillade — the  roar  of  the  great  guns  with  which  the  battle  of 
Manila  Bay  was  fought  and  won.    .    .    .    And  if  in  the  moment  of  his  last 


THE    AWAKENING   AND    REVOLT  197 

"I  declare  myself  Catholic,  and  in  this  religion  in  which  I  was 
born  and  reared,  I  wish  to  live  and  die.  I  retract  with  all  my 
heart  whatsoever  there  has  been  in  my  words,  writings,  publica- 
tions, and  conduct  contrary  to  my  quality  as  a  son  of  the  Catholic 
Church.  I  believe  and  profess  what  it  teaches,  and  submit  to 
what  it  commands.  I  abominate  Masonry,  as  hostile  to  the 
church  and  a  society  prohibited  by  the  church.  The  diocesan 
prelate,  as  the'  superior  ecclesiastical  authority,  may  make  public 
this  voluntary  statement  of  mine,  to  repair  the  scandal  my  deeds 
have  caused  and  that  God  and  man  may  pardon  me." 

It  has  been  claimed  that  this  retraction  was  obtained  through 
undue  influence  asserted  by  the  Jesuit  Fathers  who  surrounded 
him  during  the  night  which  preceded  his  death  and  that  it  did 
not  represent  Rizal's  true  convictions.  As  Le  Roy  truly  says: 
"The  document  is  really  a  revelation  of  how  strong  a  hold  the 
teachings  and  influence  of  childhood,  more  than  ever  in  a  land 
like  the  Philippines,  have  even  upon  a  man  with  the  mentality 
and  the  experience  in  life  of  Rizal,  rather  than  a  reliable  indi- 
cation that  Rizal  repented  the  general  tendency  of  his  writings  as 
a  whole.  Unquestionably,  too,  as  he  grew  older  he  felt  that  he 
had  been  unduly  rabid  in  his  youth,  and  became  stronger  in  his 
belief  that  evolution,  not  revolution,  was  the  proper  pathway 
for  his  people."^* 

The  fact  is  that  Rizal  did  not  and  never  had  favored  a  resort 
to  arms.  He  realized  that  his  people  were  not  prepared  to  govern 
themselves.  He  was  convicted  for  opinions  and  not  for  acts, 
for  what  he  was  thought  to  believe,  not  for  what  he  had  done 
or  urged  others  to  do.  His  trial  was  regular  and  yet  it  was 
grossly  unfair.  The  defense  by  his  counsel  was  formal  and  per- 
functory. His  death  had  been  determined  upon  before  he  was 
arrested  in  Barcelona.    All  that  remained  to  be  done  was  to  make 


supreme  agony  the  power  to  probe  the  future  had  been  vouchsafed  Jose 
Rizal,  would  he  not  have  died  happy  in  the  knowledge  that  the  land  he  loved 
so  dearly  was  very  soon  to  be  transferred  into  such  safekeeping?"  Sir  Hugh 
CliflFord,  in  Blackwood's  Magazine  for  November,  1902. 

i*Le  Roy,  I,  p.  113,  note.  For  the  letter  sent  by  Rizal  to  Archbishop 
Nozalada,  in  connection  with  the  retraction,  see  the  Defensa  Obligada^ 
Appendix  12. 


198  THE    PHILIPPINES 

a  record  which  would  reflect  most  upon  Rizal  and  least  upon 
Spain.  His  execution,  after  a  formal  retraction  which  was  con- 
sidered such  a  triumph  for  the  authorities,  made  reconciliation 
with  Spain  thereafter  impossible,  and  associated  Rizal's  name 
with  the  sentiment  of  nationality  which  was  just  beginning  to 
develop  in  the  hearts  of  his  countrymen.  On  the  spot  where 
Rizal  died  there  has  recently  been  erected  a  beautiful  monument, 
the  work  of  a  famous  Spanish  sculptor.  To  every  Filipino  he 
is  the  national  hero. 

The  savage  and  indomitable  spirit  manifested  in  the  execution 
of  Rizal  for  a  time  produced  its  effect  upon  the  community.  The 
people  not  already  in  arms  were  stunned  and  intimidated.  Dur- 
ing the  campaign  carried  on  by  General  Blanco  the  insurgents 
seem  to  have  generally  held  their  own.  In  February,  1897, 
General  Polavieja  took  the  field  personally  against  the  rebels 
in  Cavite  Province.  Aguinaldo,  who  was  now  the  recognized 
military  leader,  had  about  five  thousand  men  and  probably  one- 
half  as  many  firearms.  There  was  some  desperate  fighting,  but 
the  rebels  were  gradually  Avorn  away  and  scattered  over  the 
country.  Within  four  months  the  Spanish  losses  were  twenty 
officers  and  three  hundred  soldiers  killed  and  eighty  officers  and 
one  thousand  two  hundred  soldiers  wounded.  After  the  fall  of 
Imus  the  insurrection  seemed  broken,  and  Polavieja  offered  an 
amnesty  of  which  many  took  advantage.  In  April  the  governor- 
general  returned  to  Spain,  and  during  ten  days  General  La- 
chambre  acted  as  governor-general." 

On  April  twenty-fifth  the  new  governor-general,  Primo  de 
Rivera,  arrived  at  Manila  and  was  received  with  stately  cere- 
monies. Although  appointed  by  a  conservative  ministry,  Primo 
de  Rivera  was  himself  a  Liberal  who  recognized  the  necessity  for 
reforms  in  the  Philippines.  The  spirit  in  which  he  entered  upon 
his  administration  appeared  in  a  cable  sent  to  Madrid  a  few 
months  after  his  arrival  in  the  islands.  "There  must,"  he  wrote, 
*T)e  much  thought  given  to  the  political  and  economic  reforms, 

15  Lachambre  was  an  efficient  soldier.  For  an  account  of  his  work,  see 
F.  de  Monteverde  y  Sedeno,  La  Division  Lachambre  (Madrid,  1896). 


THE   AWAKENING   AND    REVOLT  199 

which  should  tend  to  assure  the  well-being  of  the  native,  or  to 
guarantee  him  against  abuses  and  clerical  exactions,  but  at  the 
same  time  to  separate  him  from  modern  currents  and  principles 
which,  if  they  are  the  essential  life  of  European  societies,  are 
the  virus  that  is  inoculated  in  colonies  for  the  growth  of  ideas  of 
separatism  and  ambition  which  revolutions  originate."" 

As  the  result  of  the  campaign  conducted  by  Primo  de  Rivera, 
Aguinaldo,  who  now  called  himself  President  and  Dictator  of  a 
Revolutionary  Government,  w^as  driven  into  the  mountains  of 
Bulican,  where  he  proposed  to  make  a  final  stand  at  a  place  called 
Biak-na-bato.^'  The  war  was  practically  at  an  end,  but  it  was 
within  the  power  of  the  insurgents  to  prolong  it  almost  indef- 
initely by  adopting  the  guerrilla  tactics  for  which  the  country  is 
so  well  adapted.  The  government  was  also  in  difficulties.  It 
was  in  great  need  of  more  troops,  but  as  Primo  de  Rivera  had 
constantly  minimized  the  revolution  in  his  reports  he  could 
not  consistently  ask  that  more  men  be  sent  from  the  Peninsula. 
More  native  soldiers  had,  therefore,  to  be  raised,  and  this 
seems  not  to  have  been  difficult,  as  the  people  were  weary  of 
the  burdens  imposed  by  the  war.  In  order  to  obtain  funds, 
bonds  to  the  amount  of  forty  million  pesos  were  issued  payable 
in  forty  years,  "with  the  special  guarantee  of  the  Philippine 
customs  and  the  general  guarantee  of  the  nation." 

But  the  preparations  for  what  was  to  have  been  the  final 
crushing  campaign  were  suddenly  suspended.  One  day  early  in 
August  there  appeared  at  the  Malicafian  Palace,  His  Excellency, 
Don  Pedro  Paterno,  a  distinguished  citizen  of  Manila  and  Ma- 
drid, wearer  of  the  Grand  Cross  of  Isabella  the  Catholic,  suave, 
resourceful,  diplomatic,  friend  of  the  people,  intimate  of  Gran- 
dees, ready  at  a  moment's  notice  to  furnish  a  treaty,  a  drama, 
an  opera,  a  form  of  government  or  a  system  of  philosophy,  and, 
like  Godoy,  ambitious  to  win  the  title  of  Prince  of  Peace."    He 


^*  Quoted  by  Le  Roy  (I,  p.  120)  from  Primo  de  Rivera's  Memoria,  which 
was  published  in  Madrid  in  1898. 

^7  For  an  account  of  the  mihtary  operations  of  the  insurgents  prepared  by 
Major  John  S.  Mallory,  see  Rept.  War  Dcpt.,  1903.  Vol.  III. 

18  For  an  interesting  account  of  Paterno,  see  Foreman,  pp.  409-413. 


200  THE    PHILIPPINES 

brought  a  proposition  to  save  his  native  land  by  paying  Aguinaldo 
and  his  associates  to  leave  it.  On  August  the  ninth,  the  governor- 
general  wrote  to  Sefior  Canova,  then  president  of  the  Cabinet, 
that  it  was  probable  that  a  permanent  peace  could  be  secured  if 
the  ministry  would  authorize  him  to  use  some  of  the  funds  to 
purchase  patriots  instead  of  munitions  of  war.  Thus  opened 
a  chapter  in  the  history  of  the  Philippines  which  is  full  of  sig- 
nificance, illustrating,  as  it  does,  Spanish  methods  and  Filipino 
characteristics. 

The  agreement  entered  Into  between  Primo  de  Rivera  and  the 
insurgent  leaders  at  Biak-na-bato  has  been  dignified  by  the  name 
of  a  treaty  and  used  by  Aguinaldo' s  friends  and  enemies  respec- 
tively as  demonstrating  his  lofty  patriotism  or  his  venality.  The 
mystery  which  for  a  time  surrounded  the  transaction  no  longer 
exists,  as  the  preliminary  negotiations  In  part  and  the  final  agree- 
ment were  reduced  to  writing,  and  filed  in  the  Filipino  govern- 
ment archives  from  whence  they  passed  Into  the  custody  of  the 
American  War  Department.  The  only  question  about  which 
there  can  now  be  any  doubt  is  whether  there  was  an  oral  col- 
lateral agreement  with  reference  to  future  reforms. 

Before  Primo  de  Rivera's  letter  reached  Madrid,  Canova  had 
been  murdered  and  In  the  resulting  confusion  the  letter  remained 
unanswered.  On  August  ninth,  Pedro  Patemo  delivered  to  the 
governor-general  the  first  of  a  series  of  very  Interesting  docu- 
ments. It  recited  that  he  was  encouraged  to  suggest  the  plan 
by  the  fact  that  on  various  occasions  he  had  heard  His  Excel- 
lency lament  that  he  was  forced  by  the  existence  of  war  "to  hold 
in  suspense  the  longed  for  reforms  solely  because  these  very  men 
continued  to  bear  arms,"  and  that  he  was  anxious  "to  establish 
and  unfold  during  his  command  a  new  series  of  reforms  bound 
to  give  satisfaction  to  the  country."  The  governor-general's 
response  was  such  as  to  encourage  Patemo  to  journey  to  Biak- 
na-bato,  from  whence  he  returned  with  an  elaborate  proposal 
duly  signed  by  Aguinaldo  and  his  associates,  and  a  full  power  of 
attorney  from  Aguinaldo  to  receive  and  disburse  the  money 
which  was  to  be  paid.     In  this  document  Aguinaldo  demanded 


THE   AWAKENING   AND    REVOLT  201 

the  payment  of  money  and  the  granting  of  the  reforms  for 
which  the  insurgents  had  gone  to  war.  The  original  of  the 
paper  is  on  file  in  the  War  Department  and  it  effectually  dis- 
poses of  the  claim  that  the  promise  of  reforms  by  Spain  formed 
a  part  of  the  agreement  which  was  signed  by  the  parties.  As 
drafted  and  carried  to  Manila  by  Patemo  the  instrument  pro- 
vided for: 

1.  "Expulsion  of  the  religious  orders,  or  at  least  regulations 
forbidding  them  to  live  together  in  cloisters. 

2.  "Representation  of  the  Filipinos  in  the  Spanish  Cortes. 

3.  "The  application  of  true  justice  in  the  Philippines,  .  .  . 
equal  for  the  Indians  and  the  Spaniards.  The  same  laws  in 
Spain  and  the  Philippines.  The  Indians  to  have  a  share  of  the 
higher  offices  of  the  civil  administration. 

4.  "Changes  in  the  laws  governing  property,  taxation,  and 
the  holding  of  the  church  benefices,  in  favor  of  the  Indians. 

5.  "Proclamation  of  the  individual  rights  of  the  Indians,  as 
for  example,  the  liberty  to  combine  in  associations,  and  the  lib- 
erty of  the  press." 

Through  the  first  and  second  of  these  provisions  and  all  refer- 
ences to  the  Philippine  Republic,  and  Aguinaldo's  position  as 
president  thereof,  Patemo  drew  a  line  with  his  lead  pencil.^"  It 
has  been  suggested  that  these  all-important  provisions  were 
stricken  by  Paterno  as  the  representative  of  Primo  de  Rivera, 
at  Biak-na-bato,  but  manifestly  this  is  wrong.  It  is  much  more 
probable  that  it  was  done  by  Paterno  at  Manila  in  his  capacity 
as  the  representative  of  Aguinaldo,  because  Primo  de  Rivera 
refused  absolutely  to  consider  any  such  demands.  In  his  Me- 
moria  the  latter  says,  and  the  records  corroborate  the  assertion, 
that  Spain  would  consider  nothing  "which  might  affect  her  honor 
or  her  sovereignty,  or  involve  compromises  for  the  future,  and 
he  informed  Paterno  that  he  could  only  employ  his  good  offices 
to  bring  about  such  reforms  as  he  thought  were  necessary  and 

"  Cong.  Rec,  May  29,  1902,  XXXV,  Part  6,  p.  6093.  In  the  documents 
as  printed  in  the  Record  the  parts  which  were  crossed  out  in  the  original, 
that  is,  numbers  1  and  2,  are  enclosed  in  brackets.  The  other  five,  which  deal 
in  generalities,  were  evidently  ignored. 


202  THE    PHILIPPINES 

that  they  would  have  to  trtist  to  the  magnanimity  of  the  govern^ 
ment." 

After  another  consultation  with  the  insurgent  leaders  Patemo 
returned  and  according  to  Primo  de  Rivera  reported  that  the 
demands  contained  in  the  previous  paper  represented  merely 
"an  aspiration  which  the  rebels  wished  the  government  to  take 
into  account;  that  they  understood  that  the  country  was  not 
sufficiently  prepared  for  the  transformation  they  desired."^** 

On  October  seventh,  the  governor-general  cabled  the  terms  of 
the  agreement  to  Madrid,  laying  particular  stress  on  the  fact  that 
the  arrangement  would  destroy  the  prestige  of  the  chiefs  who 
had  sold  out  and  left  the  country.  If  the  plan  was  not  approved 
he  was  ready  to  proceed  with  the  final  campaign.  It  would  be 
useless,  he  wrote,  to  offer  reforms  at  that  time,  as  the  insurgents 
were  "fighting  for  independence;  after  conquering  them  in  one 
way  or  another,  there  may  be  conceded  or  imposed,  the  reforms 
that  are  suitable."  In  reply  to  a  request  for  further  details  with 
reference  to  the  terms  of  payment  and  the  opinions  of  other  offi- 
cials, the  minister  was  informed  that  the  archbishop,  the  au- 
ditor-general, and  the  civil  governor  of  Manila  had  been  con- 
sulted and  approved  the  plan.  He  was  thereupon  instructed  to 
close  the  deal. 

Paterno  originally  estimated  that  $500,000.00^^  would  be  suffi- 
cient to  purchase  the  peace,  but  when  he  returned  from  Biak-na- 
bato,  he  carried  a  demand  for  $3,000,000.00  and  the  reforms. 
Primo  de  Rivera's  offer  of  $1,700,000.00  for  the  arms  and  the 
absence  of  the  leaders,  after  striking  out  the  reforms,  was  ac- 
cepted. Patemo  wrote  $800,000  in  the  paper  stating  orally  that 
the  balance  of  $900,000  should  be  paid  to  him  "on  the  side"  to 
be  used  to  indemnify  the  people  who  had  suffered  by  the  war. 
After  some  delay,  due  to  the  solicitude  of  some  of  Aguinaldo's 
subordinates,  over  the  matter  of  the  disposition  of  the  money, 
the  governor-general's   nephew,    Lieutenant-Colonel   Primo   de 


'0  Primo  de  Rivera,  Memoria,  p.  131.    Quoted  by  Le  Roy,  I,  p.  129. 
21  Mexican.    The  value  of  the  dollar  fluctuated,  but  it  was  worth  generally 
about  fifty  cents  in  gold. 


THE   AWAKENING   AND    REVOLT  203 

Rivera,  went  with  Paterno  to  Biak-na-bato  to  secure  the  signature 
of  Aguinaldo,  which,  with  the  approval  of  "the  Assembly"  and 
the  "Supreme  Council"  was  duly  affixed.  A  careful  program 
for  carrying  out  the  terms  of  the  agreement  was  worked  out  and 
signed,  but  the  agreement  itself,  although  reduced  to  writing, 
appears  not  to  have  been  signed  by  the  parties.    It  provided  that : 

"Don  Emilia  Aguinaldo,  in  his  quality  as  supreme  leader  of 
these  in  the  Island  of  Luzon,  now  waging  open  hostilities  against 
their  legitimate  government,  and  Don  Baldomero  Aguinaldo  and 
Don  Mariane  Llanera,  who  also  exercise  important  command  in 
the  forces  mentioned,  are  to  cease  their  hostile  attitude,  surrender 
the  arms  that  they  are  using  against  the  Fatherland,  and  are  to 
surrender  to  the  legitimate  authorities,  claiming  their  rights  as 
Spanish  Filipino  citizens  which  they  desire  to  preserve.  And  as 
a  consequence  of  this  surrender,  they  obligate  themselves  to 
cause  the  surrender  of  such  individuals  as  actually  follow  them 
and  those  who  recognize  them  as  leaders  and  obey  their  orders."^* 

It  was  also  provided  that  the  arms  were  to  be  surrendered 
in  accordance  with  an  inventory  to  be  taken  at  a  time  and  place 
to  be  decided  upon.  Individuals  who  surrendered  were  to  re- 
ceive passes,  and  all  were  to  be  pardoned  for  their  part  in  the 
insurrection.  Deserters  from  the  Spanish  army  were  not  to  be 
punished,  but  would  be  required  to  serve  the  balance  of  their 
terms  of  enlistment.  Spaniards  and  Americans  and  foreigners 
were  to  receive  a  pardon,  but  be  expelled  from  the  Philippines. 
All  who  did  not  surrender  within  the  time  stated  should  be  treated 
as  outlaws.    Section  four  provided  that : 

"The  Excellent  Sefior  General  Chief  will  provide  the  neces- 
sary  means  for  supporting  the  lives  of  those  who  surrender 
themselves  before  the  date  given  in  the  second  paragraph  in  view; 
of  the  painful  situation  to  which  the  war  has  reduced  them,  but 
he  will  negotiate  only  with  Don  Emilia  Aguinaldo,  through  His 
Excellency  Sefior  Don  Pedro  Alejandro  Paterno." 

The  document  closed  with  a  provision  that  if  any  of  the  para- 


"  Cong.  Rec,  XXXV,  Part  6,  p.  6092. 


204  THE   PHILIPPINES 

graphs  were  violated  the  whole  should  be  null  and  void,  and 
Patemo's  statement  that  those  whom  he  represented 

"confidently  expect  that  on  account  of  the  foresight  of  the  gov- 
ernment of  His  Majesty,  that  it  will  take  into  consideration  and 
satisfy  the  desires  of  the  Filipino  people  in  order  to  assure  them 
the  peace  and  well  being  which  they  desire." 

Delay  in  surrendering  the  expected  number  of  guns  rendered 
the  Spaniards  uneasy,  and  on  December  fourteenth  another  docu- 
ment was  signed  which  provided  in  detail  for  the  manner  of  pay- 
ing the  money.  On  December  27,  1897,  Aguinaldo  and  twenty- 
seven  of  his  followers  sailed  on  a  Spanish  ship  from  Sual  near 
Dagupan,  and  on  December  thirty-first  arrived  at  Hong  Kong. 
The  Spaniards  and  Filipinos  parted  with  many  assurances  of  un- 
dying affection  and  loyalty.  From  Biak-na-bato,  Aguinaldo  is- 
sued a  proclamation  addressed  to  the  "Manilos"  in  which  he  said : 
*'I  leave,  because,  behind  the  back  of  the  personal  immunity  con- 
ceded to  me  by  the  laws,  pledges  and  nobility  of  Spain,  the  ex- 
alted passion  of  hatred  or  some  other  outburst  of  oppressive 
policy  may  raise  its  suicidal  hand  and  make  victims,  causing  once 
more  disturbances  and  interruptions  in  the  life  and  progress  of 
our  land.    Long  live  Spain !    Long  live  the  Philippines  !'* 

Before  sailing  all  the  leaders  signed  a  telegram  addressed  to 
the  governor-general,  which  read : 

"We  all  trust  to  Spain  to  grant  reforms  without  blood  or  war- 
fare, following  the  path  of  right  and  justice.  .  .  .  To  the 
paternal  policy  of  Your  Excellency  these  who  to-day  loyally 
offer  themselves  to  Spain,  entrust  the  true  humanization  of  liber- 
ties and  rights.  May  God  bless  and  make  lasting  this  peace,  for 
the  glorious  future  of  our  loved  home,  the  Philippines,  and  for 
the  prosperity  and  greatness  of  the  Spanish  Fatherland."^^ 

The  first  payment  of  $400,000  was  made  in  Hong  Kong  on 
January  2,  1898,  and  was  deposited  in  a  bank  to  the  credit  of 
"Aguinaldo  &  Co." 


23  This  document  and  others  from  which  I  have  quoted  are  printed  by 
Le  Roy,  I,  p.  13S,  note  3. 


THE   AWAKENING   AND    REVOLT  205 

But  the  insurgents  who  were  left  behind  were  dissatisfied. 
Within  a  few  days  after  the  departure  of  Aguinaldo  a  meeting 
was  held  at  Biak-na-bato  which  was  presided  over  by  Isabella 
Artacho,  Aguinaldo's  former  Secretary  of  the  Interior,  which 
passed  resolutions  demanding  that  the  next  payment  of  $200,000, 
instead  of  being  sent  to  Hong  Kong,  should  be  paid  to  them  to 
be  distributed  among  the  people  who  were  in  dire  need.^*  This 
demand  was  complied  with.  Primo  de  Rivera  says  that  the 
balance  was  by  him  turned  over  to  his  successor.  General  Au- 
gustin.  It  was  never  accounted  for.  Nor  is  it  known  what  be- 
came of  the  $900,000  which  was  to  be  distributed  among  the 
deserving  of  the  rank  and  file.  The  leaders  are  still  charging 
one  another  with  the  misappropriation  of  this  money.  Artacho 
went  to  Hong  Kong  and  brought  suit  in  the  British  courts 
against  Aguinaldo  for  an  accounting  and  distribution  of  the 
fund,  but  the  action  was  settled  out  of  court  to  the  satisfaction 
presumably  of  all  parties.^'' 

2*  For  Aguinaldo's  account,  see  the  Resena  veridica,  in  Cong.  Rec,  XXXV, 
Appendix,  pp.  440-445.  Agoncilo's  account  given  to  General  Greene  is  printed 
in  Sen.  Doc.  62,  55  Cong.  3d  Sess.,  Part  1,  p.  430. 

25  "Artacho,  who  had  received  5,000  pesos  as  his  share  of  the  second  pay- 
ment, arrived  in  Hong  Kong  and  on  April  5  demanded  200,000  pesos  of  the 
insurgent^  funds,  probably  under  the  agreement  that  he  should  establish  a 
company  in  Hong  Kong  for  the  benefit  of  the  former  leaders  and  not  merely 
of  those  who  had  accompanied  Aguinaldo.  But  the  leaders  in  Hong  Kong 
had  denounced  that  agreement,  and  refused  to  pay.  He  then  entered  suit 
before  the  supreme  court  of  Hong  Kong,  calling  upon  Aguinaldo  for  an 
accounting  of  the  trust  funds  deposited  in  his  hands  for  the  benefit  of  Artacho 
and  others,  and  asked  for  an  injunction  restraining  Aguinaldo  or  any  mem- 
ber of  the  junta  from  handling  or  disposing  of  any  part  of  said  funds.  He 
filed  as  evidence  copies  of  the  Biak-na-bato  agreement  and  of  the  agreement 
made  by  the  leaders  on  December  19.  This  suit  was  brought  not  merely  in  the 
name  of  Artacho,  but  in  that  of  all  the  exiles  who  were  described  as  living 
in  exile  in  Hong  Kong  in  accordance  with  an  agreement  made  with  the 
Spanish  government.  Artacho  probably  had  adherents  among  these  men, 
some  at  least  of  whom  were  utterly  weary  of  waiting  in  Hong  Kong  and  of 
living  upon  what  was  doled  out  to  them.  Some  at  least  saw  no  chance  of 
any  other  fate  than  indefinite  exile  spent  in  dependence  upon  the  inner  group 
for  even  the  means  of  existence.  The  suit  was  in  equity,  and  called  for  an 
accounting  for  the  trust  funds  which  the  complainant  recognized  were  legally 
in  the  hands  of  Aguinaldo.  It  could  be  carried  on  only  with  great  difficulty 
without  his  presence  and  without  his  account  books.  Meetings  were  held, 
and  Artacho  was  denounced  as  attempting  to  extort  blackmail,  but  he  refused 
to  yield,  and  Aguinaldo,  rather  than  explain  the  inner  workings  of  the  Hong 
Kong  junta  before  a  British  court,  prepared  for  flight.  A  summons  was 
issued  for  his  appearance  before  the  supreme  court  of  Hong  Kong  on  April 
13,  1898,  but  he  was  by  that  time  beyond  its  jurisdiction.    He  drew  out  the 


206  THE    PHILIPPINES 

A  study  of  the  evidence  relating  to  this  remarkable  transac- 
tion leads  to  the  conclusions  that  the  Filipinos  were  forced  by 
circumstances  to  accept  what  the  Spanish  government  was  will- 
ing to  give  them  and  that  the  government  was  never  willing  to 
complicate  the  settlement  with  any  definite  promises  relating  to 
reforms.  The  expressions  of  hope  and  confidence  of  the  depart- 
ing insurgents  were  left  unanswered,  and  subsequently  were 
ignored.  The  war  had  gone  against  the  Filipinos.  Their  cause 
was  lost  and  the  vengence  of  the  government  stared  them  in  the 
face.  Probably  not  one  of  the  leaders  at  that  time  would  have 
declined  a  pardon  and  free  transportation  to  Hong  Kong.  Pa- 
temo's  suggestion  presented  the  possibility  of  better  terms,  and 
a  demand  for  the  reforms  was  included  in  their  proposition. 
Primo  de  Rivera  was  willing  to  pay  the  money  for  a  peace. 
With  the  leaders  discredited  and  out  of  the  country  and  tlie 
people  unarmed,  peace  might  well  be  lasting,  but  he  had  no  in- 
tention of  stipulating  for  any  reforms.  He  saw  no  necessity  for 
doing  so,  and  the  insurgents  were  not  in  a  position  to  enforce 
any  demands.  Aguinaldo  and  his  representative  did  all  the 
proposing,  conceding,  writing  and  signing.  As  has  been  said, 
Primo  de  Rivera  signed  nothing  but  the  checks.  All  references 
to  the  reforms  for  which  the  insurgents  had  gone  to  war,  except 
the  hope  for  the  future  which  Paterno  expressed,  were  stricken 
from  the  documents.  Notwithstanding  this,  Aguinaldo  subse- 
quently claimed  that  the  granting  of  the  reforms  was  the  prin- 
cipal consideration  for  the  surrender  and  departure.  But  his 
claim  finds  no  corroboration  in  the  records  or  in  the  circum- 
stances. When  an  instrument  is  signed  after  a  clause  therein 
has  been  stricken  out  it  is  ordinarily  conclusive  evidence  that  the 


50,000  pesos  from  the  Chartered  Bank,  which  had  become  due  according  to 
the  terms  of  the  deposit,  and  perhaps  such  other  sums  as  could  be  drawn 
upon  by  check,  engaged  passage  for  Europe  by  way  of  Singapore  for  G.  H. 
del  Pilar,  J.  M.  Leyba,  and  himself  under  assumed  names,  appointed  V.  Belar- 
mino  to  succeed  to  his  functions,  and  gave  him  checks  signed  in  blank  to  draw 
the  interest  of  the  sums  on  deposit  to  provide  for  the  support  of  the  exiles. 
He  gave  as  his  reason  for  departure  that  he  was  going  to  remain  under  cover 
until  Artacho  could  be  bought  oif,  but  he  intended  to  go  far  afield  for  this 
purpose,  as  he  gave  his  destination  as  Europe  and  the  United  States."  Taylor, 
Phil.  Insurg,  Recs, 


THE    AWAKENING    AND    REVOLT  207 

parties  do  not  intend  the  stricken  clause  to  be  a  part  of  the  bind- 
ing agreement. 

It  thus  appears  that  the  Spanish  government  did  not  promise 
definite  reforms  or  intend  that  its  freedom  of  action  should  be 
restricted  by  any  inference  which  the  insurgent  leaders  might 
draw  from  the  terms  of  their  surrender.  The  clause  inserted  by 
Patemo  in  the  agreement  and  the  hopes  expressed  in  the  tele- 
grams of  the  departing  leaders  met  with  no  response.  With 
Aguinaldo  and  his  lieutenants  discredited  and  in  exile  the  gov- 
ernment intended  to  exercise  its  own  discretion  as  outlined  by 
Primo  de  Rivera  in  his  telegram  to  the  Ministry. 

Aguinaldo  felt  that  his  followers  would  benefit  by  the  trans- 
action. His  demand  for  reforms  had  been  denied  and  stricken 
from  the  written  agreement.  A  pardon  and  ample  means  "to 
support  their  lives"  abroad  and  the  distribution  of  a  large  sum 
of  money  among  his  followers,  thus  relieving  their  Immediate 
necessities,  were  something  substantial  saved  from  the  wreck  of 
the  insurrection. 

The  fact  that  after  the  arrival  at  Hong  Kong  Aguinaldo  care- 
fully conserved  the  money  which  had  been  paid  to  him  as  a  trust 
fund  shows  conclusively  that  he  was  not  actuated  by  selfish  pe- 
cuniary motives.  Undoubtedly  he  intended  to  organize  a  new 
revolt  when  conditions  became  favorable  and  the  money  was  in 
fact  used  for  that  purpose.^* 

26  There  was  a  plan  to  form  a  commercial  company  with  the  fund  as  work- 
ing capital  and  under  this  cover  distribute  the  money  to  the  stockholders. 
Evidently  Aguinaldo  had  other  ideas. 


PART  III 
The  Spanish  Colonial  System 

"Bending  every  energy  for  years  to  stay  the  tide  of  change 
and  progress,  suppressing  freedom  of  thought  with  relentless 
vigor,  and  quarantining  herself  and  her  dependencies  against 
new  ideas,  conservatism  grew  to  he  her  settled  habit  and  the 
organs  of  government  became  ossified.  Policies  of  commercial 
restriction  which  were  justifiable  or  at  least  rationally  explicable 
in  the  sixteenth  century,  lasted  on,  proof  against  innovation  or 
improvement,  until  the  eighteenth  century  and  later.  Conse- 
quently from  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth  century  at  the  period 
of  the  rapid  rise  of  the  colonial  powers  of  France,  Holland  and 
England,  the  Spanish  colonies  find  themselves  under  a  commer- 
cial regime  which  increasingly  hampers  their  prosperity  and  ef- 
fectually  blocks  their  advancement."    Edward  G.  Bourne. 


CHAPTER  VIII 
The  Governmental  Organization 

Literary  Theories  of  Government — Theory  and  Practise — The  Minister  of 
Ultramar  and  the  Consejo  de  Filipinos — The  Chief  Executive — The  Board  of 
Authorities  and  the  Council  of  Administration — The  Audiencia — The  Resi- 
dencia — The  Ecclesiastical  System — The  Monastic  Orders — Powers  of  the 
Friars — Conflicting  Opinions  of  Their  Work — The  Inquisition — The  Provin- 
cial Governments — Provinces  and  Pi«^&/oi— Organization  of  Municipalities 
under  Maura  Law. 

The  real  Spanish  government  in  the  Philippines,  the  one 
that  the  people  knew  in  their  daily  lives,  was  very  different 
from  the  one  we  find  described  in  the  codes,  royal  decrees  and 
other  formal  documents.  It  is  a  very  good  illustration  of  the 
difference  which  so  often  exists  between  the  literary  theory  of 
a  government  and  the  reality.  As  worked  out  in  the  laws  it 
was  a  himiane  and  liberal  system  designed  solely  for  the  protec- 
tion and  conversion  of  the  native  people.  In  fact,  it  was  illiberal, 
restrictive  and  often  oppressive. 

In  the  sixteenth  century  the  Spanish  monarchy  was  a  con- 
geries of  more  or  less  independent  countries  united  through  a 
common  sovereign,  but  each  regulating  its  affairs  by  local  laws 
and  customs.  Dependencies,  such  as  Mexico,  were  practically  in- 
dependent monarchies  governed  by  the  king  through  his  viceroys. 

The  Philippine  government  was  subordinate  to  the  viceroyalty 
of  Mexico,  but,  like  every  other  department,  was  responsible 
directly  to  the  king.  As  it  existed  when  the  end  came  the  royal 
control  was  exercised  through  the  Minister  of  Ultramar,  to 
whom  was  entrusted  the  superior  administrative  supervision  of 
the  colonies.  He  was  assisted  by  the  Consejo  de  Filipinos,  which 
was  composed  of  persons  selected  because  of  their  special  knowl- 
edge of  the  country.     One  member  of  the  Council  represented 

211 


212  THE    PHILIPPINES 

war,  two  marine,  one  the  regular  clerical  body  in  the  Philippines, 
one  the  monastic  orders,  two  the  Philippine  branch  of  the  treas- 
ury, two  the  Home  Office,  one  the  Department  of  Grace  and 
Justice,  and  two  the  Department  of  Administration  and  Public 
Works. 

This  Council  was  consulted  by  the  minister  at  his  pleasure 
on  matters  relating  to  the  islands.  It  prepared  the  statutes  and 
decrees  or  projects  for  reforms  at  the  direction  of  the  minister 
or  on  its  own  initiative  for  his  consideration. 

At  the  head  of  the  government  in  the  islands  was  placed  a 
governor-general  with  the  additional  local  military  rank  of  cap- 
tain-general, who  was  the  representative  of  the  king's  power 
and  governed  in  his  name  under  instructions  which  were  often 
very  detailed  and  specific.  His  powers  varied  at  different  times. 
During  the  late  period  he  was  appointed  by  the  king  with  the 
approval  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  on  the  recommendation  of 
the  Minister  of  Ultramar,  under  whose  immediate  control  he 
exercised  his  functions.  He  was  regarded  as  the  representative 
of  each  of  the  home  ministries  of  State,  War  and  Marine  in 
matters  pertaining  to  those  departments.  The  powers  and 
duties  of  the  governor-  and  captain-general  may  be  summarized 
as  follows: 

As  the  representative  of  the  central  power,  it  was  his  duty  to 
publish,  execute  and  enforce  the  laws,  decrees,  orders  and  com- 
mands of  general  character  issuing  from  any  of  the  ministries 
to  which  he  was  subject,  and  to  secure  the  fulfilment  of  all  in- 
ternational obligations  pertaining  to  the  islands;  to  watch  over 
and  inspect  all  the  branches  of  the  public  service  of  the  state  in 
the  islands,  and  to  give  an  account  to  the  ministries  which  he 
represented  of  any  or  all  matters  affecting  them;  to  exercise,  in 
certain  specified  cases,  the  prerogative  of  pardon;  to  suspend  the 
resolutions,  or  the  enforcement  of  orders  of  the  general  govern- 
ment whenever  the  public  interest  in  the  islands  required  such 
action,  and  to  suspend  the  execution  of  any  act  or  resolution  of 
inferior  authorities  whenever  deemed  necessary. 

As  chief  of  the  administration  it  was  his  duty  to  maintain  the 


THE   GOVERNMENTAL   ORGANIZATION        213 

integrity  of  the  administrative  regime  in  accordance  with  law; 
to  publish  orders  and  commands  for  the  fulfilment  of  the  laws 
and  regulations,  and  for  the  administration  and  government  of 
the  islands,  giving  an  account  of  his  action  to  the  Minister  of 
Ultramar;  to  propose  to  the  home  government  whatever  in  his 
opinion  might  promote  the  moral  and  material  interests  of  the 
people  under  the  government ;  to  suspend  associations  or  corpora- 
tions which  were  found  in  delicto;  to  authorize  the  imposition 
of  fines  by  the  governors  of  provinces  upon  public  officers  or 
corporations;  and  to  suspend  for  cause  the  public  servants  of 
the  administration  appointed  by  the  home  government,  giving 
immediate  notice  thereof,  and  filling  the  vacancies  meanwhile 
in  the  manner  provided  by  law. 

As  head  of  the  military  and  naval  forces  in  the  Archipelago, 
he  had  the  powers  and  functions  accorded  to  the  captains-general 
of  the  various  districts  of  the  Peninsula,  with  the  additional 
power  of  disposing  of  troops  and  assigning  superior  officers  to 
commands,  and  the  multifarious  powers  and  functions  which 
belong  to  a  general  in  command  of  an  army  corps/ 

There  were  two  councils,  one  called  the  Board  of  Authorities 
and  the  other  the  Council  of  Administration.  The  former,  which 
was  merely  a  cabinet,  was  composed  of  the  governor-general  as 
president;  the  archbishop  of  Manila;  the  lieutenant-general  sec- 
ond in  command;  the  commander  of  the  navy;  the  chief  officer, 
intendent,  of  the  treasury;  the  director-general  of  the  civil  ad- 
ministration; the  president  of  the  audiencia,  and  the  fiscal  or 
attorney-general  of  the  islands. 

Its  functions  were  purely  advisory ;  its  advice  was  not  binding 
upon  the  governor-general;  nor  did  his  acceptance  of  its  advice 
in  any  way  relieve  him  of  personal  responsibility. 

The  Council  of  Administration  was  a  consultative  body  of 
large  representation.  It  was  composed  of  some  twelve  members 
ex  officio:  the  governor-general  as  president;  the  archbishop  of 
Manila;  the  commander  of  the  navy;  the   lieutenant-general, 

1  Vide  Report  of  Schurman  Commission,  I,  p.  72.  The  governor-general 
received  a  salary  of  $40,000,  Mexican,  per  annum. 


214  THE    PHILIPPINES 

second  in  command  of  the  army;  the  president  of  the  audiencia; 
the  intendent  of  the  treasury  department;  the  director-general 
of  the  administration;  the  superiors  of  the  religious  orders;  the 
president  of  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Manila;  the  president 
of  the  Society  of  Friends  of  the  Country  and  in  addition  six 
appointed  members,  three  from  the  provinces  of  Luzon  and 
three  from  the  Visayan  provinces.  The  delegated  members  were 
designated  by  their  respective  local  provincial  boards,  or  juntas. 
To  these  were  added  three  members  appointed  by  the  king. 

This  council  considered  the  general  budget  of  receipts  and 
expenses  in  all  the  branches  of  the  service;  the  budget  of  re- 
ceipts and  expenditures  of  local  funds;  reforms  or  changes  in 
the  regulations  or  instructions  which  the  governor-general  de- 
sired to  propose  to  the  home  government ;  royal  patronage,  and 
all  other  matters  which  the  governor-general  might  deem  it 
proper  to  submit  for  its  consideration. 

The  supervision  of  matters  relating  to  the  interior,  such  as 
education,  sanitation,  public  works,  mines,  meteorology,  agri- 
culture, industry,  commerce  and  communications,  was  in  a  Gen- 
eral Directorate  of  Civil  Administration,  composed  of  a  direc- 
tor-general and  various  heads  of  bureaus. 

Prior  to  1865  the  finances  were  under  the  immediate  control 
of  the  chief  executive,  but  in  that  year  an  attempt  was  made  to 
separate  the  financial  from  the  executive  functions.  The  ad- 
ministrative work  of  the  treasury  was  in  charge  of  an  official 
known  as  the  intendent-general,  but  the  last  word  in  matters 
financial  as  well  as  executive  remained  with  the  governor-general. 

There  were  numerous  subordinate  officials,  who  collected  and 
disbursed  public  funds  and  audited  the  accounts.  The  duties 
were  collected  through  a  customs  house  at  Manila.  A  tariff 
board  interpreted  the  regulations  and  schedules  and  made  an 
annual  report  on  general  conditions  including  the  merchant  ma- 
rine. An  auxiliary  commission  of  appraisers,  which  included 
merchants  and  traders  In  its  membership,  prepared  and  published 
tabulated  statements  showing  the  average  prices  of  imported  and 
exported  goods. 


THE    GOVERNMENTAL    ORGANIZATION         215 

The  manner  in  which  the  ecclesiastical  was  connected  with 
the  civil  power  tended  to  restrict  the  authority  of  the  governors- 
general  by  creating  a  jealous  coordinating  authority  eager  to 
maintain  its  rights  and  privileges  and  willing  to  absorb  those  of 
the  civil  authorities.  The  audiencia  had  the  legal  right  to  share 
the  executive  and  legislative  power  with  the  governor-general, 
and  at  times,  when  the  chief  executive  was  not  a  strong  man  it 
was  the  master.  Le  Gentil  regarded  it  as  the  only  safeguard 
against  the  arbitrary  disposition  of  the  governors.  But  Zuniga, 
writing  a  generation  later,  pronounced  it  ineffective.  "The 
royal  audiencia,"  says  he,  "was  established  to  restrain  the  dis- 
position of  the  governors  which  it  has  never  prevented;  for  the 
gentlemen  of  the  gown  are  always  weak-kneed,  and  the  governor 
can  send  them  under  guard  to  Spain,  pack  them  off  to  the  prov- 
inces to  take  a  census  of  the  natives,  or  imprison  them,  which 
has  been  done  several  times."^  Until  after  the  murder  of  Buste- 
mente,  the  audiencia  was  authorized  to  assume  control  of  the 
government  upon  the  death  of  the  governor-general.  Thereafter 
until  after  the  British  occupation,  the  archbishop  succeeded 
the  governor-general  during  an  ad  interim  vacancy.  But  the 
weakness  displayed  by  Archbishop  Rojo  led  the  king  to  doubt 
the  qualifications  of  archbishops  for  the  position  of  governor- 
general,  and  the  office  of  lieutenant-governor  was  created.  Sub- 
sequently it  was  so  arranged  that  in  the  absence  of  the  governor 
and  captain-general,  the  commander  of  the  army,  and  in  his 
absence,  the  admiral  of  the  navy  should  assume  the  duties  of 
chief  executive.  During  his  term  of  office  a  governor-general 
could  not  be  criticized  with  impunity.  He  was  given  free  rein 
as  far  as  the  public  and  individuals  were  concerned.  But  there 
was  for  him  a  very  serious  hereafter. 

The  position  was  never  a  bed  of  roses.  The  vexatious  con- 
troversies with  the  ecclesiastics,  the  disposition  of  the  officials 
to  abuse  their  powers  and  misappropriate  funds,  the  remoteness 
from  Spain,  and  the  general  inconveniences  and  hardships  of 
the  life  rendered  it  attractive  only  to  the  few  who  were  filled 

*  Estadismo,  I,  p.  244,  quoted,  B.  &  R.,  I,  p.  50,  note. 


216  THE    PHILIPPINES 

with  high  enthusiasm  for  the  extension  of  the  power  of  the 
king  and  the  realm  of  the  true  faith,  and  to  the  many  who  de- 
sired to  amass  fortunes  regardless  of  methods.  One  of  the  early 
officials  paints  the  portrait  of  the  ideal  governor,  such  as  he  did 
not  find  in  the  islands,  in  terms  which  are  not  yet  without  in- 
terest. "The  Governor  must,*'  he  wrote,®  "understand  war,  but 
he  must  not  be  over-confident  of  his  abilities.  Let  him  give  ear 
to  the  advice  of  those  who  know  the  country  where  things  are 
managed  very  differently  from  what  they  are  in  Europe.  Those 
who  have  tried  to  carry  on  war  in  the  islands  as  it  is  carried  on 
in  Flanders  and  elsewhere  in  Europe  have  fallen  into  irreparable 
mistakes.  The  main  thing,  however,  is  to  aim  at  the  welfare  of 
the  people,  to  treat  them  kindly,  to  he  friendly  towards  foreigners, 
to  take  pains  to  have  the  ships  for  New  Spain  sail  promptly  and 
in  good  order,  to  promote  trade  with  the  neighboring  people,  and 
to  encourage  ship-building.  In  a  word,  to  live  with  the  Indians 
rather  like  a  father  than  like  a  governor. 

The  Spaniards  devised  an  institution  known  as  the  residencia, 
under  which  the  governors  and  other  officials  were  required  to 
remain  in  the  country  of  their  service  for  a  certain  length  of 
time  after  ceasing  to  hold  office,  during  which  time  an  investiga- 
tion was  made  into  their  conduct  during  their  entire  term  of 


8  See  B.  &  R.,  I,  p.  53. 

In  an  interesting  volume  entitled  Many  Memories,  Col.  Rivett-Carnac  says 
that  for  an  ideal  governor-general  of  India,  "a  very  clever  man  is  not  what  is 
wanted.  Such  a  one  will  probably  be  full  of  fads  and  will  rub  every  one 
the  wrong  way.  ...  If  you  employ  a  clever  man,  the  effect  will  be  some- 
what the  same,  as  I  have  seen  it  described,  of  using  a  sharp  pen-knife  in  cut- 
ting the  leaves  of  your  book.  The  very  sharp  blade  will  run  off  the  line  and 
commence  to  cut  out  curves  on  its  own  account,  irrespective  of  direction. 
What  is  wanted  for  the  purpose  is  in  the  nature  of  a  good,  solid,  sound  paper 
knife  .which,  working  steadily  through  the  folds  of  the  pages,  will  do  its  work 
honestly  and  neatly." 

The  Norman  Baron's  advice  to  his  son  as  to  the  way  to  govern  his  Saxons, 
done  into  English  by  Kipling,  may  well  be  remembered — 

"Appear  with  your  wife  and  the  children 

At  their  weddings  and  funerals  and  feasts; 

Be  polite,  but  not  friendly  to  bishops ; 

Be  good  to  all  poor  parish  priests; 

Say  'we*,  'us*  and  'our'  when  you're  talking, 

Instead  of  'you  fellows*,  and  'I*. 

Don't  ride  over  seeds ;  keep  your  temper, 

And  never  you  tell  'em  a  lie." 


THE    GOVERNMENTAL   ORGANIZATION         217 

office.*  Any  one  from  his  successor  to  the  poorest  native  was 
then  at  liberty  to  file  charges  against  him.  And  a  plentiful  crop 
of  charges  was  certain. 

In  the  Philippines  the  residencia  for  the  governor-general 
lasted  for  six  months,  and  was  conducted  by  his  successor  in 
office.  Such  an  institution  must  have  constituted  a  very  effective 
restraint,  but  it  was  capable  of  infinite  abuse.  When,  as  some- 
times happened,  the  governor's  successor  was  his  personal  enemy, 
the  temptation  to  blacken  the  preceding  administration  generally 
proved  irresistible.  In  some  instances,  the  governors  were  sub- 
jected to  very  severe  penalties  for  misconduct  during  their  terms 
of  office.  Governor  Corcuera  was  brought  to  trial  and  com- 
pelled to  pay  a  heavy  fine,  and  after  having  been  imprisoned  for 
five  years,  was  released  by  royal  order  and  returned  to  Spain. 
The  investigation  into  the  affairs  of  Governor  Gargas  was  so 
extensive  that  the  preparation  of  the  report  required  four  years. 
A  statement  of  charges,  some  grave  and  others  frivolous,  filled 
twenty  volumes.  Acting-Governor  Jose  Talba  was  charged  with 
embezzlement  of  great  sums  of  money.  After  an  elaborate  in- 
vestigation he  was  sentenced  to  pay  a  fine  of  approximately 
$1,000,000  and  the  cost  of  the  trial,  to  deprivation  of  public 
office  and  banishment  from  the  Philippines  and  Madrid.  Other 
governors  were  charged  with  embezzlement  of  public  funds  and 
various  other  forms  of  official  malfeasance,  and  unless  these 
officials  were  victims  of  false  charges  or  malicious  persecution, 
as  many  of  them  possibly  were,  the  institution  of  the  residencia 
seems  to  have  justified  its  existence.  Verily,  the  consciousness 
that  an  inquiry  into  his  conduct  would  be  conducted  by  his  suc- 
cessor, who  might  be  a  personal  enemy,  may  well  have  been  a 
terrible  trial,  the  strain  of  which,  as  one  writer  says,  "would 
sometimes  break  their  hearts."  Many  a  governor  quarreling 
with  the  Church  and  facing  the  ordeal  of  the  residencia^  must 
have  felt  with  the  Knight  of  La  Manche  that  it  were  better  "to 


*  See  Morga's  Sucesos,  B.  &  R.,  XVI,  p.  166. 

'  It  would  be  interesting  to  see  the  residencia  applied  to  the  adminstra« 
tions  of  certain  modern  governors-general. 


218  THE    PHILIPPINES 

be  Sancho  Panza  and  go  to  heaven  than  be  governor  and  go 
to  hell." 

De  Pons,  after  describing  the  residencia,  says,  "I  request  the 
reader  not  to  infer  from  my  opinion  of  the  tribunals  of  residencia, 
my  confidence  in  their  efficacy.  My  homage  is  immediately  and 
solely  addressed  to  the  wisdom  of  the  law.  I  resign  all  criticism 
on  its  operation  to  those  who  know  the  seductive  influence  of 
Plutus  over  the  feeble  and  pliant  Themis."® 

As  the  propulsive  power  back  of  the  colonizing  movement 
came  from  the  ecclesiastical  authorities,  it  was  but  natural  that 
the  influence  of  the  Church  in  the  colonies  should  be  great  and 
often  controlling.  The  early  Spanish  kings  recognized  the  right 
of  the  Pope  to  dispose  of  territory  not  already  occupied  by 
Christians.  As  the  expenses  connected  with  the  discovery  of 
the  Indians  were  borne  by  the  king,  the  Pope  by  a  Bull  of  Sep- 
tember 3,  1501,  granted  to  him  the  right  to  collect  tithes,  on 
condition  that  he  would  endow  and  maintain  the  churches  to  be 
established  in  the  colonies.  These  churches  and  the  clergy  were 
thereafter  supported  by  appropriations  made  by  the  king,  who 
possessed,  in  virtue  of  this  arrangement,  certain  powers  or- 
dinarily exercised  by  church  officials. 

The  ecclesiastical  system  in  the  Philippines  was  well  organ- 
ized."^ "Here,"  says  Bourne,  "we  find  the  real  vital  organization 
of  the  Philippines  governing  system."  The  archbishop  of  Manila 
was  the  head  of  the  organization  and  under  him  as  suffragans 
were  the  bishops  of  Cebu,  Segovia  and  Caceras.  The  Domini- 
can, Augustinian,  Franciscan  and  Jesuit  orders  were  under  the 
direct  and  independent  control  of  their  own  provincials.  Each 
maintained  a  representative  in  Madrid,  through  whom  it  could 
always  reached  the  ear  of  the  king  without  the  intervention  of 
the  civil  authorities  at  Manila. 

The  persistent  claim  of  the  members  of  the  monastic  orders 
to  exemption  from  the  supervision  and  control  of  the  bishops 


6  Voyage  to  the  Eastern  Parts  of  Terra  Firma,  etc.,  II,  p.  25  (1806)  ;  B.  & 
R.,  I,  p.  52,  note. 

7  For  an  account  of  the  ecclesiastical  machinery,  see  the  translation  from 
Buzeta  y  Bravo,  Diccionario  de  las  Filipinas  (Madrid,  1850),  in  B.  &  R., 
XXVIII,  p.  266,  et  seq. 


THE    GOVERNMENTAL    ORGANIZATION         219 

led  to  many  violent  controversies  in  which  the  civil  authorities 
also  were  generally  involved.  The  friars,  or  regulars,  always 
greatly  outnumbered  the  secular  clergy,  but  the  statistics  convey 
a  very  inadequate  idea  of  their  relative  power  and  importance.® 

The  vows  of  the  friars  required  them  to  live  in  monasteries, 
but  the  Pope  was  induced  to  absolve  them  from  this  particular 
obligation  and  permit  them  to  act  as  curates  in  the  parishes,  in 
the  same  manner  as  the  secular  clergy.  This  arrangement,  which 
was  intended  to  be  but  temporary,  became  permanent  and  laid 
the  foundation  for  the  practical  control  of  the  country  by  the 
representatives  of  the  monastic  orders.  The  question  whether 
the  friars  who  were  in  charge  of  the  parishes  were  subject  to 
visitation  by  the  bishop  was  never  actually  settled.  When  the 
pressure  became  too  strong,  a  threat  to  withdraw  from  the 
islands  was  always  sufficient  to  win  the  victory,  as  the  king 
fully  realized  the  necessity  for  the  services  of  the  friars  in  the 
work  of  governing,  civilizing  and  Christianizing  the  country. 

When  Archbishop  Poblete  attempted  to  enforce  the  Bull  of 
Pope  Urban  VIII  and  subject  them  to  the  orders  of  the  bishops, 
all  the  friars  resigned  their  positions.  Archbishop  Camancho 
was  foiled  in  the  same  way.®  Between  1744  and  1753  the  Pope 
issued  four  bulls  in  which  the  friars  who  acted  as  curates  were 
placed  under  the  authority  of  the  bishops  and  Ferdinand  VI 
strictly  enjoined  the  observance  of  these  bulls.  But  with  the 
usual  threat  of  resignation  the  friars  were  able  to  defy  the  orders 


8  In  1750  of  569  parishes  with  904,116  souls,  but  148  with  147,269  persons 
were  under  secular  priests.  The  rest  were  distributed  among  the  various 
orders  as  follows : 

Augustinians   ; 115  parishes  252.963 

Franciscans 63  parishes  141,193 

Jesuits    93  parishes  209,527 

Dominicans 51  parishes  99,780 

Recolletos  105  parishes  53,384 

In  1898,  according  to  the  Church  records  in  Manila,  there  were  746  regular 
parishes,  116  mission  parishes,  346  Augustinian  friars,  107  Franciscans,  233 
Dominicans,  327  Recolletos,  42  Jesuits,  16  Capuchins,  and  6  Benedictans.  On 
January  4,  1904,  there  were  246  friars  in  the  islands.  Practically  all  soon 
thereafter  left,  but  many  have  returned. 

"  See  Dr.  Pardo  de  Tavera's  "The  Power  of  the  Monastic  Orders,"  in 
Census  of  Philippine  Islands  (1905),  I,  p.  340,  et  seq. 


220  THE   PHILIPPINES 

of  both  Pope  and  king.  A  generation  later,  when  a  similar 
attempt  was  contemplated,  the  archbishop  in  despair  wrote  to 
the  king  that  "when  the  order  for  obliging  the  friars  to  submit 
to  their  superiors  is  put  into  effect  they  will  threaten  to  abandon 
all  of  the  parishes  under  their  charge  in  these  islands,  and  rather 
than  bring  about  that  result  it  would  be  preferable  to  let  the 
present  bad  state  of  affairs  continue.  These  caprices  of  theirs 
are  of  long  standing  and  will  not  easily  be  abandoned." 

As  late  as  1865  the  archbishop  of  Manila  and  the  bishops  of 
Cebu  and  Neuva  Caceras  joined  in  a  complaint  to  the  governor 
in  which  they  denounced  the  abuses  committed  by  the  friar 
curates  which  had  been  tolerated  for  three  centuries.  "The 
friars  who  acted  as  curates,"  said  the  archbishop,  "were  almost 
sure  of  immunity;  they  relied  on  their  offices  to  shield  them 
from  punishment,  and  made  it  obligatory  for  their  ecclesiastical 
superiors  who  desired  to  avoid  scandal  to  submit  to  defeat,  to 
stomach  the  insults  heaped  upon  them  and  to  continue  in  the 
ministry  persons  who  were  not  up  to  the  standards  of  their  holy 
mission."  So  great  had  the  power  of  the  four  monastic  orders 
become  that  papal  bulls  and  royal  cedulas  were  of  no  avail 
against  the  veto  of  their  provincial  heads. 

Under  such  conditions  it  was  inevitable  that  the  government 
should  pass  under  the  control  of  the  friars.  Both  their  good 
and  evil  work  tended  to  increase  their  power  and  influence.  In 
the  distant  villages  the  curates  exercised  a  mild  but  very  effective 
despotism.  In  some  provinces  there  were  no  white  persons  other 
than  the  friars  to  assist  the  alcalde-mayor  to  perform  his  duties 
as  provincial  governor.  In  more  than  one-half  of  the  twelve 
hundred  villages  in  the  islands  "there  were  no  Spaniards,  no 
other  national  authority,  nor  any  other  force  to  maintain  public 
order  save  only  the  friars." 

They  thus  created  for  themselves  a  position  independent  of 
the  regular  ecclesiastical  authority  as  represented  by  the  arch- 
bishop, as  well  as  the  civil  power,  and  that  position  they  con- 
tinued to  strengthen  and  maintain  until  the  debacle  which  ex- 
tinguished Spanish  sovereignty  in  the  islands.    With  wealth  and 


THE   GOVERNMENTAL   ORGANIZATION        221 

political  power  came  the  arrogance  which  always  goes  with  the 
combination.  They  intimidated  bishops,  led  a  mob  against  one 
governor-general,  and  threw  another  into  the  dungeon  of  the 
Inquisition.  In  the  beginning  they  were  poor,  but  in  the  course 
of  time  the  orders  acquired  wealth  by  donations,  and  by  purchase 
and  inheritances  of  lands.  By  1601  they  were  possessed  of 
such  territorial  possessions  as  to  alarm  the  king  and  lead  to  the 
appointment  of  a  commissioner  to  investigate  and  report  on  the 
extent  and  description  of  their  lands  and  the  nature  of  the  titles 
by  which  they  were  held.  The  friars,  claiming  exemption  from 
such  formalities,  refused  to  give  any  information,  and  were 
declared  to  be  "occupants  in  bad  faith,"  of  certain  lands  of  which 
they  were  in  possession.  But  in  the  end  they  triumphed.  A 
new  archbishop  arrived;  to  him  the  friars  somewhat  inconsist- 
ently appealed  for  protection  against  the  commissioner;  and 
under  such  pressure  their  titles  were  finally  confirmed. 

After  the  early  days  of  poverty  and  enthusiasm  had  passed 
each  of  the  orders  had  its  hacienda  or  plantation  in  the  country, 
valuable  property  in  the  city,  and  shares  in  the  galleons  which 
passed  between  Manila  and  Acapulco.  Each  friar  who  acted 
as  a  curate  received  rentals  which  sometimes  amounted  to  10,000 
pesos  per  year  in  addition  to  support  and  certain  concessions  and 
gratuities  from  the  crown.  So  great  did  the  influence  of  the 
friars  become  that  in  the  latter  days  of  the  Spanish  regime  the 
curates  had  absorbed  nearly  all  political  as  well  as  ecclesiastical 
power. 

That  the  parish  priests  had  become  veritable  Pooh-Bahs  ap- 
pears from  the  testimony  which  the  head  of  the  Franciscan 
order  gave  before  the  Schurman  Commission  in  1900.  In  addi- 
tion to  the  duties  connected  with  his  sacred  office,  the  curate  was 
inspector  of  the  primary  schools,  president  of  the  Boards  of 
Health,  Statistics,  Charities,  and  Urban  Taxation;  inspector  of 
taxation;  honorary  (formerly  actual)  president  of  the  Board 
of  Public  Works;  examiner  of  pupils  who  attended  the  first  and 
second  grades  in  the  public  schools;  censor  of  native  plays,  com- 
edies and  dramas;  president  of  the  Prison  Board;  inspector  of 


222  THE    PHILIPPINES 

food  provided  for  the  prisoners;  and  member  of  the  Provincial 
Board  and  of  the  Board  for  Partitioning  Crown  lands. 

He  certified  from  his  parish  records  to  the  correctness  of 
the  cedulas,  and  to  the  certificates  of  character,  which  under 
Spanish  law  every  man  had  to  have  in  his  possession,  to  the  civil 
status  of  persons,  and  to  the  condition  of  persons  drawn  for 
military  service.  He  was  required  to  be  present  at  municipal 
elections,  act  as  a  member  of  the  municipal  council,  and  to  ex- 
amine and  censor  the  financial  budgets  before  they  were  sent 
to  the  provincial  governors.  In  some  instances  he  also  acted 
as  provincial  auditor.  "Besides  the  above,"  we  are  told,  "there 
were  other  details  which  devolved  on  the  priest."^" 

"No  pent  up  Utica  contracts  your  powers. 
But  the  whole  boundless  continent  is  yours." 

Under  such  conditions  the  ordinary  native  naturally  and  very 
properly  held  the  men  who  possessed  such  powers  responsible 
for  the  abuses  of  the  government  and  the  local  insurrections  and 
disturbances  induced  thereby  hastened,  if  they  did  not  actually 
cause,  the  downfall  of  Spanish  power. 

In  view  of  the  conflicting  testimony,  it  is  perhaps  impossible 
at  this  time  properly  to  apportion  the  merits  and  demerits  of  the 
friars.  Yet  they  were  such  an  important  part  of  the  system  of 
government  that  neither  its  form,  operations,  nor  efficiency  can 
be  understood  without  taking  the  work  of  the  friars  into  consid- 
eration. 

They  have  been  bitterly  censured  and  indiscriminately  con- 
demned. The  modern  Filipinos  almost  without  exception  at- 
tribute to  them  the  evils  from  which  the  country  suffered.  In 
this  there  is  doubtless  much  exaggeration;  there  is  another  side 
to  the  shield.  Travelers  and  residents  in  no  way  connected 
with  the  orders  have  painted  in  roseate  colors  the  early  condi- 
tions which  were  brought  about  by  the  friars.     They  doubtless 


1°  See  testimony  relating  to  the  Religious  Orders,  taken  during  July  and 
August,  1890,  Sen.  Doc.  igo,  36  Cong.,  2nd  Sess. 


THE    GOVERNMENTAL    ORGANIZATION         223 

bear  about  the  same  relation  to  reality  that  one's  view  of  a 
Filipino  village  under  the  softening  light  of  a  tropical  moon 
does  to  that  of  a  sanitary  inspector  who  makes  his  rounds  in  the 
daytime.  Tomas  de  Comyn  enthusiastically  invites  his  readers 
to  "visit  the  Philippine  Islands  and  with  astonishment  shall  we 
there  behold  extended  ranges,  studded  with  temples,  and  spa- 
cious convents,  the  Divine  worship  celebrated  with  pomp  and 
splendor ;  regularity  in  the  streets,  and  even  luxury  in  the  houses 
and  dress;  schools  of  the  first  rudiments  in  all  the  towns  and  the 
inhabitants  well  versed  in  the  art  of  writing.  We  shall  see  there 
causeways  raised,  bridges  of  good  architecture  built,  and,  in 
short,  all  the  measures  of  good  government  and  police  in  the 
greatest  part  of  the  country  carried  into  effect;  yet  the  whole 
is  due  to  the  exertions,  apostolic  labors,  and  pure  patriotism  of 
the  ministers  of  religion.  Let  us  travel  over  the  provinces  and 
we  shall  see  towns  of  five,  ten  and  twenty  thousand  Indians, 
peacefully  governed  by  one  weak,  old  man,  who,  with  his  doors 
open  at  all  hours,  sleeps  quiet  and  secure  in  his  dwelling,  without 
any  other  magic  or  any  other  guard  than  the  love  and  respect 
with  which  he  has  known  how  to  inspire  his  flock."^^ 

The  German  naturalist,  Jagor,  who  was  free  from  ecclesi- 
astical influence,  after  speaking  of  the  credit  due  to  Spain  for 
improving  the  conditions  of  the  islands,  says :  "The  monks  con- 
tributed an  essential  part  to  this  result.  Coming  from  among 
the  common  people,  used  to  poverty  and  self-denial,  their  duties 
led  them  into  intimate  relations  with  the  natives,  and  they  were 
naturally  fitted  to  adapt  the  foreign  religion  and  morals  to  prac- 
tical use.  So,  too,  in  later  times,  when  they  came  to  possess 
rich  livings,  and  their  pious  zeal  in  general  relaxed  as  their 
revenues  increased,  they  still  contributed  most  essentially  to 
bring  about  conditions  both  good  and  bad  which  we  have  de- 
scribed, since  without  families  of  their  own  and  without  refined 
culture,  intimate  association  with  the  children  of  the  soil  was 
a  necessity  to  them.     Even  their  haughty  opposition  to  the 

^^  State  of  the  Philippine  Islands,  pp.  216,  217;  B.  &.  R.,  I,  p.  59. 


224  fTHE    PHILIPPINES 

secular  authorities  was  generally  for  the  advantage  of  the  na- 
tives."" 

Palgrave,  writing  in  1878,  says  that,  "To  clerical  government, 
paradoxical  as  the  statement  may  sound  in  modern  European 
ears,  the  Philippine  Islands  owe,  more  than  to  anything  else, 
their  internal  prosperity  and  the  Malay  population  its  sufficiency 
and  happiness.  This  it  is  that  again  and  again  has  stood  a 
barrier  of  mercy  and  justice  between  the  weaker  and  stronger 
race,  the  vanquished  and  the  victor;  this  has  been  the  steady 
protector  of  the  native  inhabitants,  this  their  faithful  benefactor, 
their  sufficient  leader  and  guide.  With  a  cura  for  father  and 
the  Capitan  for  his  adjutant,  a  Philippine  hamlet  feels  and 
knows  little  of  the  vexations  inseparable  from  direct  and  for- 
eign official  administration;  and  if  under  such  rule  'progress,' 
as  we  love  to  term  it,  be  rare,  disaffection  and  want  are  rarer 
stiU."^' 

There  were  imdoubtedly  cruel  and  tyrannical  members  of 
the  monastic  orders,  such  as  are  drawn  by  Rizal  in  his  novels, 
who  were  guilty  of  wrongs  and  crimes,  but  it  is  certain  that  as 
a  class  they  were  generally,  at  least  until  about  the  middle  of  the 
nineteenth  century,  the  consistent  advocates  of  humane  treat- 
ment for  the  natives  and  their  defenders  against  the  oppressive 
measures  of  the  civil  and  military  authorities.  They  were  im- 
portant and  probably  the  controlling  factors  in  the  work  of 
conquest  and  development  of  the  country.  In  the  early  days,  at 
least,  it  was  true  that,  as  said  by  one  of  the  viceroys,  "in  each 
friar  in  the  Philippines,  the  King  had  a  captain-general  and  a 
whole  army."** 

To  quote  again  from  Tomas  de  Comyn,  who  for  eighteen 
years  resided  in  Manila  as  the  agent  of  the  Philippine  Commer- 
cial Company:  "Of  little  avail  would  have  been  the  valor  and 
constancy  with  which  Legaspi  and  his  worthy  comrades  overcame 

12  Jagor,  The  Philippine  Islands,  p.  366  (London,  1875),  B.  &  R.,  I,  p.  74. 

13  In  Cornhill  Magazine,  1878,  p.  161. 

1*  Tomas  de  Com3m,  State  of  the  Philippine  Islands  (translated  by  Will- 
iam Walton,  1821),  p.  209. 


THE   GOVERNMENTAL    ORGANIZATION         225 

the  natives  of  the  islands  if  the  apostolic  zeal  of  the  mission- 
aries had  not  seconded  their  exertions,  and  aided  to  consolidate 
the  enterprise.  The  latter  were  the  real  conquerors;  they  who, 
without  any  other  arms  than  their  virtues,  gained  over  the  good 
will  of  the  islanders,  caused  the  Spanish  name  to  be  beloved, 
and  gave  the  King,  as  it  were,  by  miracle,  two  millions  more  of 
submissive  and  Christian  subjects." 

Filipinos  who  are  not  blinded  by  prejudice  recognize  the  good 
while  condemning  the  evil  work  of  the  friars.  Doctor  Pardo  de 
Tavera,  writing  after  the  friars  had  left  the  islands,  says:  "His- 
tory makes  the  friars  responsible  for  the  errors  committed  by 
the  Spanish  government  in  these  Islands,  but  it  would  appear 
that  without  the  aid  of  the  religious  orders  it  would  have  been 
impossible  for  Spain  to  have  fulfilled,  even  to  the  extent  she 
has,  her  promises  of  civilizing  the  Filipinos,  and  of  helping 
them  to  advance  along  the  lines  marked  out  by  the  European 
nations.  It  is  impossible  not  to  recognize  the  humanitarian  im- 
pulses, truly  Christian  and  equitable,  which  guided  the  Kings 
and  the  Spanish  legislators  in  what  they  did  for  the  Philippine 
Islands.  .  .  .  The  friars  have  been  made  to  bear  the  brunt 
of  many  shortcomings,  but  if  the  other  officials  of  the  Spanish 
government  had  complied  with  their  duties  even  to  the  extent 
to  which  the  friars  complied  with  theirs,  it  is  certain  that  his- 
tory to-day  would  shift  that  burden  of  responsibility  to  other 
shoulders.  The  friars  undoubtedly  were  responsible  for  many 
things,  but  they  also  should  be  credited  with  the  attainment  of 
certain  results  in  the  civilization  of  the  Filipino  people,  the 
credit  for  which  is  now  denied  them."^"*  With  this  judgment  we 
must  agree. 

Until  the  year  1598  the  Bishopric  of  Manila  was  suffragan 
to  the  Archbishopric  of  Mexico  and  was  included  in  the  district 
of  the  Mexican  Inquisition.  But  the  energetic  Bishop  Salazar, 
on  his  own  authority,  established  an  Inquisition  and  proceeded 
to  clear  the  Philippines  of  heresy.^'    His  activities  soon  attracted 

*"  Census  of  the  Philippine  Islands,  I,  p.  340. 

^'  "The  Holy  office  of  the  Inquisition  residing  in  Mexico  of  Nueva  Espana 


?26  THE    PHILIPPINES 

the  attention  of  the  authorities  in  Mexico,  and  a  commissioner 
was  sent  out  to  vindicate  their  rights.  Salazar  refused  to  recog- 
nize the  commissioner  and  threatened  all  who  did  so  with  ex- 
communication. As  the  commissioner  was  a  member  of  the 
Augustinian  order  the  bishop  found  adherents  among  the  Jesuits 
and  for  a  time  remained  in  control  of  the  situation. 

Finally  the  tribunal  annulled  all  the  acts  of  the  bishop,  and 
the  king  wrote  that  he  had  exceeded  his  jurisdiction  and  in  the 
future  should  not  interfere  with  the  work  of  the  commissioner. 
Subsequent  attempts  to  organize  an  independent  tribunal  in  the 
islands  were  unsuccessful.  The  power  of  the  commissioner 
was  carefully  limited  and  defined.^'^  He  could  do  little  more 
than  collect  Information,  receive  charges,  search  ships  for  pro- 
hibited books  and  report  to  Mexico  and  execute  the  orders  re- 
ceived from  there.  He  could  interfere  with  the  courts,  but  not 
enforce  orders.  He  could  make  arrests  only  in  special  cases, 
such  as  bigamy  and  desertion  to  the  Dutch  or  Moros,  and  was 
required  to  send  all  his  prisoners  to  Mexico  for  trial  and  pun- 
ishment. The  cases  of  desertion  by  soldiers  to  the  Moros  or 
Dutch  proved  difficult.  The  matter  was  submitted  to  Philip  HI, 
and  learned  discussions  ensued.  But  the  question  was  purely 
academic.  The  Inquisition  never  had  a  real  case  to  act  on  for 
the  very  good  reason  that  the  military  authorities  promptly  shot 
all  available  culprits.  There  was  another  class  of  cases  which 
troubled  the  tribunals  greatly  and  which  throws  light  on  the 
conditions  in  the  military  service.  It  seems  strange  that  any  one 
should  have  voluntarily  submitted  himself  to  the  Inquisition,  but 
many  soldiers  preferred  it  to  the  hardships  of  the  service.  De- 
liberately uttering  heretical  opinions  or  blaspheming,  they  would 
be  arrested  and  sent  to  Mexico  for  trial.  The  tribunal  was  then 
called  upon  to  bear  the  expenses,  and  for  a  time  it  looked  as  if 

has  its  commissaries,  servants,  and  helpers  in  Manila  and  in  the  bishoprics  of 
the  Islands,  who  attend  to  matters  touching  the  Holy  Office.  They  never  fail 
to  have  plenty  to  do  there  because  of  the  entrance  of  so  many  strangers  into 
those  districts.  However,  the  Holy  tribunal  does  not  have  jurisdiction  of  the 
causes  pertaining  to  the  natives,  as  the  latter  are  so  recently  converted." 
Morga's  Sucesos  (1609),  B.  &  R..  XVI.  p.  154. 

1^  For  the  instructions  to  the  Commissary,  see  B.  &  R.,  V,  p.  256. 


THE    GOVERNMENTAL    ORGANIZATION         22/ 

it  might  be  required  to  furnish  free  transportation  home  to  the 
entire  army.  It  preferred  to  authorize  the  commissioner  to 
dispose  of  such  cases. 

Lea  finds  during  the  sixteenth  century  only  three  cases  of 
"real  inquisitorial  work  for  the  purity  of  the  faith."  Diego 
Hernandez,  who  was  accused  of  ordering  his  cook  to  cut  the 
chickens'  throats  instead  of  strangling  them,  had  his  property 
sequestrated  and  died  during  the  long  delay  occasioned  by  the 
search  for  evidence  in  his  home  province  in  Spain.  There  were 
numerous  insignificant  cases  during  the  following  centuries  which 
the  curious  will  find  fully  described  in  Lea's  learned  book.  In 
1762  the  commissioner  attempted  unsuccessfully  to  exercise  jur- 
isdiction over  the  Moros  and  the  English  sailors  on  board  an 
English  ship. 

The  important  fact  to  note  is  that  the  natives  were  never 
subject  to  the  inquisitional  jurisdiction;  it  applied  only  to  Span- 
iards. As  Lea  says,  "While  this  branch  of  the  Inquisition  ac- 
complished so  little  for  the  faith,  it  was  eminently  successful  in 
the  functions  of  contributing  to  the  discontent  and  confusion 
which  so  disastrously  affected  colonial  administrations."  It  be- 
came involved  in  the  quarrel  between  Governor  Corcuera  and 
the  archbishop  and  finally  lost  all  influence  with  the  public 
through  the  persecution  of  Governor-General  Salcedo.  This  pro- 
ceeding originated  in  the  malice  of  Commissioner  Paternia  and 
the  ambitions  of  his  accomplices  in  the  audiencia.  It  was  re- 
pudiated by  the  tribunal  in  Mexico,  and  Paternia,  like  his  victim, 
died  a  prisoner  while  on  the  way  to  Mexico.  But  he  had  accom- 
plished something.  He  "had  reduced  the  power  of  the  Holy 
office  until  its  officials  were  so  despised  that  if  they  had  to  ar- 
rest the  vilest  individual  no  one  would  help  them."" 

For  the  purposes  of  government  the  islands  were  at  first 
divided  into  three  provinces  and  from  time  to  time  these  were 
subdivided  according,  as  nearly  as  possible,  to  the  dialects  spoken 

**  Lea,  The  Inquisition  in  the  Spanish  Dependencies,  p.  299  et  seq.  The 
records  of  the  Inquisition  were  destroyed  in  order  to  prevent  them  from  fall- 
ing into  the  hands  of  the  English  at  the  time  of  the  capture  of  Manila. 


228  THE    PHILIPPINES 

by  the  inhabitants.  Each  province  was  under  the  control  of  a 
functionary  known  as  alcalde-mayor  who  exercised  both  ex- 
ecutive and  judicial  powers,  under  the  direction  of  and  subject 
to  rules  and  regulations  proclaimed  by  the  governor-general. 

Until  about  1884,  these  alcaldes  or  provincial  governors  were 
allowed  to  engage  in  trade  on  their  own  account,  and  as  they 
were  charged  with  the  duty  of  receiving  tribute  in  kind  and 
in  fixed  amounts,  they  were  enabled  to  profit  by  the  fluctuation 
in  prices,  thus  filling  their  own  pockets  at  the  expense  of  the 
tribute  payers.  The  king  several  times  directed  that  the  alcaldes 
should  not  engage  in  business,  but  in  1754  a  royal  cedula  per- 
mitted them  to  go  into  business  on  condition  of  paying  a  "fine 
for  engaging  in  commerce" — the  treasury  thus  sharing  in  the 
profits.  The  fines  to  be  paid  for  violating  the  law  ran  from 
forty  to  three  hundred  pesos  in  the  different  provinces.  In  1840 
to  be  alcalde  in  certain  localities  is  said  to  have  been  worth 
fifty  thousand  pesos  per  year. 

In  1886  the  office  of  alcalde  was  abolished,  and  that  of  civil 
governor  established.  The  governors  were  thereafter  charged 
with  the  administration  of  the  laws  and  the  management  of 
the  provincial  finances  and  the  punishment  of  offenses  against 
religion.  At  the  same  time  the  judicial  system  was  reorganized, 
and  the  judicial  powers  of  the  alcaldes  were  transferred  to  the 
newly  created  judges  of  the  Courts  of  First  Instance.  The  gov- 
ernors appear,  however,  to  have  retained  some  of  the  powers  of 
local  magistrates. 

Contemporaneous  writers  paint  very  somber  pictures  of  the 
men  who  were  appointed  to  these  provincial  offices  during  the 
decadent  period  of  Spanish  rule.  No  doubt,  here,  as  elsewhere, 
there  were  exceptions  to  the  rule  of  incompetency  and  corrup- 
tion. 

"It  is  a  fact  common  enough,"  says  the  indignant  Tomas  de 
Comyn,  "to  see  a  hairdresser  or  a  lackey  converted  into  a  gov- 
ernor; a  sailor  or  a  deserter  transformed  into  a  district  magis- 
trate, collector  or  military  commander  of  a  populous  province 
without  other  counselor  than  his  own  crude  understanding,  or 


THE   GOVERNMENTAL   ORGANIZATION         229 

any  other  guide  than  his  own  passions.  Such  a  metamorphosis 
would  excite  laughter  in  a  comedy  or  farce ;  but  realized  in  the 
theater  of  human  life,  it  must  give  rise  to  sensations  of  a  very 
different  nature.  Who  is  there  that  does  not  feel  horror-struck 
and  tremble  for  the  innocent  when  he  sees  a  being  of  this  kind 
transformed  from  the  yard-arm  to  the  seat  of  justice,  deciding 
in  the  first  instance  on  the  honor,  lives  and  property  of  a  hun- 
dred thousand  persons,  and  haughtily  exacting  the  homage  and 
incense  of  the  spiritual  ministers  of  the  towns  under  his  juris- 
diction as  well  as  the  parish  curates,  respectable  for  their  ac- 
quirements and  benevolence  and  who  in  their  own  native  places 
would  possibly  have  rejected  as  a  servant  the  very  man  whom 
in  the  Philippines  they  are  compelled  to  court  and  obey  as  a 
sovereign."" 

The  provinces  were  subdivided  into  districts  called  pueblos, 
each  under  a  gohernadorcillo,  ordinarily  called  capitan.  This 
important  local  official  was  required  to  be  a  citizen,  that  is,  either 
a  native  or  a  Chinese  mestizo,  twenty-five  years  old,  able  to 
speak  and  write  Spanish  and  be  or  have  been  a  caheza  for  a 
certain  number  of  years.  The  pueblos  were  subdivided  into 
barangays,  each,  as  in  the  original  native  system,  under  a  sort 
of  tribal  chief  called  a  cabeza  de  barangay.  Each  barangay  was 
supposed  to  contain  from  one  hundred  to  one  hundred  and  fifty 
families.  Originally  the  office  of  cabeza  was  hereditary,  but  in 
time  it  became  elective.^"  Morga  says  that  in  his  time  all  mar- 
ried natives  had  the  right  to  vote  for  gobernadorcillo,  but  later 
this  official  was  elected  by  thirteen  electors  from  those  who,  like 
himself,  held  the  office  of  cabeza.  The  chief  of  a  barangay  paid 
no  tribute,  and  after  three  years  of  service  could  resign  and 
thereafter  be  a  member  of  a  local  municipal  body  called  la  prin- 
cipalia^^  and  be  exempt  from  the  payment  of  tribute. 

^^  State  of  the  Philippines,  p.  194.  However,  compare  this  with  the  same 
writer's  description,  supra,  of  the  idyllic  conditions  in  the  towns  where  the 
curate  is  the  king. 

20  "Formerly  the  cabesa  exercised  many  functions  of  the  government,  but 
under  the  Spanish  regime  the  office  has  gradually  degenerated  until  the 
person  who  fills  it  enjoys  little  but  the  ill-will  of  his  district.  The  function 
he  exercised  was  that  of  a  representative,  or  better,  an  agent  for  the  govern- 
ment."   Report  of  the  Schurman  Commission,  1900,  I,  p.  56. 

21  The  leading  citizens  in  the  Philippines  are  still  referred  to  locally  as 
principalias. 


230  THE    PHILIPPINES 

The  Filipinos  seem  always  to  have  had  a  certain  instinct  for 
orderly  government  on  a  small  scale.  I  have  in  modern  times 
attended  meetings  of  the  populace  of  small  pueblos  called  to 
consider  questions  which  affected  the  community  and  heard  all 
classes  discuss  questions,  if  not  with  the  intelligence,  certainly 
with  the  interest  of  a  typical  New  England  town  meeting. 

Jagor^^  describes  an  election  for  gohernadorcillo  which  as  to 
form  and  spirit  may  have  occurred  as  well  the  present  year  as 
about  1860.  The  election  "took  place  in  the  town  house.  At 
the  table  sits  the  governor  or  his  proxy,  on  his  right  the  pastor 
and  on  his  left  the  secretary  who  is  the  interpreter.  All  the 
cahezas  de  harangay,  the  gohernadorcillo  and  those  who  have 
formerly  been  such  have  taken  their  places  on  the  benches.  In 
the  first  place,  six  of  the  cahezas  and  six  of  the  ex-gobernador- 
cillos  respectively  are  chosen  by  lot  to  serve  as  electors.  The 
gobernadorcillo  in  office  makes  the  thirteenth.  The  rest  now 
leave  the  room.  After  the  chairman  has  read  the  rules  and  ex- 
horted the  electors  to  fulfill  their  duties  conscientiously,  they 
go  one  by  one  to  the  table  and  write  three  names  on  a  ballot. 
Whoever  receives  the  largest  number  of  votes  is  forthwith  nom- 
inated for  gohernadorcillo  for  the  ensuing  year,  if  the  pastor 
or  the  electors  make  no  well  founded  objection,  subject  to  con- 
firmation of  the  Superior  Court  in  Manila,  which  is  a  matter  of 
course  since  the  influence  of  the  pastor  would  prevent  an  unsuit- 
able choice.  The  same  process  was  followed  in  the  election  of  the 
other  local  officials,  except  that  the  new  gobernadorcillo  was 
called  in  that  he  might  make  any  objections  to  the  selection." 
Probably  the  pastor  was  a  Spaniard  and  all  the  rest  were  Fili- 
pinos. 

At  the  time  of  the  American  occupation  the  municipalities 
were  gradually  being  organized  under  the  Maura  law  of  1893. 
That  law  was,  however,  very  materially  modified  before  it  was 
put  in  force  in  the  Philippines.  Many  of  its  provisions  for 
local  self-government  remained  a  dead  letter  up  to  the  time 

22  Travels  in  the  Philippines  (London,  1875).  See  Rizal's  account  of  "The 
Meeting  in  the  Town  Hall,"  in  An  Eagle's  Flight,  Chap.  XXII.  This  is  the 
absurd  title  of  the  English  translation  of  Nole  me  Jangere, 

\ 


THE    GOVERNMENTAL    ORGANIZATION         231 

of  the  revolt  in  1896  when  it  was  superseded  by  martial  law. 
It  is  important  principally  as  showing  what  the  Spanish  govern- 
ment was  attempting  to  do.^' 

The  Spanish  towns  like  Manila  were  organized  much  like 
similar  places  in  Spain.  The  corporation,  el  cabildo,  consisted 
of  two  ordinary  alcaldes,  or  justices,  eight  regidores,  or  alder- 
men, a  registrar  and  a  constable.  The  aldermen  were  elected 
annually  by  the  householders  of  the  city,  but  the  other  offices 
were  proprietary  and  could  be  sold,  bought  or  inherited. 

23  B.  &  R.,  LII,  p.  153,  note  91.  A  description  of  the  government,  pre- 
pared by  the  Jesuits,  is  printed^  in  the  Report  of  the  Schurman  Commission 
(1900),  IV,  p.  122,  The  following  table  will  enable  the  reader  to  understand 
the  system  which  was  being  introduced  into  Luzon  at  the  time  of  the  Amer- 
ican occupation : 

TERRITORIAL  DIVISIONS 

Luzon  and  the  Visa3ran  Islands  are  divided  into Provinces  and  districts 

Each  province  or  district  is  divided  into Pueblos  (towns) 

Each  pueblo  is  divided  into Distritos  (divisions) 

Each  distrito  is  divided  into Barrios  (wards) 

Each  barrio  is  divided  into Barangays     (groups    of 

from  50  to   100   fam- 
ihes) 

GOVERNING  BODIES  CORRESPONDING  TO  DIVISIONS 

The  governor-general,  assisted  by  the  Council  of 
Administration,  the  Board  of  Authorities,  and  the 
general  directorate  of   civil  administration   form 

the  general  government  of  the Archipelago 

The  governor  of  the  province,  assisted  by  the  Pro- 
vincial Council  (junta)  governs  or  rather  super- 
vises the  affairs  of  the Province 

The  municipal  tribunal,  assisted  by  the  principalia, 

administers  the  Pueblo 

The  cabeza  de  barangay  represents  the  government 

as  a  sort  of  agent  in  the Barangay 

The  divisions  called  distritos  and  barrios  are  merely 
for  the  purpose  of  administration. 

Governor  of  a  province  appointed  by  the Government  in  Spain 

Provincial  junta: 

Governor  of  province  and  five  other  officials. . .  .Members  ex  officio 

Four  other  members  elected  by Municipal  captains 

The  municipal  tribunal  (captain  and  four  lieuten- 
ants) elected  by Twelve  delegates  of  the 

principalia   (cliief  citi- 
zens) 

Twelve  delegates  of  the  principalia  chosen  by Principalia 

The  principalia  is  composed  or — 

All  persons  who  have  held  certain  offices. 
Persons  who  pay  50  pesos  land  tax. 
The  cabezas  de  barangays  are  appointed  by — 

The  governor  of  the  province  on  recommenda- 
tion of  the  twelve  delegates  or  "principals"  and 
municipal  tribunal,  but  practically  elected  by. .  Municipal  tribunal 
See  Report  Schurman  Phil.  Com.,  I,  Part  4. 


CHAPTER  IX 
Legislation,  Codes  and  Courts 

Sources  of  the  Law — ^The  Laws  of  the  Indias — Extension  of  Peninsular  Laws 
to  Philippines — The  Ancient  Spanish  Codes — The  Fuero  Juzgo — Siete  Par- 
tidas — La  Nueva  Recopilacion — The  Prelation  of  Laws — The  Modern  Codes 
— The  Judicial  Tribunals — The  Audiencia — Its  Organization  and  Powers — 
The  Provincial  Courts — The  Courts  of  First  Instance — Justice  Courts — Eccle- 
siastical, Military,  Treasury  and  Contentious  Courts — The  Judicial  Personnel 
— Unsatisfactory  Procedure — Popular  Dissatisfaction  with  the  Courts. 

During  Spanish  times  laws  for  the  Philippines  were  enacted 
or  proclaimed  in  various  forms  by  the  king  directly  or  through 
the  Council  of  the  Indias,  the  Casa  de  Contratacion  or  India 
House,  the  governor-general,  the  audiencia,  and  in  later  years 
by  the  Cortes. 

The  supreme  control  under  the  king  over  all  colonial  affairs 
was  vested  in  a  body  called  the  Council  of  the  Indias,  of  which 
the  leading  statesmen  of  the  Spanish  court  were  members.  Its 
jurisdiction  covered  the  entire  field  of  governmental  activity.  It 
enacted  laws  for  the  colonies,  determined  finally  all  controversies 
concerning  colonial  affairs  and  advised  the  king  in  all  matters 
connected  with  the  admlnstration. 

Economic  affairs  were  controlled  by  a  subordinate  body  known 
as  the  Casa  de  Contratacion  which  also  exercised  judicial  func- 
tions and  made  rules  which  had  the  force  of  law.^ 

The  Laws  of  the  Indias,  the  Novisima  Recopilacion  and  the 
Partidas  are  at  present  frequently  referred  to  in  the  Philippine 
courts  as  sources  of  controlling  law  and  are  thus  of  practical  as 
well  as  historical  importance.^ 

1  Moses'  The  Spanish  Dependencies  in  South  America,  I,  Chap.  XIV 
(1914),  and  the  same  author's  earlier  book,  Spanish  Rule  in  America,  Chap. 
Ill ;  Bourne's  Spain  in  America,  Chap.  XV. 

2  See  the  Historical  Resume  of  the  Administration  of  Justice  in  the  Philip- 

232 


LEGISLATION,    CODES    AND    COURTS  233 

The  Recopilacion  de  Leyes  de  los  Reynos  de  las  Indias,  com- 
monly referred  to  as  the  Laws  of  the  Indias,  is  a  collection  of 
cedulas,^  decretos*  resoluciones/  ordenamientos  and  pregmat- 
icas/  and  reglamentos/  which  was  published  about  1680.  It 
contains  the  general  laws  declared  or  enacted  for  the  govern- 
ment of  the  Indias  and  may  be  called  the  primary  legal  authority. 
It  never  constituted  a  complete  code  and  had  to  be  supplemented 
by  other  compilations  and  laws  designed  primarily  for  the  Penin- 
sula and  not  in  force  in  the  colonies  unless  expressly  made  so  by 
compliance  with  certain  prescribed  formalities.  According  to 
the  Spanish  constitution,  *'Las  provinces  de  Ultramar  seran 
governados  par  leyes  especiales."  Laws  enacted  in  the  Peninsula 
if  intended  to  go  into  effect  in  the  Philippines  were  transmitted 
to  the  governor-general  with  instructions  to  proclaim  and  pub- 
lish them  there.  Until  they  had  received  the  governor-general's 
"cumplase"  (let  it  go  into  effect)  they  had  no  legal  effect. 

But  it  was  necessary  occasionally  to  resort  to  laws  which  had 
never  been  enacted  for  or  extended  to  the  Philippines.  The 
Laws  of  the  Indias  provided  that  cases  not  covered  by  any  of  its 
provisions  should  be  governed  by  the  Laws  of  Castile  in  con- 
formity with  Law  1  of  the  Laws  of  Toro,  which  latter  was  in- 
cluded in  the  Novisima  Recopilacion  de  Castilla.  Thus  the  Fili- 
pino lawyer  whose  case  was  not  determined  by  the  Laws  of  the 
Indias  or  any  statute  subsequently  passed  for  or  extended  to  the 
islands  found  himself  thrown  back  on  the  ancient  Spanish  Codes. 

Spanish  history  and  jurisprudence  are  rich  in  compilations 
and  codes  in  which  are  embodied  the  legislation,  decisions,  cus- 
toms and  usages  of  hundreds  of  years  of  national  life.     While 


pine  Islands,  by  Cayetana  S.  Arellano,  Chief  Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court, 
Rept.  Phil.  Com.,  1900,  p.  225,  Exhibit  J,  Sen.  Doc.  ii2,  56  Cong.,  2d  Sess.  As 
to  conditions  about  1840,  see  Mas'  Report  in  B.  &  R.,  XXXVI,  p.  279. 

2  Orders  emanating  from  some  superior  tribunal,  promulgated  in  the  name 
and  by  the  authority  of  the  sovereign. 

*  Similar  orders  in  ecclesiastical  matters. 
^  *  Opinions  rendered  by  some  superior  authority  on  questions  duly  sub- 
mitted, and  thereafter  sent  to  the  inferior  authorities  for  their  guidance. 

"  Orders  emanating  from  the  king  differing  from  cedulas  only  in  form  and 
in  the  manner  of  their  promulgation. 

^  Informal   written   instructions   by   competent   authority.      See   Walton, 
Civil  Law  of  Spain,  p.  523,  note. 


234  THE   PHILIPPINES 

they  are  sometimes  a  source  of  weariness  to  the  men  who  are 
called  upon  to  adjust  the  rights  of  contentious  individuals,  the 
student  of  the  history  of  laws  and  institutions  finds  them  of 
absorbing  interest.  II  faut  eclairer  Vhistoire  par  lots  et  les 
lots  par  Vhistoire. 

In  these  ancient  codes,  as  clearly  as  in  the  ancient  highways, 
bridges,  viaducts,  theaters,  arches,  baths,  porticos  and  palaces, 
are  written  the  permanent  records  of  Roman,  Gothic  and  Sara- 
cen rule.  What  remains  of  Germanic  law  is  embodied  in  the 
famous  code  known  as  the  Fuero  Juzgo  or  Forma  Judicum 
which  was  probably  compiled  at  the  Council  of  Toledo^  in  the 
eighth  century.  It  was  written  in  Latin,  the  language  of  the 
Church,  and  was  not  translated  into  the  vernacular  Spanish  until 
the  thirteenth  century.  In  the  meantime,  although  undergoing 
many  vicissitudes,  it  was  always  in  force  in  some  part  of  the 
country,  more  particularly  in  sections  where  resistance  to  the 
Moors  was  strongest.  In  1241  so  strong  had  become  the  pres- 
sure of  the  Saracens  that  its  application  seems  to  have  been 
confined  to  the  towns  of  Andalusia  alone. 

After  much  controversy  as  to  the  value  of  the  Fuero  Jusgo 
its  authority  was  finally  established,  and  in  the  Spanish  law 
of  precedence  it  stands  third  in  order. 

During  the  reign  of  Charles  III,  it  was  ordered  that  a  cer- 
tain law  from  the  Fuero  Jusgo  should  be  applied  in  preference 
to  one  contained  in  the  Partidas.^  "As  said  law  of  Fuero  Jusgo 
is  not  derogated  by  any  other,  you  should  abide  by  it  in  deter- 
mining on  this  or  similar  business  without  attaching  much  im- 
portance to  those  of  the  Partidas."  "After  this  decision,"  says 
Walton,^**  "no  dispute  can  be  had  about  the  existence  to-day  of 
the  Gothic-Spanish  legislation.     Although  its  application  may 


8  A  translation  of  this  work  by  Mr,  S.  P.  Scott,  under  the  name  of  the 
Visigothic  Code,  has  been  published  by  the  Comparative  Law  Bureau  of  the 
American  Bar  Association  (Boston,  1910).  Mr.  Scott  calls  it  "the  most  re- 
markable monument  of  legislation  which  ever  emanated  from  a  semi-barbar- 
ous people,  and  the  only  substantial  memorial  of  greatness  or  erudition 
bequeathed  by  the  Goths  to  posterity."    Preface,  p.  24. 

^  Visigothic  Code,  Preface,  p.  11. 

10  Walton,  Civil  Law  of  Spain,  p.  57. 


LEGISLATION,   CODES   AND    COURTS  235 

be  limited  or  rare,  part  of  the  Fuero  Juzgo  is  included  in  the 
latter  collections  and  while  other  portions  do  not  entirely  har- 
monize with  the  social,  juridical  and  political  spirit  of  the 
epoch,  many  of  its  laws  can  be  found  in  some  form  in  the 
present  Spanish  Civil  Code."  The  same  writer  calls  this  code 
the  most  famous  and  most  important  of  all  bodies  of  laws 
formed  after  the  fall  of  the  Roman  Empire. 

Provinces,  cities  and  towns  were  governed  by  special  laws. 
In  one  section  of  the  country,  one  code,  statute  and  custom 
existed,  while  the  adjoining  community  was  governed  by  differ- 
ent laws.  By  the  middle  of  the  thirteenth  century  the  situa- 
tion had  become  intolerable,  and  that  wise  monarch,  Alfonso  X, 
caused  the  laws  to  be  recompiled  imder  the  name  of  the  Fuero 
Real.  This  collection  assumed  to  contain  all  the  laws  and  cus- 
toms of  the  Castilian  monarchy  in  force  at  the  time  of  its  pub- 
lication. 

Passing  over  the  various  other  compilations,  we  come  to  the 
famous  Partidas  published  in  1348,  which  wrought  a  radical 
change  in  Spanish  law  and  jurisprudence.  This  was  probably 
the  most  systematic  and  complete  legal  work  which  the  world 
had  seen  since  the  publication  of  the  great  masterpieces  of 
Roman  jurisprudence.  It  was  divided  into  seven  parts,  from 
which  came  the  name  by  which  it  is  now  known.^^ 

In  1567  Philip  II  sanctioned  another  compilation,  which  was 
known  as  La  Nueva  Recopilacion.  This  included  all  laws  in 
force  which  had  been  enacted  since  the  Fuero  Real  and  Partidas, 
some  from  the  Fuero  Juzgo,  and  others  from  the  laws  of  Es- 
tilo,"  Montalvo,^^  the  Ordenamiento  of  Alcala,"  the  Laws  of 
Toro,*''  and  the  autos  acordados  or  pragmaticas,  cedulas,  or- 
denes  and  decretos  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Spain. 

**  A  new  English  translation  of  this  work  is  being  made  under  the  auspices 
of  the  Comparative  Law  Bureau  of  the  American  Bar  Association. 

"  Principally  a  code  of  practise  of  the  time  of  Ferdinand  IV.    (1295-1312.) 

*8  A  collection  of  laws  made  by  Alonzo  Diaz  Montalvo  during  the  time  of 
Ferdinand  and  Isabella. 

1*  A  collection  published  in  1348. 

"A  body  of  laws  enacted  by  the  Cortes  of  Toledo  in  1502,  to  explain, 
correct  and  supply  omission  in  existing  legislation.  They  were  included  in  the 
Nueva  and  Novisima  Recopilacion. 


236  THE    PHILIPPINES 

Another  compilation  known  as  the  Novisima  Recopilacion 
was  pubHshed  in  1802.  The  work  was  hastily  done,  and  it  is 
generally  considered  inferior  to  the  earlier  compilations.  The 
royal  decree  of  July  15,  1805,  made  the  laws  which  appear  in 
the  Novisima  Recopilacion  superior  to  all  earlier  legislation. 
But  the  effect  was  simply  to  increase  the  confusion  which  al- 
ready existed,  as  it  left  in  force  the  order  of  prelation,  of  codes 
contained  in  Law  1,  of  Tore,  and  Law  28  of  the  Ordenamiento 
of  Alcala. 

Subsequently  enacted  laws  prior  to  the  modem  civil  codes  are 
found  in  compilations,  some  official,  and  other  private,  which, 
however,  did  not  assume  the  dignity  of  codes. 

After  examining  the  Laws  of  the  Indias  and  the  special  laws 
in  force  in  the  Philippines,  the  lawyers  and  jurists  were  re- 
quired, if  they  were  still  in  doubt,  to  turn  to  the  laws  of  Spain. 
In  addition  to  the  ancient  codes  and  compilations,  there  had 
grown  up  a  vast  body  of  what  is  known  on  the  continent  as 
jurisprudence,  that  is,  the  decisions  of  courts  and  the  com- 
mentaries and  emanations  of  the  text  writers.  These  became 
so  voluminous  that  the  literature  was  said  to  be  centum  camel- 
lorum  onus — a  burden  for  a  hundred  camels. 

So  confusing  were  the  various  compilations  that  it  became 
necessary  to  determine  their  prelation — the  order  in  which  they 
should  be  applied.  In  Spain  the  order  of  precedence  thereafter 
was :  ( 1 )  The  laws  enacted  after  the  Novisima  Recopilacion  de 
Castilla;  (2)  the  Novisima  Recopilacion  de  Castilla  of  1805; 
(3)  the  Fuero  Jusgo;  (4)  the  Fuero  Real;  and  then  (5)  the 
Partidas. 

In  the  Philippines  the  laws,  royal  decrees,  royal  orders,  spe- 
cially directed  to  be  there  in  force  were  controlling  and  after 
them  came:  (1)  The  Autos  Ac  or  dados  duly  made  by  the  Au- 
diencia  of  Manila;  (2)  the  Recopilacion  de  Leyes  de  Las  Indias. 
Cases  not  determined  by  either  of  these  were  governed  by  the 
Novisima  Recopilacion  de  Castilla,  the  Fuero  Jusgo,  the  Fuero 
Real,  or  the  Partidas,  in  the  order  named. 

The  Novisima  Recopilacion  and  the  Partidas  were  largely 


LEGISLATION,    CODES    AND    COURTS  237 

drawn  on  because  they  contained  both  civil  and  criminal  laws 
and  provisions  relating  to  civil  and  criminal  procedure.  Not- 
withstanding the  statutor}"-  order  of  procedure,  the  Partidas, 
which  were  composed  in  the  thirteenth  century,  were  generally 
given  preference  as  authority  over  the  Novisima  Recopilacion. 
"All  who  have  studied  the  legislation  of  Spain,"  says  Chief 
Justice  Arellano,  "know  that  the  Partidas  were  oftener  quoted, 
were  better  known,  and  more  often  applied  than  the  Novisima 
Recopilacion,  although  the  Recopilacion,  being  more  modem 
and  the  one  ordered  to  be  complied  with,  should  have  enjoyed 
greater  authority." 

It  is  probable  that  the  lawyers  and  jurists  were  more  at- 
tracted by  the  principles  of  Roman  Law  which  were  embodied 
in  the  Partidas  than  by  the  pure  Spanish  law  and  the  elements 
of  German  law  derived  from  the  earlier  codes  contained  in  the 
Novisima  Recopilacion.  The  Partidas  also  had  other  attrac- 
tions, not  always  found  in  legal  treaties  and  compilations.  As 
said  by  the  learned  Alonzo  Martinez  in  a  speech  delivered  at 
the  opening  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Spain:"  *'The  Siete  Parti- 
das are  undoubtedly  in  principle  and  form  by  reason  of  their 
contents,  the  clearness  of  their  composition,  and  the  inimitable 
graceful  language  and  style,  an  imperishable  monument  of  wis- 
dom without  rival  in  Europe  during  the  Middle  Ages;  and  as 
everything  which  is  superior  rules  by  legitimate  right,  this  code 
has  been  in  the  past  and  still  is,  the  beacon  which  illumines 
and  guides  the  courts,  judges,  and  lawyers  through  the  dark- 
ness of  our  contracted  and  contradictory  civil  legislation." 

But  even  with  all  these  compilations,  there  were  cases  for 
the  determination  of  which  resort  must  be  had  to  the  laws  of 
Spain,  enacted  after  the  publication  of  the  Novisima  Recopila- 
cion and  the  codes  in  the  order  of  precedence  established  for 
Spain.  With  all  this  complicated  confusion  it  is  easy  to  believe, 
as  has  been  stated,  that  during  the  last  quarter  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  the  tendency  of  lawyers  and  judges  was  to  rely 
on  the  general  principles  of  jurisprudence  rather  than  attempt 

"  Kept.  Phil.  Com.,  1900,  Appendix,  p.  236. 


238  THE    PHILIPPINES 

to  find  a  definite  rule  in  the  labyrinth  of  ancient  and  modern 
laws  and  codes. 

The  modern  civil  code,  which  was  promulgated  in  1889,  orig- 
inated in  the  Cortes  of  Cadiz  in  1811.  Two  years  later  a  com- 
mittee of  the  most  distinguished  lawyers  and  statesmen  of 
Spain  was  appointed  and  charged  with  the  duty  of  codifying 
the  most  important  branches  of  Spanish  law.  The  project  was 
officially  abandoned  during  the  reactionary  period,  but  in  1821 
it  was  revived,  and  thereafter  a  part  of  the  civil  code  was  pub- 
lished. The  overthrow  of  constitutional  government  in  1823 
threw  the  work  into  the  background  where  it  was  carried  on 
by  private  persons,  who  in  1839  presented  a  complete  project 
to  the  Cortes.  No  action  was  taken  thereon.  In  1843  it  was 
again  taken  up  officially.  A  new  committee  of  twenty-four 
eminent  jurists  was  appointed,  which,  after  almost  ten  years 
of  labor,  submitted  what  is  commonly  known  as  the  Project  of 
1851. 

For  several  years  it  was  circulated  among  jurists  and  states- 
men, and  criticism  and  suggestions  were  invited.  Both  were 
freely  given.  So  important  was  the  work  considered  that  the 
Royal  Academy  of  Jurisprudence  and  Legislation  convened  a 
special  juridical  congress  for  its  discussion.  Localities  jealous 
of  their  special  laws  succeeded  in  injecting  certain  exceptions 
which  cast  doubt  on  how  far  the  old  compilations  were  abro- 
gated by  the  new  code.  As  finally  promulgated  in  1889,  the 
new  code  was  not  entirely  satisfactory,  as  the  exceptions  added 
one  more  to  the  list  of  legal  puzzles  with  which  Spanish  juris- 
prudence was  already  so  well  supplied.  But  this  particular  diffi- 
culty was  not  important  in  the  Philippines,  where  the  local  and 
customary  laws  of  particular  Spanish  communities,  of  course, 
never  were  applicable. 

The  Penal  Code  went  into  efifect  in  the  Philippines  in  1886,  and 
as  modified  by  Order  No.  58  and  subsequent  American  legisla- 
tion is  now  in  force. 

The  first  governor-general  of  the  Philippines  was  vested 
:with  full  power  to  administer  civil  and  criminal  justice  and  to 


LEGISLATION,    CODES   AND    COURTS  239 

hear  and  determine  all  civil  and  criminal  actions  which  migfit 
arise  in  the  islands.  Until  the  middle  of  the  last  century,  to  a 
great  extent,  the  governors  were  judges  and  the  judges  were 
governors,  and  both  were  legislators  and  administrators.  Orig- 
inal and  appellate  judicial  powers  were  vested  in  Legaspi  by  the 
royal  order  of  his  appointment,  and  to  the  first  royal  audiencia 
was  given  **the  same  authority  and  preeminence  as  each  of  the 
royal  audiencias  of  the  town  of  Valladolid  and  the  city  of 
Granada."^'  The  territorial  district  within  which  this  august 
body  was  to  exercise  its  power  was  described  in  generous  terms 
as  including  "the  Island  of  Luzon  and  other  Islands  of  the 
Archipelago  of  China  and  the  mainlands  of  the  same,  whether 
discovered  or  to  be  discovered."  It  had  appellate  jurisdiction 
in  all  civil  and  criminal  cases  appealed  from  the  decisions  of  the 
governors,  alcaldes-mayores  and  other  magistrates.  Its  original 
jurisdiction  was  limited  to  cases  which,  on  account  of  their 
importance,  the  amount  involved,  and  the  dignity  of  the  parties, 
might  be  tried  in  the  Superior  Court,  and  criminal  cases  arising 
in  the  place  where  the  court  might  meet.  Appeals  from  judg- 
ments in  civil  cases  might  within  one  year  be  taken  to  the  king 
if  the  amount  involved  was  large. 

The  audiencia  was  more  than  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
Archipelago,  as  it  was  charged  with  the  performance  of  many 
duties  which  were  purely  administrative.  Prior  to  the  year 
1715  it  took  over  the  civil  government  in  the  interim  between 
the  death  or  departure  of  a  governor-general  and  the  arrival 
of  his  successor,  while  the  duties  of  captain-general  were 
assumed  by  the  senior  magistrate.  The  president  of  the  audi- 
encia was  required  to  send  annually  to  the  Council  of  the  In- 
dias  carefully  itemized  and  descriptive  lists  showing  the  salaries, 
payments,  fees  and  allowances  paid  by  the  royal  treasury;  a 

*'The  first  royal  audiencia,  the  Audiencia  de  Territorial  de  Manila,  was 
established  May  5,  1582.  See  B.  &  R.,  V.,  p.  274,  and  VI,  p.  35.  where  the 
instrument  stating  its  powers  and  duties  is  printed.  It  was  abolished  August 
9,  1589,  and  reestablished  May  25,  1596,  under  the  name  of  the  Audencia  de 
Chancilleria  Real  de  Manila.  It  was  reorganized  by  Toya\  Cedula,  in  1776, 
in  1815,  in  1855,  and  again  in  1886,  when  the  Audiencia  Territorial  4e  Cebu 
was  created. 


240  THE    PHILIPPINES 

list  of  the  corregidores  showing  who  were  appointed  by  the 
royal  warrant  and  who  by  the  president  of  the  audiencia,  the 
qualifications  and  merits  of  each,  the  amount  of  fees  received, 
and  the  nature  of  the  services  rendered.  A  registry  had  to  be 
kept  of  all  questions  which  came  before  the  body  pertaining  to 
the  government  and  of  the  votes  cast  by  each  member.  No  fees 
or  other  means  of  profit  were  permitted  to  be  granted  to  any  of 
the  encomenderos,  nor  could  merchants  be  allowed  to  raise  their 
prices  on  merchandise  above  the  limits  established  by  the  king. 

The  audiencia  was  authorized  to  grant  licenses  and  to  make 
repartimientos  of  land  involved  in  pending  litigation,  and  to 
summon  citizens  of  the  islands,  whether  in  peace  or  war,  under 
penalty  of  infamy  for  failure  to  respond.  The  president  and 
two  auditors  were  required  to  audit  the  accounts  of  the  royal 
treasury  annually,  to  weigh  the  gold  and  silver,  and  send  an 
account  thereof  to  the  Council  of  the  Indias.  They  were  also 
required  to  audit  the  accounts  of  the  city  of  Manila.  Each 
magistrate  in  turn  was  required  once  a  year  to  visit  the  villages 
of  the  district  of  the  audiencia,  inspect  the  inns  and  apothecary 
shops,  examine  the  nature  of  the  soil  for  agricultural  purposes, 
ascertain  the  number  of  inhabitants,  the  condition  of  the  public 
buildings,  the  habits  of  the  natives  with  reference  to  idolatrous 
worship;  how  various  officials  performed  their  duties,  whether 
the  laws  prohibiting  slavery  were  enforced,  whether  the  na- 
tives were  properly  instructed  in  doctrine,  and  various  other 
things  which  might  affect  the  welfare  of  the  communities  vis- 
ited. A  court  with  so  many  non-judicial  functions  was  bound 
to  be  involved  in  all  the  controversies  of  local  politics. 

Although  the  audiencia  was  established  as  the  result  of  the 
protest  by  Bishop  Salazar  against  the  abuses  of  power  and  the 
neglect  to  enforce  certain  decrees,  particularly  those  relating  to 
the  treatment  of  the  natives,  it  was  certain  to  come  into  early 
conflict  with  the  ecclesiastical  authorities.  The  governor-gen- 
eral was  the  presidente  of  the  audiencia,  which  exercised  juris- 
diction over  all  branches  of  the  government.  It  could  deter- 
mine the  right  of  the  ecclesiastical  courts  to  try  a  certain  case 


LEGISLATION,    CODES    AND    COURTS  241 

and  the  president  had  certain  supervisory  powers  in  connection 
with  ecclesiastical  appointments. 

A  dispute  with  Bishop  Salazar  soon  arose  over  the  wording 
of  certain  prayers  in  the  mass  and  as  to  where  the  president, 
magistrates  and  bishop  should  sit  during  the  celebration  of 
mass.  The  governor  and  the  audiencia  were  soon  at  war  over 
appointments.  The  religious  orders  resented  interference  with 
the  control  which  had  been  exercised  previously  by  the  provin- 
cials. The  master  of  the  camp  and  the  captains  of  the  four 
companies  of  the  garrison  complained  to  the  king  that  because 
of  the  constant  interference  of  the  audiencia  in  the  administra- 
tion of  the  army  and  the  unfair  bestowal  of  encomiendos  on 
the  undeserving,  the  troops  had  become  disobedient  and  had 
publicly  insulted  their  officers.  The  city  of  Manila  petitioned 
for  the  withdrawal  of  the  audiencia,  which,  in  its  opinion,  was 
expensive  and  unnecessary.  Finally  all  parties  seem  to  have 
joined  in  the  memorial  which  was  carried  to  the  Council  of  the 
Indias  by  Father  Sanchez.  The  result  was  that  the  audiencia 
was  abolished  and  was  not  reestablished  until  1596/' 

When  the  audiencia  acted  in  a  governmental,  administrative, 
or  advisory  capacity,  it  was  known  by  the  na;me  of  real  acuerdo. 
All  the  members  and  the  fiscal  or  attorney-general  were  then 
required  to  be  present.  Its  ordinances,  known  as  autos  acor- 
dados,  when  approved  by  the  president  had  the  force  of  laws 
and  as  such  were  cited  in  the  courts.^*  These  ordinances  related 
to  subjects  innumerable,  including  the  Chinese,  notaries,  prisons, 
hucksters,  slavery,  breeding  of  fowls,  the  collection  of  tribute, 
the  regulations  of  markets  and  market  supplies,  and  vagrancy.'* 


18  See  Chap.  V,  p.  158. 

The  letter  by  which  the  king  reestablished  the  audiencia  is  a  model  of  its 
kind.  It  criticizes  no  one,  makes  no  reference  to  the  real  cause  for  the  change, 
and  assigns  reasons  which  no  one  in  Manila  probably  had  thought  of. 

19  From  this  real  acuerdo  emanated  the  autos  acordados,  or  reports  which 
have  been  used  as  precedents  in  courts  of  justice  and  which  have  been  col- 
lected into  four  volumes  with  an  appendix,  edited  by  the  audiencia  of 
Manila.  This  was  formerly  the  indispensable  book  of  every  judge  and  lawyer, 
as  it  contained  all  the  rules  of  procedure,  and  many  rulings  of  an  adminis- 
trative character  which  affected  the  administration  of  justice. 

20  Many  of  these  ordinances  of  the  latter  ISOO's  are  collected  and  printed 
in  B.  &  R.,  X,  p.  293  et  seq.,  and  XI,  p.  21  et  seq.  They  cover  a  wide  range  of 
subjects. 


242  THE    PHILIPPINES 

The  composition  and  personnel  of  the  audiencia  varied  from 
time  to  time.^^  When  first  established,  it  consisted  of  a  presi- 
dent, who  was  the  governor-general,  three  magistrates,  an  at- 
torney-general and  the  necessary  subordinate  officials.^^  The 
number  of  magistrates  was  increased  from  time  to  time.  The 
attorney-general  also  held  the  office  of  "protector  of  the  In- 
dians." 

About  1815  a  regent  was  appointed  to  preside  in  the  ab- 
sence of  the  governor-general.  In  1865  the  governor-general 
ceased  to  be  the  president,  and  the  powers  of  the  real  acuerdo 
passed  to  the  Board  of  Administration,  an  advisory  or  consulta- 
tive body  which  had  been  established  in  1861  and  over  which 
the  governor-general  presided.  Thereafter  the  audiencia  in 
banc  with  the  regent,  whose  title  was  soon  changed  to  presi- 
dent (chief  justice),  presiding,  constituted  the  gubernative  body. 
After  1879  the  two  branches  of  the  audiencia  were  known  as 
the  Sala  de  lo  Civil  and  Sala  de  lo  Criminal  with  a  president 
for  each  chamber. 

As  organized  in  1855,  the  judge  advocates  of  the  army  and 
navy  were  members  of  the  court.  Under  the  reforms  of  1870 
they  ceased  to  be  magistrates,  but  ten  years  later  were  made 
ex-officio  members  of  the  civil  branch,  when  it  was  called  upon 
to  decide  questions  of  conflicting  jurisdiction  between  the  mili- 
tary, civil  and  naval  courts.  In  1886  a  territorial  audiencia 
was  established  at  Cebu,  but  later  it  was  reduced  to  the  rank  of 
criminal  audiencia  with  a  president  and  two  associates.  A 
criminal  audiencia  also  existed  at  Vigan.  Substantially  as  thus 
organized,  the  audiencias  continued  until  the  end  of  Spanish 
sovereignty  when  some  of  the  magistrates  became  members  of 
the  courts  as  organized  under  the  American  government.^^ 


21  See,  for  its  composition  during  different  periods,  Rept.  Phil.  Com.,  1900, 
Appendix,  p.  225. 

22  The  members  of  the  audiencia  other  than  the  president  were  called 
oidores,  or  auditors,  and  finally  magistrados,  or  magistrates.  The  attorney 
who  represented  the  public,  the  attorney-general,  was  called  the  fiscal. 

23  In  a  brief  summary  of  the  organization  of  the  old  Spanish  Courts,  see 
an  article  on  "The  Administration  of  Jtistice  in  the  Philippines,"  by  George 
R.  Harvey,  formerly  solicitor  general  for  the  islands.  Yale,  Law  Review. 
1914. 


LEGISLATION,    CODES    AND    COURTS  243 

The  Spanish  regulations  with  reference  to  the  conduct  and 
actions  of  the  members  of  the  audiencia  were  very  strict  and 
some  of  them  are  yet  in  force.  For  instance,  no  magistrate 
could  sit  in  any  case  when  challenged  or  when  a  relative  or 
member  of  his  family  was  interested.  Nor  could  he  engage 
directly  or  indirectly  in  any  mercantile  business  or  own  any 
income-bearing  estate  in  arable  land  or  cattle.  He  was  for- 
bidden, under  pain  of  loss  of  office,  to  avail  himself  of  the 
services  of  a  native  or  to  receive  any  fees  or  reward  or  share 
the  fees  of  any  lawyer.  The  members  of  the  audiencia  were 
required  to  be  present  each  day  for  a  certain  fixed  number  of 
hours  under  penalty  of  a  fine  of  one-half  day's  pay  for  each  day's 
absence.  The  facilities  afforded  for  maintaining  actions  for 
damages  against  judicial  officers  were  unnecessarily  good  from 
the  point  of  view  of  an  American  or  English  judge  and  they 
have  been  held  to  be  inconsistent  with  the  basic  principles  of 
the  American  system  of  government  and  therefore  repealed  by 
implication.^* 

Prior  to  1860  the  alcaldes-mayores  (provincial  governors)  and 
the  military  and  civil  officials  acted  as  inferior  judicial  officers. 
The  reforms  of  this  period  mark  the  theoretical  separation  of 
the  executive  and  judicial  powers  in  the  provinces.  It  was  pro- 
vided that  the  alcaldes-mayores  should  thereafter  exercise  judicial 
powers  only.  One  year  later  the  provinces  for  judicial  purposes 
were  divided  into  districts,  judicial  districts  and  municipal  dis- 
tricts. The  entire  islands  constituted  a  district.  The  administra- 
tion of  justice  in  the  judicial  districts  was  vested  in  the  newly  cre- 
ated Courts  of  First  Instance.  The  ordinary  functions  of  a 
trial  judge  now  devolved  on  an  official  who  was  always  a  law- 
yer, although  in  some  instances  the  provincial  governors  con- 
tinued to  act  as  judges  with  the  assistance  of  the  assessors  who 

2*  In  Alzua  V.  Johnson,  231  U.  S.  107  {21  Ph.  Kept.  308),  Mr.  Justice 
Holmes  said  :  "We  regard  it  as  fundamental  that  the  immunity  of  the  defend- 
ant from  this  suit  is  the  same  as  that  of  judges  in  the  United  States.  .  .  . 
Whatever  may  have  been  the  Spanish  law,  this  is  a  principle  so  deep  seated 
in  our  system  that  we  should  regard  it  as  carried  into  the  Philippines  by  im- 
plication as  soon  as  we  established  courts  in  those  islands." 


244  THE    PHILIPPINES 

were  appointed  to  aid  and  advise  them.  The  audiencia  exer- 
cised general  supervision  over  the  personnel  of  the  lower  courts. 

In  the  early  days  of  Spanish  occupation,  the  local  headmen 
continued  to  exercise  their  ancient  powers,  which  were  judicial 
as  well  as  executive.  The  chiefs  of  the  barangays  were  judges 
as  well  as  law-givers  and  executives.  The  Spanish  local  au- 
thorities also  exercised  rough  and  ready  judicial  powers  in  the 
pueblos  and  municipalities.  The  office  of  justice  of  the  peace  was 
created,  and  the  powers  of  the  justices  were  defined  by  the  autos 
acordados  of  1860.  After  that  date  there  was  a  justice  of  the 
peace  in  every  judicial  district  in  the  city  of  Manila,  and  in  every 
municipality  which  was  the  headquarters  of  a  judicial  district. 
The  justices  of  the  peace  were  appointed  by  the  governor- 
general  on  the  recommendation  of  the  audiencia  of  Manila. 
These  appointments  were  given  to  persons  who  were  either 
lawyers  or  who  had  some  academic  or  professional  title,  "or 
those  whose  positions  or  circumstances  warranted  it."  When 
such  persons  could  not  be  found,  the  petty  governor  of  the 
municipality  acted  as  justice  of  the  peace.  If  there  was  a  vacancy 
in  the  office  of  Judge  of  First  Instance,  or  during  the  absence 
or  sickness  of  the  judge,  the  nearest  justice  of  the  peace  who 
was  a  lawyer  was  required  to  perform  his  duties. 

The  royal  decree  of  February  3,  1883,  regulating  the  civil 
procedure  of  the  Courts  of  Spain,  was  extended  to  the  Philip- 
pines and  gave  the  justice  courts  jurisdiction  over  civil  cases 
when  the  property  involved  did  not  exceed  two  hundred  pesos 
in  value.  The  royal  decree  of  January  6,  1891,  which  was  a 
compilation  of  the  provisions  relating  to  the  administration  of 
justice  in  all  colonial  possessions,  modified  to  some  extent  the 
decrees  to  which  reference  has  been  made.  It  was  at  the  time 
regarded  as  a  very  liberal  concession  to  the  colonies,  and  it  is 
still  in  force  in  the  Philippines,  except  as  specifically  changed 
by  recent  legislation. 

There  were  also  certain  special  courts  which  should  be  briefly 
mentioned.  The  Ecclesiastical  Court  had  jurisdiction  over  mar- 
riage and  divorce,  violations  in  general  of  the  canon  law  and 


LEGISLATION,   CODES   AND    COURTS  245 

originally  over  every  action,  civil  or  criminal,  which  was 
brought  against  an  ecclesiastic.  In  1835,  the  civil  courts  were 
given  jurisdiction  over  cases  involving  certain  atrocious  crimes 
committed  by  ecclesiastics.  For  many  years  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  Ecclesiastical  Courts  was  exercised  by  such  of  the  judges 
of  the  Courts  of  First  Instance  as  were  designated  as  ecclesi- 
astical judges  by  the  Archbishop  of  Manila  and  the  suffragan 
bishops  of  the  other  dioceses. 

Military  courts  had  jurisdiction  over  offenses  purely  military 
and  of  actions  affecting  soldiers  and  other  persons  having  spe- 
cial military  privileges. 

The  Commercial  Court,  which  operated  in  Manila  only,  was 
composed  of  a  number  of  merchants  of  credit  and  respecta- 
bility known  as  consuls,  but  who  were  advised  by  lawyers  se- 
lected for  the  purpose  because  of  their  special  knowledge  of 
commercial  matters.  This  court  had  jurisdiction  over  all  com- 
mercial controversies  which  called  for  prompt  and  equitable 
action  without  much  reference  to  technical  procedure. 

There  was  also  a  Treasury  Court  which  sat  in  Manila  with 
jurisdiction  over  matters  which  affected  the  treasury  and 
which  involved  questions  supposed  to  be  within  the  peculiar 
knowledge  of  treasury  officials.  In  1887  these  special  treasury 
and  commercial  courts  were  abolished,  and  their  functions,  to- 
gether with  a  portion  of  those  of  the  military  courts,  were 
transferred  to  the  ordinary  courts.  The  clergy  and  the  mem- 
bers of  the  army  and  navy  were  thereby  deprived  of  many  of 
their  special  personal  privileges.  It  was  intended  that  the  or- 
dinary courts  should  thereafter  be  competent  to  dispose  of  all 
civil  and  criminal  cases,  but  the  decree  subjecting  the  clergy  to 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  civil  courts  never  became  effective,  as 
it  was  suspended  by  the  governor-general  until  a  decision  could 
be  received  from  the  home  government.  No  decision  was  ever 
rendered.'^'  When  the  civil  code  went  into  effect  in  1889,  the 
governor-general  was  authorized  to  suspend  certain  titles  which 

"  Rept.  Phil.  Com.,  1900,  Appendix,  p.  229. 


246  THE    PHILIPPINES 

practically  exempted  the  clergy  from  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
ordinary  courts,  except  in  case  of  atrocious  crimes. 

There  existed  also  in  Manila  what  was  known  as  the  Con- 
tentious Court  which  was  an  adjunct  of  the  Council  of  Adminis- 
tration created  by  the  royal  decree  of  July  4,  1861.  This  body, 
which  was  not  really  a  court,  was  composed  of  prominent  men 
who  heard  complaints  against  the  government  and  from  whose 
decisions  there  was  an  appeal  to  the  Council  of  State  in  Spain. 

Such  were  the  judicial  tribunals  through  which  justice  was 
administered.  As  a  rule,  the  judges  were  all  Spaniards.  The 
procedure,  both  civil  and  criminal,  followed  closely  the  forms 
observed  in  Spain.  The  evidence  all  tends  to  show  that  the 
courts  were  in  fact  inefficient  and  that  their  general  adminis- 
tration was  very  imsatis  factory  to  the  litigants.  The  substantive 
law  was  in  general  wise  and  humane  and  well  adapted  to  con- 
ditions, but  its  administration  could  not  have  been  much  worse. 
Much  of  the  personnel  of  the  lower  courts  was  bad.  Before 
the  separation  of  the  judicial  from  the  executive  functions,  the 
alcaldes-may  ores,  and  inferior  judges  generally,  appear  to  have 
been  notoriously  ignorant  and  often  corrupt.  Qualifications  for 
their  work  was  rarely  a  factor  in  their  selection.  Tant  valent 
les  juges,  tant  valent  les  lois  is  an  old  and  very  true  maxim. 

There  were  among  the  magistrados  of  the  audiencia  many 
honest  and  some  learned  lawyers  who  would  have  honored  judi- 
cial positions  in  any  country.  There  was  ample  technical  learn- 
ing, but  almost  a  complete  absence  of  the  executive  ability  which 
is  necessary  for  the  administrative  work  of  a  court.  Without  it 
all  the  learning  of  the  jurisconsults  will  not,  even  under  a  simple 
and  effective  method  of  procedure,  prevent  the  calendars  from 
becoming  clogged  with  cases  with  the  resulting  vexatious  and 
expensive  delays  which  amount  to  the  substantial  denial  of  justice. 

The  procedure  in  civil  actions  seems  never  to  have  been  sys- 
tematized and  established,  and  the  criminal  procedure  was  even 
more  uncertain.^®    The  insidious  custom  of  compensating  officials 


28  The  Philippines  never  had  a  code  of  criminal  procedure.     There  were 
merely  scattered  provisions  in  the  form  of  royal  orders  and  autos  acordados. 


LEGISLATION,    CODES   AND    COURTS  247 

by  fees  encouraged  all  manner  of  unconscionable  delays.  Thus 
before  a  civil  action  could  be  commenced  in  an  ordinary  trial 
court  the  would-be  litigant  was  required  to  execute  a  power  of 
attorney  authorizing  a  solicitor  to  appear  for  him.  This  power 
had  then  to  be  acknowledged  before  a  notary,  after  which  it  had 
to  be  examined  and  pronounced  sufficient  by  the  attorney  who 
was  to  appear  in  the  case.  The  intervention  of  three  paid  agents, 
solicitor,  notary  and  attorney,  was  thus  necessary  before  the  liti- 
gant could  get  his  case  started.  Any  formal  defect  in  the  certifi- 
cate of  the  notary,  in  the  power  of  attorney,  or  in  the  declaration 
of  sufficiency,  was  ground  for  the  dismissal  of  the  action  with 
heavy  costs.  Worse  yet,  from  a  ruling  on  either  of  these  matters 
an  appeal  could  be  taken  to  the  audiencia,  where  the  litigant 
would  learn  whether  he  was  in  court.  All  the  documents  had  to 
be  on  stamped  paper,  and  any  irregularity  in  that  respect 
might  lead  to  a  ruling  from  which  an  appeal  would  lie.  The 
competency  of  the  judge  to  try  the  case  might  be  challenged  and 
an  appeal  taken  from  the  ruling  on  that  question.  Or  the  juris- 
diction of  the  court  might  be  assailed  by  inhibitory  or  declara- 
tory pleas  and  the  foundation  laid  for  another  appeal. 

All  this  was  mere  jockeying  for  a  start.  Once  off,  at  every 
stage  of  the  proceedings  interlocutory  appeals  were  possible  and 
usual.  Actions  were  often  dismissed  on  the  most  trivial  grounds 
and  the  solicitors'  and  attorneys'  fees  taxed  against  the  unfor- 
tunate plaintiff.  The  fees  under  such  circumstances  were  like 
damages,  in  personal  injury  litigation  often  punitive,  being  al- 
ways much  larger  than  would  have  been  charged  the  client. 
Instances  of  gross  extortion  under  the  forms  of  law  were  com- 
mon. 

The  system  made  for  injustice  instead  of  justice.  The  pro- 
cedure seemed  to  have  been  skilfully  devised  to  promote  delay 
and  increase  expense.  Business  men  avoided  the  courts  and 
settled  their  controversies  or  submitted  to  loss  rather  than  allow 
themselves  to  be  robbed  under  the  forms  of  law.*'^    The  divorce 


2T  Report  of  the  Philippine  Commission,  1900,  p.  82.    Foreman,  The  Philip- 
pine Islands  (1906),  pp.  239,  241. 


248  THE    PHILIPPINES 

between  law  and  justice  was  absolute.  The  ordinary  Filipino 
is  naturally  a  contentious  person.  Next  to  a  cockpit  a  court 
room  with  cocky  abogados  pitted  against  each  other  in  the 
game  of  technicalities  is  his  ideal  place  of  entertainment.  He 
delights  in  suing  his  neighbor  and  organizing  a  gang  of  witnesses 
to  engage  in  the  cheerful  game  of  perjury.  In  the  old  days  there 
were  always  plenty  of  lawyers  to  aid  and  abet  him  in  such  en- 
terprises. There  was  also  a  sort  of  legalized  banditti,  a  special 
class  of  shysters,  known  as  ahogadocillas,  or  little  lawyers,  who 
were  recognized  as  entitled,  to  practise  before  the  justice  courts. 
Because  of  lack  of  character  or  qualifications  they  had  not  been 
regularly  admitted  to  practise  in  the  courts  of  record  and  were 
experts  at  stirring  up  strife  and  encouraging  litigation. 

The  Filipinos  realized  that  the  courts  as  administered  were 
the  agencies  of  extortion  and  injustice,  and  their  complaints  were 
loud  and  continuous.  The  necessity  for  reforming  the  procedure 
of  the  courts  was  a  matter  about  which  there  was  no  difference 
of  opinion.^^ 

28  As  to  the  unsatisfactory  state  of  the  admitiistration  of  justice,  see 
Sawyer,  The  Inhabitants  of  the  Philippines,  Chap.  IV. 


CHAPTER  X 

Taxation  and  Revenue 

The  Tax  System— Direct  Taxes— The  Tribute— Abolished  in  1884— The 
Cedula  Personal — Special  Provisions  for  Chinese — The  Income  Tax — In- 
direct Taxes — Customs  Duties — Classification  of  Goods — Rates  Levied — Cer- 
tain Special  Charges — Monopolies,  Stamps,  Cockpits,  Lotteries,  etc. — The 
Tobacco  Monopoly — Government  Receipts  and  Disbursements. 

The  system  of  taxation  which  the  Spaniards  established  in 
the  Philippines  was  suitable  for  the  people  and  the  conditions 
under  which  they  lived.^  As  usual,  it  was  the  administration 
that  was  at  fault.  The  government  raised  the  money  required 
for  its  support  by  direct  and  indirect  taxes,  and  by  trade  and 
other  monopolies.  As  noted  by  Professor  C.  C.  Plehn^  the  fea- 
ture of  the  history  of  taxation  in  the  Philippines  is  "the  con- 
tinuity in  the  development  of  the  tax  system,  the  antiquity  of 
its  origins,  and  the  skill  and  care  with  which  it  was  ever  read- 
justed to  the  conditions  of  the  times  and  of  the  country.  The 
direct  taxes  which  the  United  States  government  found  in  op- 
eration at  the  time  of  their  occupation  can  all  be  traced  back, 
with  scarcely  a  break  in  the  line  of  evolution,  to  the  primitive 
'tribute'  provided  for  with  such  simple  logic  and  stately  eloquence 
in  that  impressive  old  law  for  the  Indians  written  by  royal  au- 
thority in  1523.  The  indirect  taxes  in  their  turn  were  all  evolved 
from  the  simple  almojarifazgo,  whose  quaint  Moorish  name  so 
forcibly  suggests  its  age ;  while  the  other  revenues,  all  practically 
in  the  form  of  monopolies,  either  arose  from  the  assertion  of 
the  royal  rights  to  the  profits  of  all  trade  that  might  be  won  by 

1  The  general  opinion  is  that  the  burden  of  taxation  was  not  excessive, 
Bourne  in  B.  &  R.,  I.  Int..  p.  85. 

•  Pol.  Set.  Quar.  XVII,  p.  147.  This  account  of  the  system  of  taxation  is 
based  very  largely  upon  Prof.  Plehn's  two  articles  in  the  Political  Science 
Quarterly,  XVI.  p.  680  and  XVII,  p.  125.  See  also  Hords*  Internal  Taxation 
(J.U.R  Studies),  1907. 

249 


250  THE    PHILIPPINES 

loyal  Spanish  subjects  or  else  rested  on  the  Papal  supremacy  over 
all  the  converts  to  the  Church  of  Rome." 

The  direct  taxes  began  with  the  tribute  which,  with  no  change 
in  principle  and  but  little  in  form,  was  regularly  collected  from 
the  time  of  Legaspi  until  the  year  1884.  A  law  of  the  Indies 
declared  that : 

"Since  it  is  a  just  and  reasonable  thing,  that  the  Indians  who 
may  be  pacified  and  reduced  to  obedience  and  vassalage  to  Us, 
should  render  tribute  in  recognition  of  Our  sovereignty  and 
should  give  such  service  as  Our  subjects  and  vassals  owe,  and 
as  moreover,  they  have  established  among  themselves  the  custom 
of  paying  tribute  to  their  chiefs.  We  command  that  they  be  per- 
suaded to  aid  Us  with  tribute,  in  such  moderate  amount  of  the 
fruits  of  the  earth,  as  may  from  time  to  time  be  required  by 
law."« 

The  tribute  was  a  personal  tax,  a  kind  of  universal  poll  tax 
such  as  is  common  in  some  form  in  all  countries.  It  was  levied 
on  natives  and  mestizos,  at  the  rate  originally  of  eight  silver 
reales  for  each  family,  but  was  soon  increased  to  ten  reales  /m- 
ertes,  equal  to  about  seventy-five  cents  in  gold.  It  was  for  a 
time  payable  in  gold,  or  in  the  designated  products  of  the  coun- 
try at  a  fixed  "ofiicial  price."  The  government  determined  what 
articles  should  be  tendered  in  payment,  usually  the  principal 
products  of  the  particular  province  or  locality,  such  as  rice  in 
the  lower  provinces  of  Luzon  and  tobacco  in  the  Cayagan  Valley. 

The  family  was  the  unit  for  the  payment,  but  matters  were 
so  arranged  that  it  operated  as  a  poll  tax  of  about  one-half  a 
tribute  on  every  person,  male  or  female,  over  sixteen  and  under 
sixty  years  of  age.  The  alcaldes,  gobernadores,  and  cahezas  de 
harangay  who  collected  the  tributes,  together  with  their  wives 
and  first-born  sons,  were  exempt  from  the  tax.  The  cabesas, 
in  recognition  of  their  original  rights  as  native  chiefs  as  well 
as  their  services,  might,  if  they  had  no  sons,  adopt  one.     The 

2  Recopilacion  de  Leyes  de  los  Reynos  de  Las  Indias,  Book  VI,  tit.  v,  la 
1,  quoted  Pol.  Sci.  Quar.  XVI,  p.  684. 


TAXATION   AND    REVENUE  251 

exemption  was  also  granted  to  soldiers,  active  and  retired,  their 
wives  and  sons  residing  with  them,  the  members  of  the  pro- 
vincial reserves,  members  of  the  Civil  Guard,  revenue  inspectors, 
customs  and  marine  guards;  inspectors  and  storekeepers  under 
the  tobacco  monopoly;  government  employees  receiving  a  fixed 
salary;  paupers  and  cripples  receiving  public  aid;  those  who  had 
rendered  some  special  service  to  agriculture  or  industry;  and 
others  simply  "for  just  causes."  This  was  construed  to  include 
certain  college  students,  widows  of  advocates,  native  women  who 
were  widows  of  Spaniards,  day  laborers  in  the  royal  artillery 
shops,  and  many  other  government  employees.  The  descend- 
ants of  Don  Pedro  Mojica  and  Don  Carlos  Lacondola,  who  were 
ruling  as  petty  native  kings  when  the  Spaniards  captured  Manila, 
were  never  required  to  pay  the  tribute.  To  this  list  must  be 
added  all  those  who  paid  certain  amounts  for  other  taxes.  A 
tax  list,  padron  de  tasas,  approved  by  the  parish  priest,  was  pre- 
pared annually  for  each  caheceria  which  showed  the  name,  age 
and  occupation  of  all  heads  of  families,  and  the  caheza  had  to  ac- 
count for  the  tributes  which  thus  appeared  to  be  payable.*  Fail- 
ure in  this  meant  imprisonment  and  confiscation  of  goods.  In 
addition  to  the  regular  tribute,  the  natives  paid  one  real  for  com- 
mutation of  the  tithes;  one  for  the  community  fund,  and 
three  for  the  Church.  From  1635  to  about  1850  they  had 
to  pay  also  one-half  a  real  for  the  conquest  of  Jolo,  known  as 
the  donativo  de  Zamhoanga.  Certain  provinces  also  occasionally 
imposed  additional  direct  personal  taxes  for  such  purposes  as 
maintaining  vintas,  or  boats,  for  coast  defense.  But  in  addition 
to  these  payments,  which  it  will  be  noted  were  not  in  the  least 
oppressive  in  amount,  the  people  were  required  to  pay  heavy 
local  direct  taxes  in  the  form  of  labor  on  the  public  works  which, 
however,  could  be  commuted  and  paid  in  money. 

The  tribute  was  supposed  to  be  paid  by  those  only  who  had 
submitted  to  Spanish  rule  and  owed  the  duty  of  allegiance  to 
the  king.     The  mountain  people  were,  when  it  was  possible, 

*  The  alcaldes,  corregidores  and  gohernadorcillos  were  held  responsible 
for  the  collection  of  the  taxes  in  the  provinces  and  municipalities. 


252  .THE   PHILIPPINES 

required  to  pay  something  in  "recognition  of  vassalage."  Col- 
lecting tribute  from  the  timid  little  Negritos  must  have  been  a 
dangerous  as  well  as  unprofitable  business. 

The  liability  to  pay  tribute  seems  sometimes  to  have  been  used 
for  missionary  purposes,  as  exemption  for  a  certain  number  of 
years  was  frequently  offered  as  an  inducement  to  become  con- 
verts or  for  those  in  rebellion  to  lay  down  their  arms. 

In  1884  the  ancient  tribute  was  abolished  along  with  the  caja 
cie  communidad  and  the  sanctorum,  and  their  place  was  taken  by 
a  graduated  poll  tax.  Thereafter  every  resident  over  eighteen, 
male  or  female,  except  Chinese,  natives  and  colonists  of  Jolo, 
Palawan  and  Balabac,  was  required  annually  to  purchase  and  carry 
with  him  a  certificate  of  identification,  which  was  called  a  cedula 
personal.  It  was  a  very  convenient  method  of  collecting  the  poll 
tax  and  is  in  use  in  the  Philippines  at  the  present  time.  As  un- 
der the  old  tribute  system,  gohernadorcillos  and  their  wives, 
cahesas  de  harangay,  and  their  wives  and  assistants,  received 
'cedulas  gratis  in  consideration  of  their  services  in  collecting  the 
tax.  Monks,  sisters  of  charity,  privates  in  the  army,  naval  and 
civil  guards,  convicts  while  in  prison,  and  paupers  who  received 
public  aid  also  received  cedulas  without  charge.  The  tax,  or 
amount  paid  for  the  cedula,  ran  from  one-half  peso  to  thirty- 
seven  pesos,  determined  by  occupation,  status,  amount  of  other 
taxes  paid,  and  income. 

The  tax  lists  were  prepared  in  much  the  same  way  as  those 
iipon  which  the  tributes  had  been  based.  The  heads  of  house- 
holds were  required  to  prepare  schedules  giving  descriptions  of 
all  persons  over  eighteen  years  of  age.  Lists  of  those  under  their 
charge  or  care  were  prepared  by  the  heads  of  institutions  such 
as  convents  or  prisons,  and  the  captains  of  boats.  Cahezas  and 
captains  of  boats  were  held  personally  responsible  for  the  pay- 
ment of  the  tax  by  all  persons  under  them.  Under  this  system 
the  tax  had  to  be  paid  by  every  person  who  lived  in  the  country ; 
[without  it  nothing  could  be  done.  It  was  a  sort  of  license  to 
exist  and  do  business.    During  the  period  just  preceding  Ameri- 


TAXATION   AND    REVENUE  253 

can  occupation  the  cedulas  brought  into  the  treasury  approxi- 
mately seven  million  pesos  per  annum, 

Chinese  traders  or  Sangleys,  as  they  were  called,  were  required 
to  purchase  a  special  cedula.  The  system  of  licensing  them  was 
introduced  very  early  and  the  amount  charged  varied  at  differ- 
ent periods.  The  authorities  seem  to  have  been  in  constant  fear 
that  they  were  not  imposing  on  the  Chinese  all  that  the  traffic 
would  bear.  In  1828,  recognizing  that  the  tribute  of  eight  reales 
per  annum  which  they  were  paying  was  very  little  compared 
with  their  gains,  the  government  decided  that  a  new  list  of 
the  Chinese  residents  should  be  prepared.  They  were  to  be  di- 
vided into  cahecerias  like  the  natives,  with  Chinese  cdbezas  in 
charge,  who  should  give  bond  for  the  collection  of  the  tribute. 
For  the  purposes  of  the  tax  the  Chinese  were  divided  into  three 
classes:  (1)  The  greater  merchants,  such  as  are  now  known 
as  importers  and  exporters,  who  were  to  pay  ten  pesos  fuertes 
per  month.  (2)  The  lesser  merchants  or  shopkeepers,  who  were 
to  pay  four  pesos  fuertes  per  month,  and  (3)  the  artisans,  who 
were  to  pay  two  pesos  per  month.  Those  in  default  of  payment 
for  three  months  were  required  to  work  the  amount  out  with 
some  planter  at  a  fixed  daily  wage. 

The  plan  had  to  be  considerably  modified,  as  it  was  found  that 
many  of  the  Chinese  could  not  pay  the  two  pesos  per  month.  A 
fourth  class  was  therefore  created,  the  members  of  which  should 
pay  one  peso.  The  third  class  thereafter  included  only  over- 
seers, or  superintendents  of  shops,  and  the  new  fourth  class 
all  ordinary  laborers  and  operators.  The  law  was  a  failure. 
Many  preferred  to  return  to  China  rather  than  pay  the  tax; 
more  than  a  thousand  fled  to  the  mountains.  Nor  would 
any  Chinamen  act  as  cahesas.  The  amount  of  the  tax  was  finally 
so  reduced  that  it  could  be  paid,  but  the  special  tax  on  Chinese 
commerce  and  industry  was  increased.  In  1866  two  new  classes 
were  created.  The  first  included  all  those  who  were  engaged  in 
raising  sugar,  indigo  or  hemp  in  Luzon  and  the  Viscayas,  and  the 
second  those  engaged  in  agriculture  in  sparsely  settled  districts. 
These  were  to  pay  twelve  and  five  reales  per  annum.    Those  who 


254  THE   PHILIPPINES 

would  raise  tobacco  for  the  government  were  exempt  from  the 
tax  for  five  years.  The  benefits  of  the  act  were  afterward  ex- 
tended to  Chinese  engaged  in  fisheries,  wood-cutting,  mining, 
shipbuilding  and  other  industrial  pursuits.  But  the  Chinese 
could  not  be  taxed  out  of  commerce  and  into  agriculture. 

In  1890  the  law  was  revised  so  that  every  Chinaman,  without 
reference  to  age  or  sex,  was  required  to  procure  each  year  a 
cedula  like  that  required  of  the  natives.  The  Chinese  were  now 
divided  into  eight  classes  and  paid  from  three  to  thirty  pesos  for 
the  cedulas.  Those  under  fourteen  years  of  age  or  who  were 
unable  to  work,  received  the  cedulas  gratis. 

These  rates  were  as  usual  increased  by  several  surtaxes.  These 
were  five  per  cent  of  the  price  as  a  "consumption  tax,"  and  in  ad- 
dition about  fifty  per  cent,  for  the  benefit  of  the  provincial  and 
municipal  governments,  and  eight  per  cent,  distributed  as  follows : 
One  per  cent,  for  the  general  treasury,  two  per  cent,  for  the  costs 
of  collection,  and  five  per  cent,  to  meet  the  expenses  of  sending 
vagrant  Chinese  to  China.  The  total  cost  of  a  thirty  peso  cedida 
was  thus  actually  forty-eight  and  ninety  one-hundredths  pesos, 
and  the  others  in  the  same  proportion.  The  Chinese,  like  the  na- 
tives, were  required  to  produce  their  identification  cedulas  upon 
demand. 

A  royal  decree  of  June  14,  1878,  provided  for  a  tax  on  the 
income  received  as  rent  of  urban  real  estate  and  from  commer- 
cial and  industrial  business.  The  former,  known  as  the  urbana 
tax,  was  originally  five  per  cent,  of  the  net  rental  value  of  all 
houses  and  buildings  of  brick,  masonry,  iron  and  wood,  and 
those  of  bamboo  and  nipa  when  rented  or  used  for  commercial 
or  industrial  purposes.  The  urbana  tax  covered  all  income  de- 
rived from  real  estate  other  than  the  income  produced  by  agri- 
culture. Unoccupied  building  lots,  buildings  owned  or  used  by 
religious  communities  as  residences  for  the  parish  priests,  for 
hospitals,  houses  of  benevolence  or  schools,  houses  inhabited  by 
the  foreign  consuls  when  the  governments  they  represented  re- 


TAXATION   AND    REVENUE  255 

clprocated,  and  public  buildings  owned  or  used  by  the  State 
were  exempt. 

No  distinction  was  made  between  owners  of  different  classes 
or  nationalities.  Natives  who  paid  the  tribute  were  exempt  if 
the  urbana  tax  did  not  exceed  four  pesos  per  year.  I  f  it  reached 
or  exceeded  that  amount,  those  who  paid  it  were  exempt  from 
payment  of  the  tribute.  If  the  urbana  tax  exceeded  twelve  pesos 
the  exemption  from  tribute  extended  to  the  legitimate  children 
who  were  under  the  father's  control,  and  when  it  reached  twenty- 
five  pesos  it  also  carried  exemption  from  personal  service.  The 
tax  was  Increased  by  a  surtax  of  five  per  cent,  for  the  expenses 
of  assessment  and  collection. 

In  order  to  ascertain  the  rental  values  of  buildings,  the  officials 
were  authorized  to  examine  receipts  and  any  other  papers  relat- 
ing to  the  property.  The  rate  of  assessment  on  property  which 
was  occupied  by  the  owner  was  fixed  at  ten  per  cent,  of  the  selling 
value.  Tax  lists  were  prepared  by  a  local  assessment  board,  upon 
which  citizens  were  required  to  serve  without  compensation. 

The  industrial  tax,  which  was  much  more  important  than  the 
urbana  tax,  resembled  the  Spanish  excise,  which  was  never  col- 
lected in  the  Philippines.  In  the  beginning  it  was  levied  only  on 
the  business  of  the  Chinese.  The  elaborate  tariff  for  all  indus- 
tries and  commerce  which  was  in  force  in  1898  grew  out  of  the 
original  classification  of  Chinese  shops  according  to  their  size 
and  the  kind  of  goods  made  or  sold  therein.  One  class  included 
the  shops  which,  in  addition  to  a  main  room,  had  interior  rooms 
"where  were  displayed  manufactures  of  cotton,  linen  or  silk, 
fancy  goods,  books,  paper  and  other  things  used  by  the  rich  and 
well-to-do."  The  second  class  Included  all  those  shops  having  one 
room  only  In  which  were  sold  silks,  porcelain,  mirrors  and  the 
like.  A  third  Included  the  shops  selling  comestibles,  carpenter 
shops,  dye  shops  and  the  like ;  and  the  fourth,  all  others,  including 
umbrella  shops,  junk  shops  and  old  clothes  stores. 

Chinese  running  shops  of  the  first  class  paid  one  hundred 
pesos  per  annum ;  the  second,  sixty  pesos ;  the  third,  thirty  pesos. 


256  THE   PHILIPPINES 

and  the  fourth,  twelve  pesos.  The  rates  were,  however,  modified 
at  various  times. 

The  decree  of  June  14,  1878,  which  established  the  urbana  tax, 
extended  the  industrial  tax  as  levied  on  the  Chinese,  to  all  indus- 
tries of  the  same  sort  by  whomsoever  conducted,  and  created  two 
new  classes,  one  of  which  paid  three  hundred  pesos  and  the  other 
two  hundred  pesos  per  annum.  The  first  of  the  new  classes  in- 
cluded stock  companies,  corporations  engaged  in  making  loans 
and  discounts,  large  commercial  houses,  factories,  insurance  com- 
panies other  than  mutual,  banks  which  issued  bills  payable  to  the 
bearer  on  demand,  and  commercial  capitalists  engaged  in  bank- 
ing, the  exporting  and  importing  trade,  and  operating  warehouses 
and  selling  at  wholesale  at  Manila.  The  second  included  those 
transacting  the  same  kind  of  business  elsewhere  than  in  Manila, 
and  also  wholesalers,  money  lenders,  dealers  in  the  products  of 
the  country,  and  all  those  manufacturing  and  mercantile  houses 
which  "by  reason  of  their  business  ought  to  pay  higher  rates 
than  those  assigned  to  the  third  class."  This  system  was  gradu- 
ally extended  until  by  the  reglamento  of  June  18,  1890,  it  cov- 
ered four  hundred  different  industries  and  occupations. 

Ordinarily  no  declaration  of  the  extent  or  amount  of  income 
in  money  was  required,  as  the  amount  to  be  paid  was  determined 
by  the  nature  of  the  business,  the  kind  of  goods  manufactured, 
the  size  and  arrangement  of  the  shop  in  which  the  business  was 
transacted  and  the  importance  from  a  commercial  point  of  view 
of  the  town  in  which  it  was  located.  There  were,  however,  some 
exceptions. 

There  were  four  specific  rates  for  industrial  shops  or  occupa- 
tions. The  first  for  Manila  and  its  adjacent  suburbs,  the  second 
for  most  of  the  other  important  ports  of  entry  and  a  few  towns 
of  over  thirty  thousand  inhabitants,  a  third  for  provincial  towns 
of  over  fifteen  thousand  and  not  over  thirty  thousand  inhabi- 
tants, and  a  fourth  for  all  other  towns.  These  rates  stood  about 
in  the  relation  of  one  hundred,  sixty-eight,  fifty-one  and  thirty- 
six.  Certain  industries  which  manufactured  goods  from  raw 
material  produced  in  the  islands,  and  certain  occupations,  such 


TAXATION   AND    REVENUE  257 

as  peddling  (in  which  locaHty  was  not  important)  paid  one  rate, 
without  reference  to  location. 

The  numerous  occupations  and  industries  which  were  exempt 
included  the  following :  ( 1 )  all  persons  other  than  Chinese  whose 
incomes  were  below  six  hundred  pesos  per  annum,  such  as  seam- 
stresses, domestic  servants,  weavers  of  mats  and  nipa  thatch, 
itinerant  barbers  and  day  laborers;  (2)  all  public  officials,  includ- 
ing school-teachers;  (3)  public  and  benevolent  institutions;  (4) 
industries  otherwise  taxed  or  burdened,  as  mining  and  forestry ; 
(5)  all  branches  of  agricultural  industries;  (6)  fishing;  (7) 
writers,  authors  and  editors  of  scientific  or  literary  works,  and 
teachers  in  the  higher  branches;  and  (8),  for  two  years  only,  any 
manufacturing  industry  which  had  not  been  previously  conducted 
in  the  islands. 

Like  all  Spanish  taxes,  the  industrial  tax  was  increased  by  sur- 
taxes, some  of  which  went  to  the  provincial  and  municipal  gov- 
ernments. The  tax  was  payable  quarterly,  and  delinquents  were 
punished  by  a  fine  of  twenty-five  per  cent.,  plus  twenty-five  cents 
per  day  for  the  expenses  of  collection.  In  commenting  on  this 
income  tax,  which  was  continued  for  some  time  under  the  Ameri- 
can government,  Professor  Plehn  says :  *Tt  is  distinctly  a  tax 
on  profits.  The  only  place  where  labor  and  capital  can  go  to 
escape  this  taxation  is,  therefore,  into  agriculture,  all  branches  of 
industrial  and  commercial  activity  being  alike  subject  to  the  tax 
and  at  practically  the  same  rates;  consequently  the  price  of  manu- 
factured or  commercial  wares  can  be  affected  by  the  tax  only  to 
the  extent  that  capital  and  labor  are  driven  into  agriculture  and 
the  cost  of  agricultural  products  correspondingly  reduced.  The 
reasons  for  thus  favoring  agriculture,  which  had  all  the  more 
weight  by  reason  of  the  fact  that  the  friars  who  were  large  land 
holders  had  a  decisive  voice  in  the  government,  are  to  be  found : 
(1)  in  the  great  natural  advantages  which  the  islands  possess 
for  the  production  of  such  crops  as  hemp,  tobacco,  copra,  cocoa- 
nut  oil,  sugar,  indigo  and  chocolate — crops  which  promise  such 
magnificent  returns  for  the  general  wealth  and  welfare  of  the 
country  when  they  are  developed;  and  (2)  in  the  inertness  of 


258  THE    PHILIPPINES 

the  natives  and  their  reluctance  to  labor  after  their  immediate 
necessities  are  supplied,  which  place  so  severe  a  handicap  on  all 
agricultural  endeavors."' 

Professor  Plehn  also  comments  on  the  skilful  way  in  which  the 
Spaniards  avoided  the  difficulties  always  incidental  to  personal 
declarations  and  estimates  of  income  and  the  attendant  dangers 
of  false  statements  and  misrepresentation.  As  he  justly  re- 
marks, it  is  probably  the  only  form  of  income  tax  which  can  be 
enforced  with  any  degree  of  effectiveness  among  a  people  not 
given  to  open-heartedness  where  the  interests  of  the  government 
are  concerned.  Had  it  been  honestly  administered  it  would  have 
been  as  just  and  equitable  as  any  which  could  have  been  adopted. 

Customs  duties  assumed  little  importance  until  well  into  the 
nineteenth  century.  In  theory  the  ad  valorem  duties  (almojari- 
fasgo)  on  both  imports  and  exports,  established  for  all  Spanish 
colonies  by  the  Laws  of  the  Indias,  applied  in  the  Philippines  as 
soon  as  they  were  acquired.^  Legaspi  established  a  customs 
house  at  Manila  in  1573,.  Early  in  the  seventeenth  century  the 
law  was  modified  to  suit  conditions  in  the  Philippines,  and  as 
modified  it  continued  in  force,  with  few  exceptions,  until  1789. 
A  duty  of  (1)  fifteen  per  cent,  was  collected  on  all  goods  (ex- 
cept wines,  which  paid  twenty  per  cent.)  imported  from  Spain 
or  New  Spain  to  the  Philippines — five  per  cent,  payable  on  the 
departure  of  the  vessel  from  the  home  port  and  ten  per  cent, 
upon  the  arrival  in  the  islands;  (2)  three  per  cent,  on  all  goods 
imported  into  the  islands  from  any  other  countries,  except  mer- 
chandise brought  by  the  Chinese,  which  paid  six  per  cent.;  (3) 
ten  per  cent,  on  all  Chinese  and  other  Asiatic  wares  exported  to 
New  Spain;  and  (4)  three  per  cent,  on  all  other  goods  exported 
from  the  islands. 

The  original  classification  of  goods  with  reference  to  origin 
and  character  was  retained  as  the  foundation  of  the  system  which 
remained  in  force  until  the  end  of  Spanish  rule.     Between  1734 


5  Pol.  Sci.  Quar.  XVI,  p.  710. 
^  Ibid.,  XVII,  p.  125  etseq. 


TAXATION   AND    REVENUE  259 

and  1828  the  values  of  imported  goods  were  fixed  arbitrarily 
by  a  board  composed  of  one  royal  officer,  two  merchants  and 
the  fiscal  for  the  treasury.  Tables  of  "official  values"  were 
published  from  time  to  time.  In  1828,  as  a  part  of  a  move- 
ment to  revive  and  extend  the  commerce  of  the  islands,  a  gen- 
eral tariff  board  was  created  and  instructed  to  devise  a  tariff 
which  would  so  operate  as  to  increase  the  revenues,  nourish  and 
protect  agriculture  and  encourage  general  commerce.  The  tar- 
iff which  this  board  prepared  went  into  effect  on  January  1,  1832. 
It  enumerated  over  one  thousand  articles  of  import  and,  with  a 
very  few  exceptions,  fixed  their  value  per  unit  of  weight  or 
measure.  The  lowest  rate  of  duty  was  placed  on  Spanish  goods 
imported  in  Spanish  vessels,  the  second  on  Spanish  goods  im- 
ported in  foreign  vessels,  the  third  on  foreign  goods  imported  in 
Spanish  vessels,  and  the  fourth  and  highest  on  foreign  goods 
imported  in  foreign  vessels. 

The  goods  thus  imported  paid  respectively  three,  eight,  seven 
and  fourteen  per  cent.  Certain  special  articles  paid  more  or  less 
than  these  rates.  Thus  spirits  were  divided  into  four  classes, 
'  which  paid  respectively  ten,  twenty-five,  thirty  and  sixty  per  cent., 
except  Spanish  rum,  which  paid  three  or  eight  per  cent.  The 
four  classes  of  beer  and  cider  paid,  respectively,  three,  ten, 
twenty  and  twenty-five  per  cent.  Certain  kinds  of  cotton,  linen, 
silk  and  woolen  fabrics,  olives  and  olive  oil,  boots,  shoes,  sweet 
potatoes,  onions,  beans,  preserved  fruits,  salt  fish  and  a  few  other 
minor  articles  were  classified,  and  paid,  according  to  their  class, 
three,  eight,  forty  and  fifty  per  cent. 

Agricultural  machinery  was  admitted  free,  while  much-needed 
diamonds  and  brilliants  were  charged  but  one  per  cent.  Birds' 
nests  and  tortoise  shells  coming  from  Jolo  paid  two  per  cent. 
Trees  and  shrubs  for  horticulture,  gold  and  silver  coin,  paving 
stone,  horses  for  breeding  purposes  and  goats  were  all  on  the  free 
list. 

The  ease  with  which  the  rates  on  any  article  could  be  increased 
by  simply  increasing  the  valuation  led  to  discrimination  against 
foreign  wares.    Thus  lawns  were  valued  at  twice  their  market 


260  THE    PHILIPPINES 

value,  and  cotton  goods  and  textiles  of  colors  similar  to  those 
produced  in  the  Philippines  paid  from  fourteen  to  fifteen  per 
cent.,  while  those  of  red,  green  or  yellow,  not  local  colors,  were 
admitted  free. 

Only  fifteen  articles  of  export  are  enumerated  as  paying  ex- 
port duty,  but  everything,  in  fact,  except  gold,  silver  and  tobacco, 
sent  to  Spanish  ports  paid  such  a  duty.  Articles  not  enumerated, 
if  exported  under  the  Spanish  flag,  paid  one  per  cent. ;  if  under 
a  foreign  flag  to  Spain,  two  per  cent. ;  and  to  foreign  ports,  three 
per  cent.  Silver  coin  sent  under  the  Spanish  flag  to  a  foreign 
port  paid  two  per  cent.,  and  four  per  cent,  if  carried  under  a  for- 
eign flag.  The  export  duty  on  hemp  depended  on  four  sets  of 
conditions.  If  exported  (1)  in  Spanish  ships  to  Spanish  ports 
it  paid  one  per  cent.,  (2)  in  Spanish  ships  to  a  foreign  port,  one 
and  one-half  per  cent.,  (3)  in  foreign  ships  to  Spanish  ports,  or 
(4)  in  foreign  ships  to  foreign  ports,  two  per  cent.  Rice  under 
the  same  conditions  was  free  in  the  first  and  second  instances, 
paid  two  per  cent,  in  the  third  and  four  per  cent,  in  the  fourth. 
After  1831  rice  exported  In  foreign  ships  paid  an  additional  one 
per  cent,  for  the  benefit  of  the  poor  in  San  Jose. 

Under  this  policy  Spanish  ships  carried  nearly  all  the  imports 
and  foreign  ships  nearly  all  the  exports.  Thus  in  1854  the  im- 
ports under  the  Spanish  flag  amounted  to  5,544,844  pesos,  and 
under  foreign  flags  to  210,482  pesos.  The  exports  under  the 
Spanish  flag  amounted  to  213,656  pesos,  and  under  foreign  flags 
to  5,138,691  pesos. 

Although  the  rates  were  occasionally  revised  and  some  changes 
made  in  classification,  the  tariff  remained  substantially  in  this 
form  until  1891.  In  1857  rice  and  paddy  were  exempt  from  the 
import  duty.  Before  that  time  no  rice  of  any  consequence  had 
been  imported.  From  the  time  when  the  importation  of  rice 
commenced  the  quantity  of  hemp,  sugar,  tobacco  and  copra  ex- 
ported commenced  to  increase  steadily.  Agricultural  machinery, 
rails,  cars  and  railroad  machinery,  as  well  as  machinery  for  cer- 
tain industries,  books  and  scientific  instruments  and  the  like,  were 
placed  on  the  free  list. 


TAXATION   AND    REVENUE  261 

After  1870  the  most  of  the  duties  were  calculated  with',  ref- 
erence to  quantity  and  not  value.  The  revised  tariff  of  1891, 
which  was  in  force  at  the  time  of  American  occupation,  was  con- 
tinued until  November  15,  1901.  Under  its  provisions  all  Span- 
ish goods  imported  under  the  Spanish  flag  were  admitted  free; 
the  island  market  was  carefully  protected  for  the  benefit  of  Span- 
ish goods,  the  ad  valorem  duties  were  entirely  abandoned  and  the 
free  list  practically  wiped  out. 

Between  1890  and  1896,  reviving  an  old  custom,  a  loading  and 
unloading  tax  of  two  per  cent,  ad  valorem  based  on  "official 
values"  was  levied  on  vessels  frequenting  Manila  Harbor.  In 
1896  a  consumption  tax  at  specific  rates  was  levied  on  spirituous 
liquors,  beer  and  cider,  salt,  vegetables,  flour  and  mineral  oils. 
In  1897  six  per  cent,  additional  was  levied  as  a  war  tax. 

In  1880  the  Board  of  Harbor  Improvement  was  established  at 
Manila,  with  authority  to  collect  additional  duties  equal  to  twenty 
per  cent,  of  the  regular  duties.  At  first  this  tax  was  collected  by 
the  board  and  was  levied  even  on  Spanish  goods  which  were 
exempt  from  the  specific  duties  of  the  general  tariff.  As  goods 
from  other  ports  of  the  Philippines  did  not  pay  this  tax,  the  way 
was  open  for  fraud,  and  it  became  necessary  to  reduce  the  rate 
to  ten  per  cent,  and  collect  it  at  all  ports.  Collections  were  there- 
after made  by  the  regular  customs  officials. 

Wharf  and  harbor  dues  in  later  years  amounted  to  one  and 
one-half  peso  per  ton  of  one  thousand  kilos  (2,500  pounds)  on 
all  exports  and  one-half  peso  per  ton  on  imports  intended  for 
transshipment  to  other  parts  of  the  islands.  There  was  also  a 
charge  of  0.10  pesos  per  net  ton  for  lighthouse  dues,  and  the 
stamps  which  had  to  be  purchased  and  used  in  connection  with 
a  ship's  papers  cost  about  four  pesos.  From  1528  until  1874 
there  was  a  peculiar  charge  on  commerce  which  was  known  as 
the  average.  It  came  from  the  days  when  merchant  ships  had 
to  be  convoyed  and  was  supposed  to  reimburse  the  government 
for  special  protection  rendered  commerce  by  the  navy,  judicial 
and  lighthouse  service. 

To  illustrate  the  way  in  which  the  additional  taxes  modified 


262  THE    PHILIPPINES 

the  original  specific  duties,  Professor  Plehn  takes  the  case  of  an 
importation  of  one  hundred  kilos  of  salt/  The  following  charges 
would  have  to  be  paid : 

(1)  Specific  duty 0.650 

(2)  Surtax  for  Manila  Harbor,  ten  percent,  of  the  above 

duty    0.065 

(3)  Six  per  cent,  plus  two  per  cent  ad  valorem  (on  offi- 

cial value  of  0.40  peso) 0.032 

(4)  Consumption  tax 1 .  000 

Total 1.747 

As  was  but  natural,  this  method  caused  much  friction,  as  the 
shipping  people  inevitably  thought  in  terms  of  the  specific  tax 
and  were  greatly  irritated  by  the  extras  which  they  regarded  as 
impositions. 

A  considerable  part  of  the  income  of  the  government  was  de- 
rived from  various  forms  of  trade  monopolies.  The  sale  of 
stamped  paper  brought  a  large  revenue.  Adhesive  stamps  were 
required  to  be  used  on  insurance  policies,  drafts  and  bank  checks, 
and  such  like  instruments.  Postage  and  telegraph  stamps  were 
handled  in  the  same  general  way.  The  stamped  paper  was  in 
various  forms  and  was  sold  at  different  prices,  but  the  kind 
that  should  be  used  in  each  business  transaction  was  carefully 
determined  by  law.  In  order  to  avoid  the  handling  of  money  by 
employees  it  was  provided  that  a  person  who  was  required  to  pay 
a  fine  imposed  by  a  court  must  purchase  certain  stamped  paper, 
a  package  of  which  was  cut  through,  one  part,  upon  which  proper 
memoranda  was  made,  being  retained  by  the  official  and  the  other 
part  by  the  payer  as  his  receipt.  Considerable  revenue  was  de- 
rived from  the  sale  of  papal  bulls  and  indulgences,  which,  like 
tithes,  was  one  of  the  revenues  that  passed  to  the  Crown  under 
the  arrangement  by  which  it  assumed  the  obligation  to  support 
the  churches. 

The  exclusive  right  to  sell  opium,  which  was  farmed  out,  in 

Tpo/.  Sci.  Quar.  XVII,  p.  134. 


TAXATION    AND    REVENUE  263 

1849  yielded  five  hundred  thousand  pesos  per  annum.®  Cockpits 
were  also  sources  of  government  revenue.  A  royal  order  of 
March  21,  1861,  provided  for  the  regulation  of  this  popular 
amusement.  The  privilege  to  operate  cockpits  was  sold  to  the 
highest  bidder  and  yielded  the  government  from  one  hundred 
thousand  pesos  to  two  hundred  thousand  pesos  per  year.  In  1891 
this  source  of  revenue  was  relinquished  to  the  local  governments. 

Lotteries  were  encouraged  and  from  1850  to  the  American  oc- 
cupation they  brought  in  about  eight  hundred  thousand  pesos  per 
year.  Three-fourths  of  the  receipts  were  distributed  in  prizes, 
and  all  unsold  tickets  were  "played"  by  the  treasury. 

From  1850  to  1882  the  general  government  levied  a  tax  of 
ten  per  cent,  on  the  fees  received  by  municipal  governments  for 
licenses  for  markets,  fisheries,  ferries,  fords,  slaughter-houses, 
public  carts  and  carriages,  weights  and  measures,  and  the  rents 
received  from  public  property, — a  tax  on  the  taxes. 

Considerable  revenue  was  derived  from  the  sale  of  forestry 
products  and  lesser  amounts  from  the  sales  of  public  lands  and 
commutations,  or  payments  by  squatters  for  the  right  to  locate 
temporarily  on  public  lands.  The  carefully  guarded  mining  priv- 
ileges never  brought  the  government  a  very  great  amount  of 
revenue. 

For  many  years  the  government  derived  a  substantial  revenue 
from  the  profits  of  the  trade  and  commerce  in  which  it  engaged 
as  a  trader  or  farmed  out.  The  trade  in  quicksilver,  salt,  playing 
cards  and,  in  later  times,  spirituous  liquors,  explosives,  opium  and 
tobacco,  was  reserved  to  the  government  and  the  profits  were 
large. 

The  tribute  which  was  paid  in  kind  by  the  people,  was  ex- 
changed at  the  royal  stores  in  Manila  for  Chinese,  Indian  or  Per- 
sian goods  which  were  exported  to  Mexico  in  the  galleons  on 
government  account.  Prior  to  the  opening  of  the  nineteenth 
century  all  business  not  conducted  by  the  royal  stores  was  in  the 
hands  of  a  close  corporation  of  Manila  merchants,  the  Consulado, 


8  The  contractor  paid  a  tax  of  40  pesos  per  chest  in  addition  to  the  regular 
customs  duties. 


264  THE   PHILIPPINES 

afterward  the  Compafiia  Guipuzcoana  de  Caracas.  The  export 
trade,  which  was  confined  to  the  galleons,  paid  little  revenue  at 
the  custom  house.  Of  course  all  this  has  changed  when  the  trade 
with  Europe  and  the  Asiatic  coast  was  legalized  and  the  port  of 
Manila  opened  to  foreign  traders.® 

The  raising,  manufacture  and  sale  of  tobacco  was  assumed 
by  the  government  in  1871  and  continued  until  1884.  It  was 
the  most  important  of  all  the  government  monopolies,  and  in  it 
were  manifested  all  the  worst  evils  of  such  a  system.  At  first 
confined  to  the  district  of  Gapon,  in  Nueva  Ecija,  certain  dis- 
tricts in  the  Cagayan  Valley  and  the  island  of  Martinique,  it  was 
in  time  extended  to  La  Isabela,  La  Union,  Ibra,  Hocus  Sur  and 
Hocus  Norte.  In  the  Visayans  the  people  were  at  liberty  to  raise 
tobacco  or  sell  to  whom  they  pleased,  but  the  government  estab- 
lished collecting  centers  where  the  product  could  be  classified  and 
stored.  From  1842  the  Igorots  were  allowed  to  cultivate  tobacco, 
and  in  1853  they  produced  twenty-five  thousand  bales.  For 
many  years  this  trade  in  tobacco  furnished  one  of  the  principal 
items  in  the  budget,  but  it  ended  like  all  government  trade  mo- 
nopolies in  the  oppression  of  the  people  and  in  financial  loss. 

The  monopoly  involved  the  restriction  of  cultivation  to  cer- 
tain districts,  certainty  in  the  amount  to  be  raised,  compulsory 
labor,  the  prevention  of  contraband  production  and  sales,  the 
purchase  of  the  entire  crop  by  the  government  at  a  price  fixed 
by  the  purchaser,  inspection  of  the  growing  crop  and  of  the  prod- 
uct, its  classification,  its  transportation  under  government  super- 
vision, the  manufacture  in  government  factories,  the  prohibition 
of  the  export  of  any  tobacco  product  except  by  the  government, 
and  the  collection  and  purchase  of  as  much  as  possible  of  the 
crop  raised  in  districts  not  under  the  control  of  the  monopoly." 

The  natives  were  encouraged  and  assisted  to  settle  in  the  se- 
lected districts,  and  for  a  while  were  well  treated.  To  induce 
them  to  leave  their  old  habitations,  a  very  serious  matter  for  a 


»In  1834.    From  1785  to  1830  the  trade  other  than  between  Manila  and 
Acapulco  was  controlled  by  the  Real  Compafiia  de  la  Filipinas. 
"  C.  C.  Plehn,  Pol.  Set.  Quar.,  XVII,  p.  142. 


TAXATION    AND   REVENUE  265 

Filipino,  an  old  law  which  limited  the  responsibility  of  a  native 
for  debts  to  five  pesos  was  revived.  The  emigration,  while  fur- 
nishing the  necessary  labor  supply  for  the  tobacco  provinces, 
thus  served  also  as  a  kind  of  bankruptcy  proceedings.  But  after 
the  people  were  settled  in  the  country  and  had  become  dependent 
on  the  tobacco  crop  the  government  became  remiss  in  paying  for 
their  products.  The  interests  of  the  producers  were  neglected. 
No  other  crops  were  allowed  to  be  raised,  nor  were  the  natives 
permitted  merely  to  "scrape  up  the  earth  and  plant  where  they 
liked."  The  forced  labor  system,  which  left  such  a  blot  on  Dutch 
administration  in  Java,  was  in  full  force  in  Luzon,  with  the 
inevitable  cruelties  and  abuses.  Each  family  was  forced  to  con- 
tract to  raise  four  thousand  tobacco  plants  each  year,  and  a 
breach  of  the  contract  meant  fine  and  imprisonment.  The  caheza 
de  harangay  had  to  see  that  the  families  performed  the  contracts 
under  the  same  penalty  for  himself.  Every  leaf  of  tobacco 
raised  had  to  be  delivered,  and  what  graded  below  the  required 
standard  was  destroyed.  Juan  was  not  allowed  even  the  bad 
leaves  for  his  own  consumption. 

In  1880  a  Madrid  paper,  El  Liberal,  contained  a  letter  from  a 
planter,^^  from  which  it  appears  that  the  tobacco  grower  was 
only  allowed  to  smoke  tobacco  of  his  own  crop  inside  the  aerating 
sheds,  which  were  usually  erected  on  the  field.  For  smoking  a 
cigar  or  a  cigarette  elsewhere  he  was  fined.  From  these  fines 
in  Nueva  Ecija  alone  the  government  received  each  year  on  an 
average  seven  thousand  pesos.  "The  native  grower,"  says  Fore- 
man, who  lived  in  the  islands  at  the  time,  "was  subject  to  domi- 
ciliary search  for  concealed  tobacco.  His  trunks,  furniture  and 
every  nook  and  corner  of  the  dwelling  was  ransacked."  The  peo- 
ple were  absolutely  at  the  mercy  of  the  monopoly,  and  when  the 
government  took  the  tobacco  and  did  not  pay  for  it  they  were 
helpless. 

Often  the  government  paid  in  treasury  certificates,   which 


^^  Quoted  in  Foreman's  Philippine  Islands,  p.  295  (1906). 
Day  {The  Dutch  in  Java)  says  that  the  Filipinos  under  the  monopoly  sys- 
tem were  worse  off  than  the  slaves  in  Cuba. 


265  iTHE   PHILIPPINES 

were  immediately  bought  up  by  the  speculators  at  a  mere  frac- 
tion of  their  face  value.  Toward  the  end  the  debt  to  the  tobacco 
growers  became  so  great  that  the  governor-general  in  despera- 
tion appropriated  the  funds  of  the  Deposit  Bank,  and  its  deposit 
notes,  which  were  mostly  held  by  clerks,  were  consequently  dis- 
honored. 

And  yet  the  natives  are  said  to  have  generally  opposed  the 
abandonment  by  the  government  of  the  control  of  the  tobacco 
industry,  preferring  its  certainties  to  the  uncertainties  of  private 
control.  In  1882  the  monopoly  came  to  an  end  and  the  tobacco 
lands  soon  passed  into  the  hands  of  private  corporations  and  in- 
dividuals.^^ 

It  is  not  easy  to  ascertain  the  exact  amount  of  money  which 
the  Spanish  government  collected  through  taxation.  The  receipts 
of  the  central  government,  as  shown  by  the  annual  budgets, 
do  not  show  the  taxes  collected  by  the  provinces  and  munici- 
palities for  their  own  uses.  Nor  do  they  include  all  the  collec- 
tions made  by  the  church  authorities,  which  were  in  reality  taxes 
imposed  by  the  state  and  formed  no  small  portion  of  the  burden 
imposed  on  the  people.  Taking  the  year  1894-1895,  just  before 
the  outbreak  of  the  insurrection,  we  find  that  the  receipts  of  the 
central  government  were  as  follows  •^^ 

Direct  taxes $6,659,450 

Indirect  taxes  (customs) 4,565.000 

Receipts  for  monopolies 1,112,850 

Lotteries 873,000 

From  state  property 195,000 

Estimated  petty  receipts 174,000 

Total $13,579,300 

^2  The  Companie  General  de  Tobacco  de  Filipinos  organized  in  1883  is  still 
an  important  factor  in  the  business  life  of  the  islands.  It  is  the  only  remain- 
ing Spanish  business  concern  of  importance,  and  the  gentlemen  responsible 
for  its  policy  have  worked  in  perfect  harmony  with  the  American  govern- 
ment. 

13  The  receipts  for  1896-7  were  $17,474,000,  Mex.  The  first  budget  was 
published  in  1839.  Foreman  {The  Philippine  Islands,  p.  227)  gives  some  of 
the  figures  of  the  1888  budget.  For  the  budget  for  1896-7,  see  Sen.  Doc.  62, 
55  Cong.,  3d  Sess.,  p.  409;  Sawyer,  The  Inhabitants  of  the  Philippines,  Appen- 
dix ;  in  the  Report  of  the  Military  Governor  of  the  Philippine  Islands  on  Civil 
Affairs,  1900  {Kept.  War  Dept.,  1900,  I,  Pt.  10). 


TAXATION   AND    REVENUE  267 

The  proceeds  of  direct  taxation — that  is,  the  poll  and  income 
taxes — tlius  produced  one-half  of  the  total  revenue.  Four  mill- 
ion five  hundred  eighty-six  thousand  two  hundred  fifty  dollars 
of  it  was  collected  from  the  cedulas,  or  personal  identification  cer- 
tificates. Next  to  the  cedulas  the  tax  on  commerce  and  industry 
was  most  productive,  yielding  $1,323,000.  The  poll  tax  on  Chi- 
nese produced  $482,800,  and  the  tax  on  urban  property  $1 10,400. 
Of  the  balance  twelve  thousand  dollars  came  from  the  tributes 
received  from  wild  tribes,  thirty-five  thousand  dollars  from  the 
ten  per  cent,  tax  on  railway  tickets,  seventy  thousand  dollars 
from  a  ten  per  cent,  assessment  on  certain  salaries,  and  forty 
thousand  dollars  from  a  twenty-five  per  cent,  tax  on  the  pre- 
miums for  the  collection  of  urban  and  industrial  taxes,  cedulas 
and  the  Chinese  head  tax. 

The  customs  receipts,  which  amoimted  to  $4,565,000,  were 
made  up  of  $3,800,000  from  duties  on  imports,  $430,000  duties 
on  exports,  $300,000  clearance  dues,  and  the  balance  from  fines 
and  so  forth.  In  the  receipts  from  monopolies  are  included 
$602,300  from  the  opium  contract,  and  $510,550  from  stamps 
and  stamped  paper.  The  receipts  from  state  property  included 
rents  or  products  as  well  as  sales.  The  sale  of  forest  products 
produced  $122,000,  the  sale  of  lands  $45,000,  and  of  buildings 
$25,000.  Of  the  $174,000  estimated  petty  receipts,  $100,000 
was  expected  to  accrue  from  profits  on  the  coinage,  $9,000  from 
the  sales  of  army  and  navy  stores,  $13,000  from  resources  de- 
scribed as  "indeterminate,"  and  $30,000  was  the  estimated  unex- 
pended money  in  the  secret  service  fund. 

The  expenditures  for  the  same  fiscal  year  were : 

General  obligations $1,360,506  53 

State 65,150  00 

Church  and  courts 1,687,108  88 

War   4,045.061  84 

Navy 2,450,176  77 

Government  (gobernacion) 2,220,120  98 

Public  Works  and  Institutions 628,752  46 

Total $12,456,877,  46 


268  THE   PHILIPPINES 

It  appears  that  of  the  $1,360,506.53  the  sum  of  $118,103  was 
spent  on  the  colonial  department  in  Madrid;  $70,822.73  on  the 
colony  of  Fernando  Po,  on  the  coast  of  Africa ;  $718,000  on  pen- 
sions, and  $367,000  was  paid  for  interest.  Nearly  all  of  the 
$65,150  devoted  to  the  state  was  used  to  defray  the  cost  of 
Spain's  diplomatic  and  consular  service  in  China,  Japan  and  the 
French  and  British  colonies.  Of  the  sum  alloted  for  the  church 
and  courts,  $460,315.14  was  spent  on  the  courts,  $625,860  for 
salaries  of  the  bishops  and  parochial  clergy,  and  $419,680  for 
materials  for  the  ecclesiastical  establishment.  War,  though  it 
was  a  time  of  peace,  absorbed  almost  a  third  of  the  entire  reve- 
nue of  the  government.  Seven  hundred  seventy-one  thousand 
forty-three  dollars  twenty-five  cents  was  paid  for  the  salaries  of 
officials  in  the  administrative  bureaus,  $1,997,649.27  for  the  army 
(13,291  individuals,  of  whom  only  2,210  were  Europeans),  and 
$1,332,484.32  for  materials  for  the  army. 

Of  the  allotment  for  the  treasury,  $232,996  went  to  maintain 
the  central  offices  of  the  intendency-general  and  the  controller- 
ship,  and  $216,244  for  provincial  administration.  Of  the  navy 
allotment  $1,147,540.20  went  for  materials  and  $1,349,504  for 
salaries  and  wages.  The  governor-general  and  provincial  gov- 
ernors and  commanders  received  for  salaries  $272,606,  the  Civil 
Guard  cost  $843,735.91,  the  maintenance  of  communication,  in- 
cluding posts,  $969,921.92,  and  the  general  directorate  of  the 
civil  administration  $88,555.  Of  the  money  appropriated  for 
public  works,  $141,175.55  was  spent  for  special  institutions  of 
instruction,  chiefly  in  Manila,  and  $109,690  for  public  works  gen- 
erally. One  hundred  forty-two  thousand  three  hundred  sixty- 
five  dollars  went  for  the  general  inspection  of  mountains,  $15,575 
for  mines,  $103,570  for  agricultural  schools  and  stations,  and 
$37,462  for  navigation  and  lighthouses." 

These  figures  are  interesting  as  a  basis  for  comparing  the 
Spanish  and  American  administrations.    It  appears  that  taxes  are 


^* Report  of  Schurman  Commission  (1900),  I,  p.  79. 


TAXATION   AND   REVENUE  269 

higher  at  present  than  they  were  before  1898,  but  they  are  more 
justly  distributed  and  the  people  are  better  able  to  pay,  and  the 
proceeds  are  spent  for  the  benefit  of  the  country  instead  of  being 
stolen  or  wasted. 


CHAPTER  XI 
Personal  Status  and  Trade  Restrictions 

Classification  of  Residents — Restrictions — Status  of  Natives — Slavery  Forbid- 
den by  Law — The  Tribute  and  Its  Collection — The  Encomiendas — A  Sort  of 
Slavery — Restrictions  on  Commerce — The  Galleons — Japanese  and  Chinese — 
Segregation  and  Regulation  of  Chinese — Massacres — Effect  of  the  Restrictive 
System  on  Character  of  the  Natives. 

The  reader  who  would  understand  the  PhiHppine  people  and 
judge  of  their  capacity  for  self-government  must  never  lose 
sight  of  the  vital  fact  that  they  are  the  products  of  the  Spanish 
mission  system  of  colonial  government,  a  system  designed  to  save 
souls,  but  not  to  develop  merchants,  traders,  agriculturists  or 
citizens.  At  every  point  where  it  touched  the  natives  it  was  re- 
strictive and  repressive,  seeking  to  control  his  every  thought  and 
action.  Nothing  was  further  from  the  thought  of  the  Spaniards, 
particularly  those  to  whom  Spain  delegated  the  actual  power, 
than  to  train  the  inhabitants  for  citizenship  in  a  free  constitu- 
tional government.  The  laws  were  paternal  In  character  and 
were  enforced  by  a  superior  class  of  foreigners  temporarily  resi- 
dent in  the  country  and  to  but  a  limited  extent  identified  by  Inter- 
est or  sympathy  with  the  people.  The  Spaniards  who  were  with- 
out some  official  position  In  either  Church  or  State  were  of  little 
importance  In  the  community.^ 

The  inclination  of  the  Spanish  mestizos  was  to  identify  them- 
selves with  the  Spanish  official  class  In  order  to  share  the  privi- 
lege of  living  on  their  native  blood  relations.    Frequently  they 

1  The  number  of  unofficial  Spaniards  increased  during  the  last  three  or 
four  decades.  In  1899  a  Spaniard,  Senor  Jose  de  Loyzaga,  the  editor  of  El 
Commercio,  testified  that  there  were  about  3,000  Spaniards  in  the  islands. 
"The  Spaniards  who  hold  extensive  properties  here  are  no  more  than  three. 
The  rest  of  them  are  engaged  in  keeping  shops  or  something  of  that  sort." 
Rept.  Schurman  Com.,  II,  p.  373. 

270 


PERSONAL   STATUS  271 

were  greater  tyrants  than  the  Spaniards.  The  civil,  military 
and  ecclesiastical  officials,  a  few  Spaniards  who  were  engaged  in 
some  business  favored  by  the  government,  such  as  farming  a 
monopoly,  the  Chinese  and  tlie  natives  constituted  the  inhabi- 
tants. The  great  proportion  of  Chinese  were  native  bom,  but 
they  were  always  regarded  as  a  distinct  class  and  subjected  to 
special  laws  and  regulations. 

Until  about  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  foreigners, 
other  than  Chinese,  were  not  permitted  to  reside  in  the  Philip- 
pines. After  the  relaxation  of  the  laws  governing  foreign  com- 
merce a  few  English,  Swiss,  French  and  American  traders  estab- 
lished themselves  in  Manila;  but  they  were  a  negligible  factor 
except  in  so  far  as  they  aided  in  developing  commerce.  They  were, 
in  a  sense,  transients,  although  but  little  more  so  than  the  Span- 
ish civil  and  military  official  class  who  were  there  to  govern  the 
inhabitants  for  a  while  and  then  returned  to  the  Peninsula  or  to 
some  better  official  position  in  Mexico  or  South  America.  The 
sort  of  people  who  might  accompany  a  governor-general  to  the 
Philippines  was  determined  by  law.  Discharged  soldiers  were 
not  allowed  to  remain  in  the  country.  Of  course  these  restric- 
tions were  not  always  enforced,  but  the  policy  was  fixed  and 
definite.^ 

Trade  was  regulated  for  the  benefit  of  the  India  House  in 
Seville,  and  until  after  the  loss  of  Mexico  the  foreign  commerce 
of  the  islands  was  little  more  than  a  form  of  gambling  engaged 
in  by  the  public  officials  and  their  friends,  often  with  money  bor- 
rowed from  the  Ohras  Pias.  Commerce,  in  a  broad  and  gen- 
erous sense  of  the  term,  was  forbidden  by  law.  Manufacturing 
in  such  a  community  could  never  rise  much  above  the  level  of 
tinkering.  Agriculture  never  made  substantial  progress.  There 
were  a  few  haciendas,  or  plantations,  which  were  owned  by  the 
friars  or  by  Spaniards,  or  caciques,  and  worked  by  tenants  or  by 
workmen  who  were  generally  in  a  condition  of  peonage,  if  not 


2  From  December,  18S3,  to  November,  1854,  there  were  four  governor- 
generals.  From  1835  to  1897  there  were  fifty  governor-generals,  each  serving 
an  average  of  one  3^ar  and  three  months. 


272  THE   PHILIPPINES 

actual  slavery.  The  small  farms  were  constantly  being  divided 
among  heirs  until  they  became  little  more  than  truck  patches. 

In  the  provinces  the  people  lived  in  villages  gathered  about 
great  stone  churches  and  conventos  in  which  the  parish  priest 
lived  and  from  which  he  practically  governed  the  local  com- 
munity. All  the  political  institutions  were  designed  for  the  at- 
tainment of  religious  ends.  The  legal  status  of  the  natives  was 
that  of  minors  who  were  never  expected  to  reach  their  majority. 
They  were  the  wards  of  the  State,  by  which  they  had  been  placed 
in  the  custody  of  the  Church  to  be  made  into  Christians,  but 
never  into  citizens. 

The  system  was  admirably  adapted  for  its  purposes.  It  as- 
sumed that  the  Indians  were  incapable  of  development;  that  they 
were  children  and  would  remain  children  through  successive  gen- 
erations. It  contemplated  a  perpetual  condition  of  tutelage.  It 
succeeded  for  centuries  in  isolating  the  country  from  the  influ- 
ence of  liberal  ideas  which  were  revolutionizing  and  remaking 
the  Western  world.  It  left  its  mark  upon  every  Filipino  who  was 
born  and  reared  under  its  influence.  It  paralyzed  individual  initi- 
ative, denied  the  right  to  participate  in  public  affairs  or  to  acquire 
modern  scientific  education.  It  kept  the  people  shrouded  in  the 
mists  of  economic,  religious  and  political  medievalism,  and  it 
fought  with  unparalleled  bitterness  every  attempt  to  let  in  the 
light  of  modem  civilization.  Its  beneficial  work,  for  which  full 
credit  should  be  awarded,  was  completed  by  the  end  of  the  first 
half  century  of  Spanish  occupation ;  thereafter  it  was  obstructive, 
repressive  and  detrimental  to  the  best  interests  of  the  people. 

When  the  Spaniards  arrived  in  the  Philippines  they  found 
three  conditions  of  persons  among  the  natives — ^the  chiefs,  the 
timaguas  or  plebeians,  and  slaves.  Of  the  latter  class  there  seems 
to  have  been  a  great  number.  Slavery  was  an  established  insti- 
tution and  has  never  been  entirely  disestablished  in  all  parts  of 
the  Archipelago.  According  to  Morga  there  were  two  classes  of 
slaves — seguiguilires,  who  were  in  absolute  slavery  and  required 
to  do  all  kinds  of  work  in  and  about  the  master's  house,  and 
namamahays,  who  lived  in  their  own  houses  and  came  at  the 


PERSONAL    STATUS  273 

proper  times  and  seasons  to  assist  their  lord  in  planting  and  har- 
vesting, constructing  his  buildings,  acting  as  oarsman  for  his 
boats  and  serving  in  his  house  when  guests  of  distinction  were 
present.  All  classes  were  subject  to  sale  by  the  master.  The 
descendants  of  slaves  were  of  the  class  of  their  parents.  If  either 
the  father  or  mother  was  free  and  the  other  a  slave,  a  single  child 
was  half  free  and  half  slave.  If  there  was  more  than  one  child 
the  first  born  followed  the  condition  of  the  father  and  the  second 
that  of  the  mother.  If  there  were  an  odd  number  of  children  the 
last  bom  was  half  free  and  half  slave.  The  children  of  a  free 
father  or  mother  and  a  half  slave  were  only  one-quarter  slave. 
These  partial  slaves  served  their  masters  during  every  other 
moon.  The  price  of  a  slave  depended  upon  his  class  and  the  de- 
gree of  his  slavery. 

A  free  man  became  a  slave  if  he  entered  the  house  of  a  chief 
without  asking  permission,  if  he  crossed  the  fields  planted  by  a 
chief,  if  he  even  looked  at  a  chief's  wife;  but  it  was  not  a  com- 
mon occurrence  for  one  to  enter  the  state  of  slavery  in  this  man- 
ner, as  the  offenses  described  were  considered  so  very  serious 
that  but  rarely  was  any  one  guilty  of  their  commission. 

The  most  numerous  slaves  were  probably  those  who  were  in 
the  condition  now  known  as  peonage.  When  a  man  needed 
money  badly  it  was  customary  to  offer  himself  as  security  for 
a  loan  and  to  serve  as  a  slave  to  his  creditor  until  the  debt  was 
paid.  A  debt  of  a  few  pesos,  when  properly  manipulated,  was 
sufficient  to  make  a  man  a  slave  for  life.  A  creditor  might 
transfer  both  the  debt  and  the  security  therefor  to  another  per- 
son. As  the  wealth  and  power  of  each  headman  depended  largely 
on  the  number  of  his  slaves  he  of  course  tried  by  all  imaginable 
means  to  increase  their  number.* 


8  For  detailed  descriptions  of  slavery  amonpr  the  primitive  Filipinos,  see 
letter  of  Martin  De  Rada  (1574),  B.  &  R.,  XXXIV,  p.  292;  Chirino's  Rela- 
cion  (1604),  B.  &  R.,  XIII,  p.  56;  Morga's  Sucesos  (1609),  B.  &  R.,  XIV,  p. 
297-310;  Blumentritt,  De  los  estados  Indigenes  Existent  en  Filipinas  en 
Tiempo  de  la  Conquista  Espanola,  in  the  Revista  Contemporanca  (Madrid, 
1886). 

A  great  part  of  this  pamphlet  and  quotations  from  other  early  writers  will 
be  found  in  a  report  of  a  committee  of  the  Philippine  Assembly  entitled. 
In  forme  Sobre  la  Esclavitud  y  Peonaje  en  Filipinas  (Manila,  1914). 


274  THE   PHILIPPINES 

There  are  many  early  Spanish  laws  and  decrees  forbidding  the 
holding  of  natives  in  slavery.*  The  Bull  of  Gregory  XIV  of 
April  18,  1591,^  recited  that  some,  despite  the  edict  of  the 
king,  continued  to  keep  their  slaves,  bought  or  taken  in  war, 
"therefore,  in  order  that,  as  is  befitting  to  reason  and  equity,  the 
Indians  themselves  may  freely  and  safely,  without  fear  of  bond- 
age, come  and  go  to  their  Christian  doctrines  and  to  their  homes 
and  possessions,"  it  was  ordered  under  pain  of  excommunica- 
tion that  all  slaves  be  freed. 

Notwithstanding  the  elaborate  legislation,  slavery,  in  more  or 
less  disguised  forms,  continued  to  exist  during  the  entire  Span- 
ish period,  and  remnants  of  it  still  exist  even  in  the  civilized 
parts  of  the  islands,^  although  contrary  to  law. 

Under  the  system  which  was  introduced  immediately  after 
the  conquest  of  the  country,  every  native  family  which  acknowl- 
edged the  authority  of  the  Spaniards  was  required  to  show  the 
sincerity  of  his  loyalty  by  paying  tribute  to  the  government  or 
to  some  favored  person  to  whom  the  privilege  of  receiving  the 
same  had  been  granted.  Had  the  letter  of  this  law  been  ob- 
served the  tribute  would  not  have  imposed  any  serious  burden 
on  the  families.  It  was  no  greater  than  any  intelligent  com- 
munity of  savages  should  be  willing  to  pay  cheerfully  for  pro- 
tection against  their  raiding  neighbors,  and  even  the  Igorots  of 

*  Many  of  these  laws  are  quoted  in  the  pamphlet  Informe  Sohre  la  Esclo- 
vitud  y  Peonaje  en  Filipinas,  referred  to  above,  pp.  10-19. 

5  See  B.  &  R.,  VIII,  p.  71. 

6  In  1913  Commissioner  Worcester  published  a  report  in  which  he  asserted 
that  slavery  and  peonage  existed  in  the  Philippines  at  that  time  and  the  same 
conclusion  was  reached  by  W.  H.  Phipps,  the  Insular  Auditor,  who  made  an 
investigation  about  the  same  time.  The  Filipino  leaders  indignantly  denied 
that  slavery  existed  and  the  Assembly  conducted  an  elaborate  investigation 
into  the  conditions  and  reached  the  conclusion  that  slavery  did  not  exist.  The 
agitation  resulted  in  the  enactment  by  the  legislature  of  Act  No.  2300,  which 
supplied  the  deficiencies  of  the  Spanish  law  and  by  providing  penalties  for  the 
offense  of  holding  persons  in  involuntary  servitude  made  the  Act  of  Congress 
of  July  1,  1902,  which  had  been  held  not  self-executing,  effective.  See  Slavery 
and  Peonage  in  the  Philippine  Islands,  by  D.  C.  Worcester,  Manila,  1913; 
Rept.  on  Slavery  in  the  Philippines,  by  W.  H.  Phipps,  Manila,  1913 ;  Informe 
Sohre  la  Esclavitud  y  Peonaje  en  Filipinas,  Manila,  1914. 

The  controversy,  which  was  personal  and  political,  reduced  itself  to  a  mere 
matter  of  definition  of  the  word  slavery.  It  was  conceded  by  the  investigators 
that  there  were  many  scattered  instances  of  persons  who  were  being  deprived 
of  their  liberty  and  required  to  work  for  a  master  against  their  will. 


PERSONAL   STATUS  275 

northern  Luzon  have  come  to  take  this  view  of  its  legitimate 
successor,  the  personal  cedula.  But  the  Spaniards  always  had 
trouble  in  collecting  the  tribute.  Entire  villages  moved  away,  and 
many  of  the  people  preferred  to  flee  to  the  mountains  rather  than 
pay  for  being  civilized.  The  amount  of  the  tribute  was  ordi- 
narily not  sufficient  to  be  oppressive  and  was  never  as  objection- 
able as  the  compulsory  service  on  the  public  ways  and  works, 
which  was  known  as  the  polos  y  servicioJ 

The  encomenderos  profited  by  the  rise  of  prices,  and  the  king, 
at  the  instigation  of  the  friars,  ordered  that  the  natives  might 
pay  the  tribute  in  kind  or  in  money  at  their  option.  Morga  says 
that  this  was  a  mistake.  They  could  without  too  much  effort 
raise  the  cash,  but  "now  since  they  naturally  dislike  work  they 
do  not  sow,  spin,  dig  gold,  rear  fowls  or  raise  other  food  sup- 
plies, as  they  did  before  when  they  had  to  pay  their  tribute  in 
these  articles  .  .  .  and  the  country  which  was  formerly  well 
provided  and  well  supplied  with  all  products  is  now  suffering 
want  and  deprivation  of  them." 

Among  the  institutions  developed  by  the  Spaniards  in  tlie  work 
of  governing  their  colonies,  none  is  more  interesting  than  the 
system  by  which  the  countries  were  divided  among  the  deserving 
friends  of  the  king  or  governor,  who,  in  consideration  of  the 
gift,  assumed  responsibility  for  the  welfare  of  the  natives,  the 
collection  of  the  tribute  and  the  payment  of  a  portion  thereof  to 
the  government. 

The  repartimiento  was  at  first  a  grant  of  land  in  a  conquered 
country,  but  as  the  land  was  of  no  value  without  laborers  it  was 
soon  extended  so  as  to  include  the  natives  thereon.  The  word 
encomienda  seems  to  describe  a  later  development  of  the  system. 
According  to  Helps,®  it  was  a  right  conceded  by  royal  bounty 
to  well-deserving  persons  in  the  Indias,  to  receive  and  enjoy  for 
themselves  the  tribute  due  from  the  Indians  who  should  be  as- 


''  Morga's  Sucesos,  B.  &  R.,  XVI,  p.  164.  Originally  personal  service  was 
due  to  Spaniards.  Rizal  in  a  note  to  Morga  says  that  in  1890  it  had  disap- 
peared from  the  law  but  continued  to  exist  in  practise.  The  amount  then 
due  the  state  was  fifteen  days'  labor. 

^Spanish  Conquest  in  America,  III,  Chap.  2.  See  also  Moses,  Spanish 
Rule  in  America,  p.  93,  and  B.  &  R.,  II,  p.  54. 


276  THE    PHILIPPINES 

signed  to  them,  with  the  duty  of  providing  for  the  good  of  the 
Indians  in  spiritual  and  temporal  matters,  and  of  inhabiting 
and  defending  the  provinces  where  their  encomiendas  should  be 
granted  to  them.  It  was  simply  a  mild  form  of  slavery.  The 
grantees  were  supposed  to  maintain  order,  attend  to  the  welfare 
of  the  people  and  protect  them  from  oppression  by  soldiers  and 
other  Spaniards.  In  the  event  of  any  calamity  or  public  disaster 
they  were  expected  to  care  for  the  people.  The  amount  of  serv- 
ices they  could  require  was  in  theory  definite;  in  practise  very 
much  otherwise.  They  were  required  by  the  Laws  of  the  Indias 
to  build  stone  houses  on  their  lands  and  otherwise  develop  the 
country. 

One  of  the  vessels  which  followed  Legaspi  carried  an  order 
directing  him  to  divide  the  islands  into  encomiendas  among  the 
conquerors.  As  rapidly  as  the  country  was  subjugated  it  was 
divided  among  officers  and  soldiers.  The  energetic  Salcedo  was 
given  the  encomienda  of  Vigan,  and  upon  his  death  he  left  his 
property  to  the  Indians  who  had  been  granted  to  him.  A  few 
of  the  encomiendas  were  reserved  for  the  king.  So  rapidly  did 
the  work  proceed  that  about  twenty  years  after  the  system  was 
introduced  the  entire  island  of  Luzon,  so  far  as  it  was  ever  occu- 
pied, had  been  granted  in  encomiendas.^ 

From  Morga's  report  it  appears  that  there  were  then  266  enco- 
miendas, of  which  only  thirty-one  were  the  king's,  paying  in  all 


^Report  of  the  Encomiendas  in  the  Islands  in  1591.  Archivo  del 
Bibliofilo  Filipino,  IV,  p.  39,  quoted  in  B.  &  R.,  I,  p.  39. 

In  his  Secesos  (1609),  B.  &  R.,  XVI,  p.  157,  Morga  says:  "All  these 
islands  and  their  natives  so  far  as  they  were  pacified  were  apportioned  into 
encomiendas  from  the  beginning.  To  the  royal  crown  were  allotted  those 
which  were  the  chief  towns  and  ports,  and  the  dwellers  of  the  cities  and 
towns ;  and  also  other  special  encomiendas  and  villages  in  all  the  provinces 
for  the  expenses  and  necessities  of  the  royal  estate.  All  the  rest  were  assigned 
to  the  conquerors  and  settlers  who  have  served  and  labored  for  the  conquest 
and  pacification,  and  in  the  war.  This  matter  is  in  charge  of  the  Governor, 
who  takes  into  consideration  the  merits  and  services  of  the  claimants.  In 
like  manner  the  villages  that  become  vacant  are  assigned.  There  are  many 
very  excellent  encomiendas  throughout  the  Islands,  and  they  oflrer  many 
profits,  both  by  the  amount  of  their  tributes  and  by  the  nature  and  value  of 
what  is  paid  as  tribute.  The  encomienda  lasts,  according  to  the  royal  laws 
and  decrees,  and  by  the  regular  order  and  manner  of  succession  to  them,  for 
two  lives;  but  it  may  be  extended  to  a  third  life,  by  permission.  After  it 
becomes  vacant  it  is  again  assigned  and  granted  anew." 


PERSONAL   STATUS  277 

166,903  tributes.  It  is  estimated  that  each  tribute  represented 
five  persons.  This  probably  represents  the  population  of  the 
islands  three  hundred  years  ago,  excluding  what  are  known  as 
the  non-Christian  tribes  and  the  Moros. 

In  Spanish-America  no  one  was  permitted  to  hold  more  than 
three  hundred  Indians,  but  in  the  Philippines  one  thousand  or 
more  tributantes  were  often  held  by  a  single  person.  The  grant- 
ees were  supposed  to  live  on  their  estates,  but  in  practise  they 
soon  became  merely  collectors  of  tribute,  non-resident  encomen- 
deros,  or  landlords  who  once  a  year  went  the  rounds  and  made 
their  collections.  If  payment  was  refused  the  headman  was 
whipped  or  otherwise  punished.  Some  of  the  royal  decrees  pro- 
vided that  only  Christian  Indians  should  be  given  to  the  encom- 
enderos,  but  like  other  restrictive  laws  they  were  not  always  ob- 
served. Under  the  system  all  peacefully  inclined  Indians  who 
accepted  the  government  and  were  Christianized  could  be  made 
the  slaves  of  the  encomenderos.  Surely  this  was  not  much  of 
a  reward  to  offer  an  Indian  who  was  hesitating  between  becom- 
ing a  convert  and  a  remontado. 

The  king  attempted  to  regulate  the  forced  labor  of  the  Indians 
by  just  laws,^**  but  the  laws  were  generally  ineffectual.  After 
making  allowance  for  the  possibility  of  exaggeration,  it  is  appar- 
ent from  Bishop  Salazar's  description  of  conditions  that  the  insti- 
tution of  the  encomienda,  although  an  efficient  instrument  for 
establishing  and  maintaining  order,  was  productive  of  much  hard- 
ship and  suffering. 

During  the  first  thirty  years  of  Spanish  occupation  commerce 
with  the  coast  of  Asia  was  free  and  unrestricted.  Hardly 
had  Manila  been  established,  when  a  ship  arrived  from  China 
loaded  with  silks,  porcelain,  gunpowder,  mercury,  pepper,  cloves, 
cinnamon,  sugar,  iron,  copper,  lead,  wax,  lime,  and,  as  some  as- 
sert, images  of  saints  and  crucifixes  for  sale  to  the  Christians. 
The  trade  with  China  increased  rapidly,  and  for  some  years 
Chinese  goods  were  the  only  articles  sent  from  the  Philippines 
to  Mexico  and  other  Spanish- American  ports.     European  coun- 

io"See  Law  of  PhiUp  III.  May  26,  1609,  in  B.  &  R.,  XVII,  p.  79. 


278  THE   PHILIPPINES 

tries  were  not  allowed  to  engage  in  commerce  with  the  islands, 
but  as  ships  from  India  and  Siam  could  enter  the  Philippines, 
it  was  only  necessary  for  the  English,  Dutch  and  French  mer- 
chants to  land  in  Manila  and  from  there  import  their  goods  in 
ships  under  the  apparent  command  of  Asiatic  captains. 

But  the  merchants  of  Cadiz  and  Seville,  who  enjoyed  a  mon- 
opoly of  the  commerce  with  America,  looked  with  disfavor  on 
the  trade  in  silks  and  Chinese  products  that  had  grown  up  be- 
tween Manila  and  New  Spain.^^  At  their  instance,  about  1593, 
the  king  issued  a  royal  decree  which  restricted  the  trade  between 
the  Philippines  and  Mexico  to  two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand 
dollars  per  annum  for  exports  to  Mexico,  and  five  hundred  thou- 
sand dollars  per  annum  for  imports  to  the  Philippines,  to  be  car- 
ried in  two  ships  not  to  exceed  three  hundred  tons'  burden  each. 
It  was  also  provided  that  no  ship  should  bring  more  than  five 
hundred  thousand  dollars  in  money  including  the  situado  sent  by 
the  king  to  pay  the  cost  of  the  administration  in  the  islands. 
No  one  could  directly  or  indirectly  bring  bullion  from  Mexico 
to  the  Philippines,  and  before  an  immigrant  could  bring  in  even 
his  own  money  he  had  to  give  a  bond  guaranteeing  that  he  would 
reside  in  the  Philippines  for  not  less  than  eight  years.  For  a 
time  these  regulations  were  evaded,  but  in  1604  the  cedula  of 
1593  was  republished  and  thereafter  strictly  enforced. 

The  story  of  the  trade  which  was  carried  on  between  Acapulco 
and  Manila  is  one  of  the  strangest  in  the  history  of  commerce. 
The  profits  were  enormous.  It  was  a  lottery  in  which,  barring 
accidents,  every  ticket  drew  a  prize,  and  it  was  as  demoralizing 
as  any  other  lottery. 

Every  Spaniard  was  entitled  to  a  share  in  the  voyage  in  pro- 
portion to  his  capital  and  his  importance  in  the  community.  Ac- 
cording to  the  regulations  the  ship's  hold  was  divided  into  a 
certain  number  of  spaces  called  boletas,  and  each  boleta  was  ar- 
ranged to  hold  a  package  of  merchandise  of  a  certain  shape  and 


'^'^  Commerce  of  the  Philippines  with  Nueva  Espana  (1640-1736).  This 
elaborate  document  contains  the  protest  of  the  Manila  people  against  the 
restrictive  policy.    B.  &  R.,  XLIV,  p.  225  et  seq.,  and  XLV,  pp.  29-88. 


PERSONAL   STATUS  279 

size.  These  holetas  were  about  four  thousand  in  number,  and 
were  subdivided  into  parts  in  order  to  provide  facilities  for  the 
"small  shipper."  The  right  to  participate  was  evidenced  by  tick- 
ets which  were  distributed  by  a  board  composed  of  the  governor, 
attorney-general,  the  head  of  the  audiencia,  one  alcalde,  one 
regidor  and  eight  prominent  citizens.  The  tickets  were  divided 
into  eighths.  In  the  eighteenth  century  they  were  worth  from 
eighty  dollars  to  one  hundred  dollars  in  times  of  peace,  and  as 
much  as  three  hundred  dollars  in  war  times.  We  learn  that  in 
1766  the  tickets  sold  for  two  hundred  dollars  each  and  that  the 
galleon  went  loaded  beyond  the  legal  limit.  All  except  favored 
officials  had  to  prove  that  they  were  members  of  the  Manila 
Chamber  of  Commerce,  and  that  they  had  contributed  their  share 
of  the  twenty  thousand  dollars  which  had  to  be  paid  to  the  cap- 
tain of  the  galleon  for  each  trip  from  Manila  to  Mexico  and 
return.  Space  was  reserved  for  certain  officials,  widows  in  indi- 
gent circumstances,  and  others  whom  it  was  desired  to  favor." 

Bourne  has  drawn  from  Le  Gentil  and  Zufiiga  the  following 
account  of  the  manner  in  which  this  trade  was  managed.^^  "The 
small  holders  who  did  not  care  to  take  a  venture  in  the  voyage 
disposed  of  their  tickets  to  merchants  or  speculators,  who  bor- 
rowed money,  usually  of  the  religious  corporations,  at  twenty- 
five  to  thirty  per  cent,  per  annum  to  buy  them  up,  and  who  some- 
times bought  as  many  as  two  or  three  hundred.  The  command 
of  the  Acapulco  galleon  was  the  fattest  office  within  the  gift 
of  the  governor,  who  bestowed  it  upon  'whomsoever  he  desired 
to  make  happy  for  the  commission,*  and  was  equivalent  to  a 
gift  of  from  fifty  thousand  dollars  to  one  hundred  thousand 
dollars.  This  was  made  up  from  commissions,  part  of  the  pas- 
sage-money of  passengers,  from  the  sale  of  his  freight  tickets, 

12  Tomas  de  Comyn  says  "that  each  shipper  had  to  pay  down  twenty-five 
to  forty  per  cent  for  freight,  according  to  circumstances,  which  money  is 
distributed  among  certain  canons,  aldermen,  subalterns  of  the  army  and 
widows  of  Spaniards  to  whom  a  given  number  of  tickets  or  certified  permits 
to  ship  are  granted,  either  as  a  compensation  for  the  smallness  of  their  pay, 
or  in  the  way  of  a  privilege."  Rojo  refers  to  "having  completed  the  dis- 
tribution or  allotments  of  tiie  tickets  in  the  best  manner  that  this  labjnrinth 
of  entanglements,  complaints,  and  vileness  permits."    B.  &  R.,  XLIX,  p.  196. 

"  B.  &  R.,  I,  Int,  p.  64. 


280  THE   PHILIPPINES 

and  from  the  gifts  of  the  merchants.  Captain  Arguelles  told 
Careri  in  1696  that  his  commissions  would  amount  to  twenty- 
five  thousand  dollars  or  thirty  thousand  dollars,  and  that  in  all 
he  would  make  forty  thousand  dollars ;  that  the  pilot  would  clear 
twenty  thousand  dollars  and  the  mates  nine  thousand  dollars 
each.  The  pay  of  the  sailors  was  three  hundred  and  fifty  dol- 
lars, of  which  seventy-five  dollars  was  advanced  before  the  start. 
The  merchants  expected  to  clear  one  hundred  and  fifty  to  two 
hundred  per  cent.  The  passenger  fare  at  the  end  of  the  eight- 
eenth century  was  one  thousand  dollars  for  the  voyage  to  Aca- 
pulco,  which  was  the  hardest,  and  five  hundred  dollars  for  the 
return.  Careri's  voyage  to  Acapulco  lasted  two  hundred  and 
four  days.  The  ordinary  time  for  the  voyage  to  Manila  was 
seventy-five  to  ninety  days."  "One  such  voyage,"  wrote  Careri, 
"is  enough  to  destroy  a  man  or  make  him  imfit  for  anything  as 
long  as  he  lives." 

The  business  of  the  colony  was  confined  almost  entirely  to 
this  demoralizing  galleon  trade  with  Mexico.  "The  people  of 
Manila,"  said  Archbishop  Rojo,  "are  only  busy  for  two  or  three 
months  each  year  getting  ready  their  bales  for  the  Acapulco  ship 
and  during  the  rest  recline  at  ease.  This  ease  is  the  pillow  and 
stimulus  of  other  vices,  and  one  of  the  effects  which  is  experi- 
enced is  the  multitude  of  clerks  and  the  huge  amounts  of  copying 
paper  which  are  consumed  throughout  the  year."^* 

The  trade  continued  until  1718,  when  the  merchants  of  Se- 
ville and  Cadiz  succeeded,  over  the  protest  of  the  viceroy,  in 
having  the  importation  of  Chinese  silk  into  Mexico  forbidden. 
But  the  merchants  of  Manila  were  also  active  and  sent  a  repre- 
sentative to  Madrid,  who,  after  a  long  struggle  before  the  Coun- 
cil of  the  Indies,  succeeded  in  getting  the  law  modified  so  that 
in  1734  the  trade  was  reopened,  and  the  amounts  of  exports  and 
imports  increased  to  five  hundred  thousand  dollars  and  one  mil- 
lion dollars,  respectively.  The  last  galleon  sailed  from  Manila 
in  1811  and  returned  in  1815.  Thereafter  the  trade  was  in  the 
hands  of  private  persons,  but  was  limited  to  seven  hundred  and 

"Rojo's  Narrative,  B.  &  R.,  XLIX,  p.  193. 


I 


PERSONAL   STATUS  281 

fifty  thousand  dollars  a  year  and  confined  to  designated  ports 
in  Mexico  and  South  America.  The  direct  trade  with  Spain 
was  carried  on  by  a  public  ship  until  1783,  when  it  was  granted 
to  the  Royal  Philippine  Company  as  a  monopoly.  This  com- 
pany ceased  to  exist  in  1830. 

In  the  early  years  there  was  some  communication  between 
Spain  and  Japan,  and  this  continued  until  the  massacre  by  the 
latter  of  the  Christian  missionaries.  At  that  time  many  of  the 
converted  Japanese  escaped  to  Manila,  where  they  were  allowed 
to  reside.  The  missionaries  did  all  in  their  power  to  encourage 
Japanese  and  Chinese  to  come  to  the  islands  because  they  hoped 
thereby  to  increase  the  number  of  their  converts.  The  Chinese 
were  trading  with  the  natives  at  Manila  before  the  arrival  of 
the  Spaniards,  and  after  the  founding  of  the  Spanish  city  they 
settled  there  in  such  numbers  as  to  create  apprehensions.  In 
1580  Governor  Ronquilla  inaugurated  the  policy  of  segregating 
the  Chinese,  Japanese  and  the  Malays  from  Borneo,  and  sub- 
jecting them  to  special  laws  and  restrictions.*''  He  built  the 
Parian  under  the  guns  of  the  fort  and  the  alcaceria  or  silk  mar- 
ket, where  all  except  such  as  were  married  to  Filipino  women 
were  required  to  live  and  transact  their  business.  As  the  num- 
ber continued  to  increase,  the  Parian  was  relocated  and  laid  out  as 
a  barrio.  It  soon  grew  into  a  Chinese  town  with  its  own  church, 
cemetery  and  priest.  But  it  was  always  under  military  g^ard. 
The  Parian  became  the  commercial  quarter  of  Manila  where  all 
kinds  of  Chinese,  Japanese  and  European  goods,  wares  and  mer- 
chandise were  sold. 

The  Chinese  were  the  artisans  and  laboring  men,  the  carpen- 
ters and  blacksmiths,  as  well  as  the  merchants  of  the  city.  In 
the  course  of  time  the  entire  community  became  dependent  upon 
them.  They  had  the  same  characteristics  then  as  now.  They 
were  willing  and  anxious  to  work,  and  as  neither  the  Spaniards 
nor  the  Indians  were  particularly  ambitious  in  that  direction, 
their  opportunities  were  practically  unlimited.    It  was  inevitable 

*'  Vide  Extracts  from  the  Laws  of  the  Indians,  Relative  to  the  Chinese  in 
the  Philippines,  B.  &  R.,  XXII,  p.  151. 


282  THE   PHILIPPINES 

that  they  should  become  the  possessors  of  most  of  the  wealth 
of  the  community.  A  good  idea  of  the  extent  of  the  business 
is  gained  from  the  following  contemporary  letter  quoted  by  Ar- 
gensola/* 

"The  city  is  remarkable  for  the  size  of  the  buildings,  which 
have  surprised  me.  I  shall  mention  only  one,  which  is  the  chief 
one.  It  has  an  Alcayceria  that  contains  all  kinds  of  silks  and 
gold,  and  mechanical  trades ;  and  for  these  things  there  are  more 
than  four  hundred  shops,  and  generally  more  than  eight  thousand 
men  who  trade  therein.  When  the  trading  fleet  comes  in  from 
China  with  their  merchandise  .  .  .  there  are  always  more 
than  thirteen  thousand  or  fourteen  thousand  men.  [They  bring 
wonderful  things  that  are  found  in  Europa." 

The  Chinese  were  a  source  of  constant  worry  to  the  author- 
ities, and  the  policy  pursued  was  that  of  restriction  and  regula- 
tion. It  was  never  satisfactory.  The  enforcement  or  non- 
enforcement  of  the  strict  regulations  was  used  by  the  officials  as 
a  means  of  graft,  and  many  accumulated  wealth  through  the 
possession  of  discretionary  powers  in  this  respect.  Fear,  jeal- 
ousy, envy,  race  hatred,  and  policy  tempted  the  Spaniards  to 
destroy  the  Chinese,  and  this  they  did  at  pretty  regular  intervals. 
They  were  probably  justified  in  their  distrust  and  fear.  The 
yellow  peril  had  already  appeared  upon  the  horizon.  The  shadow 
of  a  probable  invasion  was  always  over  the  land.  After  the  visit 
of  the  mandarins,  the  Spaniards  thought  it  advisable  to  abandon 
the  Moluccas,  in  order  to  devote  their  entire  strength  to  pre- 
paring for  defense  against  the  Chinese.  In  1603  there  were  only 
about  eight  hundred  Spaniards  in  the  city  of  Manila  and  its  en- 
virons, while  there  were  about  twenty  thousand  Chinese,  who 
were  often  bold  and  insolent.  The  revolt  against  Rajah  Brooke 
in  the  near-by  country  of  Sarawak  two  centuries  later  shows  what 
they  were  capable  of  doing.  In  the  troubles  of  1603  the  Chinese 
probably  took  the  initiative;  if  so,  they  paid  the  penalty  of  an- 
nihilation. 


^^Conquesta  (1609),  B.  &  R.,  XVI,  p.  296. 


I 


PERSONAL   STATUS  283 

But  after  the  massacre  the  Spaniards  began  to  fear  that  they 
had  overobne  the  matter,  and  that  the  citizens,  Spaniards  as  well 
as  Indians,  would  be  under  the  dire  necessity  of  going  to  work. 
This,  we  are  told,  "conspired  to  sadden  the  minds  of  the  Span- 
iards." Morga  says  that  "after  the  end  of  the  war  the  need 
of  the  City  began,  for,  because  of  not  having  Chinese  who  worked 
at  the  trades,  and  brought  in  all  the  provisions,  there  was  no 
food,  nor  shoes  to  wear,  not  even  at  excessive  prices.  The  native 
Indians  are  very  far  from  exercising  those  trades,  and  have  even 
forgotten  much  of  farming  and  the  raising  of  fowls,  cattle  and 
cotton,  and  the  weaving  of  cloth,  which  they  used  to  do  in  the 
days  of  their  paganism  and  for  a  long  time  after  the  conquest 
of  the  country.  In  addition  to  this,  people  thought  that  Chinese 
vessels  would  not  come  to  the  Islands  with  food  and  merchandise 
on  accoimt  of  the  late  revolution."" 

So  the  governor  sent  a  letter  to  China  explaining  why  it  had 
been  necessary  to  kill  the  Sangleys  and  expressing  the  hope  that 
the  little  incident  would  not  prevent  their  friends  from  coming 
to  Manila  in  the  future.  The  Chinese,  as  usual,  did  not  take  the 
killing  of  their  compatriots  too  seriously,  and  their  goods  were 
soon  coming  to  Manila  in  quantities  sufficient  to  supply  the  neces- 
sities of  the  inhabitants.  The  good  people  had  learned  a  lesson, 
and  thereafter  a  few  Chinese  were  always  left  to  do  the  work. 
In  1639,  when  they  had  increased  to  forty  thousand,  they  killed 
only  twenty-two  thousand.  After  the  slaughter  in  1662  about 
eight  thousand  were  left,  but  by  1755  they  had  again  accumu- 
lated wealth,  and  at  the  instigation  of  the  Spanish  merchants, 
who  had  organized  a  society  to  take  over  all  the  buildings  and 
grounds  occupied  by  the  Chinese  communities,  the  governor- 
general  ordered  all  the  Chinese  except  such  as  had  become  Chris- 
tians to  be  expelled  from  the  islands.  There  were  only  515 
Christians,  but  with  characteristic  Celestial  shrewdness  about  one 
thousand  others  announced  that  they  were  earnestly  studying  the 

*^  This  was  written  about  thirty-five  years  after  Manila  was  founded. 
^  Rizal  in  a  note  to  his  edition  of  Morga's  Sucesos  cites  this  passage  to  sus- 
tain the  view  that  the  coming  of  the  Spaniards  and  Chinese  destroyed  the 
industry  and  agriculture  of  the  country. 


284  THE   PHILIPPINES 

doctrines  and  expected  soon  to  become  Christians,  and  they  were 
permitted  to  remain. 

The  destruction  of  the  Chinese  in  the  provinces  after  the  de- 
parture of  the  British  again  produced  a  shortage  in  the  labor 
supply,  and  the  order  of  expulsion  was  revoked.  In  1804  it  was 
ordered  that  only  those  engaged  in  agriculture  should  be  allowed 
to  live  in  the  country.  But  a  Chinaman  will  not  long  remain  an 
agriculturist.  He  travels  rapidly  from  a  garden  plot  to  a  tiende 
and  by  easy  stages  to  a  wholesale  house  in  Calle  Rosario.  A  few 
years  later  they  were  permitted  to  engage  in  any  branch  of  indus- 
try providing  a  permit  was  first  obtained  from  the  proper  gov- 
ernment official.  It  is  needless  to  say  that  in  many  cases  these 
permits  cost  a  great  deal  of  money. 

During  later  times  the  Chinese  greatly  increased  in  number. 
In  1876  there  were  over  thirty  thousand,  and  in  1886  the  num- 
ber had  increased  to  one  hundred  thousand.  Many  were  smug- 
gled in  from  Borneo,  a  custom  which  to  some  extent  has  sur- 
vived to  the  present  time.  In  1886  the  Chinese  were  forbidden 
to  reside  in  the  provinces  or  to  trade  with  the  Moros.  Two  years 
later  they  were  forbidden  absolutely  to  live  in  Mindanao.  Such 
was  their  status  when  the  country  passed  under  the  sovereignty 
of  the  United  States,  and  her  exclusionary  acts  were  made  op- 
erative. 

The  Spanish  system  of  government  rested  like  a  dead  weight 
upon  the  millions  of  common  people.  There  was  little  to  encour- 
age any  one  to  aspire  to  improve  his  condition;  nothing  was 
required  of  the  native  but  to  be  good  and  obey  orders.  Slavery, 
the  encomienda,  the  trade  restrictions,  forced  labor,  personal 
service  in  many  forms,  all  served  to  prevent  the  growth  of  self- 
respect  and  personal  independence.  The  perpetual  quarrels  of 
the  officials  and  the  ecclesiastics,  the  oppressive  acts  of  the  mili- 
tary officials  and  alcades,  rendered  the  government  an  object  of 
hatred  to  the  people.  With  examples  of  official  corruption  con- 
stantly before  them  it  is  not  surprising  that  they  were  not  im- 
bued with  high  ideals  of  government  and  were  inclined  to  ac- 
cept the  view  that  the  first  duty  of  every  public  servant  was  to 


PERSONAL   STATUS  285 

provide  for  his  own  future  out  of  the  public  funds.  Certainly 
it  was  not  a  school  in  which  to  train  an  impressionable  people 
in  the  civic  virtues  or  to  develop  in  them  the  qualities  neces- 
sary for  self-government. 


PART  IV 

American  Occupation  and  Change  of 
Sovereignty 

'7m  proportion  as  the  navigation  of  the  west  coast  of  America 
extends  the  influence  of  the  American  element  over  the  South 
Sea,  the  captivating,  magic  power  which  the  great  Republic  exer- 
cises over  the  Spanish  Colonies,  will  not  fail  to  make  itself  felt 
also  in  the  Philippines.  The  Americans  are  evidently  destined 
to  bring  to  a  full  development  the  germs  originated  by  the  Span- 
iards. As  conquerors  of  modern  times,  they  pursue  their  road  to 
victory  with  the  assistance  of  the  pioneer's  ax  and  plow,  represent- 
ing an  age  of  peace  and  commercial  prosperity  in  contrast  to  that 
bygone  and  chivalrous  age  whose  champions  were  upheld  by  the 
cross  and  protected  by  the  sword."  Jagor,  Travels  in  the  Philip- 
pines, (London,  1875),  p.  369. 

"To  extend  rulership  over  subdued  natives  is  to  bad  men  a 
felicity,  but  to  good  men  a  necessity." — St.  Augustine. 

"No  Constitution  was  ever  before  so  well  calculated  as  ours 
for  extensive  empire  and  self-government." — Thomas  Jefferson 
(1809). 


CHAPTER  XII 
The  Capture  of  Manila 

Conditions  in  1898 — Means  of  Defense — Opinions  as  to  Relative  Power — 
Dewey  at  Hong  Kong — And  Mirs  Bay — Localizing  a  War — Spanish  Prepa- 
rations at  Manila — Destruction  of  the  Spanish  Fleet — At  Anchor  on  the 
Battle-Field — New  Problems  for  the  Government — Attitude  of  Foreign  Naval 
Officers — The  Germans — The  Filipinos  Disloyal  to  Spain — Arrival  of  Amer- 
ican Troops — Camp  Dewey — The  Military  Situation — Delaying  the  Attack 
— Plan  for  Painless  Extraction  of  Spaniards — Night  Attacks — Demands  for 
Surrender — Capture  of  the  City — Terms  of  Capitulation — ^The  Insurgents  and 
Their  Claims — Conflict  Avoided — ^The  Materiel  Captured. 

The  eventful  year  of  1898  found  the  Philippines  enjoying 
a  condition  of  comparative  quiet.  The  insurrection  had  been 
brought  to  an  end  by  the  arrangement  at  Biak-na-bato,  and 
the  leaders  were  scattered  in  foreign  countries.  But  there  were 
rumblings  of  discontent  over  the  failure  of  the  government  to 
institute  reforms  which  it  was  claimed  were  a  part  of  the  con- 
sideration upon  which  the  insurgents  had  laid  down  their  arms, 
and  numerous  small  bodies  were  still  disturbing  various  sections 
of  the  country.^ 

Primo  de  Rivera  was  governor-general,*  with  Admiral  Mon- 
tojo  in  command  of  the  fleet.  The  serious  insurrection  of  1896 
had  made  it  necessary  to  strengthen  the  army  and  navy,  and  al- 
though a  number  of  soldiers  had  been  returned  to  the  Peninsula 
the  Spanish  military  power  in  the  islands  was  much  greater  than 
it  had  been  for  many  years.* 

^The  most  serious  disturbances  were  in  southern  Pangasinan,  Zambales 
and  Cebu.  Report  of  Consul-General  Williams.  Sen.  Doc.  62,  55th  Cong., 
3d  Sess.,  p.  221. 

2  On  April  10  he  was  succeeded  by  Lieutenant-General  Basilio  Augustin, 
"the  well-meaning  but  rather  dunderheaded  old  soldier  whom  the  Liberals 
had  sent  out  to  take  his  place." 

'  For  a  memorandum  of  Spanish  troops  in  the  Philippines,  see  Corres- 
pondence Relating  to  the  War  with  Spain,  II,  p.  654.  General  Corbin  esti- 
mated the  number  at  41,014. 

289 


290  THE    PHILIPPINES 

Admiral  Montojo's  fleet  in  Philippine  waters  was  composed 
of  the  Reina  Cristina,  the  Castilla,  the  Isla  de  Cuba,  the  Isla  de 
Luzon,  the  Don  Juan  de  Austria,  the  Don  Antonio  de  Ulloa,  the 
Marques  del  Duero,  and  numerous  gunboats  and  smaller  craft, 
in  all  11,689  tons,  with  a  complement  of  1,664  men.  <,^-f^ 

Notwithstanding  this  formidable  force  the  Spaniards  were 
little  better  prepared  to  defend  the  islands  against  an  efficient 
modern  military  force  than  they  had  been  a  century  and  a  half 
earlier,  when  the  British  fleet  sailed  into  Manila  Bay.  The  local 
authorities  were  familiar  with  the  political  situation  in  Europe 
and  America  and  had  been  warned  of  the  probability  of  war 
between  the  United  States  and  Spain,  but,  like  Roja  and  his  asso- 
ciates on  the  former  occasion,  they  seem  to  have  felt  that  their 
very  remoteness  was  a  defense  from  attack. 

Until  a  hostile  fleet  was  already  on  their  coasts  they  made  no 
serious  eft'ort  to  make  effective  the  means  of  defense  which  were 
at  hand,  and  then,  amid  the  usual  diversity  of  counsel,  they 
merely  succeeded  In  establishing  their  utter  incapacity. 

At  the  opening  of  the  war  both  the  United  States  and  Spain 
had  the  beginnings  of  a  modern  navy,  but  neither  was  in  even 
the  second  class  as  naval  powers.  As  events  showed,  the  United 
States  navy  was  superior  in  all  respects  to  that  of  Spain,  but 
the  world  was  not  fully  informed  as  to  the  facts  and  generally 
overestimated  the  Spanish  power,  naval  and  military. 

But  the  American  government  had  very  exact  Information  as 
to  the  inefficiency  of  the  Spanish  navy,  while  the  Spanish  political 
authorities  either  wilfully  closed  their  eyes  to  the  situation,  or 
were  so  blinded  by  prejudice  that  they  were  unable  to  see.  The 
mere  disparity  of  heavy  armament,  which  was  well  known, 
should  have  been  enough  to  "give  food  for  thought  had  the  Span- 
ish authorities  but  thought  at  all." 

Few  Americans  realize  the  tenacity  with  which  the  average 
European  believed,  and  still  believes,*  that  the  Americans  are  a 


4  In  1814  the  London  Graphic  quotes  Mr.  Gerard  Finnes,  described  as  "one 
of  the  greatest  naval  experts  of  Europe,"  as  saying : 

"There  are  a  hundred  indications  which  show  that  a  collision  between 


THE    CAPTURE    OF   MANILA  291 

mercenary,  mongrel  people  in  whom  the  sentiment  of  patriotism 
must  necessarily  be  very  weak.  The  French  press  particularly 
was  certain  that  little  could  be  expected  of  the  American  navy, 
manned  as  it  was  alleged  to  be  by  "foreign  mercenaries." 

A  leading  Spanish  paper,'*  in  commenting  on  the  approaching 
war,  said,  "We  shall  conquer  on  the  sea,  and  I  am  now  going 
to  give  you  my  reasons :  The  first  is  the  remarkable  discipline 
that  prevails  on  our  warships;  the  second  is,  as  soon  as  fire  is 
opened  the  crews  of  the  American  ships  will  begin  to  desert, 
since  we  all  know  that  among  them  are  people  of  all  nationali- 
ties— ship  against  ship,  therefore,  a  failure  is  not  to  be  feared." 

Continental  Europe  may  be  excused  for  holding  such  danger- 
ous opinions  and  the  expressions  of  the  Spanish  press,  like  the 
proclamations  of  the  governor-general  and  the  archbishop  of 
the  Philippines  may  have  been  intended  for  popular  consumption, 
but  that  intelligent  Englishmen  familiar  with  naval  history  should 
make  such  statements  is  less  comprehensible.  And  yet  an  Eng- 
lish technical  magazine,®  after  an  elaborate  analysis  of  the  two 
fleets,  informed  its  readers  that,  "The  three  thousand  Swedish 
sailors  who  were  to  form  a  part  of  the  complement  of  the  United 
States  sailors  might  be  excellent  material  if  fighting  in  defense  of 
their  own  hearths  and  homes,  but  naval  warfare  of  to-day  is  no 
pastime — it  is  a  grim  and  ghastly  reality,  swiftly  executed,  and  no 
hirelings  of  an  alien  state  are  likely  to  come  out  of  such  a  ter- 
rible ordeal.  In  point  of  fact,  we  do  not  believe  that  the  Yan- 
kees thoroughly  understand  the  spirit  of  mischief  that  they  seem 
determined  to  evoke." 


Japan  and  the  United  States  is  approaching.  The  Americans  live  in  a  fool's 
paradise  in  this  matter. 

"The  Japanese  are  full  of  contempt  for  American  brag  and  bounce  for  the 
lack  of  national  spirit  or  even  of  true  nationaHty.  They  have  a  profound 
disbelief  in  the  war-worthiness  of  the  American  navy  and  an  acute  realization 
of  the  fact  that  the  strategical  situation  is  overwhelmingly  in  their  favor.** 
Cong.  Rec,  June  23,  1915. 

»£/  Heraldo  of  Madrid,  March  6,  1898.  The  chief  owner  of  this  paper 
was  captain  of  the  Cristobal  Colon. 

*  The  Engineer,  London,  February  15,  1898.  American  names  are  mislead- 
ing; a  Swedish  or  French  name  on  the  roster  does  not  necessarily  mean  that 
the  bearer  thereof  is  a  foreigner.  His  ancestor  may  have  signed  the  Declara- 
tion of  Independence. 


292  THE    PHILIPPINES 

The  Asiatic  squadron,  under  the  command  of  Commodore 
George  Dewey,  had  been  ordered  to  concentrate  at  Hong 
Kong.  On  February  25  Mr.  Roosevelt,  as  acting  Secretary  of 
the  Navy,  had  cabled  Dewey  to  keep  his  bunkers  full  of  coal 
and  in  the  event  of  a  declaration  of  war  to  prevent  the  Spanish 
fleet  from  leaving  the  Asiatic  coasts,  and  then  to  take  the  offen- 
sive in  the  Philippines."^ 

Events  moved  rapidly.  Diplomatic  relations  between  the  two 
countries  were  severed  on  April  20,  and  on  the  following  day 
the  American  minister  at  Madrid  demanded  his  passports.  On 
April  21  the  Baltimore  arrived  at  Hong  Kong  with  ammunition 
for  the  fleet.  Although  war  had  not  yet  been  formally  declared, 
Admiral  Sampson  was  ordered  to  blockade  Cuba,  and  Dewey  was 
directed  to  hold  himself  in  readiness  for  further  orders.  On 
April  24  he  was  notified  by  the  British  authorities  that  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  requirements  of  the  law  of  neutrality  he  must 
leave  the  harbor  of  Hong  Kong  within  twenty-four  hours. 

The  European  view  of  the  situation  is  very  well  illustrated 
by  an  incident  which  occurred  as  the  fleet  was  preparing  to  sail. 
The  German  admiral,  Prince  Henry  of  Prussia,  went  aboard 
the  Olympia  and  said,  "Good-bye,  Commodore;  I  fear  I  shall 
never  see  you  again.  You  are  going  on  a  desperate  undertak- 
ing." 

On  the  morning  of  April  25  the  last  of  the  American  ships 
sailed  out  of  the  harbor  with  the  cheers  of  the  British  soldiers 
and  sailors  ringing  in  their  ears,  but  they  only  went  to  Mirs  Bay, 
some  thirty  miles  away,  where  the  evening  was  spent  in  distrib- 
uting ammunition  and  preparing  the  fleet  for  action.^  On  the  fol- 
lowing day  a  revenue  cutter  arrived  from  Hong  Kong  with  the 
news  that  war  had  been  declared  and  with  orders  for  Dewey  to 
proceed  at  once  to  the  Philippine  Islands  and  commence  opera- 
tions against  the  Spanish  fleet.®  Within  a  few  hours  thereafter 
the  squadron,  consisting  of  the  Olympia,  Baltimore,  Boston,  Ral- 


7  Dewey,  Autobiography,  p.  179.    Roosevelt,  Autobiography,  p.  234. 

8  Dewey,  Autobiography,  p.  194. 
«»/fc»d.,p.  195. 


THE    CAPTURE   OF   MANILA  293 

ii 
eigh.  Concord,  Petrel  and  the  revenue  cutter  McCulloch,  was  at 
sea  speeding  southwestward  toward  the  coast  of  Luzon. 

When  two  nations  are  at  war  the  point  of  attack  and  the  ex- 
tent to  which  the  attack  shall  be  pushed  are  determined  by  the 
particular  circumstances,  local  conditions  and  the  objects  for 
which  the  war  is  waged.  On  land  the  combatants  are  legally  con- 
fined to  their  own  territories  unless,  as  in  the  Russo-Japanese 
War,  they  are  struggling  for  the  possession  of  the  territory  of 
some  third  power.  In  that  instance,  through  the  influence  of  the 
Powers,  actual  hostilities  were  to  a  great  extent  localized.  But 
the  open  sea  is  the  common  battle-ground  for  all  nations.  Navies 
wander  over  it  in  times  of  peace,  and  when  war  commences  they 
strike  the  forces  of  the  enemy  which  are  nearest.  The  war 
with  Spain,  which  grew  out  of  the  Cuban  situation,  naturally 
localized  in  the  West  Indies,  but  when  it  opened  both  belligerents 
had  fleets  in  the  Far  East,  and  it  was  inevitable  that  they  should 
come  into  collision. 

The  Spanish  authorities  in  Manila  were  promptly  notified  by 
cable  of  the  sailing  of  the  American  fleet.  As  early  as  April  19 
Admiral  Montojo  had  been  informed  by  Madrid  "that  circum- 
stances demanded  the  closing  of  the  ports  of  the  Islands  with 
mines,"  and  had  replied,  "Your  Excellency  is  aware  that  I  have 
no  mines."  But  mines  were  somehow  improvised  and  anchored 
in  the  channel  near  Caballo  Island,  but  so  deep  that  they  were 
harmless.  A  leading  English  writer  on  naval  affairs^"  says :  "The 
water  at  the  entrance  of  the  bay  was  so  deep  as  to  render  the 
placing  of  mines  difficult,  but  numerous  powerful  contact  mines 
were  anchored  in  the  channel  by  the  Spaniards.  They  were, 
however,  placed  with  the  greatest  carelessness  at  depths  far  be- 
yond the  reach  of  any  ship's  hull  and  were  simply  wasted." 

Admiral  Montojo  advised  that  the  port  of  Subig  should  be 
fortified  and  that  the  fleet  should  repair  there  and  wait  the 
enemy,  "provided  they  come  at  all,  keeping  the  fleet  in  readiness, 


/ 


*®  Wilson,  The  Downfall  of  Spain,  p.  124.  See  also  Harper's  Magacine, 
Feb..  1899,  p.  481 ;  The  Defense  of  Manila  Bay,  by  Lieut.  J.  M.  Ellicott,  Proc. 
U.  S.  Naval  Institute,  June,  1900;  Dewey,  Autobiography,  pp.  201,  202. 


294  THE   PHILIPPINES 

in  case  Manila  should  be  assaulted,  to  hasten  there  at  night  and 
attack  the  Americans,  as  soon  as  the  governor-general  sends 
notice  by  telegram  that  the  time  is  propitious  for  such  a  ma- 
noeuvre," But,  alas !  that  propitious  time  never  came.  The  child- 
ish suggestion  throws  a  flood  of  light  upon  the  incapacity  of  the 
Spaniards  to  do  much  more  in  such  a  situation  than  to  fight 
bravely.  A  hurried  attempt,  was  in  fact  made  to  fortify  Subig 
Bay,  but  the  utter  futility  of  it  all  soon  became  apparent  even  to 
the  Spaniards. 

All  naval  authorities  are  agreed  that  of  the  possible  courses 
open  to  the  Spaniards  they  selected  the  one  which  offered  the 
least  chance  for  success.  Had  Montojo  met  the  American  ships 
as  they  were  passing  Corregidor  in  the  night  and  made  a  sharp 
vigorous  attack  he  might  have  inflicted  great  damage  and  pos- 
sibly have  left  Dewey  in  a  serious  condition.  Had  he  abandoned 
the  ships  and  added  their  guns,  equipment  and  men  to  the  de- 
fenses of  Manila  it  is  questionable  whether  Dewey  could,  under 
such  conditions,  have  done  more  than  institute  a  blockade. 

The  third  course  was  to  fight  at  anchor  under  the  guns  of  a 
fort,  and  this  was  the  one  adopted.  But  even  here,  having  the 
choice  of  two  locations,  the  Spaniards  selected  the  one  which  gave 
them  the  least  chance  of  success. ^^ 

As  far  as  armament  was  concerned,  Manila  was  reasonably 
well  provided  with  means  for  defense,  but  the  plan  of  anchoring 
the  fleet  under  the  guns  of  the  city  was  rejected  because  it  would 
provoke  the  Americans  to  bombard  the  city,  and,  as  the  precious 
Plaza  and  the  property  of  the  leading  citizens  must  not  be  sub- 
jected to  Injury,  it  was  decided  to  go  to  Cavite  and  anchor  in 
the  shallow  Bay  of  Cafiacao,  where  the  ships  could  sink  without 
much  risk  of  drowning  the  sailors.  "The  refusal  of  the  gov- 
ernor," says  Admiral  Chadwlck,*^  "to  allow  the  squadron  to 
place  itself  in  a  situation  where  the  guns  of  Manila  could  be  used 


^1  "The  Cavite  fortifications,  though  weak,  exercised  the  same  attractive 
force  on  the  Spanish  squadron  as  did  the  obsolete  works  of  Sedan  on  Mc- 
Mahon's  Army  in  1870."    Wilson,  Downfall  of  Spain,  p.  131. 

12  Chadwick,  The  Spanish- American  War,  I,  p.  169.  See  also  Wilson,  The 
Downfall  of  Spain,  p.  132. 


^  THE    CAPTURE    OF   MANILA  295 

in  its  partial  defense  was  fatal  to  any  prospect  of  success.  Not 
having  left  the  Bay  it  was  the  one  course  left.  Damage  to 
Manila  could  not  from  a  national  point  of  view  be  commensurate 
with  the  loss  of  the  Archipelago,  and  this  latter  was  the  real 
risk  which  the  Governor  insisted  upon  taking.  He  could  not 
recognize  that  a  great  question  was  in  his  hands  to  decide  as 
might  be  best  for  Spain  and  not  Manila." 

It  is  probable  that  the  responsibility  for  this  blunder  rests  with 
the  governor-general  instead  of  Admiral  Montojo.  Going  to 
Cavite  made  destruction  certain. 

The  batteries  on  the  water-front  at  Manila  were  bluffed  into 
practical  silence  by  Dewey's  threat  to  fire  in  their  direction.  Just 
what  purpose  these  batteries  were  expected  to  serve  if  they  were 
to  remain  quiet  in  order  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  firing  at  them, 
and  incidentally,  of  course,  into  the  city  behind,  it  is  difficult  to 
understand.  On  that  theory  a  few  good  old-fashioned  quaker 
guns  placed  on  the  city  walls  would  have  served  as  well  and 
been  much  cheaper  than  the  powerful  Krupps. 

Having  successfully  passed  Corregidor  and  its  much-adver- 
tised mines,  Dewey  headed  straight  for  Manila,  which  lay  twenty- 
two  miles  due  east  across  the  great  bay.  The  speed  was  so  regu- 
lated as  to  arrive  off  the  city  at  the  break  of  day.  By  three 
o'clock  the  low-lying  lights  were  visible.  As  day  broke  the  fleet 
was  three  miles  off  the  mouth  of  the  Pasig  River,  directly  in 
front  of  Fort  Santiago  and  the  city  walls.  What  in  the  indis- 
tinct light  had  looked  like  ships  of  war  proved  to  be  peaceful 
merchantmen.  But  as  the  morning  mist  rose  from  the  water  the 
Spanish  fleet  became  visible,  with  its  back  against  the  wall,  nine 
miles  south,  under  the  guns  of  Cavite  and  Sangley  Point.  The 
shore  batteries  at  Manila  had  already  opened  fire,  but  the  Olym- 
pia,  without  pausing,  turned  to  the  right  and,  followed  by  the 
Baltimore,  Raleigh,  Petrel,  Concord  and  Boston,  in  the  order 
named,  moved  southward  parallel  with  the  shore  toward  Cavite. 
The  Spanish  land  battery  at  Sangley  Point  began  firing  almost 
as  soon  as  the  Olympia  turned,  and  their  fleet  soon  joining  in, 
a  storm  of  metal  lashed  the  water  far  in  front  of  the  approaching 


296  THE    PHILIPPINES 

American  ships.  When  six  miles  away  the  Olympia  fired  one 
shot  to  test  the  range.  When  about  three  miles  from  her  target 
she  fired  an  eight-inch  shell  from  one  of  her  turret  guns. 

No  attempt  was  made  to  count  the  Spanish  ships  or  to  identify 
individual  vessels.  Close  comparison  of  forces  was  deemed  un- 
necessary. From  general  information  Dewey  was  satisfied  that 
the  six  American  cruisers  could  defeat  all  the  ships  Spain  had 
in  the  Philippines,  particularly  as  they  had  chosen  to  lie  moored 
and  motionless  within  easy  range  of  open  water  deep  enough  for 
safe  navigation. 

When  within  two  miles  the  Olympia  turned  and  led  a  stately 
procession  due  west  past  the  Spanish  ships,  while  from  every 
available  gun  a  storm  of  projectiles  rained  upon  the  enemy.    As 
the  procession  came  off  Sangley  Point  it  was  within  easy  range 
of  the  Spanish  batteries,  and  the  contest  became  one  of  marks- 
manship, with  the  natural  advantages  in  favor  of  the  shore  bat- 
teries. 
/  y.  The  Spaniards  had  seven  ships  in  an  irregular  line,  two  of 
''''^wvhich  were  moored  with  springs  on  their  cables.     The  others 
/moved  about  aimlessly,  often  masking  each  other's  fire,  "occa- 
/  sionally  dodging  back  to  the  shelter  of  the  arsenal  and  more  often 
/    making  isolated  and  ineffectual  rushes  in  advance,  rushes  which 
/      had  no  rational  significance  except  as  demonstrative  of  the  point 
[        at  hand.    They  were  mere  flourishes  of  desperation,  inspired  by 
!        defeat." 
—    ^  Their  guns  were  handled  vigorously,  although  unskilfully,  but 
the  aimless  hurrying  and  scurrying  about  was  in  painful  contrast 
with  the  orderly  movements  of  the  American  ships  as  they 
steamed  slowly  around  an  ellipse,  engaging  with  all  their  bat- 
teries.^^   Their  marksmanship  was  not  particularly  good,  but  it 
was  much  superior  to  that  of  the  Spaniards.^*,  ^j^ 

15  There  has  been  some  uncertainty  as  to  the  movement  of  the  American 
ships.  See  Chadwick,  The  Spanish- American  War,  I,  p.  179,  and  the  map  in 
Dewey's  Autobiography,  p.  198. 

1*  Mr.  Roosevelt  (Autobiography,  p.  232)  says,  "Our  navy  had  no  idea 
how  low  our  standard  of  marksmanship  was.  .  .  .  Almost  the  only  man 
in  the  navy  who  fully  realized  this  was  our  naval  attache  at  Paris,  Lieutenant 
Sims.    .    .    .    When  I  was  President,    .    .    .    Sims  was  given  the  lead  in  re- 


>  THE    CAPTURE    OF    MANILA  297 

Montojo  soon  saw  that  his  position  was  desperate.  In  a  last 
effort  to  accomplish  something  he  sent  the  Cristina  out  to  grapple 
with  the  Olympia,  but  she  was  beaten  down  under  the  concen- 
trated fire  of  the  fleet  and,  turning,  crawled  like  a  wounded  ani- 
mal toward  the  shore,  where  she  grounded. 

Five  times  the  American  ships  swung  back  and  forth  over  the 
course.  Although  the  battle  had  lasted  for  two  hours,  the  Span- 
ish fire  seemed  as  active  as  in  the  beginning.  It  was  apparent 
that  the  Rcina  Cristina  and  the  Castilla  had  suffered  seriously, 
but  otherwise  the  visible  results  of  the  firing  were  disappointing. 

About  this  time  a  disturbing  report  was  brought  to  the  Ameri- 
can commodore  that  the  ammunition  was  running  low.  A  great 
deal  of  it  had  been  wasted  by  reckless  firing  at  long  range,  and 
the  possibility  of  such  a  disaster  was  appalling.  It  was  decided, 
much  to  the  disgust  of  the  seamen,  who,  according  to  the  predic- 
tion of  European  experts,  should  have  been  deserting,  to  draw 
off  and  take  account  of  stock.  To  conceal  the  real  cause  of  the 
movement  it  was  announced  that  the  work  was  being  suspended  in 
order  to  allow  all  hands  to  enjoy  a  well-earned  breakfast.  "For 
God's  sake,  don't  stop  now.  To  hell  with  breakfast !"  shouted  a 
gunner  who  had  a  better  instinct  for  what  had  been  accomplished 
than  even  the  commodore.  In  fact,  the  latter  appears  to  have 
been  decidedly  uncomfortable — probably  more  so  than  at  any 
moment  since  sailing  from  Mirs  Bay.  He  did  not  then  believe 
that  the  Spanish  ships  had  been  sufficiently  injured  to  prevent 
them  from  renewing  the  battle.  He  had  been  distinctly  disap- 
pointed by  the  result  of  the  firing.  The  projectiles  seemed  to  go 
too  high  or  too  low,  as  had  those  of  the  Spaniards.  At  that  dis- 
tance in  a  smooth  sea  there  should  have  been  a  large  percentage 
of  hits,  but  apparently  the  Spanish  ships  had  not  been  seriously 
injured.    At  least  they  were  still  firing  as  vigorously  as  ever. 

It  was  known  that  the  enemy  had  sufficient  ammunition  to 
continue  the  fight  almost  indefinitely.     Dewey  was  more  than 

'organizing  and  introducing  the  new  system ;  and  to  him  more  than  to  any 
other  one  man  was  due  the  astonishing  progress  made  by  our  fleet  in  this 
respect,  a  progress  which  made  the  fleet,  gtm  for  gun,  at  least  three  times  as 
eflFective,  in  point  of  fighting  efficiency,  in  1908  as  it  was  in  1902." 


298  THE   PHILIPPINES  ' 

seven  thousand  miles  from  home,  and  under  the  most  favorable 
condition  it  would  require  a  month  to  secure  a  new  supply  of 
ammunition.  Without  powder  and  shell  the  hunter  might  be- 
come the  hunted.^^ 

The  American  ships  now  gathered  in  irregular  groups  four 
miles  or  so  north  of  Sangley  Point.  The  Spaniards  believed  that 
they  had  been  hauled  off  for  repairs  and  reported  to  Madrid  that 
they  had  sought  refuge  behind  the  neutral  shipping.  An  irreg- 
ular fire  was  kept  up  from  the  shore  batteries,  and  occasionally 
a  shell  fell  within  a  few  hundred  feet  of  the  cruisers.  But  the 
novelty  of  being  fired  at  had  worn  off,  and  the  work  of  consulta- 
tion and  counting  the  shells  continued,  while  the  men  enjoyed 
their  historic  breakfast  and  cheered  one  another  to  the  echo.  In 
the  meantime  the  situation  was  clearing.  The  effect  of  the  morn- 
ing's work  was  becoming  apparent.  The  Spanish  line  was  melt- 
ing away.  The  Castilla  was  in  flames.  The  magazine  of  the 
Reina  Cristina  blew  up.  Only  the  Don  Juan  de  Ulloa  kept  her 
ensign  flying  and  maintained  her  station  close  to  the  Sangley 
Point  battery.  The  smaller  craft  had  taken  refuge  behind  the 
arsenal. 

About  eleven  o'clock,  having  ascertained  that  the  reported 
shortage  of  ammunition  was  without  foundation,  the  Americans 
renewed  the  battle.  But  there  was  very  little  fight  left  in  the 
Spaniards.  The  batteries  were  soon  silenced.  By  the  middle 
of  the  afternoon  the  work  was  finished,  and  the  squadron  was 
at  anchor  off  the  City  of  Manila.  The  British  consul  came 
aboard  the  flagship  and  on  behalf  of  the  foreign  residents  re- 
quested that  the  city  should  not  be  bombarded.  To  this  Dewey 
agreed,  on  condition  that  he  be  supplied  with  coal  and  granted 
the  use  of  the  cable  to  Hong  Kong.  These  concessions  were 
refused  by  the  Spanish  authorities,  and  the  next  day  the  cable 
was  cut  and  the  end  taken  aboard  an  American  ship.  The  forti- 
fications at  Cavite  and  at  the  entrance  of  Manila  Bay  were  now 


*5J.  L.  Stickney,  in  Harper's  Magasine,  Feb.,  1899;  New  York  Herald, 
quoted  by  Chadwick,  I,  p,  181. 

Dewey  went  into  the  battle  with  but  60  per  cent,  of  a  full  supply  of  ammu- 
nition. 


THE    CAPTURE    OF    MANILA  299 

surrendered  and  were  soon  rendered  incapable  of  doing  further 
harm.^® 

The  victory  was  complete.  The  Spanish  fleet  had  been  de- 
stroyed, while  the  American  ships  were  but  slightly  damaged — 
indeed,  scarcely  more  than  scratched.  Of  the  Spanish  sailors, 
one  hundred  sixty-seven  were  killed  and  two  himdred  fourteen 
wounded.  On  the  American  ships  there  was  not  even  a  seri- 
ously wounded  sailor  to  show  for  all  the  Spanish  ammunition  that 
had  been  wasted. 

An  English  writer  has  called  the  battle  a  military  execution, 
rather  than  a  real  contest,  but,  as  Admiral  Chadwick  says,^'^  this 
is  misleading.  The  fact  is  that  the  American  ships  "were  thor- 
oughly vulnerable;  the  action  was  at  short  range;  and  had  the 
scores  in  marksmanship  been  reversed  the  victory,  despite  their 
inferiority  of  force,  would  have  been  with  the  Spaniards.  The 
gist  of  the  matter  is  thus  in  that  masterful  quality  in  human  af- 
fairs, racial  temperament,  and  in  the  superior  training  of  the 
American  gunner.  Coolness  of  action  and  its  corollary,  accu- 
racy of  aim,  were  the  deciding  factors." 

Certain  it  is  that,  as  the  English  author  admits,  the  work 
which  lay  in  the  admiral's  hands  to  do  was  done  thoroughly 
well. 

L  Dewey  was  now  in  undisputed  possession  of  the  Bay  of  Manila. 
The  instructions  of  the  Navy  Department  to  destroy  the  Spanish 
fleet  had  been  obeyed.  Spanish  naval  power  in  the  Orient  had 
been  completely  destroyed.  The  City  of  Manila  lay  helpless  un- 
der the  American  guns,  j  But  the  American  commander  had  no 
troops  with  which  to  garrison  a  captured  city.  The  insurgents 
had  become  extremely  active  on  land,  but  could  not  be  permitted 

18  For  graphic  and  authoritative  descriptions  of  the  battle,  see  Admiral 
Dewey's  Autobiography,  Chap.  15,  and  Rear-Admiral  Fisk's  War  Times  in 
Manila.  Neither  side  had  any  armored  ships  and  both  used  brown  powder. 
For  the  relative  strength  of  the  squadrons,  see  Dewey,  Autobiography,  p.  203, 
or  Anpendix  A,  p,  294:  Ref>ort  Chief  of  Ordnance  of  the  Navy,  1898,  pp. 
1180-1183;  Cong.  Rec,  XXXV,  pp.  5374-5375.  In  the  prize  money  case  of 
Dewey  vs.  United  States,  178  U.  S.  510.  the  court  found  that  there  were  2,973 
men  on  board  the  Spanish  and  1,836  on  the  American  vessels.  In  determining 
the  superiority  of  the  Spanish  force  the  land  batteries,  mines  and  torpedoes 
were  excluded.  See  Harper's  Pictorial  History  of  the  War  in  the  Philip- 
pines, p.  29.    Senate  Doc,  175,  57  Cong.,  Second  Sess. 

"  Chadwick,  The  Spanish- American  War.  I,  p.  207. 


300  THE   PHILIPPINES 

to  enter  the  city.  Reporting  the  situation  to  Washington,  Dewey 
instituted  an  effective  blockade  and  awaited  further  orders.  The 
next  move  must  be  made  in  Washington. 

The  first  news  of  the  battle  reached  the  United  States  by  way 
of  Madrid,  and  naturally  it  did  not  give  the  whole  story.  On  the 
second  day  thereafter  the  American  and  English  newspapers  had 
secured  fairly  accurate  information,  and  on  May  3  the  president 
telegraphed  his  congratulations.  Dewey*s  report  did  not  reach 
Washington  until  a  week  after  the  battle.^®  Soon  thereafter  he 
was  raised  to  the  rank  of  admiral. 

It  is  evident  that  the  authorities  at  Washington  were  a  trifle 
confused  by  the  suddenness  and  completeness  of  the  victory. 

Notwithstanding  the  statement  of  Secretary  Alger^*  that  it 
had,  before  May  1,  been  decided  to  send  an  army  to  the  Philip- 
pines, it  is  reasonably  certain  that  no  serious  plans  for  events  be- 
yond the  battle  had  been  formed.  As  said  by  Admiral  Chadwick, 
"Perhaps  none  were  more  surprised  to  find  a  great  Archipelago 
at  their  command  than  were  the  gentlemen  composing  the  Admin- 
istration at  Washington.  The  idea  of  possession  had  probably 
but  vaguely  entered  the  minds  of  any  one  until  it  was  known  that 
a  victorious  American  Squadron  commanded  so  completely  the 
situation."'^" 

But  the  administration  now  acted  with  great  promptness  and 
energy.  The  question  of  sending  troops  to  the  islands  was  con- 
sidered immediately  upon  the  receipt  of  the  public  rumors  of  the 

18  The  cable  company  refused  to  forward  messages  sent  through  from 
Manila.  There  was  some  justification  for  this  as  the  company  held  its  con- 
cession from  Spain  on  condition  that  it  should  not  send  any  cablegrams  for- 
bidden by  the  government.  A  violation  would  result  in  the  forfeiture  of  the 
franchise.  The  application  of  the  company  for  permission  to  accept  telegrams 
from  both  governments  was  declined.  The  British  government  declined  to 
permit  the  United  States  to  lay  a  cable  from  the  Philippines  to  Hong  Kong. 
On  July  11,  the  Spanish  government  consented  that  the  cable  be  neutralized, 
but  it  was  not  reopened  until  August  22. 

1^  Alger,  The  Spanish-American  War,  I,  p.  326. 

20  Chadwick,  The  Spanish-American  War,  I,  p.  208.  Probably,  however, 
plans  had  been  considered  for  securing  and  holding  a  coaling  and  naval  sta- 
tion. See  an  article  by  A.  Viallate,  "Les  preliminaires  de  la  guerre  hispano- 
Americaine  et  I'annexic/i  des  Philippines  Par  les  Etats-Unis,"  Revue  Histor- 
ique,  LXXXII,  p.  282. 


THE    CAPTURE   OF   MANILA  301 

victory.  Four  days  before  Dewey's  despatch  arrived  General 
Miles  wrote  to  the  Secretary  of  War  advising  that  Brigadier- 
General  Thomas  M.  Anderson  "be  sent  to  occupy  the  Philippine 
Islands"  in  command  of  certain  designated  regiments.  On  May  4 
President  McKinley  directed  that,  "The  troops  designated  by 
General  Miles,  if  approved  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  should  be 
assembled  at  San  Francisco,  California,  for  such  service  as  may 
be  ordered  hereafter." 

Upon  receiving  Dewey's  first  despatch  the  Department  notified 
him  that  the  Charleston  would  sail  at  once  with  ammunition,  and 
that  another  vessel  would  follow  with  troops  "unless  you  tele- 
graph otherwise.    How  many  will  you  require  ?" 

Five  days  after  receiving  this  inquiry  Dewey  notified  Wash- 
ington that  he  could  take  Manila  at  any  time,  that  he  was  main- 
taining a  strict  blockade,  and  that  he  believed  that  the  rebels 
were  hemming  in  Manila  by  land,  although  they  were  inactive 
and  making  no  demonstrations.  The  possibilities  of  the  future, 
other  than  the  hostility  of  the  natives,  were  now  in  his  mind,  as 
he  advised  the  Department  that  in  his  judgment  to  retain  posses- 
sion and  thus  control  the  Philippine  Islands  would  require  a  well- 
equipped  force  of  five  thousand  men. 

On  May  29  Dewey  was  informed  that  no  Spanish  troops  were 
on  the  way  to  Manila,  and  that  the  first  expedition  of  United 
States  troops  had  already  sailed  from  San  Francisco. 

In  the  meantime,  while  Washington  was  devising  a  policy, 
events  of  importance  were  happening  in  Manila  Bay.  The  moral 
effect  of  the  naval  victory  had  been  very  great.  The  confidence 
of  Europe  In  the  efficiency  of  the  Spanish  navy  had  been  badly 
shaken,  and  the  talk  in  the  press  about  putting  restraint  upon  the 
conduct  of  the  United  States  came  to  a  sudden  end.  Chadwick 
says :  "The  curiosity  of  naval  commanders  in  the  East  was  in- 
tense but  natural.  There  was  no  question  of  the  friendliness  of 
those  of  Great  Britain  and  Japan,  with  whom  the  American  Ad- 
miral was  on  most  cordial  terms.  But  the  attitude  of  the  powers 
of  Continental  Europe  was  doubtful,  and  when  the  number  of 


302  THE    PHILIPPINES 

German  ships  rose  to  five  and  their  movements  assumed  an  activ- 
ity and  character  not  consonant  with  friendliness  the  situation 
became  serious."^^ 

The  first  German  cruiser,  the  Irene,  which  arrived  on  May  6, 
ignored  the  blockade  and,  steaming  by  the  Olympia,  dropped 
anchor  at  a  place  of  her  own  selection.  The  Cormoran  arrived 
at  three  o'clock  in  the  morning,  and  as  she  ignored  the  hail  of 
a  steam  launch,  the  Raleigh  fired  a  shot  across  her  bows.  The 
German  captain,  says  Dewey,^^  "was  surprised  at  our  action, 
but  our  boarding  officer  explained  the  law  and  also  the  risk  that 
a  man-of-war  was  running  into  in  coming  into  the  harbor  at 
night.  We  had  no  thought  of  being  discourteous  and  no  desire 
to  arouse  ill-feeling,  and  fully  appreciated  how  our  point  of  view 
had  not  occurred  to  the  captain  of  the  Cormoran  when  he  ran 
straight  in  toward  our  squadron  in  the  dark." 

On  the  same  day  a  German  transport  brought  fourteen  hun- 
dred sailors  to  relieve  the  crews  of  the  German  squadron,  but  the 
men  were  kept  on  the  ship.  On  May  twelfth  Vice-Admiral  von 
Diedrich  arrived  with  the  Kaiserin  Augusta. 

From  the  first  the  relations  between  the  American  and  German 
commanders  were  strained.  When  Dewey  at  their  first  meeting 
commented  on  the  apparent  disproportion  between  the  naval 
force  which  had  been  assembled  in  Manila  Bay  and  German 
commercial  interests  in  the  Philippines,  the  German  admiral 
remarked  stiffly,  *T  am  here  by  order  of  the  Kaiser,  sir."  The 
Germans  ignored  the  fact  that  Manila  was  blockaded.  Their 
officers  landed  in  Manila  and  affiliated  with  the  Spaniards;  the 
vice-admiral  called  officially  on  the  Spanish  captain-general,  who 
returned  the  call  at  night ;  the  Irene  went  to  Subig  Bay  and  inter- 
fered between  the  Spaniards  and  insurgents ;  German  sailors  were 
landed  for  drill  at  Marivales;  German  boats  took  soundings  at 
the  mouth  of  the  Pasig  River,  and  their  sailors  for  a  time  occu- 
pied the  lighthouse  within  the  city  of  Manila.  During  this  time 
Admiral  Dewey  was  inferior  in  force  to  the  Germans,  but  the 


21  The  Spanish-American  War,  II,  p.  364. 
^^Autobiography,  p.  255. 


THE   CAPTURE   OF   MANILA  303 

arrival  of  the  Monterey  restored  the  equilibrium  and  an  issue 
was  at  once  made.  There  had  been  formal  correspondence  be- 
tween Dewey  and  Von  Diedrich  with  reference  to  the  rights  of 
neutral  warships  in  a  blockaded  harbor,  in  which  the  latter  at- 
tempted to  sustain  the  utterly  untenable  position  that  his  ships 
were  not  subject  to  any  regulation  while  in  Manila  Bay.  Ad- 
miral Dewey  disclaimed  any  intention  of  exercising  a  right  of 
search,  but  claimed  "the  right  to  communicate  with  all  vessels 
entering  the  port  now  blockaded  with  the  forces  at  my  com- 
mand."^^  The  German  admiral  agreed  to  submit  the  question 
to  a  conference  of  the  senior  officers  of  the  men-of-war  in  the 
harbor,  but  only  Captain  Chichester,  of  the  British  cruiser,  ap- 
peared, and  he  agreed  with  Dewey.  Von  Diedrich  refused  to 
acquiesce,  and  later,  when  the  Cormoran  in  entering  the  bay 
ignored  a  signal  to  communicate,  the  McCulloch  fired  a  shot 
across  her  bows.  The  next  day,  when  the  indignant  German 
commander  sent  a  staff  officer  to  state  his  grievance,  Admiral 
Dewey  bluntly  told  him  to  inform  his  chief  that  persistence 
in  the  course  which  had  been  adopted  would  lead  to  a  con- 
flict. *T  made  the  most  of  the  occasion,"  says  Dewey,  "and 
by  using  him  as  a  third  person  to  state  candidly  and  firmly  my 
attitude  in  a  verbal  message,  which  he  conveyed  so  successfully 
that  Vice-Admiral  von  Diedrich  was  able  to  understand  my 
point  of  view.  There  was  no  further  interference  with  the  block- 
ade or  breach  of  the  etiquette  which  had  been  established  by  the 
common  consent  of  the  other  foreign  commanders."^* 

23  The  right  claimed  by  Admiral  Dewey  is  recognized  by  all  writers  on 
international  law. 

^*  Autobiography,  p.  266.  The  accuracy  of  Admiral  Dewey's  account  is 
confirmed  by  Admiral  Fiske  {With  Dewey  at  Manila,  pp.  111-114).  See  also 
Chadwick,  The  Spanish-American  War,  II,  p.  364 ;  Wilson,  The  Downfall  of 
Spain,  p.  167. 

^  After  the  publication  in  1914  of  Admiral  Dewey's  Autobiography  Von 
Diedrich  issued  a  statement  in  which  he  denied  some  of  Dewey's  statements 
and  attempted  to  explain  his  actions  at  Manila.  New  York  Times,  Feb.  25  and 
28,  1914.  His  story  appeared  in  the  German  naval  magazine,  Marine  Rund- 
chau,  for  March,  1915.  He  claimed  that  the  concentration  of  the  German 
squadron  was  merely  fortuitous  and  that  the  misunderstanding  with  the 
American  admiral  was  due  to  the  latter's  misconstruction  of  the  situation. 
While  it  appears  from  Admiral  von  Diedrich's  statement  that  Dewey  may 
have  misconstrued  some  of  tlie  acts  of  the  Germans,  the  substantial  accuracy 


304  THE    PHILIPPINES 

It  is  difficult  to  understand  the  motives  which  actuated  the 
Germans.  Naval  officers  do  not  ordinarily  ignore  the  established 
customs  and  courtesies  of  international  intercourse.  Admiral 
von  Diedrich  seemed  to  resent  the  presence  of  the  Americans, 
and  made  no  attempt  to  conceal  that  feeling  of  contempt  for 
American  military  operations  which  then  pervaded  continental 
Europe.  He  was  there  "by  order  of  the  Kaiser,  sir,"  and  that 
simple  fact  to  his  mind  determined  all  questions  of  right  or 
wrong. 

The  first  troops  from  the  United  States,  under  the  command 
of  Brigadier-General  Thomas  M.  Anderson,  U.  S.  A.,  arrived  at 
Manila^^  on  June  30,  a  second  expedition^^  under  Brigadier-Gen- 


of  the  latter's  account  of  what  occurred  remains  unshaken.  Von  Diedrich's 
absurd  statement  that  Dewey  never  established  a  legal  blockade  throws  a 
flood  of  light  on  the  situation. 

The  author  of  The  Life  and  Letters  of  John  Hay  (II,  p.  280)  repeats  the 
story  that  the  Germans  sent  their  fleet  to  Manila  at  the  suggestion  of  an  Amer- 
ican official  at  Berlin.  I  am  informed  by  Dr.  White,  who  was  then  the  Amer- 
ican ambassador,  that  there  is  no  foundation  for  the  story. 

On  May  18,  1898,  six  days  after  the  arrival  of  Admiral  von  Diedrich  in 
Manila  Bay,  Prince  Bismarck,  in  a  conversation  with  Mr.  Wolf  von  Schear- 
band,  said : 

"This  whole  war  is  indefensible  on  grounds  of  international  equity.  It  is 
a  war  of  pretext,  undertaken  against  a  waning  power  for  the  sole  sake  of 
spoils.  The  United  States  complained  that  Cuba,  as  a  Spanish  colony,  was 
being  maladministered.  What  of  that?  Colonies  have  often  been  misman- 
aged and  I  suppose  the  Americans,  when  they  shall  have  colonies,  will  not  be 
exempt.  But  that  is  no  fair  reason  for  dispossessing  the  owners.  Other 
powers  have  never  interfered  in  such  cases  before.  The  Creoles  and  the 
West  India  half-breeds  are  difficult  to  manage  and  it  would  be  impossible 
to  satisfy  them  under  any  circumstances.  The  Americans  will  find  them 
later  on  a  hard  nut  to  crack.  Spoils,  spoils,  all  else  is  pretense.  That,  too, 
has  been  your  procedure  in  the  Philippines.  The  Americans  call  this  Europe 
of  ours  effete.  Well,  there  must  be  some  truth  in  it  or  else  there  would  have 
been  a  united  European  front  to  oppose  and  hinder  this  unrighteous  war. 
And  the  Monroe  Doctrine  ?  .  .  .  That  is  a  species  of  arrogance  peculiarly 
American  and  inexcusable.  .  .  .  How  will  you  enforce  it?  .  .  .  With 
your  pigmy  navy?"  Germany,  The  Welding  of  a  World  Power,  by  Wolf 
von  Schearband,  p.  352  (New  York,  1902). 

25  This  expedition  consisting  of  the  Second  Oregon  and  the  First  Cali- 
fornia Volunteers,  five  companies  of  the  14th  United  States  Infantry,  and  a 
detachment  of  the  CaUfornia  Heavy  Artillery,  in  all  one  hundred  seventeen 
officers,  and  2,386  men,  sailed  from  San  Francisco  on  May  25,  1898,  on  the 
chartered  steamers  City  of  Pekin,  City  of  Sidney  and  Austraila.  It  brought 
four  hundred  tons  of  much-needed  ammunition  for  the  fleet.  On  the  way 
out  it  took  possession  of  the  island  of  Guam. 

28  The  second  expedition  was  composed  of  the  First  Colorado  and  the 
Tenth  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  one  Battalion  18th  Infantry,  one  Battalion  23rd 


THE    CAPTURE   OF   MANILA  305 

eral  F.  V.  Greene,  U.  S.  V.,  on  July  17,  and  a  third  under  Briga- 
dier-General Arthur  MacArthur,  U.  S.  V.,  with  which  came 
Major-General  Wesley  Merritt,  U.  S.  A.,  the  commander  of  the 
Department  of  the  Pacific,  on  July  25.  A  camp  was  established  on 
the  beach  south  of  Manila,  near  the  present  polo  grounds.  As  the 
water  was  shallow  and  the  position  within  easy  range  of  the 
Spanish  guns  in  Fort  Antonio  de  Abad,  it  was  necessary  to  land 
the  troops  from  the  transports  by  means  of  cascos  and  steam 
launches.  The  Spanish  guns,  overawed  by  the  guns  of  the  fleet, 
remained  quiet  as  the  American  soldiers  waded  ashore  and  went 
into  camp,  preparatory  to  marching  against  the  defenses. 

The  camp,  which  was  large  enough  to  care  for  about  five  thou- 
sand men,  covered  practically  all  the  land  in  the  vicinity  that 
during  the  rainy  season  was  above  the  level  of  the  rice  swamps. 
Here  the  troops  remained  for  twenty-six  wet  and  weary  days 
while  the  chiefs  were  arranging  the  stage  for  the  battle  of 
Manila. 

It  was  the  rainy  season,  and  nothing  but  the  inherent  good 
temper  and  patience  of  the  intelligent  American  soldier  made 
the  life  endurable.  Granted  the  privilege  of  grumbling  and  ex- 
plaining the  shortcomings  of  those  in  authority  to  his  comrades 
and  the  folks  at  home,  he  could  manage  to  await  the  course  of 
events.  But  he  had  traveled  ten  thousand  miles  for  the  purpose 
of  fighting  the  Spaniards  and  could  not  quite  see  why  there 
should  now  be  so  much  delay.  True,  there  were  not  more  than 
four  thousand  troops  in  camp,  and  in  front  of  them  were  thir- 
teen thousand  perfectly-armed  and  equipped  Spanish  troops,  pro- 
tected by  ancient  but  massive  fortifications  of  the  Vauban  type 
surrounded  by  almost  impassable  moats.    There  was  also  a  line 


Infantry,  two  Batteries  Utah  Light  Artillery,  and  twenty-eight  men  from 
the  Regular  Eng^ineers,  in  all  three  thousand  five  hundred  men.  Of  these  the 
China  carried  thirteen  hundred,  the  Senate  about  nine  hundred,  and  the 
Zealand  and  Colon  about  seven  hundred  each. 

The  third  expedition,  under  the  command  of  Brig.  Gen.  Arthur  Mac- 
Arthur  consisted  of  one  hundred  ninety-seven  officers  and  four  thousand  six 
hundred  fifty  men. 


306  THE    PHILIPPINES 

of  Spanish  blockhouses  and  trenches  on  a  semicircle  which  en- 
closed the  various  villages  which  clustered  about  the  city. 

Just  outside  of  the  Spanish  lines  the  insurgents  had  taken, 
possession  of  all  the  roads  and  connected  them  by  small  trenches, 
in  which  they  had  a  fluctuating  force  of  about  ten  thousand  men. 

Between  the  American  camp  and  the  city  of  Manila,  about 
three  miles  away,  lay  the  villages  of  Malate  and  Ermite,  each 
with  its  plaza  and  huge  stone  church.  Malate  was  nearest  the 
American  camp,  and  at  its  southern  limit,  at  the  water's  edge  on. 
the  point  of  a  peninsula  formed  by  a  small  stream  that  flowed 
diagonally  southward  through  the  city,  was  a  strong  stone  fort 
known  as  San  Antonio  de  Abad,  which  mounted  good  modern 
artillery.  Opposite  this  fort  the  stream  was  spanned  by  a  bridge 
with  stone  parapets  backed  by  sand-bags.  Starting  at  this  bridge, 
which  was  but  a  few  feet  from  the  fort,  and  extending  about 
one  thousand  yards  inland  to  a  blockhouse,  was  a  strong  line  of 
trenches  about  five  feet  high  and  eight  feet  thick,  with  heavy 
traverses  at  intervals  of  a  few  yards.  From  this  blockhouse, 
which  commanded  one  of  the  roads,  the  line  of  defense  turned 
to  the  north  and,  as  it  appeared  to  the  Americans,  "disappeared 
in  the  bamboo  thickets." 

General  Anderson  had  brought  instructions  from  Major-Gen- 
eral Merritt,  who  had  been  assigned  to  the  command  of  the 
Eighth  Army  Corps,  not  to  attack  Manila  before  he  arrived  un- 
less he  was  certain  of  success.  Admiral  Dewey  did  not  wish  to 
risk  his  ships  until  the  monitors  Monterey  and  Monadnock  ar- 
rived and  with  their  heavy  guns  silenced  the  shore  batteries. 
Under  the  circumstances  it  was  thought  best  to  await  the  arrival 
of  General  Merritt.  In  the  meantime  General  Anderson  and  Gen- 
eral Greene  carefully  studied  the  ground  and  prepared  plans  for 
an  attack.  The  former  favored  moving  to  the  right  across  the 
lowlands  to  the  high  ground  back  of  the  city,  near  the  village 
of  San  Pedro  Macati,  on  the  Pasig  River,  while  Greene  was 
in  favor  of  advancing  along  the  shore  of  the  bay  and  driving  the 
Spaniards  out  of  the  fort  and  trenches. 

When  General  Merritt  arrived,  on  July  25,  he  approved  Gen- 


THE   CAPTURE   OF   MANILA  307 

eral  Greene's  plan,  but  manifested  a  disappointing  lack  of  enthu- 
siasm for  an  immediate  advance  on  either  line.  Admiral  Dewey 
had  for  some  time  been  carrying  on  negotiations  with  the  Span- 
iards through  the  Belgian  ConsuP^  Andre,  and  had  become  con- 
vinced that  the  city  could  be  induced  to  surrender  without  loss 
if  a  plan  could  be  devised  whereby  the  Spaniards  could  be 
given  an  opportunity  to  protect  their  "military  honor,"  which,  in 
the  language  of  the  Orient,  means,  "saving  face." 

Admiral  Dewey  gives  a  carefully  guarded  account  of  the  ar- 
rangements.^' 

"When  the  negotiations  with  the  Captain-General  tending  to 
a  surrender  were  again  broached  it  was  M.  Andre  who  acted  as 
intermediary,  transmitting  all  messages  (always  verbal  ones) 
from  the  Captain-General  to  me  and  from  me  to  the  Captain- 
General.  I  was  almost  alone  in  believing  in  the  sincerity  of  these 
negotiations.  General  Merritt  was  skeptical,  but  ready  to  defer 
to  my  judgment,  and  so  were  my  Chief  of  Staff  and  my  flag  lieu- 
tenant. Nevertheless  I  felt  confident  of  the  outcome,  in  which 
I  considered  I  was  fully  justified  by  later  events.  .  .  .  Andre 
continued  with  General  Jaudenes  the  negotiations  begun  with 
Don  Basillo.  These  progressed  with  varying  success  and  nu- 
merous side  issues,  but  always  with  the  stipulation  on  the  part 
of  the  Spaniards  that  if  they  surrendered  the  insurgents  should 
be  kept  out  of  the  city.  Finally,  without  making  any  definite 
promise,  General  Jaudenes  agreed  that,  although  he  would  not 
surrender  except  in  consequence  of  an  attack  upon  the  city,  yet, 
unless  the  city  was  bombarded,  the  Manila  batteries  would  not 

_  27  "The  negotiations  by  which  it  was  attempted  to  secure  a  surrender 
without  resistance  was  carried  on  through  Mr.  Andre,  the  Belgian  consul. 
His  method  was  to  go  to  the  governor-general  and  get  a  statement,  which  he 
wrote  down  in  a  memorandum  book.  Then  he  would  go  to  General  Merritt 
and  Admiral  Dewey  and  get  a  statement  from  them,  which  he  would  carry 
back  to  the  governor-general.  This  was  apart  from  some  formal  corre- 
spondence. After  the  surrender  Andre  translated  to  me  the  notes  in  his 
memorandum  book,  for  they  were  written  in  Spanish.  The  substance  of  the 
agreement  seemed  to  be  that  if  the  fleet  did  not  throw  shells  into  the  walled 
city  on  the  Spanish  part  of  Manila,  the  Spanish  artillery  would  not  open  on 
the  fleet.  There  was  no  agreement,  as  the  agreement  was  read  to  me,  that 
our  land  forces  would  not  be  fired  on.  On  the  contrary  there  was  a  state- 
ment that  the  honor  of  Spain  required  that  there  should  be  resistance,  or 
that  under  the  Spanish  Army  Code  their  officers  surrendering  without  re- 
sistance or  giving  a  parole  would  subject  themselves  to  court-martial.  Ac- 
cordingly we  were  fired  on  from  the  trenches  and  back  through  the  streets 
of  the  city."  Anderson,  in  North  Am.  Rev.,  CLXX,  p.  213. 
't^  Autobiography,  pp.  273,  274. 


308  THE    PHILIPPINES 

open  on  our  ships.  Moreover  once  the  attack  was  begun  he  would 
if  willing  to  surrender,  hoist  a  white  flag  over  a  certain  point 
in  the  walled  city  from  which  it  could  be  seen  both  from  Malate 
and  from  the  bay."^^ 

General  Merritt  on  his  arrival  was  convinced  by  Admiral 
Dewey  that  the  plan  was  practicable.  The  motives  which 
prompted  the  adoption  of  this  plan  of  procedure  were  beyond 
praise,  but  as  events  unfolded  it  seems  that  a  number  of  Ameri- 
can soldiers  lost  their  lives  unnecessarily.  It  might  have  been 
better  to  have  allowed  the  Spanish  officers  to  stand  trial  accord- 
ing to  the  barbarous  military  code  under  which  they  were  serv- 
ing.^" A  few  shells  sent  into  the  city  would  have  forced  a  prompt 
surrender  without  the  loss  of  a  single  American  soldier.  Instead 
of  adopting  this  course  the  rank  and  file  of  the  army  were  left 
to  believe  that  they  were  to  engage  in  a  serious  struggle  against 
a  superior  force  strongly  entrenched.  They  believed  that  they 
were  risking  death  in  their  country's  service,  when  the  fact  was 
that  they  were  about  to  engage  in  a  sham  battle  with  ball-cart- 
ridges. 

The  brigade  commanders  were  not  informed  of  what  was  be- 
ing arranged  and  proceeded  with  the  work  of  preparation.  The 
insurgents  were  between  the  American  camp  and  the  Spanish 
lines,  and  before  an  advance  could  be  made  it  was  necessary  that 
they  be  removed.  The  task  under  the  circumstances  was  difficult. 
General  Merritt  had  given  imperative  orders  that  there  must  be 
no  rupture  with  the  natives  and  that  only  pacific  and  diplomatic 
means  must  be  used.^^  Nevertheless,  he  directed  General  Greene 
that  he  must  get  the  Filipinos  out  of  the  way. 

29  Soon  after  the  naval  battle  of  May  1,  Governor-General  Don  Basilio 
Augustin  intimated  through  the  British  consul  that  he  was  willing  to  sur- 
render the  city.  A  request  to  Madrid  for  authority  to  make  the  surrender 
resulted  in  Augustin's  being  directed  to  turn  over  his  office  to  General  Firmin 
Jaudenes.  Don  Basilio  was  then  permitted  by  Admiral  Dewey  and  General 
Merritt  to  sail  from  Hong  Kong  on  a  German  vessel. 

30  There  was  reason  for  the  solicitude  of  the  Spanish  officers.  After  their 
return  to  Spain  Admiral  Montojo  and  General  Jaudenes  were  confined  under 
the  most  humiliating  conditions  in  cells  in  the  prison  of  San  Francisco, 
Madrid.  A  military  tribunal  convicted  and  sentenced  them  to  forced  retire- 
ment and  inability  in  the  future  to  discharge  any  public  duties.  Their  offense 
was  inability  to  accomplish  the  impossible. 

81  Merritt's  orders  were :  "No  rupture  with  insurgents ;  this  is  imperative ; 


THE   CAPTURE   OF   MANILA  309 

A  polite  request  to  vacate  and  permit  the  Americans  to  man 
the  trenches  and  install  better  artillery  was  referred  to  Aguinaldo, 
who  expressed  a  desire  to  have  the  request  in  writing.  This 
suggestion  was  brushed  aside  with  the  statement  that  such  for- 
mal matters  could  be  arranged  later.  In  the  meantime  General 
Greene  needed  the  trenches,  and  soon  got  them.^^ 

New  and  more  substantial  trenches  were  now  constructed  much 
nearer  the  enemy's  lines.     The  Spaniards  did  not  observe  or 


can  ask  insurgents'  generals  for  permission  to  occupy  their  trenches,  but  if 
refused  not  to  use  force."    War  Dept.  Kept.,  1898,  I,  Part  2,  p.  7Z. 

32  A  great  deal  has  been  made  of  this  incident.  General  Greene  gives  the 
following  account: 

"General  Merritt  arrived  on  .  .  .  July  25,  and  after  examining  the 
ground  the  following  day  promptly  decided  two  points :  First,  that  the  attack 
would  be  made  along  the  shore,  and  second,  that  it  was  necessary  to  get  the 
insurgents  off  to  one  side  so  as  to  give  us  the  right  of  way.  He  was  very 
anxious  to  avoid  any  entangling  alliances  with  Aguinaldo,  with  whom  he  had 
no  direct  communication.  He  therefore  sent  his  chief  of  staff  on  the  after- 
noon of  July  28  with  a  verbal  message  directing  me  to  persuade  the  insur- 
gents, if  possible,  to  evacuate  a  portion  of  their  trenches,  but  I  was  to  do  this 
on  my  own  responsibility  and  without  intimating  that  I  had  instructions  to 
this  effect  from  him.  I  had  previously  met  General  Noriel,  who  commanded 
the  brigade  of  insurgents  nearest  the  beach,  and  on  receiving  General  Mer- 
ritt's  message,  I  sent  my  orderly,  who  spoke  Spanish  fluently,  to  find  this  gen- 
eral and  give  him  a  most  polite  message  that  I  desired  to  see  him  on  matters 
of  common  interest.  At  the  same  time  the  orderly  was  instructed  not  to  come 
back  without  him.  He  returned  in  about  an  hour  with  General  Noriel  and  his 
young  Adjutant-General  Arevolas,  both  wearing  handsome  uniforms  and 
equipment  I  explained  to  him  that  the  antique  six-inch  columbiads  which  he 
had  in  his  trenches  were  of  an  obsolete  pattern  and  very  ineflfective  against  the 
Spanish  artillery,  and  that  if  he  would  give  up  the  trenches  for  about  four 
hundred  yards  from  the  beach  I  would  place  in  them  the  fine  modern  pieces 
of  field  artillery  which  we  had  brought  and  which  would  be  much  more  effect- 
ive against  the  Spaniards.  He  received  the  idea  favorably,  but  said  he  could 
do  nothing  without  consulting  Aguinaldo,  and  I  requested  him  to  do  this  by 
telegraph  (Aguinaldo's  headquarters  being  about  eleven  miles  in  the  rear)  and 
give  me  an  answer  during  the  night  He  promised  to  do  so.  About  half-past 
two  in  the  morning  his  adjutant-general  arrived,  having  been  obliged  to  ride 
back  through  the  rain  and  mud  to  Bacour  to  see  Aguinaldo,  as  the  answer  by 
telegraph  was  not  satisfactory.  He  said  Aguinaldo  had  given  his  consent  pro- 
vided I  would  make  the  request  in  writing.  I  told  him  that  I  had  no  objec- 
tion to  this,  but  in  order  to  save  time  I  would  post  troops  in  the  trenches 
early  in  the  morning  and  send  the  written  request  as  soon  thereafter  as 
possible.  This  arrangement  was  carried  out"  Century  Magazine,  XXXV, 
p.  916. 

Millet  {The  Expedition  to  the  Philippines,  p.  83)  says:  "On  the  afternoon 
of  the  28th,  General  Greene  received  a  verbal  message  from  General  Merritt 
suggesting  that  he  juggle  the  insurgents  out  of  part  of  their  lines,  always  on 
his  own  responsibility,  and  without  committing  in  any  way  the  Commanding 
General  to  any  recognition  of  the  native  leaders  on  opening  up  the  prospect 
of  an  allaince.  This  General  Greene  accomplished  very  cleverly,  dealing  with 
the  natives  exactly  in  accordance  with  their  own  methods." 


310  THE   PHILIPPINES 

chose  to  ignore  what  was  going  on  until  the  night  of  July  31, 
when  they  opened  on  the  Americans  with  artillery  and  infantry 
fire.  Notwithstanding  orders  to  the  contrary,  the  fire  was  re- 
turned and  some  casualties  resulted.  This  was  repeated  on  suc- 
ceeding nights.  General  Greene  was  anxious  to  advance,  but 
General  Merritt's  orders  were  to  hold  the  trenches  and  avoid 
bringing  on  an  engagement.  Owing  to  the  bad  weather,  it  had 
not  yet  been  possible  to  disembark  all  of  General  MacArthur's 
brigade,  which  had  arrived  on  July  25,  and  Admiral  Dewey  still 
advised  delay. 

The  Monterey  arrived  on  August  4.  By  this  time  the  Ameri- 
cans, while  on  the  defensive  in  the  trenches,  had  suffered  a  loss 
of  twelve  killed  and  twenty-two  wounded.  On  the  following  day 
Greene  held  a  conference  with  Merritt  and  Dewey  and  urged  an 
immediate  advance.  Dewey  advised  waiting  until  the  Monterey 
could  be  overhauled  and  the  Monadnock  had  arrived,  but  finally 
said:^^  "The  decision  rests  with  you.  If  you  bum  the  blue  light 
on  the  beach  the  Raleigh  will  immediately  open  fire,  the  Charles- 
ton  will  go  to  her  assistance,  and  the  Boston  and  Monterey  will 
follow  if  the  engagement  continues.  All  three  ships  have  steam 
up  every  night  and  these  orders  have  been  given  to  their  captains, 
but  I  hope  you  will  not  bum  the  light  unless  you  are  on  the  point 
of  being  driven  out." 

Merritt  agreed  with  Dewey,  and  Greene  returned  with  orders 
to  do  no  more  than  hold  the  trenches.  That  night  three  more 
men  were  killed  and  seven  wounded,  and  it  was  decided  to  hasten 
the  action  of  the  Spanish  commander.  Dewey  and  Merritt  sent 
a  joint  letter  to  the  governor-general  stating  that,  "If  the  night 
attacks  continue,  at  the  end  of  forty-eight  hours  an  attack  of  the 
land  and  naval  forces  would  take  place,  and  that  the  notice  was 
given  in  order  to  enable  the  noncombatants  to  be  removed  to  a 
safe  place."  The  governor-general  replied  that  he  was  sur- 
rounded by  insurgents  and  had  no  place  to  send  his  people.  But 
so  potent  was  the  fear  of  the  naval  guns  that  not  another  shot 


S3  Dewey,  Autobiography,  p.  272. 


THE   CAPTURE    OF   MANILA  311 

was  fired  on  the  trenches  during  the  six  days  which  followed 
before  the  surrender  of  the  city. 

The  shipping  people  and  the  residents  of  Manila  took  the 
forty-eight  hours'  notice  seriously,  and  on  the  morning  of  the 
ninth  all  the  foreign  ships  left  their  anchorage  and  steamed  out 
into  the  bay.  Foreigners  moved  their  persons  and  as  much  of 
their  property  as  was  possible  aboard  their  national  warships. 
Red  Cross  flags  blossomed  out  at  unexpected  places.  But  the  fate- 
ful hour  of  noon  passed  and  nothing  happened.  The  stage  was 
not  yet  arranged  and  additional  arguments  instead  of  shells  were 
sent  into  the  city. 

The  attention  of  the  authorities  was  called  again  to  the  help- 
lessness of  the  city  and  a  peremptory  demand  for  surrender  was 
made.  The  governor-general  declined  to  surrender  and  asked 
permission  to  communicate  with  his  government  in  Madrid. 
This,  of  course,  was  refused,  and  the  next  two  days  were  devoted 
to  the  serious  work  of  preparation  for  the  assault,  which  was 
to  be  made  on  the  morning  of  August  13. 

The  plan  of  battle  contemplated  that  at  10:10  a.  m.  the  cruisers 
should  take  their  positions  and  open  fire  on  Fort  San  Antonio  de 
Abad,  which  was  well  south  of  the  city.  Immediately  thereafter 
the  field  artillery  in  front  of  the  Spanish  trenches  would  join. 
After  the  firing  had  continued  for  a  reasonable  time  the  Olympia 
would  move  up  in  front  of  the  city  and  display  the  international 
signal,  which  means,  "surrender."  If  this  was  answered  accord- 
ing to  program  by  the  display  of  a  white  flag  the  troops  would 
then  move  forward  and  take  possession.  It  was  not  contem- 
plated that  the  troops  should  bring  on  an  actual  battle. 

The  Memorandum  for  General  Officers,  issued  on  the  twelfth 
regarding  "the  possible  action  on  August  13,"  specified  definitely 
that  this  white  flag  might  be  expected  to  appear  "on  the  angle 
of  the  walled  city,"  and  concluded  with  the  statement  that,  "It 
is  intended  that  these  results  shall  be  accomplished  without  loss 
of  life."  If  for  any  reason  the  white  flag  failed  to  appear,  the 
troops  were  to  await  further  orders  front  General  Merritt.  No 
one  but  the  commanding  general  and  admiral  knew  whether 


312  THE    PHILIPPINES 

there  was  to  be  an  assault.  These  careful  plans  may  have  been 
humanitarian  and  designed  to  save  life,  but  the  general  innocuous- 
ness  of  the  whole  proceedings  suggests  the  order  given  by  the 
Spanish  Ministry  to  Admiral  Camera,  who  was  directed  to  re- 
turn to  Spain  and  "when  the  torpedo  boat  destroyers  have  re- 
joined your  squadron,  start  for  Cadiz  with  the  Pelayo,  etc., 
keeping  close  to  the  shore,  so  as  to  he  seen  from  Spanish  cities, 
exhibiting  when  near  them  the  national  flag  illuminated  by 
search-lights,  which  are  also  to  be  thrown  upon  the  cities." 

Long  before  the  navy  opened  fire  on  the  morning  of  the  thir- 
teenth, the  troops  were  in  position  and  eager  to  advance.  The 
artillery  fire  brought  no  response.  The  guns  on  the  Luneta 
sulked,  and  Antonio  de  Abad  was  as  silent  as  a  tomb.  After  the 
fire  had  continued  for  some  time,  General  Greene,  who  had  re- 
ceived orders  changing  those  of  the  previous  day,  sent  one  regi- 
ment forward  along  the  water-front  and  took  possession  of  the 
deserted  fort  and  trenches.  The  Spaniards  retired  to  their  second 
line  of  trenches  without  offering  any  substantial  resistance,  and 
Greene's  brigade  pushed  forward  along  the  shore  and  through 
Malate  to  the  open  space  in  front  of  the  walled  city  known  as 
the  Luneta. 

On  the  right  of  the  line  Mac  Arthur's  men  advanced  along  the 
Pasay  road,  and  after  capturing  the  first  blockhouse,  all  but  a 
battalion  of  the  Minnesota  regiment  (which  reached  the  Luneta) 
moved  through  Singalong  into  the  Paco  district.  Severe  fighting 
occurred  in  Singalong,  and  there  were  heavy  losses.  The  white 
flag,  which  had  now  been  raised,  was  not  visible  to  the  men  who 
were  entangled  in  the  bamboo  thickets  and  flower  gardens,  and 
the  firing  continued  for  some  time.  The  Spanish  soldiers  did 
not  seem  to  have  been  notified  of  the  surrender.^* 

All  of  the  city  outside  of  the  walls  was  soon  in  the  hands  of 
the  Americans  and  Filipinos,  and  the  white  flag  was  flying  from 
the  walls.  Staff  officers  were  sent  in  to  communicate  with  the 
Spanish   authorities.     General    Merritt   and    General    Jaudenes 


"*For  a  good  description,  see  Millet,  The  Expedition  to  the  Philippines, 
p.  153,  et  seq. 


THE    CAPTURE    OF   MANILA  313 

agreed  on  preliminary  terms  of  capitulation,  and  the  city  was 
delivered  into  the  care  of  the  American  troops.  On  the  follow- 
ing day  formal  articles  of  capitulation  were  prepared  and  duly 
signed. 

A  capitulation  is  a  surrender  upon  conditions,  a  bargain  in  the 
common  interest  of  the  contracting  parties  by  which  one  avoids 
the  certain  loss  involved  in  the  continuance  of  a  hopeless  strug- 
gle and  the  forces  of  the  other  are  released  for  service  elsewhere. 
After  a  place  has  been  taken  by  assault  it  is  too  late  to  ask  for 
conditions ;  the  surrender  must  then  be  unconditional.  Capitula- 
tions are  purely  military  conventions.  The  commanding  officer 
may  include  therein  stipulations  and  conditions  of  a  political  na- 
ture, but  they  are  not  effective  until  approved  by  the  political 
authorities.  Subject  to  this  limitation,  any  terms  may  be  granted 
which  the  importance  of  the  place  and  the  forces  surrendered 
and  the  bravery  of  the  defendants  seem  to  require. 

During  the  Franco-German  War  of  1870  the  Germans  permit- 
ted the  French  who  had  surrendered  Bel  fort  to  march  out  unmo- 
lested through  the  German  lines,  carrying  their  arms  and  bag- 
gage, and  join  the  main  body  of  their  army  some  distance  away. 
The  capitulation  of  Manila  more  nearly  resembles  that  of  Bel- 
fort  than  that  of  Sedan,  which  is  a  fair  type  of  the  ordinary 
form. 

The  conditions  granted  to  the  Spaniards  were  unusually  favor- 
able. It  was  provided  that  the  troops,  Spanish  and  native,  capitu- 
lated with  all  the  honors  of  war;  that  the  officers  should  retain 
their  side  arms,  horses  and  private  property,  including  money, 
but  that  all  public  property,  including  money,  should  be  delivered 
to  the  representatives  of  the  United  States.  Spanish  families 
might  leave  the  city  at  any  time,  but  all  questions  relating  to  the 
repatriation  of  officers  and  men  of  the  Spanish  forces  and  their 
families,  and  the  expenses  connected  therewith,  were  to  be  re- 
ferred to  Washington. 

As  a  special  concession  to  Spanish  susceptibility,  it  was  pro- 
vided that  all  persons  included  in  the  capitulation  should  "remain 
at  liberty,  the  officers  remaining  in  their  respective  homes,"  but, 


314  THE  PHILIPPINES 

nevertheless,  all  should  be  supplied  by  the  United  States,  accord- 
ing to  their  rank,  with  rations  and  necessary  aid  as  though  they 
were  prisoners  of  war  until  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty  of  peace 
between  the  United  States  and  Spain. 

A  more  unusual  concession,  however,  was  that  by  which  the 
Spaniards,  upon  the  evacuation  of  the  city,  by  either  the  Spanish 
or  the  Americans,  were  to  receive  back  all  their  arms.  The 
instrument  closed  with  the  solemn  words : 

"This  city,  its  inhabitants,  its  churches  and  religious  worship, 
its  educational  establishments  and  its  private  property  of  all  de- 
scription are  placed  under  the  special  safeguard  of  the  faith  and 
honor  of  the  American  army." 

The  capitulation  of  Manila  was  inconsistent  with  the  theory 
that  the  city  had  been  carried  by  assault,  as  claimed  by  the 
army. 

"So  far  as  the  land  forces  were  concerned,"  says  General  An- 
derson, "they  took  the  place  by  storm,  and  it  has  never  been 
made  apparent  why  the  Spaniards  were  allowed  the  honors  of 
war  and  why  the  return  of  all  captured  property  upon  the  sign- 
ing of  the  treaty  of  peace  was  assured  to  them.  The  Filipinos 
assumed  that  it  was  because  we  intended  to  turn  the  Spaniards 
loose  on  them  as  soon  as  we  had  made  satisfactory  terms  with 
the  Spanish  government."^^ 

The  terms  granted  the  Spaniards  and  the  fact  that  the  sur- 
render was  under  the  form  of  a  capitulation,  although  the  city 
outside  the  walls  was  already  in  the  hands  of  the  American 
troops,'*  was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  surrender  was  all  carefully 


85  Anderson,  "Our  Rule  in  the  Philippines,"  North  Am.  Rev.,  CLXX,  p. 
213. 

38  The  southern  limits  of  the  city  of  Manila  are  now  near  the  point  where 
the  Spanish  line  of  trenches  came  down  to  the  old  fort.  At  the  time  of  the 
battle  "Manila"  meant  the  part  enclosed  within  the  walls,  intramuros,  about 
a  mile  square.  In  popular  language,  Manila  to-day  means  that  part  within 
the  old  walls,  and  it  is  common  to  hear  a  cab  driver  directed  to  go  to  Manila 
when  he  is  already  in  the  very  center  of  the  business  part  of  modern  Manila. 
Binondo,  Paco,  Malate,  Singalong,  Ermite,  etc.,  now  sections  or  wards  of 
Manila,  were,  while  technically  a  part  of  the  city,  in  fact,  at  the  time  of 
the  battle  separate  villages  or  barrios.  The  American  troops  never  entered 
llhe  walled  city,  to  which  the  Spaniards  retired,  until  after  the  capitulation. 


THE   CAPTURE   OF  MANILA  31$ 

iprearranged.  But  the  army  resented  the  suggestion  that  the  bat- 
tle was  not  real,  and  it  certainly  was  real  to  all  below  the  rank  of 
commanding  general.'^ 

The  Filipino  troops  had  done  some  good  fighting  against  the 
demoralized  Spaniards,  but  they  had  no  part  in  the  final  opera- 
tions which  resulted  in  the  surrender  of  Manila.  During  the 
long  weeks  while  Admiral  Dewey  was  waiting  for  the  arrival 
of  the  army  they  had  succeeded  in  driving  the  Spaniards  out 
of  the  country  between  Cavite  and  the  suburbs  of  Manila  and 
within  the  outer  lines  of  the  city,  but  there  is  no  justification  for 
the  assumption  that  this  work  would  have  had  to  be  done  by  the 
Americans  in  the  way  in  which  it  was  done  by  the  Filipinos. 
They  had,  however,  succeeded  in  putting  Manila  in  a  state  of 
siege,  although  its  effectiveness  has  been  exaggerated.  "The  in- 
surgents," says  General  Greene,  "had  furnished  a  force  which, 
tmorganized  and  poorly  equipped  as  it  was,  nevertheless  was  suf- 


At  the  time  of  the  surrender  the  American  troops  had  merely  driven  the 
Spaniards  within  the  walls,  where  their  main  defense  would  have  been  made. 

87  General  Anderson,  who  was  second  in  command,  wrote :  "I  do  not  know 
that  I  can  give  the  absolute  gospel  truth  as  to  the  so-called  capitulation 
agreement,  but  I  can  say  that  if  there  was  an  agreement  that  Manila  was  to 
be  surrendered  with  only  a  semblance  of  a  fight,  it  was  not  communicated  to 
the  army.  I  was  directed  to  draw  up  and  submit  what  is  known  as  the  tech- 
nical plan  of  attack.  I  drew  it  up  on  the  theory  that  there  was  to  be  a  bona 
fide  resistance,  and  it  was  adopted  by  the  commanding  general.  I  was  directed 
not  to  press  the  land  attack  until  it  was  seen  whether  the  Spaniards  raised 
the  white  flag  after  the  navy  opened  fire.  I  had  twelve  field  pieces  of  artillery 
bearing  on  the  Spanish  lines  and  four  in  reserve.  I  waited  twenty  minutes 
after  the  naval  guns  began  firing  and  then  directed  the  land  batteries  to  open. 
As  the  white  flag  was  not  then  raised  the  infantry  advanced,  carried  the 
Spanish  works  and  entered  the  city  and  then,  and  not  before,  the  white  flag 
was  raised."   No.  Am.  Rev.,  CLXX,  p.  213. 

In  an  article  published  in  the  Century  Magazine,  XXXV,  p.  942,  Mr.  John 
T.  McCutcheon,  who  was  on  board  the  Olympia,  says  that  after  the  firing 
had  continued  for  some  time,  "Captain  Lamberton  turned  his  glasses  on  the 
walled  city  and  said,  reflectively:  'They  were  to  raise  a  white  flag  on  the 
southeast  corner,  but  I  do  not  see  it  yet*  The  Admiral  said  that  it  had  been 
there  for  some  time  and  that  by  close  observation  it  was  discovered  at  the 
appointed  place  and  had^  evidently  been  raised  according  to  program  and  at 
the  proper  moment.  This  was  part  of  the  agreement  The  Spaniards  would 
not  give  up  the  city  without  a  theatrical  show  of  resistance  which  could  be 
reported  to  Madrid,  but  they  had  arranged  to  raise  a  white  flag  when  the 
Malate  fort  was  taken.  In  the  meantime  it  was  tacitly  understood  that  the 
guns  of  the  fleet  should  not  be  turned  on  the  city  and  that  the  guns  of  Manila 
should  not  be  turned  on  the  Americans." 

Admiral  Dewey  has  cleared  up  whatever  doubt  there  may  have  been. 
Autobiography,  p.  273. 


316  THE   PHILIPPINES 

ficlent  to  capture  the  waterworks  and  to  prevent  any  food  enter- 
ing the  city,  thus  leaving  the  population  dependent  on  rain-water 
and  on  the  food  supply  that  happened  to  be  in  the  city."  Although 
badly  organized  and  disciplined,  they  fought  well,  and  generally 
with  success.  It  must  be  remembered,  however,  that  the  Span- 
iards were  at  that  time  intimidated  by  the  presence  of  the  Amer- 
ican fleet  in  front  of  the  city.^* 

There  were  various  reasons,  some  political  and  others  human- 
itarian, why  the  insurgents  should  not  enter  the  city.  To  have 
permitted  them  to  join  in  the  attack  would  have  given  them  at 
least  a  moral  right  to  be  heard  as  to  the  terms  of  surrender  and 
the  future  control  and  government  of  the  city.  The  subsequent 
demand  by  Aguinaldo  that  the  governor-general's  palace  should 
be  delivered  to  him  for  his  use  as  an  official  residence  suggests 
the  nature  of  the  demands  which  would  have  been  made  had  he 
been  allowed  to  enter  the  city  as  one  of  the  captors.  It  was  also 
feared  that  the  leaders  of  the  undisciplined  Filipinos  would  not 
be  able  to  control  them  and  that  summary  vengeance  would  be 
taken  on  their  ancient  enemies. 

As  some  of  the  insurgents  might,  notwithstanding  the  order, 
succeed  in  getting  into  Manila,  General  Merritt  on  the  evening 
before  the  attack  sent  Aguinaldo  a  copy,  of  the  proclamation 
which  he  intended  to  issue  after  the  capture,  in  which  the  maxi- 
mum penalty  known  to  military  law  was  announced  as  the  pun- 
ishment which  would  be  imposed  on  all  who  were  guilty  of  vio- 
lence or  pillage. 

About  the  same  time  General  Anderson  was  ordered  to  notify 

88  General  Greene,  who  saw  much  of  the  native  troops,  gives  a  very  good 
picture  of  their  methods  of  fighting.  "They  had,"  he  says,  "but  Httle  organi- 
zation and  were  young  men  and  boys  of  slight  stature  weighing  from  100  to 
120  pounds  each,  dressed  in  a  uniform  of  striped  blue  cloth  and  a  straw  hat, 
without  shoes.  They  were  armed  indiscriminately  with  Mausers  and  Rem- 
ingtons and  took  turns  in  serving  in  the  trenches  for  a  few  days  and  then 
returning  to  their  homes  in  the  vicinity  for  a  week  of  rest,  their  posts  and 
arms  being  taken  by  others.  They  occupied  the  houses  in  the  numerous  vil- 
lages in  the  rear  of  their  barricades  and  trenches,  and  here  their  food,  which 
consisted  principally  of  rice,  occasionally  with  a  little  meat,  was  cooked  and 
then  carried  to  the  trenches.  .  .  .  They  were  constantly  engaged  in  desul- 
tory fighting  with  the  Spaniards,  and  when  their  ammunition  was  exhausted 
they  would  abandon  a  barricade  in  a  body  and  go  off  to  get  more."  Century 
Magazine,  XXXV,  p.  790. 


THE   CAPTURE   OF   MANILA  317 

Aguinaldo  to  forbid  his  troops  to  enter  the  city.  This  unpleas- 
ant information  reached  the  insurgent  leader  late  on  the  evening 
of  August  12,  after  he  had  made  all  his  preparations  to  attack 
the  Spanish  lines  on  the  following  morning.  It  was  received 
with  anger  and  indignation.  Fearing  that  the  order  would  not 
be  obeyed,  General  Anderson  sent  troops  to  hold  the  bridge 
which  the  insurgents  must  cross  if  they  followed  the  Americans 
when  they  advanced. 

However,  during  the  battle  they  broke  through  by  way  of 
Santa  Anna,  and  by  the  time  the  white  flag  was  raised  fully 
four  thousand  of  the  Filipinos  were  in  possession  of  Paco,  close 
to  the  walls  of  the  old  city. 

General  Greene  tells  an  interesting  story  of  the  summary  man- 
ner in  which  he  disposed  temporarily  of  a  considerable  force 
which  he  found  close  at  hand  waiting  for  the  gates  to  be  opened, 
by  simply  crowding  them  to  one  side.'*  But  they  could  not  be 
thus  shouldered  out  of  the  suburbs. 

General  Anderson  drew  a  cordon  of  troops  around  the  in- 
surgents to  prevent  them  from  looting  or  spreading.  "The  sit- 
uation," says  he,  "was  very  critical.  Our  soldiers  believed  that 
the  Filipinos  had  fired  on  them  and  the  Filipinos  were  almost 
beside  themselves  with  rage  and  disappointment.  The  friendly 
relations  we  had  with  Generals  Recarti  and  Noriel  alone  pre- 
vented a  conflict  with  them  then  and  there." 

Early  in  the  evening  orders  came  from  the  commanding  gen- 
eral to  remove  the  insurgents  from  the  city.  The  use  of  force 
meant  a  conflict  between  ten  thousand  Americans  and  fourteen 
thousand  Filipinos,  in  which  thirteen  thousand  Spaniards  who 
were  looking  on  from  the  comparatively  safe  vantage  ground  of 
the  interior  of  the  walled  city  would  probably  join.  General 
Anderson,  with  good  judgment,  took  the  responsibility  of  send- 
ing a  message  to  Aguinaldo,  who  was  at  Bacour,  ten  miles  away, 
requesting  him  to  withdraw  his  troops.  In  reply  there  came  a 
commission  consisting  of  Sefiors  Buencamino,  Legarde,  Araneta 
and  Sandico  with  a  proposition  that  the  insurgent  troops  would 

39  Century  Magasine,  XXXV,  p.  790. 


318  THE    PHILIPPINES 

be  withdrawn  if  the  Americans  would  agree  to  reinstate  them 
in  the  same  positions  when  peace  was  made  between  Spain  and 
the  United  States. 

This  proposal  seems  to  have  impressed  General  Anderson  as 
reasonable,  but  General  Merritt,  to  whom  it  was  referred,  in- 
formed the  commissioners  that  he  could  not  give  such  a  promise 
and  that  they  must  rely  on  the  good-will  and  sense  of  justice 
of  the  American  people.  The  commissioners  then  returned  to 
Aguinaldo  for  further  instructions,  but  one  of  the  members  left 
with  General  Anderson  a  letter  in  which  Aguinaldo  claimed  that 
he  had  been  treated  harshly  and  that  he  had  given  up  the  trenches 
before  Camp  Dewey  on  a  promise  that  there  should  be  cooper- 
ation in  future  military  movements.  It  is  certain  that  no  such 
promise  was  made  by  General  Greene. 

General  Merritt  directed  that  Aguinaldo  should  be  informed 
that  if  he  had  been  treated  with  apparent  harshness  it  was  from 
military  necessity  and  that,  while  we  might  recognize  the  justice 
of  their  insurrection,  it  was  thought  judicious  to  have  but  one 
army  in  Manila  at  a  time.  Aguinaldo,  in  reply,  agreed  to  the 
latter  proposition  but  evidently  felt  that  the  army  should  be  com- 
posed of  Filipino  instead  of  American  troops. 

During  the  operations  which  resulted  in  the  capitulation  of 
Manila,  the  American  army  had  nineteen  men  killed  and  one  hun- 
dred and  three  wounded.  At  this  cost  approximately  ten  thou- 
sand American  soldiers,  with  the  assistance  of  the  navy,  captured 
a  city  of  more  than  two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  inhabitants, 
thirteen  thousand  Spanish  prisoners,  twenty-two  thousand  small 
arms,  ten  million  rounds  of  ammunition,  seventy-five  modern 
guns,  several  hundred  ancient  bronze  cannon  well  adapted  for 
decorating  parks  and  plazas,  and  nine  hundred  thousand  dollars 
of  public  money. 


CHAPTER  XIII 
The  Peace  Protocol  and  the  Treaty  of  Paris 

Spain  Sues  for  Peace — Negotiations  Through  French  Ambassador — ^The 
Protocol — Status  of  Spain  in  Philippines — Effect  of  the  Capitulation — The 
Peace  Commissioners — Opening  of  the  Conference — Uneasiness  about  Philip- 
pines— Spanish  Preliminary  Demands — Proposals  for  Treaty — Assumption  of 
Sovereignty  over  Cuba — The  Colonial  Debts — Refusal  of  the  United  States  to 
Assume  Debts — Original  Instructions  as  to  Philippines — Growth  of  Sentiment 
in  United  States — Investigations  by  Commission — Conflicting  Opinions — Final 
Instructions — Claim  of  Conquest — The  Philippine  Public  Debt — Continental 
Sentiment  Favors  Spain— British  Attitude— Offer  of  $20,000,000— Spain  Ac- 
cepts America's  Terms — Certain  Minor  Issues — ^The  Treaty — Purchase  of 
Additional  Islands — The  End  of  a  Colonial  Empire. 

By  the  middle  of  July,  1898,  it  had  become  apparent  to  the 
Spanish  government  that  the  prolongation  of  the  war  could 
only  add  to  its  already  heavy  accumulation  of  disasters.  Spain 
had  entered  upon  the  war  with  the  confident  expectation  that  she 
would  be  able  at  least  to  inflict  sufficient  injury  upon  the  United 
States  to  enable  her  to  secure  creditable  terms  of  peace.  But 
the  accomplishments  of  her  army  and  navy  had  been  so  slight 
that  the  proud  old  monarchy  was  left  in  a  position  perilously  near 
the  ridiculous.  Judged  by  the  results,  neither  army  nor  navy 
had  been  able  to  make  even  a  reasonable  showing,  and  Spain's 
prestige  as  a  military  power  had  vanished.  Further  delay  might 
mean  the  loss  of  everything  and  even  the  humiliation  of  having 
the  Peninsular  coasts  visited  by  an  American  fleet. 

Having  come  to  a  realizing  sense  of  the  actual  conditions, 
Spain  lost  no  time  in  opening  negotiations  for  peace.  The  Duke 
of  Almodovar,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  directed  the  Span- 
ish ambassador  at  Paris  to  ask  for  the  good  offices  of  the  French 
government  in  conveying  to  the  United  States  the  desire  of  Spain 

319 


320  THE   PHILIPPINES 

for  an  immediate  suspension  of  hostilities  preliminary  to  nego- 
tiations for  a  treaty  of  peace. 

There  was  some  delay  in  Paris,  occasioned  by  the  absence  of 
the  president  of  the  Republic  and  the  unwillingness  of  the  min- 
ister of  foreign  affairs  to  assume  the  responsibility  of  instruct- 
ing M.  Cambon,  the  French  ambassador  at  Washington,  to  act 
on  behalf  of  Spain.  This  lack  of  enthusiasm  on  the  part  of  the 
French  minister  irritated  Almodovar,  who  fully  appreciated  the 
value  of  time,  and  the  ambassador  at  Paris  was  instructed  to 
say  that  the  request  did  not  admit  of  delay.  In  fact,  extreme 
haste  was  necessary,  as  the  loss  of  even  a  few  hours  might  be 
of  the  gravest  consequence  to  Spain.  The  capitulation  of  Ma- 
nila might  occur  at  any  time,  and  additional  victories  would  prob- 
ably result  in  greater  claims  being  advanced  by  the  United 
States/ 

Without  further  delay  M.  Cambon  was  directed  to  represent 
the  interests  of  Spain,  and  on  July  26  he  presented  a  communi- 
cation which  expressed  a  desire  to  learn  from  the  president 
upon  what  basis  the  political  status  of  Cuba  could  be  established 
and  the  war  thus  brought  to  an  end.  The  request  was  so  worded 
as  to  imply  that  the  future  of  Cuba  was  the  only  question  at 
issue  between  Spain  and  the  United  States.  During  the  con- 
versation which  followed  Secretary  Day,  in  the  presence  of  Pres- 
ident McKinley,  stated  that  he  understood  that  Spain  desired 
to  know  also  upon  what  conditions  it  would  be  possible  to  ter- 
minate hostilities  at  all  points  where  they  then  existed,  and  M. 

1  Duke  of  Almodovar  to  Sthor  Leon  y  Castillo,  Sp.  Dip.  Corr.  and  Docs. 

(1896-1900),  p.  200. 

The  documents  and  correspondence  relating  to  the  war  and  the  treaty  of 
peace  will  be  found  in  Foreign  Relations,  1898;  Spanish  Red  Book,  Ncgo- 
cidcions  diplomaticas  desde  el  principio  de  la  guerra  con  los  Estados  Unidos 
hasta  la  firma  del  protocolo  de  Washington  (i8g8) ;  Conferencia  de  Paris  y 
tratado  de  pas  de  jo  de  dicicmbre  de  1898  (1899),  and  the  volume  published 
by  the  French  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Negociations  pour  la  paix  cntres 
I'Espagne  et  les  Etats-Unis  (1898).  The  formal  record  of  the  Conference  is 
in  Senate  Doc.  No.  62,  $s  Cong,  srd  Sess,  Part  I.  The  instructions  of  the 
president  and  the  cable  correspondence  were  printed  as  Sen.  Doc.  No.  148,  56 
Cong.  2nd  Sess.  The  matter  is  the  same  as  For.  Rel.  1898.  See  an  article 
entitled  "Revelations  of  a  Senate  Document"  in  the  North  Am.  Rev.  for  June, 
1901.  For  the  question  of  the  debts,  see  Magoon's  Repts.  (1902),  pp.  180-183. 
For  Mr.  Reid's  private  letters  to  the  president,  see  Olcott's  Life  of  McKinley, 
II,  Chap.  XXVIII. 


THE    TREATY    OF    PARIS  321 

Cambon  replied  that  such  seemed  to  be  the  effect  of  the  Span- 
ish communication. 

Before  a  formal  reply  could  be  made  M.  Cambon  received  a 
despatch  from  the  Duke  of  Almodovar  stating  that  Spain  would 
accept  any  conditions  which  would  result  in  the  pacification  of 
Cuba,  whether  they  involved  absolute  independence,  independ- 
ence under  a  protectorate  or  annexation  to  the  United  States. 
The  latter  was  preferred,  as  it  would  guarantee  security  for  the 
lives  and  property  of  Spaniards  who  were  established  in  Cuba.* 

It  was  assumed  that  the  United  States  would  demand  some- 
thing by  way  of  indemnity,  but  on  that  subject  M.  Cambon  was 
instructed  to  "maintain  reserve."  Spain  did  not  want  to  be  held 
responsible  for  the  expenses  of  military  expeditions  undertaken 
against  territory  remote  from  Cuba,  as,  according  to  Almodo- 
var's  theory,  the  war  should  have  been  localized.  What  he  feared 
was  that  the  United  States  might  hold  the  islands  she  had  cap- 
tured on  what  may  be  called  collateral  expeditions  as  indemnity 
for  the  expenses  of  their  capture.  M.  Cambon  was  directed  par- 
ticularly to  ascertain  the  disposition  of  the  president  toward 
Porto  Rico  and  the  Philippines,  and  if  he  was  found  reasonable 
from  the  Spanish  point  of  view,  to  press  for  the  immediate  sus- 
pension of  hostilities. 

Spain  thus  opened  the  negotiations  for  peace  with  a  proposal 
to  abandon  Cuba,  with  the  expectation — ^not  expressed,  however 
— ^that  something  would  have  to  be  done  toward  indemnifying 
the  United  States  for  the  expenses  of  the  war,  but  hoping  to  save 
Porto  Rico.  It  is  hardly  probable  that  she  then  seriously  feared 
that  she  would  lose  all  of  the  Philippine  Islands,  as  the  Ameri- 
cans at  that  time  had  done  nothing  in  that  part  of  the  world  ex- 
cept destroy  the  Spanish  fleet. 

On  July  30  Almodovar  was  informed  that  the  United  States, 
as  a  condition  of  the  suspension  of  hostilities,  would  require: 

"First.  The  relinquishment  by  Spain  of  all  claim  of  sover- 
eignty over  or  title  to  Cuba,  and  her  immediate  evacuation  of  the 
island. 


»For.  Rel,  1898,  p.  819. 


322  THE    PHILIPPINES 

"Second.  The  president,  desirous  of  exhibiting  signal  gener- 
osity, would  not  at  that  time  make  any  demand  for  pecuniary 
indemnity.  Nevertheless,  he  could  not  be  insensible  to  the  losses 
and  expenses  of  the  United  States  incident  to  the  war  or  to 
the  claims  of  American  citizens  for  injuries  to  their  persons  and 
property  during  the  late  insurrection  in  Cuba.  He  must,  there- 
fore, require  the  cession  to  the  United  States  of  the  islands  of 
Porto  Rico  and  the  other  islands  then  under  the  sovereignty  of 
Spain  in  the  West  Indies,  and  also  the  cession  of  an  island  in 
the  Ladrones  to  be  selected  by  the  United  States. 

"Third.  On  similar  grounds  the  United  States  was  entitled  to 
occupy  and  would  hold  the  city,  bay  and  harbor  of  Manila  pend- 
ing the  conclusion  of  a  treaty  of  peace  which  should  determine 
the  control,  disposition  and  government  of  the  Philippines."^ 

From  these  terms  there  was  never  thereafter  any  material  de- 
parture. The  word  possession  originally  used  in  the  paragraph 
relating  to  the  Philippines  was  changed  to  disposition,  on  the 
earnest  representation  of  M.  Cambon  that  it  would  when  trans- 
lated into  Spanish  carry  a  meaning  which  would  make  it  impos- 
sible for  the  negotiations  to  proceed. 

M.  Cambon  struggled  desperately  to  secure  some  material  mod- 
ification of  these  terms,  particularly  as  regards  the  demand  for 
Porto  Rico,  which  he  characterized  as  evincing  a  spirit  of  con- 
quest inconsistent  with  the  declaration  of  disinterestedness  with 
which  the  United  States  had  commenced  the  war.  The  temper 
manifested  is  illustrated  by  his  statement  that  in  making  this 
claim  for  the  cession  of  Porto  Rico  and  one  of  the  Ladrones, 
the  United  States  evidently  considered  as  a  definite  conquest  all 
territory  "upon  which  the  fortune  of  arms  has  permitted  an 
American  soldier  to  set  his  foot,"  thus  ignoring  the  fact  that 
the  islands  had  been  demanded,  not  on  the  theory  of  conquest, 
but  in  lieu  of  a  money  indemnity.  The  provision  relating  to  the 
Philippines  he  charged  must  have  been  inserted  for  the  purpose 
of  putting  an  end  to  the  present  negotiations,  as  Madrid  would 
certainly  construe  it  as  casting  doubt  upon  her  present  and  fu- 
ture sovereignty  in  the  Archipelago.  Such  charges  of  bad  faith 
and  insincerity  were  not  well  calculated  to  secure  modifications 


'  For.  Rel.,  1898,  p.  820.    These  terms  were  drafted  by  the  president  per- 
sonally, Olcott's  Life  of  McKinley,  II,  p.  67. 


THE   TREATY    OF   PARIS  323 

of  the  well-considered  terms  which  the  president  had  offered  to 
Spain. 

"You  will  observe,"  replied  the  president,  "that  my  demands 
set  forth  in  the  first  two  articles  do  not  admit  of  any  discussion. 
I  leave  to  negotiations  the  task  of  resolving  the  question  of  the 
Philippines.  If  the  American  forces  have  remained  until  now 
in  their  positions,  it  is  in  obedience  to  a  duty  with  respect  to 
residents  and  strangers  and  the  progress  of  affairs  imposed  on 
me. 

M.  Cambon  had  another  interview  with  the  president  and 
secretary  of  state  on  August  3,  when  he  pressed  for  an  expres- 
sion of  intention  as  regards  the  Philippines.  What  then  oc- 
curred is  important,  as  the  Spanish  commissioners,  during  the 
negotiations  at  Paris,  asserted  that  the  United  States  had  never 
until  then  expressed  in  concrete  form  the  idea  understood  to  be 
conveyed  by  the  phrase,  ^'control,  disposition  and  government  of 
the  Philippines."  They  claimed  that  the  demand  for  the  cession 
of  the  entire  Archipelago  was  a  surprise.  It  is  evident  from 
what  we  now  know  that  the  surprise  was  purely  technical. 

During  the  interview  on  August  3  M.  Cambon  stated  to  the 
president  that  the  provision  was  so  drawn  as  to  imply  no  restric- 
tions upon  the  demands  which  the  United  States  might  make, 
and  thus  created  grave  apprehensions  on  the  part  of  Spain  as  to 
the  fate  of  her  future  sovereignty.  The  reports  of  this  confer- 
ence made  by  Cambon  and  Secretary  Day  differ  in  some  re- 
spects,* but  both  make  it  clear  that  the  president  declared  his 
purpose  to  leave  to  the  negotiators  of  the  treaty  the  most  ample 
freedom  with  reference  to  the  Philippines." 

According  to  M.  Cambon's  report  the  president  said  that  he 
did  not  want  any  misunderstanding  on  this  subject  and  that  the 
"negotiators  of  the  two  countries  must  be  the  ones  to  decide 
what  should  be  the  permanent  advantages  that  we  shall  demand 

*  See  despatch  from  the  American  commissioners  from  Paris,  dated  No- 
vember 19.  1898. 

«  For.  Rel.,  1898,  p.  955.  See  also  Sen.  Doc.  62,  55  Cong.,  3d  Sess.,  Part  I, 
p.  132.    This  document  will  be  hereafter  cited  as  Sen.  Doc.  62. 


324  THE   PHILIPPINES 

in  the  Archipelago,  and  finally  the  control,  disposition  and  gov- 
ernment of  the  Philippines." 

Secretary  Day,  in  his  memorandum  of  the  conversation,  says 
that  the  ambassador  called  attention  to  the  statement  in  the 
note  of  July  30,  that  the  possession  of  the  city,  bay  and  harbor 
of  Manila  should  be  retained  during  the  pendency  of  the  treaty, 
and  asked  what  was  to  be  done  with  them  afterward.  "That," 
said  the  president,  "must  depend  upon  the  terms  of  the  treaty." 
The  ambassador  then  inquired  whether  the  United  States  had 
prejudged  the  matter  of  the  Philippines  and  the  rights  to  be  ac- 
quired therein  by  the  United  States.  The  president  replied  that 
the  case  had  not  been  prejudged;  that  the  whole  matter  would 
be  left  to  the  commissioners  for  negotiation  to  be  settled  by  the 
treaty  of  peace. 

M.  Cambon  persisted,  and  presented  a  communication"  from 
the  Spanish  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  dated  August  7,  which 
came  near  bringing  the  negotiations  to  an  abrupt  close.  The 
conditions  contained  in  the  first  and  second  paragraphs  of  the 
proposal  were  accepted  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  Cortes; 
the  third  paragraph  was  described  as  quite  indefinite,  but  never- 
theless was  accepted  with  an  accompanying  interpretation  and 
reservation.  The  positions  taken  in  this  note  were  maintained 
by  the  Spaniards  to  the  end  of  the  chapter. 

"On  one  hand,"  wrote  the  duke,  "the  ground  on  which  the 
United  States  believe  themselves  entitled  to  occupy  the  bay,  the 
harbor  and  the  City  of  Manila,  pending  the  conclusion  of  a  treaty 
of  peace,  can  not  be  that  of  conquest,  since  in  spite  of  the  blockade 
maintained  on  sea  by  the  American  fleet,  in  spite  of  the  siege 
established  on  land  by  a  native  army  supported  and  provided  for 
by  the  American  admiral,  Manila  still  holds  its  own  and  the  Span- 
ish standard  still  waves  over  the  city.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
whole  Archipelago  of  the  Philippines  is  in  the  power  and  under 
the  sovereignty  of  Spain.  Therefore  the  government  of  Spain 
thinks  that  the  temporary  occupation  of  Manila  should  consti- 
tute a  guaranty.  It  is  stated  that  the  Treaty  of  Peace  shall 
determine  the  control,  disposition  and  government  of  the  Philip- 

«  For.  Rel,  1898,  pp.  822-^. 


THE   TREATY   OP   PARIS  325 

pines;  but  as  the  intentions  of  the  Federal  Government  by  regres- 
sion remain  veiled,  therefore  the  Spanish  Government  must  de- 
clare that  while  accepting  the  third  condition,  they  do  not  a 
priori  renounce  the  sovereignty  of  Spain  over  the  Archipelago, 
leaving  it  to  the  negotiators  to  agree  as  to  such  reforms  which 
the  condition  of  these  possessions  and  the  level  of  culture  of 
their  natives  may  render  desirable." 

M.  Cambon  reported  that  the  reading  of  this  note  visibly  an- 
noyed the  president  and  the  secretary  of  state,  and  that  after  a 
prolonged  silence  the  president  said : 

"I  asked  of  Spain  the  cession,  and  consequently  the  immediate 
evacuation  of  the  Islands  of  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico.  Instead  of 
a  categorical  acceptance,  as  was  expected,  the  Spanish  Grov- 
ernment  addresses  me  a  note  in  which  it  invokes  the  necessity 
of  obtaining  the  approval  of  the  Cortes.  I  can  not  lend  myself 
to  entering  into  these  considerations  of  domestic  governments." 

M.  Cambon  replied  that  the  Spanish  minister  was  merely  con- 
forming to  his  constitutional  obligations,  and  that  the  president 
had  formerly  stated  that  his  acts  also  must  be  ratified  by  the 
Senate.  In  fact,  the  preliminary  document  would  merely  em- 
body the  understanding  of  the  two  governments  upon  which 
hostilities  would  be  suspended,  and  only  the  definite  treaty  was 
required  to  be  ratified  by  either  the  Cortes  or  the  Senate. 

Cambon  finally  agreed  to  secure  authority  to  sign  a  protocol, 
"having  by  all  his  persistence  and  diplomacy  succeeded  in  hav- 
ing only  one  word,  and  it  unimportant,  of  the  proposed  terms 
changed.  He  reported  to  Madrid  that  it  was  the  best  he  could 
do  and  that  nothing  more  was  to  be  expected  "from  a  conqueror 
resolved  to  procure  all  the  profit  possible  from  the  advantages  it 
has  obtained."' 

The  protocol,  as  signed  on  August  12,  provided  that 

"The  United  States  will  occupy  and  hold  the  city,  bay  and 
harbor  of  Manila  pending  the  conclusion  of  a  treaty  of  peace 

"fSp.  Dip.  Corr.  and  Docs.,  p.  219;  For.  Rel,  1898,  p.  956. 


326  THE   PHILIPPINES 

which  shall  determine  the  control,  disposition  and  government 
of  the  Philippines."® 

Commissioners  representing  Spain  and  the  United  States  were 
to  convene  at  Paris  on  the  first  day  of  October,  for  the  purpose 
of  negotiating  a  treaty  of  peace.  In  the  interim  M.  Cambon 
would  continue  to  represent  Spanish  interests  at  Washington. 

The  situation  created  by  this  protocol  was  somewhat  unusual, 
and  differences  of  opinion  soon  developed  over  the  meaning  of 
the  provisions  relating  to  the  status  of  Spain  in  the  Philippines. 
Arrangements  were  to  be  made  for  the  evacuation  of  Cuba  and 
Porto  Rico,  and,  regardless  of  theories,  Spanish  sovereignty  in 
those  islands  came  at  once  to  an  end.  But  the  capitulation  of 
Manila  a  few  hours  after  the  signing  of  the  protocol  at  Wash- 
ington created  a  situation  which  bristled  with  legal  difficulties. 
The  protocol  provided  that  the  United  States  would  occupy  the 
city,  bay  and  harbor  of  Manila,  which  implied  that  elsewhere  in 
the  Archipelago  Spain  should  not  be  relieved  of  the  duty  of 
maintaining  order  and  protecting  the  lives  and  property  of  her 
subjects.  The  fact  that  a  native  insurrection  was  in  progress 
was  not  taken  into  consideration,  nor  did  the  protocol  contain 
anything  which  implied  that  Spanish  sovereignty  should  be  sus- 
pended elsewhere  than  over  the  city,  bay  and  harbor  of  Manila. 

The  reasonable  inference  was  that  these  places  were  to  be  held 
as  security  until  the  future  disposition  of  the  islands  was  deter- 
mined in  the  manner  provided,  but  the  capitulation  of  Manila 
after  the  signing  of  the  protocol,  and  without  knowledge  thereof, 
changed  the  situation.  The  Spanish  took  the  plausible  position 
that  all  military  operations  after  the  protocol  was  signed  were 
without  legal  value;  that  is,  created  no  legal  rights.  Had  this 
view  been  adopted  it  would  have  left  the  parties  to  the  protocol 
where  they  probably  intended  to  place  themselves  when  it  was 
signed.  The  city,  bay  and  harbor  would  have  been  in  the  pos- 
session of  the  United  States,  but  the  Spanish  soldiers  would  not 
have  been  technically  prisoners  of  war,  and  the  public  property 
would  have  remained  the  property  of  Spain. 


^For.Rel,  1898,  p.  824. 


THE   TREATY   OF   PARIS  327 

Several  communications  passed  between  the  French  ambas- 
sador and  the  secretary  of  state,  in  which  the  former  called 
attention  to  rumors  which  had  come  by  way  of  Madrid  that  the 
insurrection  was  spreading  throughout  the  islands  and  that  the  in- 
surgents were  sending  out  armed  vessels  to  attack  Spanish  ports 
and  shipping ;  that  ships  were  being  chartered  at  Hong  Kong  to 
transport  the  Spanish  troops  from  Manila  to  Spain,  and  that  the 
United  States  was  increasing  its  naval  strength  in  the  Pacific  by 
sending  the  Oregon  and  Iowa  to  Manila.  Assuming  that  Spain 
was  still  under  obligation  to  maintain  law  and  order  beyond 
the  limits  of  the  city,  harbor  and  bay  of  Manila,  M.  Cambon 
suggested  that  either  the  Spanish  troops,  who  had  been  reduced 
to  inactivity  by  the  capitulation  of  Manila,  should  be  placed  at 
the  disposal  of  Spain  to  be  used  against  the  insurgents,  or  that 
troops  for  that  purpose  should  be  despatched  from  Spain.  Such 
a  proposal  shows  how  little  he  understood  the  actual  situation  in 
the  islands,  and  it  also  shows  what  Spain  expected  to  do  with 
the  forces  which  would  be  released  upon  the  evacuation  of  Cuba. 

In  language  which  assumed  that  the  United  States  was  re- 
sponsible for  and  controlled  the  actions  of  the  Filipino  insur- 
gents, it  was  requested  that  the  United  States  cause  hostili- 
ties by  all  parties  to  cease  while  the  peace  negotiations  were 
pending.  Secretary  Day  assured  M.  Cambon  that  the  rumors 
which  had  caused  so  much  anxiety  were  mostly  without  founda- 
tion, but  that  the  release  of  the  Spanish  troops  for  use  against 
the  insurgents  could  not  be  considered,  nor  would  the  sending  of 
troops  from  Spain  be  looked  upon  with  favor.  While  assum- 
ing no  responsibility  for  the  actions  of  insurgents  beyond  the 
limits  of  Manila,  Spain  was  assured  that  the  government  of  the 
United  States  would  exert  its  influence  in  favor  of  a  suspen- 
sion by  them  of  hostilities  while  peace  negotiations  between  the 
United  States  and  Spain  were  in  progress. 

On  September  11  M.  Cambon  transmitted  a  note  from  the 
Duke  of  Almodovar,  in  which  the  views  of  Spain  as  to  the  situa- 
tion were  summarized. *    Practically  all  of  its  propositions  had 

~For.  Rel.  1898,  p.  813. 


328  THE    PHILIPPINES 

already  been  advanced  by  M.  Cambon  and  their  validity  denied 
by  Secretary  Day.  In  view  of  what  occurred  during  the  peace 
negotiations,  it  is  interesting  to  note  the  position  of  the  Spanish 
government  as  expressed  immediately  after  the  signing  of  the 
Peace  Protocol. 

It  was  contended  that  the  occupation  of  the  city,  bay  and  har- 
bor of  Manila  should  be  considered  to  be  under  the  provision  of 
the  protocol  of  August  12,  and  not  of  the  capitulation  of  August 
13,  which  Spain  claimed  was  null  and  void,  because  concluded 
after  the  agreement  to  suspend  hostilities  had  been  signed.  Spain 
had  acquiesced  in  the  occupation  of  Manila  without  renouncing 
her  sovereignty,  and,  therefore,  possession  did  not  authorize  the 
United  States  to  alter  the  Spanish  law  then  in  force.  All  civil, 
administrative,  judicial  and  political  institutions  should  remain 
unchanged  until  the  treaty  of  peace  determined  the  control,  dis- 
position and  government  of  the  islands.  The  Spanish  troops  in 
Manila  were  free,  and  Spain  by  the  terms  of  the  protocol  had 
the  right  to  use  them  during  the  interim  and  transport  them, 
with  their  colors,  arms  and  ammunition,  to  parts  of  the  Archi- 
pelago not  occupied  by  the  Americans,  to  suppress  rebellion,  main- 
tain order  and  protect  the  lives  and  property  of  foreigners  and 
subjects  in  accordance  with  its  duties  as  sovereign.  As  the  insur- 
gents had  not  been  recognized  as  belligerents,  their  armed  ships 
which  engaged  in  depredations  on  the  high  seas  were  pirates  and 
should  be  treated  as  such.  Therefore,  confidence  was  expressed 
that  during  the  period  preceding  the  making  of  a  treaty  of  peace 
the  United  States  would  not  introduce  changes  into  the  economic 
and  fiscal  administrations  of  Manila,  nor  divert  for  other  pur- 
poses the  customs  revenues  which  were  pledged  for  lawfully 
incurred  obligations. 

The  propositions  thus  advanced  by  Spain  were  not  argued  by 
Mr.  Day;  they  were  simply  denied.  It  was  conceded  that  the 
United  States  held  Manila  by  virtue  of  the  provisions  of  the 
protocol,  but  that,  nevertheless,  the  capitulation  was  valid  be- 
cause the  suspension  of  hostilities,  provided  for,  must  be  con- 
sidered as  taking  effect  at  the  date  of  the  receipt  of  the  notice. 


THE   TREATY    OF   PARIS  329 

However,  it  was  immaterial  whether  the  occupation  was  by 
virtue  of  the  protocol  or  the  capitulation;  in  either  case  it  was 
military  occupation,  and  the  rights  and  powers  of  the  occupants 
were  the  same. 

The  Spanish  government  replied  that  the  theory  of  the  valid- 
ity of  the  capitulation  was  contrary  to  international  law  and  the 
history  of  wars  between  civilized  countries,  and  dissented  from 
the  assertion  that  the  powers  of  the  occupant  were  the  same 
whether  the  possession  was  under  the  protocol  or  the  capitula- 
tion.'" 

But  the  Peace  Commission  was  now  in  session  in  Paris,  and 
John  Hay,  who  had  become  secretary  of  state,  after  correcting 
certain  statements  as  to  facts,  declined  to  continue  further  the 
consideration  of  questions  which  would  come  before  that  body. 

The  representatives  of  the  United  States  and  Spain  met  at 
Paris  on  the  Quai  d'Orsay,  October  1,  1898,  and  entered  upon 
the  work  of  negotiating  a  treaty  of  peace.  For  the  United  States 
it  was  to  be  a  gathering  of  the  fruits  of  the  war;  for  Spain,  the 
last  struggle  to  save  something  from  the  wreck  of  her  ancient 
colonial  possessions. 

The  United  States  sent  to  the  conference  the  ablest  men  who 
had  represented  her  in  any  such  capacity  since  Gallatin,  Adams, 
Clay,  Bayard  and  Russell,  at  Ghent,  succeeded  in  wresting  from 
Great  Britain  a  treaty  which  would  have  been  creditable  had 
they  represented  a  victorious  instead  of  a  sadly  discomfited 
nation. 

The  American  commissioners  were  William  R.  Day,  former 
Secretary  of  State,  who  had  been  in  charge  of  foreign  affairs 
during  the  war  and  until  after  the  signing  of  the  Peace  Protocol 
under  which  the  commission  was  acting;  Cushman  K.  Davis,  a 
senator  of  the  United  States  from  Minnesota,  the  powerful  chair- 
jnan  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs,  a  lawyer  of 
great  learning  and  experience,  an  orator  and  scholar  learned  in 
international  law  and  diplomatic  usage ;  William  P.  Frye,  a  sen- 

•^'^For.  Rel,  1898,  pp.  815-817. 


330  .THE   PHILIPPINES 

ator  of  the  United  States  from  Maine  and  a  man  of  vast  experi- 
ence in  public  life;  George  Gray,  a  senator  from  Delaware,  who 
had  represented  the  country  on  various  international  tribunals; 
and  Whitelaw  Reid,  a  journalist  and  publicist  of  international 
reputation,  who  had  lately  retired  from  the  position  of  minister 
to  France.  As  secretary  and  consul.  President  McKinley  named 
John  Bassett  Moore,  formerly  Assistant  Secretary  of  State,  Pro- 
fessor of  International  Law  at  Columbia  University,  a  member 
of  the  Institute  of  International  Law,  and  well  and  widely  known 
as  a  writer  on  international  law. 

The  members  of  the  Spanish  Commission  were  all  men  of  dis- 
tinction and  experience.  E.  Montero  Rios  was  President  of  the 
Senate,  ex-Minister  of  the  Crown  and  President  of  the  Supreme 
Tribunal  of  Justice;  Buenaventura  Abarzuza  was  a  senator  and 
former  ambassador;  Jose  de  Garnica  y  Diaz,  a  member  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Justice;  W.  R.  de  Villa-Urrutia,  Minister  of 
Spain  at  the  Court  of  Brussels,  and  a  professor  in  the  Royal 
Academy  of  Jurisprudence  and  Legislation;  Rafael  Cerero,  a 
General  of  Division,  and,  like  the  others,  entitled  to  wear  the 
insignia  of  many  illustrious  orders.  Senor  Emilio  de  Ojeda  was 
secretary  of  the  Spanish  Commission.** 

The  negotiations  extended  from  October  1  to  December  10, 
and  were  distinguished  by  some  acerbity  and  arrogance  on  the 
part  of  the  Spaniards  and  stern  adherence  to  their  demands  by 
the  Americans.     As  President  McKinley  had  imposed  his  de- 

11  The  Filipinos  sent  Seiior  Filipe  Agoncillo  to  Paris  to  present  their  case 
to  the  Conference,  but  he  never  made  any  serious  effort  to  be  heard,  beheving 
evidently  that  he  could  be  more  effective  at  Washington.  It  has  been  fre- 
quently asserted  that  Agoncillo  was  denied  a  hearing,  that  the  door  was 
slammed  in  his  face.    See  Mr.  Schurtz's  speech  at  Chicago,  October,  1899. 

There  is  some  uncertainty  as  to  what  occurred.  Mr.  Justice  Day's  rec- 
ollection is  that  a  representative  of  Aguinaldo  requested  a  hearing  which  was 
denied  on  the  ground  that  the  commission  had  no  authority  to  deal  with  the 
matter.    Personal  letter,  March  22,  1916. 

Whitelaw  Reid  (American  and  English  Studies,  I,  p.  177),  says:  "Now, 
whatever  might  have  happened,  the  door  was  certainly  never  slammed  in 
their  faces  at  Paris,  for  they  never  came  to  it.  On  the  contrary,  every  time 
Mr.  Agoncillo  approached  any  member  of  the  Commission  on  the  subject  he 
was  courteously  invited  to  send  the  Commissioners  a  written  request  for  a 
hearing,  which  would  at  any  rate  receive  immediate  consideration.  No  such 
request  ever  came,  and  any  Filipino  who  wrote  for  a  hearing  in  Paris  was 
heard." 


THE   TREATY    OF   PARIS  331 

mands  upon  M.  Cambon  in  Washington,  so  the  commissioners 
in  Paris,  acting  under  his  immediate  instructions  and  orders,  did 
little  more  than  announce  what  America  required  of  Spain  and 
proceed  to  make  up  a  record  of  the  conferences. 

Spain  knev/  that  her  possessions  in  the  West  were  gone  for- 
ever, but  her  representatives  evidently  went  to  Paris  expecting 
that  with  the  burdens  would  go  the  troublesome  possessions.  The 
colonial  debts,  it  was  assumed,  would  pass  with  the  sovereignty, 
and  thus  substantial  future  good  might  come  out  of  the  hopeless 
conditions  which  preceded  the  war.  In  this  she  was  to  be  griev- 
ously disappointed. 

She  also  hoped  that  she  would  be  permitted  to  retain  her  colo- 
nial possessions  in  the  Far  East,  as  they  had  been  but  indirectly 
involved  in  the  war,  and,  as  far  as  she  knew,  there  was  nothing 
in  the  past  history  of  the  United  States  to  suggest  that  it  would 
care  to  assume  the  burden  of  governing  these  far-away  colonies 
inhabited  by  an  alien  people  who  had  already  formed  well-estab- 
lished insurrectionary  habits.  Nevertheless,  it  was  possible  that 
the  United  States  would  wrest  this  last  vestige  of  her  colonies 
from  her.  Suggestions  to  this  effect  began  to  appear  in  the 
American  press  almost  immediately  after  the  naval  battle  of 
Manila  Bay,  and  the  sending  over  of  an  army  to  capture  and 
hold  Manila  was  ominous  of  an  intent  to  do  more  than  repeat 
the  British  exploit  of  1762.  This  uneasiness,  as  we  have  already 
seen,  was  apparent  throughout  the  preliminary  negotiations  at 
Washington. 

Events  in  Manila  had  also  added  to  Spanish  perturbation. 
The  capitulation  of  the  city,  with  its  army  and  public  property, 
on  the  day  after  the  signing  of  the  Peace  Protocol  was  very  un- 
fortunate for  Spain.  It  was  the  fear  of  this  very  thing  which 
agitated  the  Duke  of  Almodovar  when  he  hurriedly  sought  the 
good  offices  of  France  to  bring  hostilities  to  a  close.  But  Manila 
had  been  captured  before  notice  of  the  cessation  of  hostilities 
could  reach  the  American  commander,  and  when  the  commis- 
sion met  in  Paris  American  officers  were  already  ruling  the  city, 
as  the  exigencies  of  military  occupation  and  the  peculiar  local 


332  THE   PHILIPPINES 

conditions,  created  by  the  existence  of  Agulnaldo  and  his  gov- 
ernment, seemed  to  require.  To  the  demand  of  the  governor- 
general  for  the  status  quo.  General  Merritt  had  replied  that  as  he 
had  no  notice  of  the  signing  of  the  protocol  until  after  the  capitu- 
lation of  the  city,  he  held  it  as  a  military  conqueror  and  would 
govern  it  under  military  law  according  to  the  terms  of  the  capit- 
ulation. A  similar  answer  had  been  given  to  M.  Cambon  by  the 
secretary  of  state. 

At  the  first  conference  the  Spanish  took  the  offensive  by  stat- 
ing in  rather  peremptory  terms  what  they  designated  as  the 
preliminary  demands  of  Spain.  Senor  Montero  Rios  announced 
that  he  was  charged  with  the  duty  of  laying  before  the  American 
commissioners  a  proposition  in  limine  and  of  a  pressing  nature. 
It  related  to  the  situation  in  the  Philippines  and  to  the  claim 
that  the  rights  of  the  respective  states  were  fixed  and  determined 
as  of  the  date  of  the  signing  of  the  Peace  Protocol  and  could  not 
be  thereafter  altered  to  the  prejudice  of  the  parties  during  the 
suspension  of  hostilities.  Therefore,  the  Spanish  representatives 
felt 

"bound  to  propose  and  demand  of  the  said  Commissioners  that 
jointly  with  the  undersigned  they  be  pleased  to  declare  that  the 
said  status  quo  must  be  immediately  restored  by  the  contracting 
party  that  may  have  altered  the  same,  or  may  have  consented  to, 
or  failed  to  prevent  its  alteration  to  the  prejudice  of  the  other. 
And  the  Spanish  Commissioners,  understanding  that  such  status 
quo  was  altered  and  continues  being  altered  with  daily  increas- 
ing gravity  to  the  prejudice  of  Spain  by  the  Tagalog  rebels,  who 
formed  during  the  campaign,  and  still  form,  an  auxiliary  force  to 
the  regular  American  troops,  demand  of  the  American  Commis- 
sioners that  jointly  with  the  undersigned  they  be  pleased  to  de- 
clare that  the  authorities  and  officers  of  the  American  forces  in 
the  Philippine  Islands  must  at  once  proceed  fully  and  absolutely 
to  restore  the  said  status  quo  in  the  territories  they  may  occupy, 
and  must  abstain  from  preventing,  by  any  means,  direct  or  indi- 
rect, the  restoration  thereof  by  the  Spanish  authorities  and  forces, 
in  the  territory  now  occupied  by  those  of  the  United  States."** 

^'^Sen.  Doc.  62,  p.  15;  For.  Rel,  1898,  p.  916.  Mr.  Reid,  in  an  interesting 
private  letter  to  President  McKinley  (Olcott,  II,  p.  123),  says  that  their  tone 
was  "one  of  rather  proud  supplication,"  an  appeal  to  our  magnanimity. 


THE   TREATY   OF   PARIS  333 

The  American  commissioners  concurred  in  tHe  opinion  that 
the  protocol  of  August  12  embodied  the  conditions  upon  which 
the  negotiations  for  peace  were  proceeding,  but  declined  to  join 
in  the  proposals  and  demands,  because  they  could  see  therein 
nothing  but  an  attempt  to  divert  the  conference  from  the  objects 
for  which  it  had  met  to  the  consideration  of  subjects  which  prop- 
erly belonged  to  their  governments,  and  which  had,  in  fact,  been 
already  disposed  of  at  Washington." 

Mr.  Day  reported  to  Secretary  Hay  that  this  communication! 
was  well  received  by  the  Spanish  commissioners.**  If  so,  it  sug- 
gests that  they  must  have  expected  very  little,  for  they  got  nothing. 
Secretary  Hay  had  declined  to  consider  further  the  questions 
raised  in  the  Spanish  note  of  October  4,  presented  at  Wash- 
ington by  M.  Cambon,  because  they  were  for  the  consideration 
of  the  conference.  The  Spanish  commissioners  were,  therefore, 
obliged  to  content  themselves  with  asserting  that  it  was  their 
duty  to  make  known  to  the  American  commissioners  that  if  the 
status  quo  existing  in  the  Philippines  on  August  12  continued  to 
be  disturbed  to  the  prejudice  of  Spain  the  representatives  of  Her 
Catholic  Majesty  reserved  the  right  to  act  as  they  might  deem 
the  rights  of  Spain  required,  since  they  could  not  conceive  how 
the  treaty  of  peace  they  were  charged  with  arranging  with  the 
American  commissioners  on  the  immutable  basis  of  the  protocol 
could  be  continued  if  these  bases  were  being  constantly  altered 
to  the  prejudice  of  Spain.*"  Having  thus  entered  its  protest,  the 
Spanish  Commission  allowed  this  question  to  rest  until  the  future 
of  the  Philippines  was  brought  up  for  consideration. 

The  way  being  thus  cleared,  thje  conference  proceeded  to  the 
consideration  of  the  provisions  of  the  Peace  Protocol.  At  the 
third  meeting  the  Spanish  commissioners  proposed  various  ar- 
ticles for  a  treaty,  the  first  of  which  raised  a  question  upon  which 
the  conference  came  near  going  to  pieces — that  of  the  colonial 
debts.    Upon  this  Spain  made  her  first  stand,  and  fought  as  des- 

"  Sen.  Doc.  62,  p.  21. 
^*For.Rel.,  1898,  p.  917. 
i»  Sen.  Doc.  62,  p.  25. 


334  THE   PHILIPPINES 

perately  as  had  her  soldiers  and  sailors  on  more  spectacular  if 
not  less  important  fields.  Time  has  shown  that  her  fears  of  utter 
bankruptcy  were  groundless,  but  they  were,  nevertheless,  at  the 
time  very  serious  and  reasonable  fears.  The  Spanish  people 
failed  to  see  that  Spain  with  the  debts  and  without  the  colonies 
would  be  on  a  firmer  financial  basis  than  with  the  debts  and  the 
debt-breeding  colonies.  Of  course,  to  be  relieved  of  both  the 
colonies  and  the  debts  was  a  consummation  devoutly  to  be  wished ; 
but  it  was  not  to  be. 

By  one  of  the  proposed  articles^^  Spain  was  to  relinquish  her 
sovereignty  over  Cuba  to  the  United  States,  which  accepted  it 
in  order  to  transfer  it  to  the  Cuban  people.  The  relinquishment 
was  to  include  all  the  prerogatives,  powers  and  rights  which  be- 
longed to  Spain  and  all  charges  and  obligations  of  every  kind 
in  existence  at  the  time  of  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  of  peace 
which  Spain  in  the  exercise  of  her  sovereign  authority  had  law- 
fully contracted  in  Cuba. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  the  third  article  of  the  Peace  Proto- 
col made  no  reference  to  these  debts,  although  it  is  inconceivable 
that  the  matter  was  not  in  the  minds  of  the  negotiators.  It  is  a 
remarkable  fact  that  while  the  president's  instructions  to  the 
peace  commissioners  referred  to  a  rumor,  which  proved  un- 
founded, that  a  claim  would  be  made  for  compensation  for  the 
public  property  of  the  Spanish  government  in  Cuba  and  in  the 
territories  ceded  to  the  United  States,  no  reference  was  made  to 
the  substantial  bonded  indebtedness  of  Cuba,  Porto  Rico  and  the 
Philippine  Islands.  The  Spaniards  assumed  that  under  estab- 
lished public  law  the  public  debt  of  a  ceded  province  or  country 
would  pass  as  an  incident  of  the  cession  to  the  new  sovereign. 
But  so  far  as  the  record  shows,  the  probability  of  this  claim 
being  made  did  not  even  suggest  itself  to  the  president  or  the 
secretary  of  state. 

Spain  wished  to  relinquish  Cuba  to  the  United  States  and  per- 
mit her  to  dispose  of  it  in  the  future  as  to  her  seemed  most  expe- 
dient and  desirable.     It  was  contended  that  under  the  rules  of 


^«  See  Annex  to  Protocol,  No.  3,  Sen.  Doc.  62,  p.  27. 


THE   TREATY    OF   PARIS  335 

international  law  the  public  debts  which  were  a  charge  on  Cuba 
should  pass  with  the  sovereignty.  The  argument  was  legally 
sound,  and  the  only  way  it  could  be  effectively  met  was  by 
impugning  the  moral  validity  of  the  debts  as  obligations  of  the 
colonies. 

The  administration  of  the  Spanish  colonies  had  always  been 
kept  distinct  from  that  of  the  mother  country.  Each  colony  col- 
lected its  own  revenues,  and  its  deficits  were  made  up  not  by 
Spain,  but  from  the  treasury  of  some  other  more  prosperous 
colony.  Thus  for  many  years  Cuba  and  the  Philippines  received 
their  annual  situado,  or  subsidy,  from  Mexico.  In  more  modern 
times  each  colony  had  its  own  budget,  and  generally  its  own 
personal  deficit.  When  the  revenues  were  insufficient  the  ex- 
penses of  the  local  government  were  provided  for  by  consoli- 
dated mortgages,  or  floating  debts  which  were  charged  to  the 
colony  for  whose  benefit  they  were  contracted.  Neither  Cuba 
nor  Porto  Rico  had  ever  been  included  in  the  general  budget  of 
Spain  nor  had  their  revenues  or  expenses  ever  appeared  there. 

All  the  Spanish-American  colonies  when  they  separated  from 
Spain  had  recognized  this  situation  and  had  voluntarily  assumed 
their  existing  public  debts.  Spain  now  desired  the  recognition 
in  the  treaty  of  the  principle  that  a  debt,  being  exclusively  the 
debt  of  the  colony  and  affecting  its  territory  only,  should  go  with 
the  colony.  The  application  of  the  principle  could  be  intrusted 
to  a  commission  to  be  provided  for  in  the  treaty  of  peace. 

In  one  of  their  memoranda*^  the  Spanish  commissioners  in- 
dulged in  some  moralizing  upon  the  duties  of  a  government  to- 
ward its  subjects  in  terms  which,  in  the  light  of  her  history,  must 
have  suggested  to  the  American  public,  if  not  to  the  American 
commissioners,  the  well-known  habit  of  a  certain  distinguished 
personage  of  quoting  the  Scriptures :  "The  Sovereign,  it  is  true," 
it  was  said,  "has  prerogatives  and  rights  over  the  territory  and 
its  inhabitants;  but  these  prerogatives  and  rights  attach  to  him 
not  for  his  own  satisfaction  and  enjoyment,  but  for  the  good 
government  and  the  welfare  of  the  people,  subject  to  his  rule." 

"  Sen.  Doc.  62,  p.  41. 


336  THE   PHILIPPINES 

Spain,  therefore,  could  not  consent  to  sacrifice  the  financial  rights 
of  her  subjects  who  were  the  holders  of  the  colonial  debts.  Lan- 
guage such  as  this  was  purely  conventional  and  had  a  false  ring, 
but  the  following  words  which  closed  one  of  the  Spanish  com- 
munications can  not  be  read  without  sympathy  by  those  who  are 
familiar  with  Spanish  history: 

Issues  which  related  to  money  only  could  not  "fail  to  be  solved 
satisfactorily  between  two  parties,  one  of  which  is  the  greatest 
nation  of  the  new  world,  immensely  rich  and  prosperous,  blessed 
with  inexhaustible  resources,  whether  due  to  nature  or  the  pro- 
digious activity  of  its  inhabitants,  which,  on  the  one  hand,  ac- 
quires by  this  treaty  territories  of  great  importance,  and  thereby 
fulfils  an  aspiration  of  its  policy  in  America,  while  the  other 
party  is  a  great  and  noble  nation  of  the  old  world,  a  cordial  friend 
of  her  late  antagonist  in  days,  for  her,  more  prosperous,  but  now 
impoverished  through  the  misfortunes  heaped  upon  her  during 
the  century  which  is  about  to  terminate ;  whose  treasury  is  over- 
burdened by  obligations,  and  for  whom  the  present  treaty  will 
mean  the  solemn  confirmation  of  the  loss  of  the  last  remnant  of 
her  American  Empire."^* 

But  the  American  Commission  had  decided  that  the  debts 
should  not  be  assumed  and  that  the  Cubans  should  start  their 
independent  existence  with  the  national  homestead  free  from  in- 
cumbrance. It  must  be  conceded  that  this  was  legally  a  tour  de 
force.  According  to  the  settled  principles  of  international  law 
the  debts  which  had  been  legally  incurred  and  secured  as  a  spe- 
cific lien  on  the  colonial  revenues,  particularly  when  the  proceeds 
had  been  used  for  the  construction  of  public  works,  should  have 
been  held  to  run  with  the  country. 

The  arguments  advanced  by  the  American  commissioners 
were  mostly  either  extremely  technical  or  were  based  on  such 
large  general  principles  that  they  were  without  any  real  basis  in 
public  law.  The  distinction  which  it  was  sought  to  make  be- 
tween the  relinquishment  and  the  abandonment  of  sovereignty 
was  not  substantial,  and  the  attempt  of  the  Americans  to  sustain 
their  view  by  citing  Eschriche's  Diccionario  drew  the  remark 

"  Sen.  Doc.  62,  p.  93. 


THE   TREATY   OF   PARIS  337 

that  this  was  a  very  respectable  work  much  used  in  Spain  by 
young  lawyers  in  the  early  stages  of  legal  practise.  Nor  was 
the  claim  that  the  question  of  the  debts  was  excluded  from  con- 
sideration by  the  language  of  the  protocol  tenable,  as  it  was 
fairly  one  of  the  details  connected  with  the  relinquishment  of 
sovereignty  over  Cuba  and  the  cession  of  the  other  islands. 

Mr.  Day  notified  Washington  that  the  Spanish  Commission 
had  expressed  a  willingness  to  relinquish  sovereignty  over  Cuba 
if  some  responsibility  for  the  debt  was  acknowledged,  and  that 
they  had  been  requested  to  state  whether  they  would  decline  to 
sign  any  treaty  which  did  not  contain  such  a  provision. 

This  was  the  critical  stage  of  the  negotiations.  On  the  eve- 
ning of  October  25  the  Spanish  ambassador  called  upon  Gen- 
eral Horace  Porter,  the  American  ambassador  to  France,  and 
explained  the  situation  to  him.  From  General  Porter  he  went 
to  Mr.  Reid  and  informed  him  that  Montero  Rios  could  not  re- 
turn to  Spain  and  must  break  off  negotiations  rather  than  aban- 
don the  claim  to  have  at  least  a  part  of  the  Cuban  debt  assumed 
by  the  United  States  or  Cuba. 

The  ambassador  suggested  that  possibly  if  Spain  abandoned 
her  demand  for  the  assumption  of  the  Cuban  debt,  some  compen- 
sating advantage  might  be  granted  her  in  the  form  of  a  conces- 
sion in  connection  with  the  Philippines.  Mr.  Reid  could  give 
him  little  satisfaction.  He  informed  the  ambassador  that  the 
American  people,  while  not  eager  to  retain  the  Philippines,  were 
beginning  to  feel  that  as  they  had  practically  conquered  the 
islands  they  had  a  right  to  retain  them.  He  believed  that  the 
preponderance  of  sentiment  in  the  United  States  favored  that 
course,  although  an  influential  minority  did  not  go  to  that  length. 
It  was  possible,  Mr.  Reid  suggested,  that  out  of  this  condition  the 
Spanish  commissioners  might  be  able  to  find  something  in  terri- 
tory or  debt  which  would  seem  to  their  people  at  home  like  a 
concession/' 

While    waiting    for   the    Spanish    commissioners    to    decide 


"  Mr.  Day  to  Mr.  Adee,  Oct  27,  For.  Rel,  1898,  p.  936. 


338  THE    PHILIPPINES 

whether  they  would  stand  or  fall  on  the  question  of  the  debt, 
Mr.  Day  asked  the  secretary  of  state  whether  the  president 
would  approve  an  article  to  the  effect  that  the  United  States, 
while  not  assuming  any  independent  liability  of  its  own,  would 
use  its  good  offices  with  any  people  or  government  possessing 
sovereignty  in  Cuba  for  the  acknowledgment  of  debts  incurred 
by  Spain  of  a  pacific  character  in  the  island — the  amounts  to  be 
determined  by  a  commission.  The  American  Commission,  he 
thought,  might  feel  inclined  to  make  this  concession  on  the 
strength  of  the  precedents  and  opinions  of  publicists  that  local 
debts  incurred  specially  for  the  benefit  of  territory  are  trans- 
ferred with  such  territory.^" 

But  this  disposition  on  the  part  of  the  commissioners  to  yield 
to  argument  and  authority  was  promptly  suppressed.  Secretary 
Hay  replied  that  he  was  directed  by  the  president  to  say  that 

"under  no  circumstances  will  the  United  States  Government 
assume  any  part  of  what  is  known  as  the  Cuban  debt,  .  .  .  nor 
would  the  United  States  engage  to  use  its  good  offices  to  induce 
any  government  hereafter  to  be  established  in  Cuba  to  assume 
such  debt."" 

The  Spanish  commissioners  were  then  bluntly  informed  that 
the  United  States  did  not  believe  that  there  were  any  debts  out- 
standing which  had  been  incurred  by  Spain  for  existing  improve- 
ments of  a  permanent  character f^  that  while  the  United  States 
would,  of  course,  assume  the  obligations  imposed  by  the  rules 
of  international  law,  and  which  would  follow  from  its  occupa- 
tion of  Cuba,  it  declined  to  accept  the  burden  of  Cuban  debts 
either  for  itself  or  for  Cuba.  Spain  must,  in  the  language  of  the 
protocol,  simply  relinquish  her  claim  of  sovereignty  over  and  title 
to  Cuba  and  cede  to  the  United  States  the  islands  of  Porto  Rico 
and  Guam  in  the  Ladrones. 


20  Mr.  Day  to  Mr.  Hay,  October  25,  For.  Rel,  1898.  p.  931. 

21  Secretary  Hay  to  Mr.  Day,  Oct.  25,  1898,  For.  Rel.  1898,  p.  932. 
22/7or.  Rel,  1898,  p.  936.    A  royal  decree  of  June  28,  1897,  announced  the 

issuance  of  bonds  to  the  amount  of  40,000,000  pesos  due  in  forty  years,  se- 
cured by  the  Philippine  customs  on  the  general  guarantee  of  Spain.  The 
proceeds  certainly  were  not  used  to  construct  public  works,  but  the  $20,000,- 
000  paid  by  the  United  States  probably  represented  about  the  amount  that 
had  from  time  to  time  been  invested  in  such  works  on  the  islands. 


THE   TREATY   OF   PARIS  339 

The  Spanish  commissioners,  with  elaborate  explanations  and 
reservations,  then  accepted  the  articles  proposed  by  the  Ameri- 
cans, and  suggested  that  the  matter  of  the  Philippines  should  be 
taken  up.  It  was  evident  that  the  faint  hope  held  out  by  Mr. 
Reid  to  the  Spanish  ambassador  had  been  seized  upon  by  the 
Spaniards.  After  the  conference  Senor  Ojedo  informed  Mr. 
Day  that  a  surrender  on  their  part  without  some  relief  would 
mean  national  bankruptcy,  and  that  they  hoped  they  would  re- 
ceive liberal  treatment  in  the  matter  of  the  Philippines.  "He 
made  further  appeal,"  says  Mr.  Day,  "to  which  I  made  no  an- 
swer." 

But  it  was  to  no  purpose  that  Spain  thus  humiliated  herself. 
At  the  conference  on  October  31  the  American  commissioners 
demanded  the  cession  of  the  entire  Philippine  Archipelago,  merely 
stating  that  the  United  States  would  assume  any  existing  indebt- 
ness  which  had  been  incurred  for  public  works  and  improvements 
of  a  pacific  character  in  the  Philippines.^' 

The  decision  to  take  the  islands  was  not  reached  without  care- 
ful consideration  of  conditions  and  possible  consequences,  and 
after  much  correspondence  with  Washington.  The  problem  was 
worked  out  while  the  conference  was  in  session.  When  the 
Peace  Protocol  was  signed  on  August  12  public  opinion  in  the 
United  States  had  not  crystallized,  and  the  president,  as  we  have 
seen,  decided  to  leave  the  question  of  the  future  of  the  islands 
to  be  decided  by  the  commission,  which  was  to  meet  some  months 
later.  He  realized  that  any  demand  for  territory  in  the  Far  East 
must  be  made  to  square  with  the  disinterested  motives  which  had 
been  proclaimed  to  the  world  at  the  beginning  of  the  war.  The 
original  instructions^*  stated  that  while  still  solicitous  to  adhere 
to  our  original  purpose,  we  could  not  be  unmindful  that,  without 
any  desire  on  our  part,  the  war  had  brought  duties  and  respon- 
sibilities "which  we  must  meet  and  discharge  as  becomes  a  great 
nation  on  whose  growth  and  career  from  the  beginning  the 

"  Sen.  Doc.  62,  p.  107. 

"  See  Vor.  Rel.,  1898,  p.  904,  et  seq. 


340  THE   PHILIPPINES 

Ruler  of  Nations  has  plainly  jvritten  the  high  command  and 
pledge  of  civilization." 

The  United  States,  therefore,  could  not  accept  less  than  the 
cession  in  full  right  and  sovereignty  of  the  island  of  Luzon,  and 
it  vv^as  desirable  that  we  should  acquire  the  right  of  entry  for 
vessels  and  merchandise  belonging  to  citizens  of  the  United  States 
into  such  ports  of  the  Philippines  as  were  not  ceded  to  the  United 
States  upon  terms  of  equal  favor  with  Spanish  ships  and  mer- 
chandise. 

But  it  is  evident  that  the  commissioners  understood  that  these 
instructions  were  merely  tentative,  as  they  immediately  began 
to  collect  information  with  reference  to  conditions  in  the  islands 
and  the  commercial  value  of  the  country. 

On  October  4  Mr.  Day  telegraphed  to  Secretary  Hay  that  the 
opinion  of  Admiral  Dewey  in  the  possession  of  the  commission 
seemed  to  favor  the  retention  of  Luzon  only,  but  as  it  appeared 
to  have  been  given  in  answer  to  a  question  as  to  which  island 
should  be  retained,  it  was  desired  that  the  admiral's  opinion  as 
to  the  value  of  the  other  islands  should  be  obtained.  Five  days 
later  the  commission  reported  that  it  had  taken  the  testimony 
of  General  Merritt,  and  had  received  and  considered  the  state- 
ments of  General  F.  V.  Greene,  Major  Bourne,  Major  J.  F.  Bell, 
Admiral  Dewey,  Commander  R.  B.  Bradford,  General  C.  A. 
Whittier,  Colonel  C.  L.  Jewett,  the  Belgian  Consul,  Andre,  and 
the  correspondence  which  had  passed  between  the  American  offi- 
cers and  Aguinaldo. 

On  October  9  they  examined  Mr.  John  Foreman,  an  English- 
man who  had  lived  in  Manila  and  had  written  a  popular  book  on 
the  Philippines.  The  weight  of  the  evidence  taken  supported  the 
view  that  the  islands  should  not  be  returned  to  Spain;  that  the 
Filipinos  were  not  then  capable  of  self-government,  and  that  it 
would  be  good  policy  for  the  United  States  to  acquire  the  entire 
Archipelago  instead  of  merely  the  island  of  Luzon.^' 


2"  The  opinions  were  summarized  in  a  despatch  to  Secretary  Hay  October  6. 
For.  Rel.,  1898,  p.  918.  The  evidence  and  statements  in  full  are  in  Sen.  Doc. 
62,  p.  362  et  seq. 


THE   TREATY   OF   PARIS  341 

About  the  same  time  a  message  was  received  from  Admiral 
Dewey,  which  doubtless  had  some  effect  upon  the  action  of  the 
commissioners.  "It  is  important,"  said  the  admiral,  "that  the 
disposition  of  the  Philippine  Islands  should  be  decided  as  soon  as 
possible  and  a  strong  government  established.  Spanish  author- 
ity has  been  completely  destroyed  in  Luzon,  and  general  anarchy 
prevails  without  the  limits  of  the  city  and  bay  of  Manila. 
Strongly  probable  that  islands  to  the  south  will  fall  into  the 
same  state  soon.  Distressing  reports  have  been  received  of 
inhuman  cruelty  practised  on  religious  and  civil  authorities 
in  other  parts  of  these  islands.  The  natives  appear  unable  to 
govern."^" 

Five  days  later  a  telegram  from  General  Otis,  forwarded  to 
Paris,  announced  that  the  situation  in  Luzon  was  somewhat  im- 
proved ;  that  Aguinaldo  was  moderately  recognized  by  the  natives, 
but  that  the  insurgent  authority  was  "crude."  By  this  time  con- 
flicting opinions  had  developed  among  the  commissioners,  and 
on  October  25  complete  statements  of  their  different  views  were 
cabled  to  Washington,^^  with  a  request  for  explicit  instructions. 
Davis,  Frye  and  Reid,  who  had  reached  the  conclusion  that  it 
would  be  a  political  and  commercial  mistake  to  divide  the  Archi- 
pelago, therefore  favored  taking  the  entire  group  and  asked  for 
broader  instructions. 

Mr.  Day  believed  that  they  should  be  mindful  of  the  oft- 
declared  disinterestedness  of  purpose  and  freedom  from  designs 
of  conquest  with  which  the  war  had  been  undertaken,  and  should 
not  peremptorily  demand  the  entire  Philippine  group.  He  fa- 
vored experimenting  with  the  colonial  problem  on  a  small  scale. 

"Only  experience,"  he  said,  "can  determine  the  success  of  colo- 
nial expansion  upon  which  the  United  States  is  entering.  It 
may  prove  expensive  in  proportion  to  the  scale  upon  which  it  is 
tried  with  ignorant  and  semi-barbarous  people  at  the  other  side 
of  the  world.    It  should,  therefore,  be  kept  within  bounds." 


^^For.  Rel,  1898,  p.  928. 
*tFor.  Rel,  1898,  p.  932. 


342  THE   PHILIPPINES 

Senator  Gray's  statement  summed  up  the  familiar  arguments 
against  the  policy  of  annexation. 

But  the  president  had  reached  the  conclusion  that  it  was  neces- 
sary to  demand  the  entire  Archipelago,  and  Secretary  Hay  in- 
formed the  commission  that : 

"The  information  which  has  come  to  the  President  since  your 
departure  convinces  him  that  the  acceptance  of  the  cession  of 
Luzon  alone,  leaving  the  rest  of  the  islands  subject  to  Spanish 
rule,  or  to  be  the  subject  of  future  contention,  can  not  be  justi- 
fied on  political,  commercial  or  humanitarian  grounds.  The  ces- 
sion must  be  of  the  whole  Archipelago  or  none.  The  latter  is 
wholly  inadmissible  and  the  former  must  therefore  be  required. 
The  President  reaches  this  conclusion  after  most  thorough  con-, 
sideration  of  the  whole  subject  and  is  deeply  sensible  of  the  grave 
responsibilities  it  will  impose,  believing  that  this  course  will  en- 
tail less  trouble  than  any  other,  and  besides  will  best  subserve  the 
interests  of  the  people  involved,  for  whose  welfare  we  can  not 
escape  responsibility."^* 

This  was  followed  by  another  telegram,  in  which  Secretary 
Hay  considered  the  grounds  upon  which  the  demand  should  be 
made.  "While  the  Philippines  can  be  justly  claimed  by  conquest, 
which  position  must  not  be  yielded,  yet  their  disposition,  control 
and  government  the  President  prefers  should  be  the  subject  of 
negotiations  as  provided  in  the  protocol.  .  .  .  The  sentiment 
in  the  United  States  is  almost  universal  that  the  people  of  the 
Philippines,  whatever  else  is  done,  must  be  liberated  from  Span- 
ish domination.    In  this  sentiment  the  President  fully  concurs." 

The  president,  wrote  Secretary  Hay,  "can  see  but  one  plain 
path  of  duty — the  acceptance  of  the  Archipelago.  Greater  diffi- 
culties and  more  serious  complications,  administrative  and  inter- 
national, would  follow  any  other  course."^' 


28  For.  Rel.,  1898,  p.  935.  In  a  speech  delivered  after  the  treaty  was  signed, 
Senator  Foraker  said :  "The  case  of  Cuba  was  simple,  involving  only  our 
relations  with  Spain  and  the  Cubans,  In  the  case  of  the  Philippines  there 
were  other  complications  which  can  not  be  mentioned  here,  but  of  which 
senators  will  hear  in  Executive  session,  which  justified  the  President's  course 
in  most  ample  manner  and  vindicated  most  completely  everything  he  has 
done."    Quoted  in  The  London  Times,  Jan.  13,  1899. 

29  Mr,  Hay  to  Mr.  Day,  Oct.  28,  1898,  For.  Rel,  1898,  p.  937.  See  the 
president's  statement  to  the  Methodist  bishops  on  Nov,  21,  1899,  Olcott's  Life 
of  McKinley,  II,  p.  109,  also  in  The  Christian  Advocate,  January  22,  1903. 


THE   TREATY    OF   PARIS  343 

The  president  and  Secretary  Hay  were  of  the  opinion  that 
the  entire  Archipelago  had  been  acquired  by  conquest,  but  the 
commissioners  could  not  accept  that  view.  "After  careful  ex- 
amination of  the  authorities,"  wrote  Mr.  Day,  "the  majority  of 
the  Commission  are  clearly  of  the  opinion  that  our  demand  for 
the  Philippine  Islands  can  not  be  based  on  conquest.  When  the 
protocol  was  signed,  Manila  was  not  captured;  siege  was  in 
progress  and  capture  made  after  the  execution  of  the  protocol. 
Captures  made  after  agreement  for  armistice  must  be  disregarded 
and  status  quo  restored  as  far  as  practicable.  We  can  require 
cession  of  the  Philippine  Islands  only  as  indemnity  for  losses  and 
expenses  of  the  war."^'^ 

The  president  replied  that  the  destruction  of  the  Spanish  fleet 
on  May  1  was  the  conquest  of  Manila,  the  capital  of  the  Philip- 
pines, and  that  the  claim  by  right  of  conquest  should  not  be  aban- 
doned. But  the  commissioners  were  convinced  that  to  urge  the 
claim  of  conquest  would  probably  prevent  the  making  of  a  treaty, 
as  "subsequent  military  operations  and  capitulation,  no  less  than 
mutual  acceptance  of  the  protocol,  precludes  making  demand 
upon  that  ground.  Our  opinion  as  to  the  ineffectiveness  of  capit- 
ulation after  protocol  has  already  been  stated." 

Senator  Davis  added  the  following  statement  to  the  despatch : 
"I  think  we  can  demand  cession  of  the  entire  Archipelago  on 
other  and  more  valid  grounds  than  a  perfected  territorial  con- 
quest of  the  Philippine  Islands,  such  as  indemnity  or  as  condi- 
tions of  peace  imposed  by  our  general  military  success,  and  in 
view  of  our  future  security  and  general  welfare,  commercial  and 
otherwise."" 

In  the  face  of  this  opposition  the  president  gave  way,  and  Sec- 
retary Hay  replied  that  the  only  wish  of  the  president  was  to 
hold  all  the  grounds  upon  which  the  United  States  could  fairly 
and  justly  make  the  claim;  that  while  indemnity  should  be  put 
forth  as  the  chief  ground,  conquest  should  not  be  ignored.    His 


«o  Mr.  Day  to  Mr.  Adee,  Nov.  3,  1898.    For.  Rel.  1898.  p.  940. 
81  Mr.  Day  to  Mr.  Adee,  Nov.  4,  1898.   (Marked  Special  for  the  President) 
For.  RcL,  1898,  p.  941. 


344  THE   PHILIPPINES 

great  concern  was  to  secure  a  treaty  which  would  not  only  satisfy 
the  present  generation,  but  also  meet  with  the  approving  judg- 
ment of  poster ity.^^ 

Upon  the  presentation  of  the  American  demand  for  the  Phil- 
ippines the  Spaniards  attempted  to  reopen  all  the  questions  which 
had  been  considered  and  disposed  of  in  connection  with  the  ces- 
sion of  Cuba. 

It  was  again  asserted'^  that  the  protocol  provided  for  the  tem- 
porary and  provisional  occupation  only  of  the  city,  bay  and 
harbor  of  Manila  until  such  time  as  the  treaty  of  peace  was  con- 
cluded. Argument  to  support  this  view  was  found  in  the  circular 
sent  by  the  French  government  to  its  ambassadors,  in  which 
it  was  stated  that  the  French  ambassador  at  Washington  had 
signed  in  the  name  of  Spain  a  protocol  which  contained  a  provi- 
sion for  the  provisional  occupation  of  Manila  by  the  American 
forces. 

They  also  reoccupied  their  former  position  with  reference  to 
colonial  debts,  saying  loftily,  "Let  it  be  understood,  therefore, 
and  the  Spanish  commissioners  hope  there  will  be  no  necessity 
to  repeat  it,  that  Spain  can  not  and  ought  not,  since  respect  for 
the  rights  of  others  forbids  it,  to  agree  to  this  treaty  or  to  any- 
thing implying  the  impairment  or  suppression,  or  even  disregard, 
of  the  private  rights  of  others  against  the  will  of  their  legitimate 
and  special  proprietors." 

After  renewing  her  protest  against  the  exercise  of  sovereign 
power  by  the  American  military  government  at  Manila,  and 
asserting  again  the  invalidity  of  all  military  acts  subsequent  to 
the  signing  of  the  Peace  Protocol,  the  Spanish  commissioners 
announced  that  they  could  not  consent  to  the  cession  of  the  Phil- 
ippine Archipelago,  but  would  he  happy  to  consider  the  question 
of  the  liability  of  the  United  States  for  the  hostile  acts  committed 
after  August  12. 

The  Americans  met  the  charge  of  inconsistency  with  the  state- 
ment'* that  they  had  based  their  demands  with  reference  to  Cuba 

82  Secy.  Hay  to  Mr.  Day,  Nov.  5,  1909.    For,  ReL,  1898,  p.  941. 
^^Sen.  Doc.  62,  p.  119. 
^Sen.  Doc.  62.  p.  129. 


THE   TREATY    OF   PARIS  345 

and  Porto  Rico  upon  the  precise  terms  of  the  protocol,  because 
it  was  in  those  terms  that  the  United  States  had  made  its  de- 
mands. As  to  the  Philippines,  the  United  States,  except  as  to  the 
present  occupation  of  Manila,  confined  itself  in  the  protocol  to 
demanding  that  the  future  of  the  islands  should  be  left  in  the 
widest  and  fullest  sense  for  future  consideration.  While  it  had 
not  in  the  protocol  demanded  other  specific  concessions,  it  had 
reserved  the  right  to  demand  them.  Of  course,  the  protocol  pro- 
vided for  the  temporary  occupation  of  Manila.  Had  it  provided 
for  permanent  occupation  the  Philippines,  to  that  extent,  would 
have  been  withdrawn  from  future  consideration. 

The  negotiations  .  with  M.  Cambon  were  then  reviewed  at 
length.  President  McKinley  had  clearly  and  definitely  stated 
the  situation  with  reference  to  the  islands.  With  reference  to 
the  claim  that  the  French  minister  of  foreign  affairs  had  under- 
stood the  third  article  of  the  protocol  as  providing  for  a  tempo- 
rary possession  only,  they  quoted  a  letter  from  General  Horace 
Porter,  the  American  ambassador  in  Paris,  to  the  effect  that  the 
French  minister  for  foreign  affairs,  when  his  attention  was 
called  to  the  use  that  the  Spanish  commissioners  were  making 
of  his  circular,  had  "disclaimed  any  intention  of  giving  any  views 
of  his  own  regarding  it,  having  no  authority  for  so  doing,  and 
declared  that  the  brief  mention  contained  in  his  letter  could  in 
no  wise  be  construed  as  an  interpretation  by  him  of  the  terms  or 
meaning  of  that  instrument."^' 

The  United  States  did  not  ask  for  a  pecuniary  indemnity,  nor 
would  it  take  to  itself  the  sovereignty  of  Cuba.  It  assumed  only 
the  burdens.  It  did  demand  Porto  Rico,  and  now  Spain  was  asked 
to  cede  a  country  constantly  in  rebellion,  a  country  in  which 
if  to-day  the  United  States  should  withdraw  its  troops  Spain 
would  immediately  have  to  resort  to  force  to  overcome  a  rebel- 
lious and  discontented  people. 

It  was  the  turn  of  the  American  Commission  to  be  "surprised** 
at  the  "extraordinary"  claims  of  Spain,  who  seemed  to  be  at  one 
time  claiming  under  and  at  another  repudiating  the  Peace  Pro- 

»»  Gen.  Porter  to  Mr.  Day,  Nov.  S,  1898.    Sen.  Doc.  62,  p.  140. 


346  THE   PHILIPPINES 

tocol.  "Spain,"  it  was  said,  "could  claim  only  the  status  quo 
provided  for  by  that  instrument,  and  that  was  the  right  of  the 
United  States  to  occupy  and  hold  the  city,  harbor  and  bay  of 
Manila  pending  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty  of  peace.  The  city, 
harbor  and  bay  of  Manila  were  in  the  possession  of  the  United 
States;  it  had  been  conceded  by  Spain,  and  the  results  incident 
thereto  can  not  be  defeated  by  alleging  the  invalidity  of  acts  of 
hostility  subsequent  to  the  protocol." 

According  to  the  American  view  the  protocol  was,  in  legal 
effect,  a  military  convention  which  provided  for  the  capitulation 
of  Manila  which  should  thereafter  be  governed  by  the  laws  of 
war.  Hence  the  acts  complained  of  and  for  which  Spain  de- 
manded compensation  were  legal  even  under  the  protocol  and 
could  rightfully  have  been  done  if  no  hostilities  had  been  con- 
ducted after  it  was  signed. 

When  the  protocol  "was  executed  by  the  United  States  taking 
possession,  it  presented  a  case  of  military  occupation  of  that  cer- 
tain defined  territory,  and  vested  in  that  government  all  the  rights 
which  the  laws  of  war  give  to  a  military  occupation.  This  capit- 
ulation was  general  in  its  character  and  terms.  It  comprehended 
the  defined  territory  and  all  that  it  contained,  including  the  forts, 
the  muniments  of  war  and  the  barracks.  It  included  everything 
and  every  person  left  in  the  city  by  Spain.  It  included  the  garri- 
son for  that  reason.  Under  the  special  circumstances  of  the  case 
the  surrender  of  the  garrison  was  necessarily  contemplated  by 
the  protocol.  .  .  .  Had  it  been  intended  that  the  garrison 
should  be  permitted  to  depart  from  the  capitulated  city,  the  usual 
provision  would  have  been  made  that  it  should  march  out  with 
its  arms  and  with  the  honors  of  war.  Containing  no  such  pro- 
vision, the  exaction  that  the  Spanish  troops  should  surrender  to 
the  occupying  power  was  as  justifiable  and  legal  under  the  pro- 
tocol as  was  the  taking  possession  by  that  power  of  the  forts, 
barracks  and  muniments  of  war.  ...  In  all  cases  where, 
pending  war,  a  certain  defined  part  of  the  territory  of  the  bellig- 
erent is,  by  the  terms  of  a  military  convention,  agreed  to  be  put 
in  the  military  possession  of  the  other  belligerent,  the  sovereignty 
of  the  occupying  party  (the  United  States  in  the  present  instance) 
displaces  or  suspends  the  sovereignty  of  the  other  belligerent  and 


I 


THE    TREATY    OF    PARIS  347 

"becomes  for  the  purposes  of  the  mihtary  occupation  a  substitute 
for  it." 

In  an  elaborate  memorandum,  somewhat  overcharged  with  sar- 
casm, presented  at  the  conference  of  November  16,'"  the  Spanish 
commissioners  returned  to  the  question  of  colonial  debts  and 
reviewed  again  the  negotiations  preceding  the  signing  of  the  pro- 
tocol, but  nothing  of  value  was  added  to  the  argument  against 
the  claim  that  the  occupation  of  Manila  under  the  protocol  was 
a  military  occupation. 

The  Spaniards  now  proposed  that  the  meaning  of  articles 
three  and  four  of  the  protocol  should  be  submitted  to  arbitration, 
and  in  view  of  "the  glorious  precedents"  which  had  been  estab- 
lished by  the  United  States  they  expressed  great  confidence  that 
the  proposition  would  be  accepted.  It  was  a  very  good  move. 
But  the  answer  was  that  arbitration,  while  commendable  in  itself, 
should  precede  war  and  not  come  after  the  trial  by  battle  to 
enable  the  defeated  party  to  escape  the  consequences  of  his 
folly." 

As  to  the  Filipinos  being  allies,  "It  was  not  a  relation  which 
the  government  of  the  United  States  intended  to  establish,  but 
it  must  be  at  least  admitted  that  the  insurgent  chiefs  returned  and 
assumed  their  activities  with  the  consent  of  our  military  and 
naval  commanders,  who  permitted  them  to  arm  with  the  weapons 
which  we  had  captured  from  the  Spaniards  and  assured  them  of 
fair  treatment  and  justice.  Would  we  be  justified  now  in  sur- 
rendering these  people  to  the  government  of  Spain,  even  under 
a  promise  of  amnesty,  which  we  know  they  would  not  accept? 
.  .  .  The  situation  which  has  arisen  in  the  Philippines  was 
neither  foreseen  nor  desired  by  the  United  States;  but  since  It 
exists  tliat  government  will  not  shirk  the  responsibility  growing 
out  of  it,  and  the  American  Commissioners  now  make  to  the 

^'^Sen.Doc.62,p.  174. 

*'"The  principle  thus  stated  is  thought  self-evidently  sound  and^  just 
Americans  were  surprised  to  find  how  completely  it  was  overlooked  in  the 
contemporaneous  European  discussion — how  general  was  the  sympathy  with 
the  Spanish  request  for  arbitration,  and  how  naive  was  the  apparently  genuine 
surprise  at  the  instant  and  unqualified  refusal  to  consider  it  Even  English 
voices  joined  in  the  chorus  of  encouraging  approval  that  from  every  quarter 
of  Europe  greeted  the  formal  Spanish  appeal  for  an  opportunity  to  try  over 
in  another  form  the  questions  they  had  already  submitted  to  the  arbitrament 
of  arms."    Reid,  Problems  of  Expansion,  p.  74. 


348  THE    PHILIPPINES 

Spanish  Commissioners,  in  the  light  of  these  responsibihties,  the 
final  proposition." 

The  Spaniards  made  considerable  capital  out  of  the  alleged 
harshness  of  the  American  demand  and  appealed  with  some  suc- 
cess to  the  sympathies  of  the  public. 

The  peace  conferences  were  being  held  in  a  distinctly  anti- 
American  environment.^^  M.  Gabriel  Hanotaux,  who  was  then 
the  French  minister  for  foreign  affairs,  in  his  recent  book,  La 
France  vivante  en  I'Amerique  du  Nord,  assures  us  that  French 
diplomacy  was  eminently  correct.^^  Nevertheless,  neither  France, 
Germany  nor  Russia  was  in  sympathy  with  American  aims  or 
methods.  The  demand  for  the  Philippines  was  regarded  as  un- 
warranted. The  holders  of  Cuban  bonds  were  active  in  trying 
to  bring  influence  to  bear  on  the  American  commissioners.  Ger- 
man, like  French  diplomacy,  was  formally  correct,  but  the  people 
and  the  press  were  distinctly  hostile  to  America.  Doctor  An- 
drew D.  White,  who  was  the  American  minister  at  Berlin,  says 
that  "whatever  may  have  been  the  attitude  of  the  German  press 
and  people,  and  indeed  of  continental  Europe  generally,  the  Im- 
perial Government  at  Berlin  was  friendly  to  us  rather  than  to 
Spain.  They  knew  what  Spain  was  and  what  we  are;  they 
showed  this  from  the  first  in  ways  which  could  not  be  mis- 
taken."*" 

America's  traditional  European  friend,  Russia,  which  was  then 
working  out  the  Manchurian  policy  which  resulted  so  disastrously, 

88  On  Nov.  15  the  American  commissioners  found  it  advisable  to  issue 
a  statement  to  meet  the  charges  of  violation  of  the  protocol  with  which  the 
Spaniards  had  flooded  the  European  press.    For.  Rel.,  1898,  p.  948. 

39  "Suddenly,  and  from  no  one  knows  where,"  says  _M.  Hanotaux,  "the 
rumor  spread  that  France  was  hostile  to  the  great  American  Republic.  Cer- 
tainly we  had  no  need  to  take  part  against  our  neighbors  and  friends  of  the 
Peninsula.  But  if  any  diplomacy  was  ever  correct  and  applied  conscien- 
tiously the  rules  of  neutrality,  it  was  the  French  diplomacy  of  the  period,  as 
the  documents  would  establish  if  it  were  necessary.  However,  the  rumor, 
once  launched,  grew  till  it  became  menacing  throughout  all  North  America. 
It  was  an  admitted  and  accepted  fact  that  Americans  passing  through  Paris 
were  hostilely  received,  molested,  maltreated,  France  was  putting  herself  at 
the  head  of  a  league  of  hostile  nations  against  the  United  States!  ...  It 
was  one  of  the  worst  moments  of  my  ministerial  career." 

40  Personal  letter  to  the  author.  Dec.  18,  1913.  See  Mr.  Hay's  account  of 
his  interview  with  the  German  ambassador,  Count  Hatzfeldt,  on  July  13,  01- 
cott's  Life  of  McKinley,  II,  p.  133. 


THE   TREATY    OF    PARIS  349 

very  seriously  objected  to  the  injection  of  a  new  power  into  the 
Far  Eastern  situation.  The  Gazette  of  St.  Petersburg,  as  quoted 
in  the  London  Times,  said : 

"By  the  transfer  of  the  whole  of  the  Philippines  to  such  enter- 
prising and  tenacious  people  as  the  Americans,  the  Pacific  Ocean 
would  soon  become  a  North  American  lake  on  which  the  flag  of 
other  nations  would  be  merely  tolerated.  And  yet  this  is  what 
the  American  delegates  now  demand  in  the  peace  conference  at 
Paris.  McKinley,  since  his  visit  to  Chicago,  has  joined  the 
American  jingoes.  Madrid  can  only,  of  course,  protest  on  paper. 
But  besides  the  United  States  and  Spain  there  are  other  great 
powers  who  have  shown  themselves  capable  of  acting  in  concert 
in  Japan  and  Crete,  and  those  powers  will  no  doubt  be  able  to 
play  a  very  affecting  and  harmonious  tune  to  the  North  Ameri- 
cans on  the  shores  of  the  Philippines,  at  San  Francisco  and  New 
York,  and,  if  necessary,  in  Washington.  Only  the  growing  in- 
toxication induced  by  their  victories  over  the  Spaniards  could 
have  led  them  to  dream  that  Europe,  which  is  now  so  intensely 
interested  in  the  permanent  balance  of  national  forces  on  the 
East  Asiatic  coast,  would  permit  such  a  post  as  the  Philippines 
to  be  placed  exclusively  in  the  possession  of  the  United  States." 

The  British  public  was  friendly  to  the  United  States,  although 
the  London  Times  criticized  her  attitude  on  the  question  of  the 
Cuban  debts.*^  Nevertheless  it  saw  nothing  unreasonable  or 
indeed  harsh  in  the  terms  which  the  United  States  proposed  to 
impose  upon  Spain.  They  were  no  more  severe  than  those  im- 
posed by  Germany  on  France  in  1871,  or  by  Russia  on  Turkey 
in  1878,  even  after  the  latter  were  revised  by  the  cdncert  of 
Europe.  According  to  the  Times,  the  language  of  the  protocol 
did  not  imply  the  necessary  continuance  of  Spanish  sovereignty 
in  the  Philippines.  On  November  9  it  editorially  expressed  "The 
hope  that  Spain  would  speedily  bow  to  necessity  and  confine  her 
efforts  in  the  negotiations  to  obtaining  the  best  bargain  possible 
in  the  allocation  of  the  debts  of  her  lost  dependencies.  .  .  . 
The  sacrifice  which  she  is  called  upon  to  make  is  not  so  great 


*^  Mr.  Frye  reported  the  fact  to  Washington  October  30.    For.  Rel.,  1898, 
p.  939. 


350  THE   PHILIPPINES 

as  it  appears.  The  retention  of  a  nominal  sovereignty  in  the 
Philippines  would  be  a  purely  imaginary  gain,  and  any  share  of 
effectual  control  would  only  be  a  danger  to  her  peace  and  a  drain 
upon  her  resources." 

Indeed  Great  Britain  was  anxious  that  the  United  States  should 
acquire  the  islands,  as  she  expected  thereby  to  gain  a  new  ally 
in  the  Far  East.*^  Lord  Salisbury,  never  an  enthusiastic  admirer 
of  America,  speaking  at  the  Guildhall  while  the  Peace  Confer- 
ence was  in  session,  said:  "It  is  the  first  year  in  which  the 
mighty  force  of  the  Republic  has  been  introduced  among  the 
nations  whose  dominions  are  expanding  and  whose  instruments 
are  war.  I  am  not  implying  the  slightest  blame — far  from  it; 
I  am  not  refusing  sympathy  to  the  American  Republic  in  the 
difficulties  through  which  they  have  passed,  but  no  one  can  deny 
that  their  appearance  among  the  factors  of  Asiatic  diplomacy 
is  a  grave  and  serious  event  which  may  not  induce  to  the  inter- 
ests of  peace,  though  I  think  in  any  event  it  is  likely  to  conduce 
to  the  interests  of  Great  Britain." 

On  November  13  the  Times  said:  "We  would  rather  see  the 
Philippines  in  the  hands  of  our  American  friends  than  in  those 
of  any  European  power." 

Of  Count  Cassini's  subsequent  protest  against  the  idea  that  the 
Russian  government  ever  harbored  the  intention  of  interfering 
with  America's  action,  the  Times  observed  that  "Governments 
were  never  so  foolish  as  to  avow  an  intention  which  it  has  not 
been  found  convenient  to  act  upon." 

In  his  original  instructions  to  the  commissioners  President 
McKinley  said  that  he  was  not  "unmindful  of  the  distressed  finan- 
cial condition  of  Spain,  and  whatever  consideration  the  United 
States  make  now  must  come  from  its  sense  of  generosity  and 
benevolence  rather  than  from  any  real  o^*  technical  obligation." 
As  the  Spaniards  refused  to  discuss  the  nature  of  the  debts  and 
the  purposes  for  which  the  money  had  been  expended,  nothing 

*2  This  expectation  has  not  been  reahzed  in  any  marked  degree.  Great 
Britain's  alliance  with  Japan  has  prevented  unity  of  action  by  the  English- 
speaking  powers  in  China. 


THE  TREATY  OF  PARIS  351 

could  be  done  but  estimate  the  amount  as  nearly  as  possible  from 
the  available  data  and  offer  a  gross  sum  of  money  in  lieu  of  a 
formal  assumption  of  the  debt.*^  The  way  in  which  the  amount 
finally  paid  was  determined  appears  in  the  correspondence  which 
passed  between  the  commissioners  at  Washington.  As  on  many 
other  matters  the  individual  commissioners  entertained  conflict- 
ing views.  On  October  29  the  secretary  of  state  was  informed 
that  it  was  the  intention  to  offer  to  assume  the  existing  indebted- 
ness incurred  for  necessary  works  and  improvements  of  a  pacific 
character,  and  this  was  approved  by  the  president. 

On  the  following  day  Mr.  Frye  sent  a  telegram  for  the  presi- 
dent, in  which,  after  stating  that  he  feared  there  would  be  no 
treaty,  he  outlined  a  plan  which  he  believed  might  be  adopted. 
The  articles  relating  to  the  Cuban  debt  had  been  accepted  pro- 
visionally only  by  the  Spanish  Commission.  The  matter  was 
therefore  still  unsettled.  It  seemed  to  him  that  the  United  States 
might  agree  to  use  its  good  offices  with  any  government  here- 
after established  in  Cuba  to  secure  the  assumption  by  it  of  any 
indebtedness  incurred  for  internal  improvements  there,  and  her- 
self assume  any  like  indebtedness  in  the  territory  ceded  to  the 
United  States,  "Might  we  not  go  further,"  he  added,  "and 
agree  to  pay  Spain  from  ten  to  twenty  million  dollars  if  thus  a 
treaty  could  be  secured?  If  no  treaty,  then  war;  a  continued 
disturbance  of  business,  an  expenditure  of  a  million  dollars  a 
day,  and  further  loss  of  life.    Would  not  our  people  prefer  to 

<3  For  details  of  the  debt,  see  Sen.  Doc.  148,  p.  44.    For.  Rel,  1898,  p.  945. 

"The  American  Commissioners,"  says  Mr.  Reid,  "recognized  the  duty  of 
reimbursement  for  debts  legitimately  incurred  for  specified  improvements  or 
otherwise  for  the  real  benefit  of  the  transferred  territory.  Not  till  it  began 
to  appear  that  of  the  Philippine  debt,  $40,000,000  (Mexican),  or  a  little  under 
twenty  millions  of  our  money,  had  been  transferred  direct  to  aid  the  war  in 
Cuba,  and  the  rest  had  probably  been  spent  in  the  war  in  Luzon,  did  your 
representatives  hesitate  at  the  payment;  and  even  then  they  decided  to  give 
a  lump  sum  equal  to  it  which  could  serve  as  a  recognition  of  whatever  debts 
Spain  might  have  incurred  in  the  past  for  expenditures  in  that  Archipelago 
for  the  benefit  of  the  people."  Reid,  Problems  of  Expansion,  p.  40.  In  an 
article  published  in  the  Anglo-Saxon  Review  for  June,  1899,  Mr.  Reid  says: 
"She  could  use  it  to  pay  the  Philippine  bonds  if  she  chose.  That  was  the 
American  view  of  the  sanctity  of  public  debts  legitimately  incurred  in  behalf 
of  ceded  territory;  and  that  is  an  explanation  of  the  money  payment  in  the 
case  of  the  Philippines,  as  well  as  the  precise  amount  at  which  it  was  finally 
fixed." 


352  THE   PHILIPPINES 

pay  Spain  one-half  of  war  expenditures  rather  than  indulge  in 
its  costly  luxury?  Europe  sympathizes  with  Spain  in  this  re- 
gard. The  correspondent  of  the  London  Times,  in  his  yesterday's 
letter,  criticised  severely  our  attitude.  The  precedents  of  the  last 
century  are  antagonistic  to  our  position.  Of  course,  we  will  not 
pay  debts  incurred  in  the  suppression  of  the  colonial  rebellions."** 

The  president  again  expressed  the  desire  that  the  commis- 
sioners should  be  generous  in  all  matters  which  did  not  require 
a  disregard  of  principle  or  duty,  and  a  willingness  to  consider 
favorably  whatever  the  commission  deemed  best  with  reference 
to  debts  for  pacific  public  improvements  in  the  Philippines. 

On  November  10  the  personal  views  of  each  commissioner 
with  reference  to  the  assumption  of  the  debt  or  a  money  payment 
to  Spain  were  cabled  to  Washington.*^  Mr.  Day  adhered  to 
his  previously-expressed  opinion  that  the  islands  would  prob- 
ably prove  a  burden  instead  of  a  benefit  to  the  United  States. 
Assuming,  however,  that  the  entire  group  was  to  be  taken,  and 
in  view  of  the  fact  that  Spain  was  bankrupt  and  losing  her  colo- 
nies, the  revenues  of  which  were  charged  with  the  outstanding 
debts,  he  favored  paying  a  lump  sum  of  about  fifteen  million 
dollars. 

Senator  Frye  favored  taking  the  entire  group  of  islands  and 
paying  therefor  the  sum  of  ten  million  dollars,  which  he  con- 
sidered a  fair  estimate  of  the  debt  properly  chargeable  to  the 
Philippine  Islands.  If  necessary  to  secure  a  treaty,  however, 
he  favored  taking  Luzon,  Mindora,  Palawan  and  one  of  the 
Carolines,  and  paying  from  five  to  ten  million  dollars,  but  re- 
quiring, in  addition,  certain  trade  and  cable  concessions  for 
Americans  in  the  islands  retained  by  Spain,  and  the  immediate 

**>or.  ReL,  1898,  p.  939. 

In  an  address  delivered  at  Chicago,  Feby.  13,  1899,  Mr,  Reid  said  that 
the  American  commissioners  had  "maintained,  :n  the  face  of  the  most 
vehement  opposition,  not  merely  of  Spain  but  of  well-nigh  all  Europe,  a 
principle  vital  to  oppressed  people  struggling  for  freedom,  a  principle  vk^ithout 
which  our  own  freedom  could  not  have  been  established,  and  without  which 
any  successful  revolt  against  any  unjust  rule  could  be  made  practically  im- 
possible. That  principle  is  that,  contrary  to  the  prevailing  rule  and  practice 
in  large  transfers  of  sovereignty,  debts  do  not  necessarily  follow  the  territory 
if  incurred  by  the  mother  country  distinctly  in  efforts  to  enslave  it." 

45  For.  Rel,  1898,  p.  945. 


THE   TREATY    OF   PARIS  353 

release  of  all  political  prisoners  held  in  Cuba,  Porto  Rico,  Guam 
and  the  Philippines,  as  well  as  freedom  of  religion  in  the  islands. 

Senator  Grey  was  now  willing  to  accept  the  cession  of  the 
islands  in  order  to  avoid  what  would  inevitably  result  should 
\var  be  resumed,  the  seizure  with  the  strong  hand  of  all  Spain's 
colonial  possessions. 

Mr.  Reid  estimated  the  costs  of  the  war  at  approximately  three 
hundred  million  dollars.  He  regarded  Porto  Rico  as  worth  not 
more  than  fifty  million,  and  favored  taking  the  entire  Archipel- 
ago as  indemnity  for  the  balance,  regarding  "it  as  an  asset  of 
some  sort,  whether  to  develop  or  dispose  of."  However,  to 
secure  a  treaty,  he  was  willing  to  leave  the  island  of  Mindanao 
and  the  Sulu  group  and  take  in  their  place  the  Caroline  Islands 
and  the  Ladrones,  and  pay  a  lump  sum  of  from  twelve  to  fifteen 
million  dollars,  which,  however,  should  be  returned  to  the  United 
States  out  of  the  future  revenues  of  the  islands. 

Senator  Davis  favored  presenting  an  ultimatum  requiring  the 
cession  of  the  entire  Archipelago,  Porto  Rico  and  Guam,  and 
the  relinquishment  of  sovereignty  over  Cuba,  without  any  money 
payment  or  the  assumption  of  debts  of  any  kind. 

It  will  be  noted  that  none  of  the  commissioners  made  any 
reference  to  the  duties  which  it  was  assumed  that  we  owed  to  the 
Filipinos.  The  problem  had  been  reduced  to  one  of  indemnity 
and  the  form  the  demand  should  take. 

The  definite  and  final  instructions  came  on  the  following  day.** 
The  commission  was  instructed  to  insist  upon  the  cession  of  the 
whole  of  the  Philippines,  and,  if  necessary,  to  pay  from  ten 
million  to  twenty  million  dollars.  Questions  of  indemnity  and 
trade  advantages  might  be  yielded,  "they  might  be  waived  or 
compromised,  but  the  question  of  duty  and  humanity  appeals 
to  the  President  so  strongly  that  he  can  find  no  appropriate 
answer  but  the  one  he  has  here  marked  out." 

On  November  21  the  offer  of  twenty  million  dollars  was  made, 
and  an  answer  required  within  one  week. 

On  November  22  the  president  of  the  Spanish  Commission 

*«For./?^/.,  1898,  p.  948. 


354  THE    PHILIPPINES 

submitted  seven  questions  to  Mr.  Day,  which  were  designed  to 
bring  out  the  meaning  which  the  Americans  attached  to  the  pro- 
posed articles,  and  on  the  following  day  the  Spaniards  presented 
three  alternative  propositions  for  which  consideration  was  re- 
quested. The  differing  views  of  individual  members  were  again 
communicated  to  Washington,  but  the  president  directed  the 
commission  to  be  guided  by  the  instructions  already  given,  and 
on  November  26  the  Spanish  commissioners  were  so  informed. 

On  November  29  Mr.  Day  telegraphed  Washington  that  the 
Spanish  commissioners  had  given  a  definite  and  final  acceptance 
of  the  American  proposals. 

Considerable  time  was  now  devoted  to  subsidiary  and  collat- 
eral matters.*'^  The  Spanish  commissioners  attempted  unsuc- 
cessfully to  have  inserted  articles  permitting  all  Spanish  subjects 
residing  in  the  islands  to  retain  Spanish  citizenship,  binding  the 
United  States  to  recognize  the  validity  of  existing  contracts  for 
the  construction  of  public  works,  for  the  return  of  the  privately- 
owned  bonds  and  moneys  which  had  been  paid  into  the  public 
treasury  as  security  for  the  performance  of  such  contracts,  for 
the  investigation  of  the  Maine  disaster  by  a  commission,  and 
for  the  assumption  by  the  United  States  of  certain  pensions 
which  Spain  had  always  paid  to  the  descendants  of  Columbus. 

The  nationality  article  proposed  by  the  Spaniards  could  not 
be  accepted,  as  it  would  have  allowed  the  natives  of  the  Philip- 
pines, including  the  uncivilized  tribes,  to  create  for  themselves 
a  nationality  other  than  the  one  in  control  of  the  territory.  The 
article  with  reference  to  the  recognition  of  certain  contracts  was 
rejected  because  the  nature  and  obligation  of  the  contracts  were 
unknown.  It  was  conceded  that  if  an  investigation  showed  that 
the  contracts  were  valid  the  obligations  Imposed  by  international 
law  upon  the  successor  in  sovereignty  would  fall  upon  the  United 
States.  As  to  the  bonds  held  as  security  for  the  performance  of 
contracts,  it  was  said  that  nothing  was  further  from  the  inten- 
tion of  the  United  States  government  than  to  keep  from  the 
lawful  owner  such  sums  as  come  under  its  control,  and  that  they 

*7  Sen.  Doc.  62,  pp.  258,  261. 


THE   TREATY    OF   PARIS  355 

would  be  restored  after  the  fulfilment  of  the  contracts  or  obliga- 
tions for  which  they  were  security.  The  United  States  had  no 
intention  to  confiscate  private  property. 

The  Americans  declined  to  enter  upon  any  consideration  of 
the  question  of  the  destruction  of  the  battleship  Maine,  and  closed 
their  final  communication  by  expressing  their  sense  of  the  thor- 
oughness, learning,  ability  and  uniform  courtesy  with  which  the 
Spanish  commissioners  had  conducted  the  negotiations.  This 
compliment  was  about  all  the  devoted  Spaniards  secured  to  carry 
back  to  Madrid. 

The  treaty  was  not  signed  until  December  10,  1898.  By  its 
terms  Spain  relinquished  all  claim  of  sovereignty  over  and  title 
to  Cuba,  and  ceded  to  the  United  States  the  Philippine  Islands, 
Porto  Rico  and  other  islands  under  Spanish  sovereignty  in  the 
West  Indies,  and  the  island  of  Guam  in  the  Ladrones.  The 
United  States  agreed  during  its  occupancy  of  Cuba,  but  no  longer, 
to  assume  and  discharge  all  obligations  which  under  international 
law  resulted  from  such  occupation,  to  pay  to  Spain  the  sum  of 
twenty  million  dollars  within  three  months  after  the  exchange 
of  ratifications  of  the  treaty,  to  send  back  to  Spain  at  its  own 
cost  and  expense  soldiers  taken  as  prisoners  of  war  at  Manila,*^ 
and  to  restore  to  them  their  arms. 

It  was  agreed  that  all  stands  of  colors,  uncaptured  war  vessels, 
small  arms,  guns  of  every  caliber  with  their  carriages  and  acces- 
sories, powder,  ammunition,  and  live  stock,  and  materials  and 
supplies  of  all  kinds,  belonging  to  the  land  and  naval  forces  of 
Spain  in  the  Philippines  and  Guam  should  remain  the  property 
of  Spain.  Pieces  of  ordnance,  exclusive  of  artillery  in  the  forti- 
fications and  coast  defenses,  should  remain  in  their  emplacements 
for  the  term  of  six  months  from  the  ratifications  of  the  treaty, 
the  United  States  reserving  the  right  in  the  meantime  to  purchase 
the  same  from  Spain. 

Spain  agreed  at  once  to  release  all  prisoners  of  war  and  all 

*8  The  United  States  obligated  itself  to  convey  to  Spain  only  such  Spanish 
soldiers  as  were  actually  prisoners  of  war.  Troops  which  were  under  arms 
and  under  control  of  the  Spanish  authorities  were  not  included.  22  0pp. 
Atty.-Gen.,  383  (1899). 


356  THE    PHILIPPINES 

persons  detained  or  imprisoned  for  political  offenses  in  connec- 
tion with  the  insurrection  in  the  Philippines  during  the  war  with 
the  United  States.  The  United  States  agreed  to  obtain  the 
release  of  all  Spanish  prisoners  held  by  the  insurgents  in  Cuba 
and  the  Philippines.  Each  government  at  its  own  expense  was 
to  return  all  released  prisoners  of  war  to  their  homes.  All  claims 
for  indemnity,  national  and  individual,  against  either  govern- 
ment were  mutually  released,  but  the  United  States  agreed  to 
adjudicate  and  settle  the  claims  of  its  citizens  against  Spain. 

It  was  declared  that  the  relinquishment  or  cession  of  the  desig- 
nated islands  and  the  buildings,  forts,  barracks,  structures,  pub- 
lic highways,  and  other  immovable  property  which  belonged  to 
the  Crown  of  Spain,  should  not  be  held  in  any  respect  to  impair 
the  property  or  rights  which  by  law  belonged  to  the  peaceful 
possession  of  property  of  all  kinds,  of  provinces,  municipalities,*' 
public  or  private  establishments,  ecclesiastical  or  civil  bodies,®" 
or  of  any  other  associations  having  legal  capacity  to  acquire  and 
possess  property  in  the  renounced  and  ceded  territory,  or  of  pri- 
vate individuals  of  whatsoever  nationality.^^ 

The  Spaniards  residing  in  the  ceded  or  relinquished  territory 
were  to  be  subject  to  the  same  law  and  entitled  to  the  same  rights 
and  privileges  before  the  courts  as  citizens  of  the  country.  Care- 
ful provision  was  made  for  the  determination  of  the  proceedings 
then  pending  before  the  judicial  tribunals.  Judgments  rendered 
before  the  exchange  of  the  ratifications  of  the  treaty,  in  the  cases 
in  which  under  the  Spanish  law  there  was  no  right  of  review, 

*9  Public  property  belonging  to  the  city  of  Manila  did  not  pass  to  the 
United  States.  It  remained  the  property  of  the  municipality.  Vilas  v.  Manila 
(1911),220U.  S.  345. 

so  The  Roman  Catholic  Church  in  Porto  Rico  was  held  to  be  a  legal  per- 
sonality within  this  provision.  Ponce  v.  Roman  Catholic  Apostolic  Church 
(1908),  210  U.  S.  296.  The  Roman  Catholic  Church  in  the  Philippines  is  a 
legal  personality  with  power  to  hold  property  acquired  by  gift.  Santos  v. 
Holy  Roman  Catholic  Church,  212  U.  S.  463. 

SI  An  hereditary  franchise  granted  by  the  Spanish  Crown  and  appurtenant 
to  the  office  of  mayor  of  Havana,  giving  the  exclusive  right  of  slaughtering 
cattle  in  the  city  of  Havana  was  held  to  constitute  private  property  within  the 
protection  of  this  provision  of  the  treaty.  O'Reilly  de  Camera  v.  Brooke,  135 
Fed.  Rep.  384.  But  it  did  not  include  the  office  of  Solicitor  of  the  Court  of 
First  Instance  which  had  been  purchased  in  perpetuity.  Alvarez  v.  Sanchez, 
216  U.  S.  167. 


THE   TREATY    OF   PARIS  357 

•were  to  be  final.  Civil  actions  which  were  pending  and  not 
determined  at  the  time  of  such  exchange  of  ratifications  would 
continue  to  judgment  in  the  same  court,  or  in  the  court  which 
might  be  substituted  therefor. 

Criminal  actions  pending  on  the  date  of  the  exchange  of  rati- 
fications before  the  Supreme  Court  of  Spain  against  citizens  of 
the  territory  which  by  the  treaty  ceased  to  be  Spanish  should 
continue  under  the  jurisdiction  of  that  court  until  final  judg- 
ment, but  the  execution  of  the  judgment  rendered  therein  should 
be  committed  to  the  authorities  of  the  place  where  the  case 
arose. 

All  copyrights  and  patents  which  had  been  acquired  by  Span- 
iards in  the  ceded  territory  should  be  respected."^  Spanish  scien- 
tific, literary  and  artistic  work  not  subversive  of  public  order  in 
the  territories  in  question  were  to  be  admitted  free  for  a  period 
of  ten  years,  and  during  the  same  time  Spanish  merchant  ves- 
sels and  merchandise  should  be  admitted  into  all  ports  of  the  Phil- 
ippines on  the  same  terms  and  conditions  as  ships  and  merchan- 
dise of  the  United  States.  This  privilege  proved  of  little  value 
to  Spain,  as  the  United  States  permitted  the  ships  and  merchan- 
dise of  all  nations  to  enter  on  the  same  terms. 

There  was  also  a  rather  superfluous  provision,  to  the  effect  that 
the  inhabitants  of  the  lost  territories  should  be  secured  in  the  free 
exercise  of  their  religion. 

Spanish  subjects,  natives  of  the  Peninsula  residing  in  the  ter- 
ritory over  which  Spain  relinquished  her  sovereignty,  might  re- 
main or  remove  therefrom,  retaining  in  either  event  all  their 
property  rights,  with  the  right  to  carry  on  their  industry,  com- 
merce and  professions,  subject  to  the  laws  applicable  to  other 
foreigners.  If  they  remained  in  the  territory  they  might  pre- 
serve their  allegiance  to  the  Crown  of  Spain  by  making  before 
a  court  of  record  within  a  year  from  the  exchange  of  ratifica- 
tions of  the  treaty,  a  declaration  of  their  decision  to  preserve 


62  The  validity  of  such  rights  were  to  be  determined  by  Spanish  law.    22 
Opp.  Atty.-Gen.  617  (1899). 


358  THE    PHILIPPINES 

such  allegiance."  In  default  of  such  declaration,  they  should 
be  held  to  have  renounced  it  and  to  have  adopted  the  nationality 
of  the  territory  in  which  they  resided.  The  civil  rights  and  politi- 
cal status  of  the  native  inhabitants  of  the  territories  ceded  by 
the  United  States  were  to  be  determined  by  the  Congress  of  the 
United  States." 

It  was  subsequently  discovered  that  Spain  owned  certain  islands 
which  were  not  within  the  boundary  lines  drawn  in  the  treaty 
which  were  thus  left  derelict  and  useless  to  Spain.  Under  a 
treaty  signed  at  Washington,  November  7,  1900,  and  ratified 
January  23,  1901,  it  was  agreed  that  in  consideration  of  the  pay- 
ment of  one  hundred  thousand  dollars  all  islands  belonging  to  the 
Philippine  Archipelago  lying  outside  of  such  lines,  particularly 
the  islands  of  Cagayan  Sulu  and  Sibutu  and  their  dependencies, 
should  be  included  in  the  cession.^^ 

Such  was  the  Treaty  of  Paris,  which  was  supposed  to  mark 
the  close  of  an  era  of  the  world's  history.  As  the  result  of  a 
war  into  which  the  fatuous  Madrid  government  allowed  itself 
to  drift,  the  old  Spain  ceased  to  exist.  Thereafter  what  re- 
mained was  a  different  Spain.  As  said  by  an  European  critic,  it 
was  Spain's  misfortune  and  fault  "that  her  extraordinary  mis- 
management of  Cuba  brought  her  into  conflict  with  the  United 
States,  whose  politicians  had  little  regard  for  the  conventions  of 
European  diplomacy  and  no  particular  reverence  for  the  status 
quo.  For  whatever  mistakes  she  may  have  made  at  this  crisis, 
Spain  has  paid  the  penalty  to  the  full."®^ 

53  By  a  subsequent  protocol  signed  at  Washington  on  March  29,  1900,  tiie 
time  was  extended  for  six  months  from  April  11,  1900. 

5*  It  was  the  intention  of  the  f  ramers  of  the  treaty  to  leave  Congress  a 
free  hand  to  deal  with  the  islands.^  Dorr  v.  U.  S.  (1904),  195  U.  S.  138. 

The  Filipinos  did  not  become  citizens  of  the  United  States.  Congress,  by 
Act  of  July  1,  1902,  as  amended  by  Act  March  23,  1912,  authorized  the  Philip- 
pine Legislature  to  provide  for  the  acquisition  of  citizenship  by  certain  natives 
who  did  not  come  within  the  terms  of  the  treaty.  The  act  makes  all  in- 
habitants of  the  islands  on  April  11,  1899,  including  Spanish  subjects  who  did 
not  elect  to  retain  their  Spanish  allegiance,  citizens  of  the  Philippines.  Roga 
V.  Col.  of  Customs,  22  Ph.  Rep.  332.    Fed.  Stat.  Ann.  Sup.  1914,  p.  310. 

55  Fed.  Stat,  Ann.,  VII,  p.  818 ;  For.  Rel,  1900,  p.  887. 

56  The  London  Times,  Dec.  12,  1898. 


CHAPTER  XIV 
The  Policy  of  Expansion  and  the  Anti-Imperialists 

Some  Generalities — First  Impressions — McKinley's  Original  Views — Publi- 
cists and  Literary  Men — Their  Arguments  Inefifective — A  Question  of  National 
Policy — Instincts  of  the  People — Natural  Desire  for  Growth — Decision  Rested 
With  McKinley — The  Anti-Imperialists — Nature  of  Their  Opposition — Senti- 
ment in  Continental  Europe — British  Feeling — Kipling's  Appeal — Opposition 
at  First  Negative — The  Policy  of  "Walk  Alone" — Senator  Hoar's  Suggestion 
for  a  Convention  of  Nations — The  World  Power  Idea,  Altruism  and  Com- 
mercialism— Not  Originally  a  Party  Issue — Mr.  Bryan's  Responsibility — Rati- 
fication of  the  Treaty — Future  Policy  Left  Undetermined. 

It  is  difficult  to  ascertain  the  causes  of  a  war.  It  is  impossible 
to  anticipate  its  consequences.  Some  simple  or  dramatic  incident 
serves  as  a  spark  and  lights  a  magazine  in  which  the  troubles  of 
an  era  have  accumulated.  A  battleship,  while  in  a  friendly  port, 
is  blown  up;  an  ancient  colonial  empire  crumbles  and  a  modem 
republic  is  deflected  into  new  courses.  An  irritated  Bey  strikes 
a  French  ambassador  with  a  fan,  Algiers  is  occupied,  and  in  the 
course  of  a  few  years  France  finds  herself  charged  with  the  cares 
of  a  colonial  empire.  A  company  of  traders  on  the  far  side  of 
the  world  bring  about  conditions  which  force  England,  against 
her  will,  to  assume  the  burden  of  governing  the  millions  of  India. 
Certain  bondholders  so  involve  her  in  the  entangling  meshes  of 
Egyptian  affairs  that  thereafter  all  the  struggles  and  writhings 
of  her  statesmen  serve  only  to  draw  tighter  her  bonds.  Even 
the  Romans  were  not  intentionally  the  conquerors  of  the  world.* 
Verily,  as  McKinley  said,  the  march  of  events  rules  and  overrules 

1  "Events  have  generally  evolved  themselves  so  that  a  contest  has  arisen 
out  of  comparatively  insignificant  causes,  such  as  a  border  line  or  a  commer- 
cial right  of  way,  and  the  conqueror  by  his  mere  victory  has  been  obliged  to 
enlarge  the  boundaries  of  his  country.  Even  the  Romans  were  not  inten- 
tionally the  conquerors  of  the  world."  Delbriick,  Contemporary  Review, 
Oct.,  1909. 

359 


360  THE    PHILIPPINES 

human  actions.  The  incidental  becomes  the  principle,  the  tem- 
porary the  permanent,  and  the  world  bows  its  head  in  acquies- 
cence before  au  fait  accompli.  More  than  twenty  centuries  ago 
Thucydides  remarked  that  war  was  the  last  thing  in  the  world  to 
go  according  to  program.  We  speak  of  the  purposes  of  a  war 
and  propose  to  confine  and  limit  its  results.  But  when  the  flood- 
gates of  war  are  once  opened  man  seems  able  to  do  but  little  more 
than  run  for  a  time  along  the  shore  and  watch  the  torrent  as  it 
breaks  new  channels  and  spreads  into  the  most  unexpected  places. 
"I  claim  not  to  have  controlled  events,"  said  Lincoln,  "but  confess 
plainly  that  events  have  controlled  me.  Now  at  the  end  of  three 
years'  struggle  the  nation's  condition  is  not  what  either  party  or 
any  man  desired  or  expected."  The  world  is  never  the  same  after 
as  before  a  war.  "A  stricken  field,"  says  Lord  Salisbury,  "is 
one  of  the  stages  upon  the  road  of  history,  and  the  state  of 
things  that  existed  before  that  stricken  field  can  not  be  the  same 
as  that  which  exists  afterward."^  It  is  not  surprising  that  the 
Spanish-American  War  created  unexpected  conditions  and  new 
problems  for  solution. 

The  great  question  whether  the  United  States  should  take  the 
Philippines  from  Spain  and  assume  the  burden  of  governing  and 
developing  an  alien  people  was  seriously  and  even  acrimoniously 
discussed  almost  from  the  day  of  Dewey's  victory.  It  is  probably 
true  that  in  the  beginning  a  majority  of  the  thoughtful  men  in  the 
country  instinctively  shrank  from  the  adoption  of  a  national 
policy  which  seemed  so  remote  from  anything  in  the  past  history 
of  the  country. 

Doctor  Schurman  relates  that  when  he  was  offered  the  presi- 
dency of  the  first  Philippine  Commission  by  President  McKinley, 
he  replied,  "To  be  plain,  Mr.  President,  I  am  opposed  to  your 
Philippine  policy.  I  never  wanted  the  Philippines."  "Oh,"  re- 
plied the  president,  "that  need  not  trouble  you;  I  did  not  want 
the  Philippines  either,  and  in  the  protocol  to  the  treaty  I  kept 
myself  free  not  to  take  them,  but  in  the  end  there  was  no  alterna- 
tive." 


2  The  Times,  Nov.  11,  1898. 


THE    POLICY    OF    EXPANSION  361 

To  the  suggestion  that,  after  reserving  suitable  naval  stations, 
the  islands  should  be  left  in  the  possession  of  Spain,  the  presi- 
dent replied  that  the  American  people  who  had  gone  to  war  for 
the  emancipation  of  Cuba  would  not  after  Dewey's  victory  in 
Manila  Bay  consent  to  leave  the  Filipinos  any  longer  under  the 
dominion  of  Spain,  and  that  if  Spain  were  driven  out  and  Ameri- 
can sovereignty  not  set  up,  the  peace  of  the  world  would  be 
endangered.' 

When  a  few  months  later  the  president  asked  Judge  Taft  to 
become  the  president  of  the  second  Philippine  Commission,  it  is 
said  that  he  was  met  with  substantially  the  same  reply  that  he 
had  received  from  Doctor  Schurman. 

Many  distinguished  scholars,  educators,  statesmen,  publicists, 
literary  men,  poets  and  philosophers,  were  saddened  by  what 
seemed  to  them  the  proposed  abandonment  of  the  primary  prin- 
ciples upon  which  the  nation  had  been  founded.  Some  of  the 
arguments  which  these  men  advanced  against  the  policy  of  expan- 
sion seemed  unanswerable,  and  yet  they  were  not  effective.  The 
speeches  delivered  by  Senator  Hoar  in  the  Senate  won  the  respect 
and  admiration  of  the  entire  country,  but  convinced  no  one  who 
was  not  already  of  the  same  way  of  thinking.  The  powerful 
addresses  of  Carl  Schurz,  Moorfield  Storey  and  others  were 
equally  admirable  and  equally  unconclusive.  It  is  possible  that 
they  were  pitched  on  too  high  a  key  and  that  the  speakers  neg- 
lected the  appeal  to  certain  very  human  traits.  The  wise  man 
who  tells  the  people  of  their  incapacity  generally  has  a  silent 
audience,  while  he  who  flatters  is  certain  of  applause. 

The  extremists  predicted  that  the  new  policy  would  lead  to 
glory  ineffable  or  disaster  dire  and  dreadful.  The  optimists 
found  in  it  inspiration  and  encouragement.  But  the  pessimists 
questioned  the  source  of  the  inspiration  and  drew  an  inference 
from  the  incident  recorded  in  the  fourth  chapter  of  the  Gospel 
according  to  St.  Matthew :  "The  devil  taketh  him  up  into  an 
exceeding  high  mountain,  and  sheweth  him  all  the  kingdoms  of 


8  Schurman,  Philippine  Affairs,  p.  2.    See  Olcott's  Life  of  William  Mc- 
Kinley,  I,  Chap.  IX,  p.  175. 


362  THE   PHILIPPINES 

the  world,  and  the  glory  of  them;  And  salth  unto  him,  All  these 
things  will  I  give  thee,  if  thou  wilt  fall  down  and  worship  me." 

The  arguments  on  both  sides  were  often  carried  to  such  ex- 
tremes as  to  seem  absurd  and  hysterical.  An  emotional  patriot 
sobbing  over  what  he  thought  was  the  grave  of  the  Declaration 
of  Independence  irresistibly  reminded  the  common  man  of  Mark 
Twain  weeping  at  the  grave  of  Adam.  And  the  harrowing  pic- 
tures painted  by  the  expansionists  of  the  confusion  and  the 
awful  results  generally  which  would  follow  the  withdrawal  of 
American  troops,  were  also  overdrawn.  "What  do  you  suppose 
the  Filipinos  would  do,"  dramatically  asked  Mr.  Choate,  "if 
we  should  withdraw  the  American  troops?"  "Well,"  drawled 
Speaker  Reed,  "I  don't  suppose  they  would  pursue  us  farther 
than  San  Francisco."  Unemotional  people  were  reasonably  cer- 
tain that  the  United  States  would  continue  to  prosper  under 
either  policy. 

It  was,  after  all,  merely  a  question  of  national  policy.  Neither 
national  life  nor  liberty  was  involved.  The  people  were  untram- 
meled  by  any  precedent  or  principle  which  forbade  them  to 
acquire  and  hold  dependencies,  and  they  took  no  stock  in  the 
assertion  that  they,  the  descendants  of  successful  colonists,  were 
incompetent  to  develop  colonies  or  govern  dependencies,  or  in 
the  theory  that  the  reaction  from  the  attempt  would  ruin  the 
home  coimtry.  They  knew  instinctively  the  meaning  of  their 
political  maxims  and  realized  the  implied  limitation  upon  the 
general  statements  that  all  men  are  created  free  and  equal  and 
that  government  should  rest  on  the  consent  of  the  governed. 
Every  reasonably  well-informed  person  knew  that  the  natives  of 
California,  Louisiana,  Florida,  New  Mexico  and  Alaska  had  not 
been  asked  whether  they  desired  to  become  citizens  or  subjects 
of  the  United  States,  and  that  the  people  of  the  southern  states 
had,  against  their  will  and  by  force  of  arms,  been  compelled  to 
remain  within  the  Union  and  continue  to  hear  the  Declaration 
of  Independence  read  on  each  recurring  Fourth  of  July.  They 
realized,  also,  that  in  the  United  States,  as  elsewhere,  there  had 
always  been  a  wide  divergence  between  the  precepts  of  political 


THE   POLICY   OF   EXPANSION  363 

philosophy  and  the  practise  of  politicians.  Their  histories  told 
them  that  the  leading  statesmen  of  the  East,  from  Daniel  Web- 
ster and  Josiah  Quincy  to  Senator  Hoar  and  his  associates,  had 
opposed  the  territorial  expansion  of  the  United  States,  and  the 
extension  of  her  boundaries  west  of  the  Mississippi,  as  strenu- 
ously as  they  now  opposed  its  extension  beyond  the  Pacific.  In 
fact,  the  desire  for  expansion,  for  bigness,  for  new  lands  to 
develop  was  a  race  inheritance.  It  existed  before  the  Constitu- 
tion was  adopted,  and  it  exists  to-day.  Democracies  are  usually 
aggressive  and  sometimes  intolerant.  The  American  democracy 
is,  and  from  its  birth  has  been,  one  of  the  aggressive  nations 
of  the  earth.  Its  territorial  expansion  has  been  one  of  the  mar- 
vels of  the  age.  It  has  recognized  no  line  of  sea,  river  or  moun- 
tain as  a  permanent  boundary.  By  the  end  of  the  nineteenth 
century  the  idea  of  contiguous  and  non-contiguous  territory  had 
become  little  more  than  a  mere  verbal  collocation.  Facilities 
for  rapid  communication  had  destroyed  all  such  limitations.  All 
the  world  was  contiguous  to  a  farmer's  section  of  land. 

With  expansion  has  always  gone  some  form  of  colonization. 
When  in  contact,  a  higher  generally  absorbs  or  destroys  a  lower 
civilization.  The  Germans  would  reduce  this  dangerous  lesson 
of  history  to  a  natural  law.    Mommsen  says  :* 

"By  virtue  of  the  law,  that  a  people  which  has  grown  into  a 
state  absorbs  its  neighbors  who  are  in  political  nonage,  and  a 
civilized  people  absorbs  its  neighbors  who  are  in  intellectual 
nonage — by  virtue  of  this  law,  which  is  as  universally  valid  and 
as  much  a  law  of  nature  as  the  law  of  gravity,  the  ancient  Italian 
nation  .  .  .  was  entitled  to  reduce  to  subjection  the  Greek 
states  of  the  East  which  were  ripe  for  destruction,  and  to  dis- 
possess the  people  of  lower  grades  of  culture  in  the  West  .  .  . 
by  means  of  its  settlers;  just  so  England,  with  equal  right,  has 
in  Asia  reduced  to  subjection  a  civilization  of  rival  standing  but 

*  History  of  Rome,  V,  Chap.  8. 

Of  course  the  impulse  to  obey  a  natural  law  need  not  be  selfish.  If  it  is 
a  natural  law  it  must  in  the  end  operate  for  the  good  of  humanity.  Nature 
is  constantly  sacrificing  the  individual  for  the  benefit  of  the  race.  According 
to  Professor  Frank's  interpretation  of  the  history  of  Roman  expansion,  it 
was  not  unlike  that  of  America — forced  upon  the  state  by  considerations 
neither  selfish  nor  commercial. 

Frank,  Roman  Imperialism  (1904). 


364  THE    PHILIPPINES 

politically  impotent,  and  in  America  and  Australia  has  marked 
and  ennobled,  and  still  continues  to  mark  and  ennoble  ex- 
tensive barbarian  countries  with  the  impress  of  its  nationality. 
.  .  .  It  is  the  imperishable  glory  of  the  Roman  democracy  or 
monarchy — for  the  two  coincide — to  have  correctly  apprehended 
and  vigorously  realized  this,  its  highest  destination." 

It  is  a  simple  observable  fact  that  virile  nations  are  and  always 
have  been  colonizing  nations,  and  non-expanding  and  non-col- 
onizing nations  generally  fall  out  of  the  race.  Whether  it  pleases 
us  or  not,  these  things  are  regulated  by  some  law  which  the  opti- 
mist must  believe  makes  for  the  uplifting  of  the  human  race.  As 
said  by  the  writer  of  an  interesting  article  in  The  Spectator^ 

"The  great  races,  when  the  hour  of  opportunity  arrives,  ex- 
pand greatly — that  is  all  we  really  know;  and  what,  when  the 
momentum  is  on  them,  they  have  to  care  about  is  to  see  that 
their  actions,  for  which  they  are  only  half  responsible,  benefit 
the  world." 

With  such  nations  as  England,  France,  Germany,  Japan  and 
Italy  actively  working  outward,  seeking  new  worlds  to  conquer 
and  new  fields  for  the  exercise  of  the  superabundant  activities 
of  their  people,  it  ought  not  to  have  been  expected  that  the  Amer- 
ican people  would  be  content  with  the  policy  of  ingrowing  devel- 
opment. 

No  American  statesman  ever  had  a  keener  sense  for  detecting 
the  currents  and  drifts  of  public  opinion  than  President  McKin- 
ley.  What  the  people  really  desired  he  seems  to  have  wanted 
them  to  have,  regardless  of  his  own  private  views  as  to  what  was 
best  for  them. 

Under  the  pressure  of  public  opinion  the  president  had  been 
forced  into  the  war  with  Spain  against  his  better  judgment. 
Thereafter,  however,  until  the  treaty  of  peace  was  signed  he 
controlled  men  and  events  with  a  firm  hand.  Some  of  the 
most  drastic  provisions  of  the  treaty  of  peace  were  inserted, 
under  the  orders   of  the  president,   against  the  judgment  of 

^Jan.  14,  1899.  Of  course  when  the  lines  of  expansion  meet  it  becomes 
merely  a  question  of  strength. 


THE   POLICY    OF   EXPANSION  365 

at  least  a  part  of  the  commission.  His  was  the  wisdom  of 
Polonius :  "Beware  of  entrance  into  quarrel ;  but  being  in,  bear 
it,  that  the  opposer  may  beware  of  thee."  George  W.  Smalley 
gives  Whitelaw  Reid  the  credit  for  determining  McKinley's  Phil- 
ippine policy  for  him."  Mr.  Reid,  while  a  member  of  the 
Peace  Commission,  was  certainly  very  influential,  and  his  inti- 
mate knowledge  of  diplomatic  affairs  enabled  him,  at  a  critical 
stage  of  the  negotiations,  to  plant  a  fertile  suggestion  in  the  mind 
of  the  Spanish  ambassador  at  Paris.  But  Smalley's  account  of 
events  is  quite  inaccurate  and  his  assertions  are  not  sustained  by 
the  correspondence  that  passed  between  Washington  and  the 
Peace  Commission.  President  McKinley,  on  vital  matters,  such 
as  the  Cuban  and  Philippine  debts  and  the  claim  of  conquest, 
showed  a  persistence  and  determination  which  are  quite  inconsist- 
ent with  the  popular  but  erroneous  idea  of  his  character.''' 

After  availing  himself  of  every  means  of  information  he 
reached  the  conclusion  that  a  large  majority  of  the  people  fa- 
vored retaining  the  Philippines,  and  subsequent  events  proved 
that  he  was  correct.  They  were  not  averse  to  acquiring  addi- 
tional territory,  whether  contiguous  or  non-contiguous,  if  it 
seemed  the  proper  thing  to  do  and  for  the  probable  political  and 
commercial  advantage  of  the  United  States.  They  had  not,  in- 
deed, contemplated  the  invasion  of  the  Far  East.  The  idea  of 
absorbing  an  archipelago,  of  which  the  greater  number  possibly 
had  never  even  heard,  required  consideration.  The  proposal  that 
they  should  become  responsible  for  the  government  of  another 
alien  race  induced  a  perceptible  hesitancy.  After  a  tour  through 
the  Western  States  the  president  returned  to  Washington,  con- 
vinced that  he  would  be  supported  in  demanding  the  cession  of 
the  entire  group  of  islands.*    At  this  stage  of  the  controversy 

"  Smalley,  Anglo-American  Memories,  2nd  Series,  p.  191. 

7  See  Olcott's  Life  of  William  McKinley,  II,  Chap.  XXVIII. 

*  Senator  Hoar  wrote :  "I  dare  say  that  he  was  influenced  as  any  other 
man  who  was  not  more  than  human  would  have  been  influenced  by  the  ap- 
parently earnest  desire  of  the  American  people,  as  he  understood  it,  as  it 
was  conveyed  to  him  on  his  Western  journey.  But  I  believe  every  step  he 
took  he  thought  necessary  at  the  time.  .  .  .  The  feeling  of  the  country 
was  deeply  excited.  President  McKinley  made  his  famous  Western  journey. 
He  was  greeted  by  enthusiastic  throngs.    The  feeling  in  that  part  of  the 


366  THE   PHILIPPINES 

the  situation  was  within  his  control.  The  people  were  wilHng  to 
accept  his  judgment.  The  peace  commissioners  at  Paris  were 
divided.  Had  President  McKinley  directed  the  commission  not 
to  demand  the  cession  of  the  Philippines,  the  American  people 
would  have  acquiesced,  probably  with  a  sigh  of  relief.  He  had 
the  power  to  choose,  and  his  choice  was  subsequently  ratified  by 
the  people. 

Mr.  Taft  in  a  public  address  once  said  that  the  United  States 
blundered  into  colonization.®  It  is  a  common  view,  but  entirely 
erroneous.  What  was  done  was  done  deliberately.  If  it  was  a 
blunder,  it  was  a  deliberate  blunder  adopted  after  the  fullest 
consideration.  Those  who  opposed  the  policy  of  expansion  or- 
ganized under  the  name  of  Anti-Imperialists  and  characterized 
their  opponents  as  Imperialists.  As  a  term  of  reproach,  the  word 
imperialist  was  not  a  very  disparaging  one.  The  great  majority 
of  the  nation  which  successfully  governs  more  than  a  fifth  of  the 
population  of  the  world  bear  it  proudly  as  a  term  of  honor. 
Whether  intended  as  a  term  of  honor  or  reproach  depends,  of 
course,  upon  what  it  connotes  to  the  person  who  uses  it.  It  per- 
tains to  empire,  something  which  may  be  very  noble,  or  very 
much  otherwise.  Chief  Justice  Marshall  referred  to  "the  empire 
of  the  United  States."  Thomas  Jefferson,  from  his  retirement, 
wrote  to  Madison  that  "no  constitution  was  ever  before  so  well 
calculated  as  ours  for  extensive  empire  and  self-government."^® 
W.  H.  Stead  wrote  of  the  "ministry  of  empire,"  and  declared 
its  "essence  to  be  not  lordship,  but  service."  It  is  true,  as  said 
by  a  recent  English  writer,^*  that  there  is  a  debased  and  mock 
imperialism  which  walks  in  jackboots  and  works  to  the  sound 
of  kettledrimis,  but  there  is  also  another  and  finer  Imperialism 

country  in  favor  of  permanent  dominion  over  the  Philippine  Islands  was 
uttered  by  excited  crowds,  whom  he  addressed  from  the  platform  and  the 
railroad  cars  as  he  passed  through  the  country.  But  the  sober,  conservative 
feeling  which  seldom  finds  utterance  in  such  assembly  did  not  make  itself 
heard."    Autobiography,  II,  p.  311. 

^  Geographical  Magazine,  Aug.,  1905. 

^°  Reid,  One  Welchman,  p.  43. 

11  Fraser,  Lord  Curson  in  India  and  After,  p.  456.  For  a  statement  of 
the  faith  of  a  "sound  but  reasonable  Imperialist,"  see  Lord  Cromer's  paper  on 
the  "Government  of  Subject  Races,"  in  The  Edinburgh  Review,  June,  1908; 
Cromer's  Pol.  and  Lit.  Essays,  p.  3. 


THE   POLICY   OF   EXPANSION  367 

which  has  for  its  object  the  creation  of  great  nations  upon  firm 
foundations,  the  uplifting  of  myriads  to  a  happier  and  nobler 
level,  the  spread  of  justice  and  liberty,  and  the  evolution  of  a 
higher  manhood.  And  such,  regardless  of  the  errors  and  mis- 
takes which  are  incident  to  all  great  undertakings,  America's 
"imperial"  work  in  the  Orient,  if  such  it  be  called,  has  proved 
to  be. 

Empire  and  democracy  are  not  necessarily  antagonistic.  The 
most  advanced  democracies  in  the  world,  such  as  New  Zealand, 
nestle  within  the  protecting  arms  of  the  greatest  of  empires. 

"The  world,"  says  Professor  Giddings,*^  "has  been  accustomed 
to  think  of  democracy  and  empire  as  antagonistic  phenomena. 
It  has  assumed  that  democracy  could  be  established  only  on  the 
ruins  of  empire,  and  that  the  establishment  of  empire  necessarily 
means  the  overthrow  of  liberty  by  a  triumphant  reign  of  abso- 
lutism. Yet  in  our  day,  we  are  witnessing  the  simultaneous 
development  of  both  democracy  and  empire.  The  two  most 
powerful  nations  of  the  world  are  becoming,  year  by  year,  more 
democratic  in  their  local  life,  in  their  general  legislation,  and  in 
their  social  institutions.  Nevertheless,  for  a  generation,  both 
have  been  continually  extending  their  territorial  boundaries,  ab- 
sorbing outlying  states  or  colonial  possessions,  and  developing 
a  complicated  system  of  general  or  imperial  administrations. 
Not  only  so,  but,  under  that  government  which  has  carried  this 
policy  to  its  highest  perfection,  the  coexistence  of  democracy 
and  empire  has  become  an  approximately  perfect  blend." 

The  work  of  the  Anti-Imperialist  League  during  the  early  part 
of  the  controversy  was  commendable.  It  supplied  the  organized 
opposition  essential  for  the  proper  discussion  and  consideration 
of  an  important  question  of  national  policy.  It  fought  great 
battles  in  the  Senate,  through  the  press  and  on  the  platform. 
No  more  patriotic  body  of  citizens  were  ever  banded  together 
in  the  support  of  a  cause.  But  after  the  insurrection  in  the 
islands  began,  the  impartial  historian  will  find  but  little  to  com- 
mend in  the  course  pursued  by  the  organization,  or  at  least  by 

^^  Giddings,  Democracy  and  Empire,  p.  1 ;  and  see  Frank's  Roman  Im' 
perialism.  Chap.  6  (Rome  as  an  Imperial  Democracy),  pp.  88-110. 


368  THE    PHILIPPINES 

some  of  its  most  active  members.  The  warfare  which  was  car- 
ried on  after  the  political  battle  had  been  lost  much  resembled 
that  which  prevailed  in  the  Philippines  after  Aguinaldo  had  been 
driven  into  the  mountains — it  was  of  the  guerrilla  variety,  de- 
signed merely  to  annoy. 

The  acquisition  by  the  United  States  of  territory  in  the  Far 
East  was  regarded  with  much  disfavor  by  the  nations  of  conti- 
nental Europe.  Russia  and  Germany  in  particular  resented  what 
was  assumed  to  be  the  entry  of  a  new  and  aggressive  western 
power  into  world  affairs.  Officially  the  conduct  of  these  govern- 
ments may  have  been  strictly  correct  and  friendly  to  us,  but  the 
weight  of  public  sentiment  was  thrown  in  favor  of  Spain  and 
against  the  policy  of  American  expansion. 

The  continental  press  was  loud  in  its  protests  against  the  acqui- 
sition of  territory  by  America  in  the  Orient.  To  the  editors  of  the 
anti-republican  journals  it  seemed  exceedingly  sad  that  the  great 
republic  should  fall  away  from  its  ideals.  Incidentally  they  sur- 
mised that  events  might  strengthen  a  power  which  would  stand  in 
the  way  of  their  advances  in  Manchuria  and  China.  Writing  on 
the  assumed  decay  of  Anglo-Saxondom,  M.  de  Pressence  noted 
that  "in  the  United  States  we  see  the  intoxications  of  the  strong 
wine  of  warlike  glory  carrying  a  great  democracy  off  its  feet  and 
raising  the  threatened  specter  of  militarism," 

In  England  the  extremists,  of  whom  Wilfred  Blunt  and  Kier 
Hardie  were  leading  exemplars,  the  men  who  have  always  op- 
posed their  own  country's  policy  in  India  and  Egypt,  naturally 
sympathized  with  the  Anti-Imperialists.  The  erratic  Mr.  Labou- 
chere  wrote  pungently  and  interestingly  in  Truth  of  what  he 
called  the  affiliation  of  English  and  American  jingoes.^^ 

13  Truth,  July  7,  1898.  Truth,  Jan.  5,  1899,  sent  the  following  New  Year's 
greeting  to  Uncle  Sam.  While  not  much  as  poetry,  it  is  worth  something  as 
a  prophecy: 

"We  wish  you  much  joy  of  the  islands 

Which  you  have  so  easily  won. 

But  the  troublesome  part  of  the  business 

Has  only,  we  fear,  just  begun. 

You  will  prove  how  extremely  ungrateful 

Your  new  fellow  subjects  can  be. 

Compelling  you  even  to  shoot  them 

Before  they  consent  to  be  free. 


THE    POLICY    OF   EXPANSION  369 

But  the  Times  and  its  constituency  and  responsible  English 
statesmen  generally  were  friendly  to  the  expansion  policy  upon 
which  the  United  States  was  entering.  The  work  ahead  of 
America  appealed  to  the  instinct  of  those  Englishmen  who  gen- 
erally assume  that  the  lower  races  have  been  provided  by  Provi- 
dence as  material  upon  which  to  exercise  their  special  talents  for 
government/*  If  they  were  not  themselves  to  govern  the  Philip- 
pines, they  preferred  that  the  duty  should  fall  upon  Americans. 
Mr.  Smalley  tells  of  a  conversation  with  Lord  Kitchener,  who, 
like  many  Americans,  thought  that  the  Filipinos  were  causing  an 
unreasonable  amount  of  trouble.  He  attempted  to  explain  the 
situation  by  stating  that  America  was  inexperienced  in  colonial 
work.  Lord  Kitchener  replied,  "I  should  like  to  govern  them  for 
you,"  and  it  was  evident,  adds  Mr.  Smalley,  that  while  the  re- 
mark was  not  serious,  he  would  like  "to  have  taken  on  a  job  of 
that  kind,  had  it  been  possible."  Later  in  Egypt  he  dealt  suc- 
cessfully with  similar  problems. 

The  controversy  inspired  one  poem  which  made  a  strong  ap- 
peal to  the  conscience  and  sense  of  obligation  of  the  American 
people.  A  great  English  poet,  idealizing  the  imperial  vocation, 
stripped  it  of  the  tinsel  and  glitter  by  which  its  enemies  and  some 
of  its  friends  are  accustomed  to  ornament  it,  and  revealed  it  as 


You  will  certainly  find  yourself  bothered 
At  first  in  your  much  enlarged  sphere, 
But  nations  that  go  on  the  warpath 
Can  not  hope  for  a  Happy  New  Year." 

i*Thus  in  an  address  delivered  April  30,  1914,  Sir  George  Reid  said: 
"Let  us  consider  what  being  a  Britisher  means.  It  means  belonging  to  the 
only  race  capable  of  managing  the  affairs  of  every  other  race  and  creed." 
United  Empire,  V  (N.  S.),  p.  481.  This  assumption  by  the  British  of  omnip- 
otence in  colonial  matters,  however  well  justified  by  history,  is  sometimes 
a  little  trying  to  the  people  who  have  been  less  favored  by  Providence. 

A  blockade-running  English  skipper,  who  was  in  Philippine  waters  during 
the  war,  published  a  book  in  which  he  suggested,  that,  in  view  of  America's 
experience  with  negroes  and  England's  natural  qualifications  for  governing 
Eastern  people,  the  Philippines  should  be  exchanged  for  Jamaica.  Ross, 
Sixty  Years'  Life  and  Adventure  in  the  Far  East  (1911).  A  more  practical 
plan  was  that  suggested  by  Congressman  Bede,  that  America  should  re- 
lieve herself  from  the  Philippine  troubles  and  at  the  same  time  preserve 
the  protective  principle  by  exchanging  the  Philippines  for  Ireland  and  then 
raise  her  own  policemen. 


370  THE    PHILIPPINES 

a  necessary  but  thankless  task  to  be  performed  by  the  white  race 
under  the  restraints  of  conscience/^ 

In  winged  words  which  circled  the  earth  in  a  day  and  by  repeti- 
tion became  hackneyed  within  a  week,  Kipling  appealed  to  Amer- 
ica to 

"Take  up  the  White  Man's  burden — 

Send  forth  the  best  ye  breed — 

Go  bind  your  sons  to  exile 

To  serve  your  captives'  need ; 

To  wait  in  heavy  harness, 

On  fluttering  folk  and  wild — 

Your  new-caught  sullen  peoples 

Half  devil  and  half  child. 


"Take  up  the  White  Man's  burden. 
And  reap  his  old  reward : 
The  blame  of  those  ye  better 
The  hate  of  those  ye  guard. 

"Take  up  the  White  Man's  Burden, 
Have  done  with  childish  days — 
The  lightly  proffered  laurel, 
The  easy,  ungrudged  praise. 
Come  now,  to  search  your  manhood. 
Through  all  the  thankless  years. 
Cold,  edged  with  dear  bought  wisdom, 
The  judgment  of  your  peers."^* 

This  stirring  appeal  did  much  to  make  real  and  definite  the 
sense  of  responsibility  which  had  been  vague  and  inarticulate  and 
to  crystallize  public  sentiment  in  the  United  States." 

15  W.  H.  Stead  in  Eng.  Rev.  of  Rev.,  March,  1899. 

16  First  published  in  McClure's  Magasine. 

i'^  Of  course,  Kipling's  suggestion  of  the  relative  value  of  white  and  brown 
people  was  offensive  to  those  whose  minds  were  constantly  "groping  in  the 
ethics  of  a  more  expansive  humanity."  A  recent  Indian  writer  says :  "The 
'White  Man's  Burden'  aroused  a  storm  of  bitter  criticism  and  howling  ap- 
preciation. Within  a  few  days  of  its  publication  journalists  on  the  staff  of 
country  periodicals  with  a  reputation  for  verse,  amateur  poets,  poetasters, 
and  would-be  poetasters  had  written  replies,  imitations,  and  parodies  in 
rhythmic  foot.  Even  Labouchere  wrote  a  reply.  The  poem  was  a  stirring 
success.  .  .  .  Kipling  achieved  more.  Not  only  did  he  invent  an  excuse, 
he  founded  an  inspiring  war  note.  He  filled  the  young  blood  with  the  germ 
of  a  complicated  disease  ...  an  empire-building  fever.  Kipling  made 
himself  immortal."    Mr.  A.  R.  Sarath-Roy  in  N.  A.  Rev.,  Feb.,  1914,  p.  279. 


THE   POLICY    OF   EXPANSION  371 

The  weakness  of  the  opposition  to  the  policy  of  expansion  lay 
in  the  fact  that  it  was  nothing  but  obstruction.  America  was 
already  in  the  Philippines,  and  the  problem  was  whether  inglori- 
ously  to  scuttle  away  or  remain  at  least  until  the  Filipinos  could 
put  the  house  in  order  for  their  own  housekeeping.  It  was  a 
situation  in  which  inaction  by  the  United  States  was  impossible. 

The  Anti-Imperialist  leaders  soon  realized  that  a  policy  of 
negation  could  not  win.  Charles  Francis  Adams  wrote  to  Carl 
Schurz :  "  "Whenever  we  criticize  the  policy  up  to  this  time  pur- 
sued, we  are  met  with  an  inquiry  as  to  what  we  have  to  oppose  to 
it,  we  are  invited  to  stop  finding  fault  with  others,  and  to  propose 
some  feasible  alternative  policy  ourselves.  ...  It  is,  in  my 
judgment,  useless  to  attempt  to  carry  on  the  discussion  merely  in 
a  negative  form.  As  opponents  of  an  inchoate  policy  we  must,  in 
place  of  what  we  object  to,  propose  something  positive,  or  we 
must  abandon  the  field."  The  alternative,  according  to  Mr. 
Adams,  was  the  old  policy  of  "hands  off"  and  "walk  alone," 
which  the  United  States,  it  was  alleged,  had  pursued  "with  such 
signal  success"  toward  Mexico,  Hayti  and  Venezuela,  countries 
whose  people  were  "equally  unfit  for  self-government." 

The  results  of  that  policy  in  those  countries  when  compared 
with  the  work  of  the  British  in  Egypt  and  the  Straits  Settlements 
can  hardly  be  called  brilliant.  The  Anti-Imperialists  finally  set- 
tled upon  the  plan  of  an  independent  Philippine  Republic  either 
under  the  protection  of  the  United  States,  or  of  the  Powers  gen- 
erally through  some  form  of  neutralization. 

But  this  proposed  solution  of  future  difficulties  did  not  solve 
the  immediate  problems,  and  its  possible  ultimate  adoption  was 
not  in  the  least  inconsistent  with  the  course  which  was  being  at 
the  time  pursued  by  the  administration.  Senator  Hoar  favored 
calling  a  convention  of  the  nations  and  asking  a  joint  guarantee 
of  autonomy  and  good  government ;  a  singular  suggestion  indeed 


Kipling  may  have  much  to  answer  for,  but  it  is  rather  too  much  to  charge 
him  with  responsibility  for  creating  the  germ  of  the  disease  of  empire 
building. 

"See  Adam's  pamphlet,  Imperialism  (1899). 


372  THE    PHILIPPINES 

from  a  statesman  who  aided  in  preventing  the  ratification  of  the 
Congo  treaty  of  1878. 

The  opponents  of  the  administration  policy  advanced  three 
propositions,  either  of  which  if  accepted  would  require  the  United 
States  to  withdraw  from  the  Philippines  and  leave  the  natives 
free  to  erect  such  a  government  as  to  them  seemed  most  desir- 
able.   Their  principal  contentions  were : 

( 1 )  That  the  United  States,  having  reached  its  natural  bound- 
aries, should  be  content  with  its  present  size  and  devote  its  energy 
to  the  solution  of  problems  connected  with  its  internal  welfare 
and  development. 

(2)  If,  however,  additional  territory  was  to  be  acquired,  it 
should  be  such  only  as  in  the  course  of  time  could  be  created  into 
new  states  of  the  Union.  This  meant,  in  the  words  of  Grover 
Cleveland,  that  "the  government  of  remote  and  alien  peoples 
should  have  no  permanent  place  in  the  purposes  of  our  national 
life."  It  meant  the  permanent  exclusion  of  the  United  States 
from  the  work  of  developing  the  tropics,  which  Mr.  Kidd  in  his 
remarkable  book^^  predicted  would  be  the  most  important  work 
of  the  twentieth  century. 

(3)  Should  neither  of  the  foregoing  principles  be  adopted, 
the  Philippines  should  nevertheless  be  abandoned,  because  (a) 
the  United  States  was  pledged  to  acquire  no  territory  by  the 
war,  (b)  the  Filipinos  had  been,  by  implication,  promised  their 
independence  and  were  fully  capable  of  self-government,  and  (c) 
to  impose  American  sovereignty  upon  the  islands  under  such 
conditions  would  be  to  violate  the  principles  which  had  hitherto 
guided  the  national  life  and  deny  the  ideals  which  had  made  the 
Republic  honored  throughout  the  world.  It  was  also  asserted 
that  the  islands  would  prove  a  financial  burden,  that  the  Ameri- 
can system  was  not  adapted  to  governing  colonies,  and  that  Amer- 
icans, being  without  experience  in  such  work,  would  prove  un- 
equal to  the  task.^° 

^^The  Control  of  the  Tropics  (1899). 

20  The  arguments  will  be  found  in  Jordan's  Imperial  Democracy;  Ran- 
dolph, The  Law  and  Policy  of  Annexation  (1901)  ;  Hoar,  Autobiography, 
II,    Chap.    33;    Adam's    Imperialism    and    the    Tracks    of    Our   Ancestors 


THE   POLICY   OF   EXPANSION  373 

The  reply  was  that  the  country  was  dealing  with  conditions 
and  not  theories;  that  the  situation  had  not  been  voluntarily 
created;  that  out  of  the  war  had  come  unexpected  duties  and 
obligations  which  could  not  honorably  be  shirked;  that  having 
destroyed  the  power  of  Spain  in  the  islands,  the  United  States 
could  not,  consistent  with  its  duty  to  foreign  residents  as  well 
as  to  natives,  abandon  them  to  disorder  or  anarchy;  that  the 
Filipinos  had  never  been  promised  independence ;  that  they  were 
without  experience  in  self-government  and  incapable  of  estab- 
lishing a  government  which  would  be  able  to  maintain  law  and 
order  and  protect  the  lives  of  foreigners;  that  such  a  condition 
would  be  a  temptation  to  predatory  powers  and  a  threat  to  the 
peace  of  the  world;  that  the  title  to  the  islands  under  the  treaty 
with  Spain  was  perfect  In  morals  and  in  law,  and  that  it  was 
the  solemn  duty  of  the  United  States  to  assume  the  government 
in  a  spirit  of  devotion  and  self-sacrifice  for  the  good  of  the  na- 
tives and  of  humanity  in  general. 

America,  it  was  said,  had  always  been  a  colonizing  nation,  the 
policy  of  expansion  was  not  new,  and  while  the  administration 
of  a  distant  dependency  would  present  new  problems,  they  would 
not  be  unsolvable.  It  was  conceded  that  the  islands  must  be  gov- 
erned for  the  benefit  of  the  natives  and  that  possibly  they  would 
for  many  years  constitute  a  burden  upon  the  United  States. 
Until  the  natives  were  educated  and  trained  for  self-government 
their  future  should  be  left  undetermined.  It  was  generally  im- 
plied, however,  that  when  they  should  be  capable  of  self-gov- 
ernment they  would  be  given  the  right  to  determine  whether  to 
remain  under  the  American  flag  or  set  up  a  government  of  their 
own." 


(1898)  ;  Speeches  by  Carl  Schurz  at  Conference  on  the  Foreign  Policy  of  the 
United  States,  Chicago,  Aug.  18,  1898 ;  Univ.  of  Chicago.  July  4,  1899 ;  Phila- 
delphia, Apr.  7,  1899;  Cooper  Union,  New  York,  May  24,  1900.  Hugo 
Munsterberg  (The  Americans,  1902)  gives  a  very  good  summary  of  the 
arguments  for  and  against  holding  the  Philippines. 

The  fear  that  the  Philippines  would  be  made  a  state  of  the  Union  was  soon 
dissipated.  The  history  of  the  short-lived  Filipino  Federal  party  showed  that 
the  natives  as  well  as  the  Anti-Imperialists  were  opposed  to  it. 

21  Messages  and  Speeches  of  President  McKinley,  Olcott's  Life  of  Mc- 
Kinley  (1916),  Reid's  Problems  of  Expansion  (1900).  Coleridge  The  United 
States  as  a  World  Power  (1908).  Speeches  of  Lodge,  Spooner  and  Foraker  in 
Congressional  Records  from  1899  to  1902. 


374  THE   PHILIPPINES 

Three  special  facts — pride  in  a  suddenly  realized  sense  of  inter- 
national importance,  altruism  and  commercialism — operated  in 
different  degrees  and  upon  different  types  of  mind  in  inducing 
the  American  people  to  favor  the  policy  of  expansion.  The 
people  for  the  first  time  realized  what  had  long  been  an  estab- 
lished fact,  that  the  United  States  was  one  of  the  great  powers 
of  the  world.^*  The  effect  which  the  acquisition  of  the  Philip- 
pines would  have  upon  the  future  international  policy  of  the 
United  States  was  greatly  exaggerated.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it 
bound  her  to  no  necessary  change  of  national  policy.  Her  ab- 
stention from  participation  in  European  politics  from  the  first 
had  been  voluntary,  not  compulsory.  The  explanation  is  found 
in  the  simple  fact  that  her  interests  were  elsewhere.  But  she  had 
always  been  recognized  as  a  member  of  the  family  of  nations  and 
had  been  invited  to  send  representatives  to  nearly  all  the  inter- 
national congresses  which  had  met  in  Europe  during  the  preced- 
ing century. 

The  United  States  has  always  been  active  diplomatically  in 
the  Orient,  where  her  policy  has  been  of  a  peaceful  and  commer- 
cial character.  While  abstaining  from  interference  in  Europe, 
Africa  and  the  Levant,  she  has  from  the  first  asserted  equality 
with  European  powers  in  the  extreme  Orient.  The  implied  limi- 
tation on  her  activities  which  were  supposed  to  result  from  the 
Monroe  doctrine  has  never  been  held  to  apply  in  the  Far  East. 
American  diplomats,  from  Burlingame  to  Foster,  have  exerted 
great  influence  in  the  domestic  and  foreign  affairs  of  China. 
Ward,  a  Yankee  from  Salem,  organized,  and  until  his  death,  led 
the  "Ever  Victorious  Army,"  which  for  the  time  saved  the 
Manchu  dynasty  and  later  brought  fame  to  Gordon.  Commo- 
dore Perry  opened  Japan  to  the  world  and  started  the  country 
on  its  spectacular  course.  In  fact,  the  policy  of  the  United  States 
in  that  part  of  the  world,  although  peaceful,  had  been  rather  ag- 
gressive.^'   It  was  now  assumed  that  the  acquisition  of  important 

22  Dr.  A.  B.  Hart,  Harper's  Mag.,  Feby.,  1899. 

23  See  generally,  Foster's  American  Diplomacy  in  the   Orient    (1903); 


THE   POLICY    OF   EXPANSION,  375 

territory  in  the  East  would  induce  the  United  States  to  enter  even 
more  actively  into  the  politics  of  that  part  of  the  world. 

There  was  no  apparent  reason  why  the  ownership  of  these 
islands  should  require  the  United  States  to  accept  invitations  to 
conferences  dealing  with  purely  European  affairs  such  as  she 
had  previously  declined.  But  the  world  agreed  in  assuming  that 
America  was  entering  upon  a  new  era  of  her  history,  and  to  a 
certain  extent  such  was  the  fact.  It  was  assumed  that  she  was 
now  full  grown,  and  Dewey's  battle  in  Manila  Bay  was  regarded 
as  a  sort  of  national  coming-out  party.  Henceforth  Columbia 
was  to  be  considered  in  society.  While  the  conservatives  shrank 
from  the  assumption  of  the  new  responsibilities  which  would 
result  from  the  policy  of  expansion,  such  things  had  no  terrors 
for  the  average  uncloistered  citizen  who  was,  in  fact,  very  willing 
to  get  down  into  the  dust  of  the  arena  and  battle  for  the  world's 
prizes. 

The  importance  of  the  economic  factor  in  the  policy  of  ex- 
pansion must  not  be  underestimated.  Nations  no  less  than  in- 
dividuals are  interested  in  dollars.  Statesmen  could  not  be  in- 
different to  the  commercial  possibilities  of  the  situation,  and  they 
were  disposed  to  give  them  due  consideration.  It  was  a  time 
when  trade  expansion  was  much  discussed  at  home.  In  an  ad- 
dress as  Chairman  of  the  Republican  National  Convention  which 
renominated  President  McKinley,  Senator  Henry  Cabot  Lodge 
said :  "We  make  no  hypocritical  pretense  of  being  interested  in 
the  Philippines  solely  on  account  of  others.  We  believe  in  trade 
expansion."  There  were  also  many  who  felt  that  some  of  the 
most  revered  of  our  political  maxims  had  outlived  their  useful- 
ness and  that  commercialism  had  become  the  directing  and  con- 
trolling force  in  international  affairs.^* 

Soon  after  the  Spanish  fleet  was  destroyed  measures  were 
taken  to  ascertain  the  real  and  potential  wealth  of  the  Philip- 
Morse,  Int.  Rel.  of  the  Chinese  Empire  (1910)  ;  Conant,  The  United  States 
in  the  Orient,  p.  156  et  seq.;  American  Foreign  Policy.  By  a  Diplomat; 
Chap.  5. 

2*  See  article  by  F.  A.  Vanderlip  in  Century  Magazine,  August,  1898,  also 
in  Senate  Doc.  62,  p.  563. 


376  THE   PHILIPPINES 

pines.  An  expert  was  detailed  to  report  upon  the  financial  and 
industrial  conditions  and  a  geologist,  charged  with  the  duty  of 
investigating  the  mineral  resources,  accompanied  the  first  ex- 
pedition to  Manila.^^ 

Nevertheless,  the  altruistic  factors  of  the  situation  were  those 
which  controlled.  Had  investigation  shown  that  the  islands  were 
commercially  and  economically  useless,  it  is  improbable  that  the 
McKinley  administration  would  have  pursued  any  course  other 
than  that  which  was  adopted.  The  president  could  not  be  made 
to  believe  that,  after  having  destroyed  the  power  of  Spain  and 
overthrown  the  existing  government,  the  United  States  could, 
consistent  with  its  obligations  to  foreign  residents  and  the  na- 
tives, withdraw  the  troops  and  leave  the  country  to  "stew  in  its 
own  juice."  It  was  largely  on  these  grounds  that  the  American 
people  sustained  the  administration  policy.  They  felt  that,  like 
the  Cubans,  the  Filipinos  were  entitled  to  receive  some  benefit 
from  the  destruction  of  Spanish  power.  Just  how  it  was  to 
come  about  they  were  not  then  able  to  say,  but  they  were  certain 
that  to  abandon  the  natives  to  their  own  devices  at  that  stage 
of  the  proceedings  would  be  to  inflict  upon  them  an  irreparable 
wrong.^^ 

It  was  not  until  after  the  treaty  was  ratified  that  the  policy 
of  expansion  became  a  party  issue.  While  many  members  of 
the  Democratic  party  were  affiliated  with  the  so-called  Anti- 
Imperialists,  others,  and  those  not  the  least  influential,  gave  active 
as  well  as  passive  support  to  the  administration  measures.  When 
the  treaty  was  before  the  Senate  party  lines  were  loosely  drawn. 
Senator  Hoar,  one  of  the  old-time  leaders  of  the  Republican 
party,  led  the  opposition  to  ratification,  while  Senator  Gray, 
who  as  a  member  of  the  Peace  Commission  had  opposed  the 

25  Senate^  Doc.  62,  pp.  513-518. 

26  One  distinguished  publicist,  writing  before  the  capture  of  Manila  and 
when  American  dealings  with  the  Filipinos  had  not  extended  beyond  furnish- 
ing Aguinaldo  and  a  few  companions  with  free  transportation  from  Hong 
Kong,  giving  him  some  arms,  and  putting  him  ashore  with  the  advice  to  "get 
his  army  going,"  wrote,  "We  do  not  intend  to  hand  the  people  of  the  Philip- 
pines back  to  the  Spaniards,  and  our  sense  of  decency  and  respect  for  the 
enlightened  opinion  of  mankind  will  not  permit  us  to  abandon  them."  Rev. 
of  Rev..  July,  1898. 


THE   POLICY   OF   EXPANSION  377 

acquisition  of  the  islands,  spoke  and  voted  in  favor  of  ratifica- 
tion. But  for  the  votes  of  democratic  senators  the  treaty  would 
have  been  defeated.  It  rested  with  Mr.  W.  J.  Bryan,  who  had 
been  the  Democratic  candidate  for  the  presidency  in  the  pre- 
ceding election,  to  determine  the  issue.  How  his  influence  was 
exerted  is  thus  told  by  Senator  Hoar :  "Mr.  Bryan,  in  the  height 
of  the  contest,  came  to  Washington  for  the  express  purpose  of 
urging  upon  his  followers  that  it  was  best  to  support  the  treaty, 
end  the  war,  and  let  the  question  of  what  should  be  done  with 
our  conquest  be  settled  in  the  coming  campaign.  He  urged  upon 
them,  as  I  was  told  by  several  Democrats  at  the  time  who  did 
not  take  his  advice,  that  the  Democratic  party  could  not  hope 
to  win  a  victory  on  the  financial  questions  at  stake,  as  they  had 
been  "beaten  on  them  in  a  time  of  adversity ;  and  that  they  must 
have  this  issue  for  the  coming  campaign.  He  was  besought  by 
his  wiser  political  associates  to  go  away  and  leave  the  Senate 
to  settle  the  matter.  But  he  remained.  After  that  it  became 
impossible  not  only  to  defeat  the  treaty,  but  to  defeat  the  policy 
which  had  inspired  it."^'' 

According  to  Senator  Hoar,  the  Democratic  party,  at  least 
in  the  early  days  of  the  controversy,  were  not  earnestly  and  se- 
riously opposed  to  the  acquisition  of  the  Philippines.  They  never 
wielded  their  party  strength  in  opposition  to  it.  The  leaders  sup- 
ported the  administration  in  enacting  the  legislation  necessary 
to  suppress  the  insurrection  which  followed  the  ratification  of 
the  treaty.^®  *T  do  not  mean  to  imply,"  says  Senator  Hoar, 
"that  a  large  number  of  the  Democratic  party,  both  in  public  life 
and  out  of  it,  were  not  sincere  and  zealous  in  their  objection  to 
this  wretched  business.  But  next  to  a  very  few  men  who  con- 
trolled the  policy  of  the  Republican  party  in  this  matter,  Mr. 


"  Autobiography,  II,  p.  322. 

28  In  the  Washington  Post  of  February  6.  1899,  Sen.  Bacon  is  quoted  as 
saying :  "I  will  cheerfully  vote  all  the  money  that  may  be  necessary  to  carry 
on  the  war  in  the  Philippines,  but  I  still  maintain  that  we  could  have  avoided 
a  conflict  with  those  people  had  the  Senate  adopted  my  resolution  or  a  similar 
resolution  announcing  our  honest  intentions  with  regard  to  the  Philippines." 


37«  THE    PHILIPPINES 

Bryan  and  his  followers  who  voted  in  the  Senate  for  the  treaty, 
are  responsible  for  the  results."^^ 

On  February  10,  1899,  a  few  days  after  the  attack  by  the 
Filipinos  upon  the  American  troops,  the  treaty  was  ratified  by 
a  vote  of  fifty-seven  to  twenty-seven.  Three  Democratic  sen- 
ators, who  had  been  understood  to  be  in  opposition,  voted  in  the 
affirmative  and  saved  the  treaty.^" 

Mr.  Bryan  and  his  followers  thus  consented  to  the  acquisition 
of  the  Philippines  by  the  United  States.  As  conditions  then 
were  it  was  the  proper  thing  for  them  to  do.  They  could  very 
properly  support  the  treaty  and  yet  oppose  the  permanent  re- 
tention of  the  islands.  But  on  the  questions  of  the  propriety 
or  morality  of  the  acquisition  it  was  incumbent  on  them  there- 
after to  maintain  silence. 

On  the  motion  of  one  of  the  Democratic  senators  who  had 
voted  for  ratification,  the  Senate,  by  a  majority  vote  only,  then 
passed  a  resolution  similar  to  the  one  which  previously  had  been 
offered  by  Senator  Bacon,  declaring  that  the  ratification  of  the 
treaty  was  not  to  be  deemed  a  determination  that  the  United 
States  would  permanently  hold  the  islands.     This  was  merely 

^^Autobiography,  II,  p.  323. 

In  a  letter  to  the  author  dated  November  9,  1915,  Mr.  Bryan  says :  "Sen- 
ator Hoar's  criticism  of  my  position  is  unjust.  He  looks  at  the  matter  from 
the  standpoint  of  a  Republican,  I  from  the  standpoint  of  a  Democrat.  The 
situation  was  this :  It  might  have  been  possible  to  defeat  the  ratification  of 
the  treaty,  but  it  was  impossible  to  itistrtict  the  commission  and,  of  course, 
it  was  not  proper  according  to  the  theory  of  our  institutions  that  a  minority 
should  dictate  to  the  majority  how  the  treaty  should  be  made.  .  .  .  The 
Democratic  party,  however,  was  to  furnish  the  bulk  of  the  votes  to  defeat  the 
treaty  and  our  party  would  have  had  to  bear  the  responsibility  for  anything 
that  might  have  happened  as  a  result  of  the  rejection  of  the  treaty.  .  .  . 
Then,  too,  a  great  pressure  was  being  brought  to  bear  upon  the  government 
by  parents  to  get  their  boys  out  of  the  army,  the  actual  fighting  being  over, 
and  this  blame,  too,  would  have  been  thrown  upon  the  Democratic  party, 
the  few  Republicans  being  unable  to  commit  their  party  or  fasten  the  respon- 
sibility upon  it._  .  .  .  My  advice  was  to  ratify  the  treaty  and  at  the  same 
time  promise  independence  by  resolution.  ...  As  the  leader  of  the 
Democratic  party  I  was  interested  in  having  it  pursue  a  course  which  would 
give  it  the  largest  possibility  of  doing  good  with  the  least  risk  of  being  held 
responsible  for  things  which  it  could  not  prevent."  In  the  light  of  this  state- 
ment, it  is  difficult  to  see  wherein  Senator  Hoar's  criticism  is  unjust. 

^^  Senate  Journal,  SS  Cong.,  3d  Sess.,  p.  216;  40  Republicans,  10  Demo- 
crats, 3  Populists,  2  Silverites  and  2  Independents  voted  for  ratification,  and 
22  Democrats,  3  Republicans  and  2  Populists  voted  against  it.  Sen,.  Doc.  182, 
57  Cong.,  1st  Sess. 


THE   POLICY    OF   EXPANSION  379 

a  formal  expression  of  the  sentiments  of  individual  senators. 
The  resolution  was  never  presented  to  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives, and  it  had  no  legal  force.^^ 

In  Spain  the  treaty  encountered  even  greater  opposition  than 
in  the  United  States.  The  Cortes  refused  to  ratify  it,  and  on 
March  19  the  queen  regent,  in  the  exercise  of  a  constitutional 
alternative  power,  ratified  it  in  her  own  name.  The  ratifications 
were  exchanged  on  April  11,  1899,  and  on  that  date  the  Spanish- 
American  War  came  legally  to  an  end  and  the  sovereignty  of 
the  United  States  over  the  Philippine  Archipelago  became  an  es- 
tablished fact.  Thereafter  the  question  was  as  to  the  manner 
of  governing  the  people  and  the  ultimate  disposition  of  the  coun- 
try. After  the  lapse  of  nearly  two  decades  it  is  clear  that 
the  fears  of  the  Anti-Imperialists  were  groundless.  The  United 
States  has  not  become  embroiled  in  the  affairs  of  Europe; 
neither  has  it  become  wedded  to  militarism,  nor  have  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  fathers  suffered  to  any  appreciable  extent.  The 
Pax  Americana  envelopes  the  Philippine  Archipelago  and  the 
natives  enjoy  a  civil  and  political  liberty  and  a  general  material 
prosperity  such  as  they  never  before  experienced. 

^Cong.  Rec,  VoL  XXXII,  pt.  2,  Feb.  14,  1899,  pp.  1845-7;  The  Diamond 
Rings,  183  U.  S.  Rep.  176.    Brown,  J. 

The  rejection  of  the  treaty  would  have  placed  the  country  in  a  serious 
situation.  "The  President,"  said  Senator  Lodge,  "can  not  be  sent  back  across 
the  Atlantic  in  the  person  of  his  Commissioners,  hat  in  hand  to  say  to  Spain, 
with  bated  breath,  T  am  here  in  obedience  to  the  mandate  of  a  minority  of 
one-third  of  the  Senate  to  tell  you  that  we  have  been  too  victorious,  and  that 
you  have  yielded  us  too  much,  and  that  I  am  sorry  that  I  took  the  Philippines 
from  you.'  I  do  not  think  that  any  American  President  would  do  that,  or 
that  any  American  would  wish  him  to."  Olcott's  Life  of  William  McKinley, 
II,  p.  138. 


CHAPTER  XV 
The  Diplomacy  of  the  Consulates 

EARLY  RELATIONS  WITH  THE  INSURGENTS 

Charges  of  Bad  Faith — Consular  Activities — Wildman's  Relations  with  Hong 
Kong  Junta — Forbidden  to  Discuss  Policies — Aguinaldo  at  Singapore — The 
Pratt-Dewey  Cables — No  Reference  to  Independence — Aguinaldo  at  Hong 
Kong — Minutes  of  Meeting  of  Junta — Aguinaldo  Meets  Dewey — Is  As- 
sisted with  Arms — Organizes  Army  and  Government — Dewey's  Statement — 
Proclaims  Independence — Origin  of  the  Promise  Myth — Filipino  Claims 
— Bray  and  St.  Clair — Aguinaldo's  Report  to  the  Junta — Summary — Filipino 
Plans  and  Policies — American  Policy  Unknown — No  Promise  Made  and  No 
Bad  Faith. 

According  to  Carl  Schurz  and  other  radical  Anti-Imperi- 
alists, America's  early  relations  with  the  Filipino  insurgents 
make  "a  story  of  deceit,  false  pretense  and  brutal  treachery 
to  friends  without  parallel  in  the  history  of  republics."^  The 
constant  repetition  of  such  charges  has  left  a  vague  impression 
on  the  public  mind  that  the  government  of  the  United  States, 
President  McKinley,  President  Roosevelt,  Admiral  Dewey  and 
their  subordinates  in  the  Far  East  were  guilty  of  acts  of  bad 
faith  in  their  relations  with  the  Filipino  leaders  and  that  there 
is  a  sort  of  moral  cloud  on  our  title  to  the  Philippines. 

Aguinaldo  and  his  advisers  claimed  that  the  American  gov- 
ernment, through  its  authorized  representatives,  promised  ex- 
pressly and  by  implication,  in  return  for  his  military  cooperation, 
to  assist  in  establishing  an  Independent  state  In  the  Philippines. 
Their  supporters  In  the  United  States  have  placed  the  stress  on 
the  implications  said  to  result  from  a  de  facto  alliance  with  the 
Filipino  organization.  The  records  of  the  American  and  Fili- 
pino governments  and  armies  are  now  accessible  and  there  is  no 

1  Bancroft,  Reminiscences  of  Carl  Schurs,  III,  p.  446.  See  Chap.  XVII, 
infra. 

380 


THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  CONSULATES      381 

reason  for  any  further  misunderstanding  as  to  >vhat  actually  oc- 
curred.   The  facts  are  no  longer  in  doubt.^ 

The  early  relations  with  Aguinaldo  had  more  effect  upon  sen- 
timent in  the  United  States  than  upon  the  actual  military  con- 
ditions in  the  Philippines.  The  importance  and  extent  of  the 
assistance  rendered  the  United  States  by  the  insurgents  have  been 
greatly  exaggerated.  They  were  merely  such  as  were  incidental  to 
their  own  operations.  Manila  lay  defenseless  under  the  guns 
of  the  fleet.  All  Dewey  needed  was  men  to  garrison  it.  The 
city  would  have  fallen  had  there  been  no  insurgents  and  the 
Spanish  troops  would  have  become  prisoners  of  war  whether  they 
were  in  Manila  or  in  the  provinces.® 

2  The  captured  records  of  the  insurgent  government  and  army  were  de- 
posited in  the  archives  of  the  War  Department  at  Washington.  Captain  (now 
Major)  John  R.  M.  Taylor  was  detailed  to  prepare  an  official  history  of  the 
insurrection  based  upon  these  records.  One  volume  of  narrative  and  two 
supplementary  volumes  of  documents  were  prepared  by  him  and  printed,  but 
Mr.  Taft,  then  secretary  of  war,  after  reading  the  proofs,  decided  that  while 
the  government  was  cultivating  friendly  relations  with  the  Filipinos,  it  would 
be  contrary  to  public  policy  to  publish  the  record  of  their  cruelties  and  treach- 
ery. The  type  was  therefore  thrown  down.  Two  copies  of  the  galley-proofs 
were  preserved  and  deposited,  one  in  the  War  Department  at  Washington, 
and  the  other  in  the  Department  of  Commerce  and  Police  at  Manila.  I  have 
made  use  of  the  Manila  copy  in  preparing  this  chapter,  but  the  references  are 
to  the  War  Department  records.  Major  Taylor's  text  is  cited  under  his  name, 
followed  by  the  numbers  of  the  proof  sheets.  The  documents  are  cited  as 
Philippine  Insurgent  Records,  with  the  file  number  or  the  exhibit  number  in 
the  matter  prepared  by  Captain  Taylor. 

A  pamphlet  edited  by  Captain  Taylor  entitled  Telegraphic  Correspondence 
of  Emilio  Aguinaldo,  July  15,  l8g8,  to  November  28,  iSgg,  annotated,  was 
published  in  1903.  _ 

A  few  of  the  insurgent  records  were  printed  in  Taylor's  Report  on  the 
Organisation  for  the  Administration  of  Civil  Government  Instituted  by 
Emilio  Aguinaldo  and  His  followers  (Washington,  1903). 

3  For  various  opinions  as  to  the  value  of  the  services  rendered  to  the 
Americans  by  the  Filipino  army,  see  Century  Magazine  for  May,  1899  (Gen. 
F.  V.  Greene)  ;  Sen.  Doc.  62,  p.  375  (Gen.  Merritt). 

Admiral  Dewey  in  his  testimony  in  1902  was  inclined  to  belittle  the  value 
of  such  services.  In  reply  to  questions  he  said :  'T  would  like  to  say  now, 
that  Aguinaldo  and  his  people  were  forced  on  me  by  Consul  Pratt  and  Consul 
Williams.  ...  I  did  not  think  they  would  do  anything.  I  would  not  have 
taken  them.  I  did  not  want  them,  I  did  not  believe  in  them.  .  .  .  They 
were  assisting  us.  .  .  i  They  were  assisting  us,  but  incidentally  they  were 
fighting  their  own  enemies.  ...  It  was  their  own  idea  coming  over  there. 
We  could  have  taken  the  city  on  any  moment  we  had  the  troops  to  occupy  it." 
Sen.  Doc.  25,  pp.  37-31. 

In  his  proclamations  to  the  people  Aguinaldo  generally  claimed  to  have 
an  alliance  with  the  Americans  but  in  his  reply  to  Paterno's  Manifesto  in 
favor  of  an  alliance  with  Spain  instead  of  the  United  States,  Aguinaldo  said : 
"Remember,  Senor  Paterno,  that  we  make  war  without  the  help  of  any  one; 


B92  THE   PHILIPPINES 

Although  the  Spanish  "policy  of  attraction"  was  making  some 
headway  among  the  Tagalogs,  the  Filipinos  generally  were  no 
more  loyal  to  Spain  than  they  had  been  before  the  pact  of  Biak- 
na-bato.  The  reforms  which  they  had  been  told  were  to  result 
from  the  banishment  of  their  leaders  had  not  materialized  and 
in  certain  parts  of  the  country  the  fires  of  revolt  had  again  been 
lighted.  But  the  leaders  were  discouraged  and  hopeless.  It  was 
inevitable  that  a  declaration  of  war  against  Spain  by  the  great 
Republic  of  the  West,  the  traditional  friend  of  the  South  Amer- 
ican colonies  and  the  champion  of  Cuba  Libre,  would  revive  the 
hopes  of  the  insurgents.  But  Aguinaldo  failed  to  grasp  the  sit- 
uation and  left  Hong  Kong  at  the  time  when  it  was  most  im- 
portant for  the  Philippine  leaders  to  be  within  reach  of  Manila.* 
What  the  Insurgents  could  have  accomplished  without  Aguinaldo 
is,  of  course,  mere  conjecture.  Some  inspiration  came  from  the 
widely  advertised  claim  that  there  was  an  "alliance"  with  the 
Americans.  Without  Aguinaldo,  Luna  the  soldier,  and  Mabini 
•  the  politician,  might  have  organized  a  formidable  movement 
against  Spain,  but  the  probabilities  are  that  Aguinaldo  was  the 
only  Filipino  then  capable  of  consolidating  the  factions.  He 
showed  no  particular  capacity  as  a  general  or  as  a  constructive 
politician.  Other  men  planned  his  campaigns,  fought  his  battles, 
wrote  his  proclamations  and  organized  his  government.  He  was 
at  that  time  only  twenty-nine  years  old  and  almost  pathetically 

not  even  the  North  Americans ;  but  no !  We  have  the  help  of  God,  who  is 
eternally  allied  with  great  and  just  causes  such  as  that  which  we  defend 
against  Spain,  our  own  beloved  independence."  Paterno's  Manifesto  and 
Aguinaldo's  reply  are  published  in  full  in  Foreman's  The  Philippine  Islands, 
pp.  438-445  (1906).  The  insurgent  newspaper,  La  Independencia,  for  No- 
vember 22,  1899,  concedes  that  "America  has  aided  us  indirectly  by  the 
blockade  of  Manila,"  but  does  not  claim  that  the  Filipinos  had  in  any  way 
assisted  the  United  States. 

*  Major  Taylor  says  (Taylor,  I,  42,  F.Z.)  :  "In  fact,  Aguinaldo  had  no  just 
conception  of  the  conditions  and  opportunities  which  were  about  to  open 
before  the  Hong  Kong  junta  for,  although  war  between  Spain  and  the  United 
States  was  imminent  and  the  United  States  squadron  was  at  Hong  Kong 
threatening  Manila,  Aguinaldo  was  chiefly  concerned  in  finding  how  to  avoid 
losing  the  money  which  had  been  received  from  the  Spanish  Government  as 
the  price  of  his  surrender.  The  importance  of  his  presence  near  the  Philip- 
pines in  case  of  war  did  not  occur  to  him  or.  if  it  did  occur  to  him,  anything 
which  he  could  obtain  there  from  the  United  States  seemed  for  the  moment 
of  little  consequence  compared  with  escaping  from  his  wrangling  companions 
with  enough  money  to  live  on  in  Paris." 


THE    DIPLOMACY    OF   THE    CONSULATES      383 

ignorant  of  the  world  beyond  the  island  of  Luzon,  where  he  had 
spent  his  life.  He  knew  nothing  of  books  and  little  of  men  and 
events  beyond  the  islands.  He  was,  nevertheless,  a  born  leader 
of  men.  He  was  dignified,  ambitious  and  personally  honest,  and 
nature  had  endowed  him  with  those  undefinable  qualities  which 
induced  men  of  much  greater  ability  and  intelligence  to  accept 
his  leadership.  He  and  the  members  of  the  Hong  Kong  junta 
were  the  leaders  of  the  movement  for  independence.  Had  they 
not  been  brought  back  to  the  islands  the  insurgents  might  have 
continued  the  contest  against  the  Spaniards,  but  it  is  very  doubt- 
ful whether  there  would  have  been  a  revolt  against  the  United 
States,  as  the  leadership  would  probably  have  fallen  to  more 
conservative  men. 

The  initial  responsibility  for  injecting  Agulnaldo  and  the  Hong 
Kong  junta  into  American  affairs  rests  with  certain  United 
States  consular  officials  in  the  Far  East.  When  the  Spanish- 
American  War  began  our  commercial  interests  were  represented 
at  Manila  by  Oscar  G.  Williams,  at  the  British  port  of  Hong 
Kong  by  Rounceville  Wildman  and  at  Singapore  in  the  Straits 
Settlements  by  E.  Spencer  Pratt.  The  position  of  American 
consul  at  Manila  had  been  of  slight  importance.  Williams, 
judged  by  his  official  correspondence,  was  a  typical  old-fashioned 
consul  who  wrote  rhetorical  despatches  in  which  he  did  not  al- 
ways discriminate  nicely  between  rumors  and  ascertained  facts.* 
When  the  crisis  came  he  performed  his  duties  well  and  was  com- 
mended by  Admiral  Dewey  and  the  State  Department.  He  was 
called  to  Hong  Kong  to  report  on  the  condition  of  the  Spanish 
defenses  and  was  thus  enabled  to  return  to  Manila  with  the  fleet 


'  On  August  5,  1898,  Consul  Williams  wrote  the  State  Deiwirtment  solicit- 
ing an  appointment  in  the  Philippines  as  either  general  commissioner  of  cus- 
toms, general  commissioner  of  agriculture,  superintendent  of  public  instruc- 
tion, or  lighthouse  inspector. 

"For  many  years,"  he  wrote,  "T  have  made  a  special  study  of  tariff  and 
economic  questions ;  have  translated  the  Philippine  tariff,  and  so  have  a  meas- 
ure of  fitness.  Then  I  was  reared  a  farmer  and  my  business  interests  having 
always  been  along  such  lines,  I  have  kept  fully  abreast  of  agricultural  matters. 
I  am  a  graduate  of  Cornell  University  and  for  about  twenty  years  was  a 
teacher,  lecturer,  and  author."  Sen.  Doc.  62,  Part  i,  55  Cong.,  3rd  Sess.,  p. 
332. 


384  THE   PHILIPPINES 

and  observe  the  battle  from  the  bridge  of  the  Olympia.  His 
relations  with  the  Filipinos  were  friendly  and  sympathetic.  He 
assumed  from  the  first  that  the  islands  would  be  conquered  and 
annexed  to  the  United  States  and  that  the  Filipinos  would  gladly 
accept  such  a  solution  of  their  difficulties.  The  desirability  of 
securing  the  military  cooperation  of  the  insurgents  was  to  him 
self-evident.* 

Wildman,  at  Hong  Kong,  seems  to  have  been  fairly  well  qual- 
ified for  his  duties.  He  had  lived  among  the  Malays  of  the 
Straits  Settlements  and  had  some  knowledge  of  Malay  charac- 
ter. His  sympathies  were  with  the  insurgents  and  he  believed 
that  they  desired  the  annexation  of  the  islands  to  the  United 
States. 

E.  Spencer  Pratt  had  been  minister  to  Persia,  but  when  he 
was  selected  for  the  post  of  consul  at  Singapore  it  is  im- 
probable that  his  qualifications  for  diplomacy  were  care- 
fully investigated.  He  proved  to  be  an  ambitious  busy- 
body who,  by  meddling  with  matters  which  were  beyond  the 
scope  of  his  official  duties,  succeeded  in  putting  his  country  in 
a  false  light  before  the  world.  Williams  had  slight  opportunity 
to  muddle  things  and  so  did  fairly  well.  Wildman  maintained 
improper  relations  with  the  Filipino  exiles  before  the  war  and 
improperly  assumed  to  control  their  actions  after  war  was  de- 
clared. Pratt  was  incompetent,  had  no  sense  of  official  propriety, 
misconceived  the  nature  of  his  duties  and  was  guilty  of  indis- 
creet acts  and  conduct  which  enabled  the  insurgents  to  claim  with 
color  of  truth  that  he  had  entered  into  a  formal  agreement  with 
Aguinaldo  and  that  Dewey  had  approved  it.    He  at  least  was 


6  Mr.  Williams  to  Mr.  Day,  May  12,  1898,  Sen.  Doc.  62,  p.  327.  On  May  12 
Williams  wrote  that  from  the  naval  battle  "must  come  the  acquisition  of  these 
islands,  many  times  more  extensive,  more  populous,  and  more_  valuable  than 
Cuba."  On  June  16  he  wrote,  "I  expect  that  on  July  4  we  will  celebrate  in 
Manila  under  the  folds  of  Old  Glory  and  write  in  living  letters  a  page  of 
history  that  this  magnificent  insular  empire  has  become  a  part  and  parcel  of 
the  United  States  of  America."  On  July  2  he  expressed  the  ill-advised  hope 
that  10,000  American  workmen  and  artisans  would  during  the  year  settle  in 
the  islands.  On  August  5  he  wrote :  "Presumably  when  Manila  falls  and  the 
Philippines  become  a  part  of  our  rational  domain,"  etc.  Sen.  Doc.  62,  pp. 
330,  332. 


THE   DIPLOMACY   OF   THE   CONSULATES      385 

typical  of  the  men  who  were  formerly  appointed  to  positions 
in  the  consular  service  as  rewards  for  political  work  on  the  gen- 
eral theory  that  if  they  did  the  country  no  good  they  could  at 
least  do  it  no  harm  when  so  far  away  from  it.  In  this  instance 
extraordinary  conditions  arose  which  called  for  the  exercise  of 
intelligent  discretion  and  judgment.'' 


The  insurrection  in  the  Philippines  had  not  attracted  much 
attention  in  the  United  States.  When  Commodore  George 
Dewey  at  Nagasaki  on  June  2,  1897,  assumed  command  of  the 
Asiatic  squadron,  he  was  officially  informed  that,  while  the  news- 
papers had  occasionally  referred  to  a  revolution  in  the  Philip- 
pines, no  information  had  been  received  which  suggested  that 
American  interests  were  likely  to  be  affected.®  But  the  atten- 
tion of  the  State  Department  had,  shortly  before  that  time,  been 
called  to  the  existence  of  the  insurgents  through  a  remarkable 
letter  from  the  United  States  consul  at  Hong-Kong.*  The  rev- 
olutionary government  of  1896  had  sent  a  young  lawyer 
named  Agoncillo  to  represent  it  abroad.  While  the  negotia- 
tions between  the  Spanish  governor-general  and  Aguinaldo 
which  led  to  the  pact  of  Biak-na-bato  were  in  progress  Agoncillo 
was  in  Hong  Kong  bearing  a  commission  as  foreign  agent  and 
high  commissioner  of  the  Philippine  Republic.  Consul  Wildman 
was  at  that  time  in  close  communion  with  the  group  of  Filipinos 
who  were  then  living  in  Hong  Kong  as  political  exiles.  On 
November  3,  1897,  about  six  months  before  the  declaration  of 
war  against  Spain,  he  informed  Washington  that  in  view  of  a 
possible  war  between  the  United  States  and  Spain  Agoncillo  had, 
on  behalf  of  the  Republic  of  the  Philippines,  offered  to  enter 


"^  Certain  letters  written  by  Mr.  Wildman  to  Aguinaldo  during  June  and 
July,  1898,  do  not  put  the  consul-general  in  a  very  favorable  light  They 
were  printed  in  connection  with  Buencamino's  Address  to  Congress,  August 
20,  1899.    Cong.  Rec,  57  Cong.,  ist  Sess.,  p.  6180. 

*  Dewey's  Autobiography,  p.  175.  No  American  vessel  had  visited  Manila 
for  three  years  and  the  last  official  report  relative  to  the  islands  was  dated 
1876.    Ibid.,  p.  175. 

"  Mr.  Williams  to  Mr.  Day,  Nov.  3,  1897.    Sen.  Doc.  62,  p.  333. 


386  THE   PHILIPPINES 

into  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance  with  the  United  States. 
Pending  the  execution  of  a  formal  treaty,  he  requested  that  the 
United  States  send  to  some  port  of  the  Philippines  twenty  thou- 
sand rifles  and  two  hundred  thousand  rounds  of  ammunition,  to 
be  paid  for  when  the  United  States  recognized  the  Independence 
of  his  government.  As  security,  the  high  commissioner  offered 
to  pledge  two  provinces  and  the  custom  house  at  Manila.  The 
price  to  be  paid  for  the  arms  was  of  slight  importance;  he  had 
no  objection  to  the  United  States  making  twenty-five  or  even 
thirty  per  cent,  profit.  As  Agonclllo  had  written  his  government, 
then  at  its  last  gasp  at  Blak-na-bato,  that  he  had  hopes  of  induc- 
ing the  United  States  to  supply  the  arms  and  was  threatening  to 
proceed  to  Washington  "to  conclude  the  proposed  treaty,"  the 
consul  thought  it  advisable  to  inform  the  Department  of  State 
of  the  nature  of  the  offer.  The  naivete  of  this  proposition 
seems  not  to  have  struck  the  consul,  as  he  communicated  It  with 
perfect  seriousness  to  the  Department.  He  was  curtly  directed 
to  inform  Agonclllo  that  the  United  States  did  not  negotiate 
such  treaties  and  to  forward  no  more  such  communications. 
Notwithstanding  this  rebuff,  Wildman  continued  to  have  close 
relations  with  the  Filipino  colony.  After  war  was  declared  and 
while  Aguinaldo  was  in  Singapore  consulting  with  Consul  Pratt, 
he  received  a  delegation  from  the  insurgent  junta  who  desired 
to  return  to  Manila  with  the  fleet,  and  pledged  them  to  obey 
the  orders  of  Dewey  and  observe  the  rules  of  civilized  warfare. 
After  consulting  Consul  Williams,  Wildman,  with  the  consent 
of  Dewey,  took  two  Filipinos  to  MIrs  Bay  and  put  them  on  board 
the  Olympia. 

Aguinaldo,  who  reached  Hong  Kong  from  Singapore  on  May 
2,  expressed  to  Wildman  a  desire  to  become  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States,  but,  being  informed  that  this  was  impossible, 
asked  to  be  allowed  to  go  to  Manila  and  place  himself  under 
the  orders  of  Dewey. ^^  It  was  finally  arranged  that  he  should 
sail  on  the  revenue  cutter  McCulloch,  and  Wildman  outlined  the 
proclamation  which  was  subsequently  issued  from  Cavite  for- 

10  Taylor,  Phil.  Insurg.  Rec,  44,  F.  Z. 


THE   DIPLOMACY    OF   THE   CONSULATES      387 

bidding  pillage  and  making  the  abuse  of  neutrals  a  criminal  of- 
fense/^ Two  months  thereafter  Wildman  wrote  to  the  State 
Department  that,  in  view  of  the  rumors  that  the  United  States 
on  the  conclusion  of  the  war  intended  to  return  the  islands  to 
Spain,  he  desired  to  say  that  after  years  of  experience  with  the 
thirty  or  forty  Filipino  leaders  with  whose  fortunes  he  had  been 
closely  connected,  he  knew  that  they  were  "fighting  for  annexa- 
tion to  the  United  States  firstly  and  for  independence  secondly, 
if  the  United  States  decides  to  decline  the  sovereignty  of  the 
Islands/'" 

The  close  association  of  the  American  consul  with  the  Fili- 
pino junta  naturally  caused  newspaper  comment  and  on  August 
6  there  came  a  cable  from  Washington  disapproving  statements 
which  Wildman  was  reported  by  the  London  Daily  Mail  to  have 
made  to  Aguinaldo,  and  forbidding  him  to  make  pledges  or  dis- 
cuss questions  of  policy  with  the  Filipino  leaders.  In  reply  he 
denied  that  he  had  made  any  pledges  or  discussed  the  policy  of 
America  with  Aguinaldo  further  than  to  try  to  hold  him  to  prom- 
ises made  before  he  left  for  Cavite.  He  and  Consul  Williams 
had  taken  the  position  that  the  insurgents  were  a  necessary  evil 
in  the  situation  and  that  if  Aguinaldo  was  placed  in  command 
Dewey  and  Merritt  would  have  some  one  they  could  hold  respon- 
sible for  excesses.  The  other  alternative  was  to  allow  the  islands 
to  be  overrun  by  small  bands  bent  on  revenge  and  looting.  They 
had  made  Aguinaldo  no  pledges  and  extracted  from  him  but  two 
promises,  to  obey  unquestioningly  the  commander  of  the  Amer- 
ican forces  and  to  conduct  his  warfare  on  civilized  lines.  He 
felt  that  he  had  taken  Aguinaldo's  measure,  had  some  influence 
with  him,  and  had  used  it  for  the  benefit  of  the  United  States. 


11  Mr.  Wildman  to  Mr.  Moore,  July  18.  1898.    Sen.  Doc.  62,  p.  336. 

12  Mr.  Williams  to  Mr.  Day,  July  18,  1898.  Sen.  Doc.  62,  p.  336.  In  this 
despatch  Wildman  says  that  he  was  in  Hong  Kong  in  Sept.,  i8g7,  when 
Aguinaldo  and  his  leaders  arrived  under  contract  with  the  Spanish  govern- 
ment and  that  after  waiting  until  November  1  for  the  payment  of  the  prom- 
ised money  by  Spain  they  lost  faith  in  tlie  promise  and  on  November  3 
Agoncillo  came  to  him  with  the  proposition  transmitted  to  the  Department  in 
his  despatch  of  November  3,  1897.  Supra,  p.  386.  This  is  a  mistake,  as 
Aguinaldo  and  his  companions  did  not  sail  from  the  Philippines  imtil  Decem- 
ber 27,  1897. 


388  THE    PHILIPPINES 

He  had  no  doubt  but  that  Aguinaldo  would  like  to  be  president 
of  the  Philippine  Republic  and  that  there  might  be  a  small  coterie 
of  his  native  advisers  who  entertained  a  like  ambition.  "But 
he  was  perfectly  certain  that  the  great  majority  of  his  followers 
and  all  the  wealthy,  educated  Filipinos  had  but  one  desire,  to 
become  citizens  of  the  United  States  of  America."^' 

II 

Without  occupation  and  denied  access  to  the  money  which  had 
been  furnished  by  Spain  for  their  support,  it  was  inevitable  that 
the  exiled  Filipinos  should  fall  to  quarreling  among  themselves. 
Aguinaldo  was  determined  to  conserve  the  funds  for  use  in  pos- 
sible future  military  operations.  He  seems,  however,  to  have 
become  discouraged  and  disgusted  with  his  companions,  and  after 
being  made  defendant  in  the  lawsuit  brought  by  Articho  to  com- 
pel a  distribution  of  the  money,  he  arranged  for  the  modest  sup- 
port of  the  rest  of  the  party,  drew  fifty  thousand  pesos  from 
the  bank  and,  under  assumed  names,  engaged  passage  to  Europe 
for  himself,  his  aide,  C.  H.  Del  Pilar,  and  his  secretary,  J.  M. 
Leyba.  The  party  went  first  to  Saigon  in  French  Indo-China 
and  from  there  to  Singapore,  where  they  arrived  on  April  22.** 

13  Mr.  Wildman  to  Mr.  Moore,  August  9,  1898.    Sen.  Doc.  62,  p.  338. 

His  admiration  for  the  insurgent  leaders  expressed  in  the  letter  of  July  8, 
had  now  somewhat  abated.  Aguinaldo  had  for  some  weeks  been  getting  what 
Dewey  called  the  "big  head"  and  had  been  writing  sulky  and  childish  letters. 
"My  correspondence  with  Aguinaldo  has  been  strictly  of  a  personal  nature 
and  I  have  missed  no  opportunity  to  remind  him  of  his  ante  helium  promises. 
His  letters  are  childish  and  he  is  far  more  interested  in  the  kind  of  cane  he 
will  carry  or  the  breast-plate  he  will  wear  than  in  the  figure  he  will  make  in 
history.  The  demands  that  he  and  his  junta  here  have  made  upon  my  time 
are  excessive  and  most  tiresome.  He  is  a  man  of  petty  moods  and  I  have  re- 
peatedly had  letters  from  Consul  Williams  requesting  me  to  write  to  Agui- 
naldo a  friendly  letter  congratulating  him  on  his  success  and  reminding  him 
of  his  obligations."    Sen.  Doc.  62,  p.  339. 

^  Under  the  Spanish  government  a  cane  was  the  badge  of  office  and  the  law 
still  prescribes  the  description  of  cane  which  certain  officers  may  carry. 

1*  Aguinaldo  undoubtedly  intended  to  go  to  Europe. 

In  an  article  in  the  Singapore  Free  Press,  May  4,  1898,  W.  G.  St.  Clair, 
evidently  upon  information  furnished  by  H.  W.  Bray,  made  the  absurd  state- 
ment that  "the  principal  purpose  of  Aguinaldo's  visit  to  Singapore  was  to 
consult  other  friends  here,  particularly  Mr.  Howard  W.  Bray,  an  old  and 
intimate  English  friend  and  for  fifteen  years  a  resident  of  the  Philippines, 
about  the  state  of  affairs  in  the  islands,  particularly  as  to  the  possibility  of 


THE   DIPLOMACY    OF   THE   CONSULATES      389 

Consul  Pratt  first  learned  of  Aguinaldo  from  an  Englishman 
named  Howard  W.  Bray,  who  had  formerly  lived  in  the  Philip- 
pines but  was  then  in  Singapore  writing  for  the  Singapore  Free 
Press.  Whether  he  had  known  Aguinaldo  personally  does  not 
appear.  He  certainly  knew  of  his  relation  to  the  insurrection 
and,  sensing  an  opportunity  which  might  be  turned  to  his  own 
advantage,  Bray  arranged  to  bring  the  American  consul  and  the 
former  insurrectionary  leader  together.  Aguinaldo,  with  a  letter 
of  credit  for  twenty-five  thousand  dollars  gold  and  a  ticket  to 
Europe  in  his  pocket,  seems  not  to  have  been  very  anxious  to 
consult  with  Pratt.  However,  during  the  night  of  April  22-23 
Pratt,  Aguinaldo,  Del  Pilar,  Leyba  and  a  Filipino  resident  of 
Singapore  named  Doctor  Marcelino  Santos  met  secretly  and 
talked  over  the  situation.  Pratt  neither  spoke  nor  understood 
Spanish  and  Aguinaldo  was  ignorant  of  English.  Bray,  who 
acted  as  interpreter,  was  active  in  the  interests  of  the  Filipinos, 
and  subsequently  received  five  thousand  dollars  from  Aguinaldo 
as  compensation  for  his  services  at  Singapore  and  Hong-Kong.*" 
It  very  satisfactorily  appears  from  Bray's  own  correspondence 
that  he  was  a  man  upon  whose  word  no  reliance  could  be  placed. 
Sastron  very  justly  observes  that  Bray  "engineered  the  whole 
proceedings."" 

After  his  first  talk  with  Aguinaldo,  Pratt  cabled  Commodore 
Dewey  that  if  desired  Aguinaldo  would  go  to  Hong  Kong  to 
arrange  with  him  for  the  cooperation  of  the  insurgents.  Dewey, 
who  was  expecting  orders  to  sail  for  Manila,  replied,  "Tell 
Aguinaldo  to  come  as  soon  as  possible."  After  receiving  this 
cable  Pratt  had  another  interview  with  Aguinaldo,  at  which 


war  between  the  United  States  and  Spain  and  ■whether  in  such  an  event  the 
United  States  would  eventually  recognize  the  independence  of  the  Philippines 
provided  he  lent  his  cooperation  to  the  Americans  in  the  conquest  of  the 
country."  Just  what  special  knowledge  of  the  possibility  of  war  between  the 
United  States  and  Spain  this  stray  English  newspaper  writer  in  Singapore 
had  does  not  appear.  The  article  was  written  a  few  days  after  Pratt  and 
Aguinaldo  had  their  interview,  and  was  designed  to  magnify  Mr.  Bray. 

^^  In  1902  Buencamino  said  {Hearings,  etc..  Com.  on  Ins.  Affrs.,  1901-1903, 
p.  283)  that  the  insurgent  treasury  was  called  upon  to  pay  $6,000  to  satisfy 
a  judgment  for  libel  which  Pratt  had  obtained  against  Bray  at  Singapore. 

^*  La  Insureccion  en  Filipinos,  pp.  415-419. 


390  THE   PHILIPPINES 

Leyba,  Del  Pilar  and  Bray  were  present,  the  latter  again  acting 
as  interpreter.  Immediately  thereafter,  on  April  26,  under  as- 
sumed names,  Aguinaldo  and  Leyba  sailed  for  Hong  Kong  on 
the  British  steamer  Malacca.^'^ 

On  the  following  day  Pratt  reported  to  the  secretary  of  state 
that  Aguinaldo  had  at  his  instance  gone  to  Hong  Kong  to  ar- 
range for  the  cooperation  of  the  insurgents  with  Dewey.  On 
the  twenty-eighth  he  wrote,  stating  that  after  learning  from  Ag- 
uinaldo the  object  sought  to  be  obtained  by  the  insurrectionary 
movement,  he  had  taken  it  upon  himself,  while  explaining  that  he 
"had  no  authority  to  speak  for  the  government,  to  point  out 
the  danger  of  continuing  independent  action  at  this  stage,  and 
having  convinced  him  of  the  expediency  of  cooperating  with 
our  fleet  then  at  Hong  Kong,  and  obtained  the  assurance  of  his 
willingness  to  proceed  further  and  confer  with  Commodore 
Dewey  to  that  end,  should  the  latter  so  desire,"  he  sent  the  cable- 
gram to  the  commodore. 

Appraising  highly  what  he  had  done,  Mr.  Pratt  added : 

"I  think  that  in  arranging  for  his  direct  cooperation  with  the 
commander  of  our  forces  I  have  prevented  possible  conflict  of 
action  and  facilitated  the  work  of  occupying  and  administering 
the  Philippines."" 

Pratt  certainly  realized  that  Aguinaldo  was  thinking  of  in- 
dependence, but  from  this  correspondence  it  is  clear  that  Pratt 
was  not  then  conscious  that  he  had  promised  that  the  United 
States  would  assist  Aguinaldo  in  establishing  an  independent 
government.  There  is  no  reference  to  independence  in  either 
of  his  letters  to  the  Departm.ent  or  in  the  two  telegrams,  and 
there  were  but  two,  which  passed  between  Pratt  and  Dewey,  nor 
does  Pratt  appear  even  to  have  discussed  the  conditions  upon 
which  the  anticipated  cooperation  should  be  carried  out.  That 
was  left  for  Dewey  and  Aguinaldo  to  arrange. 

17  Mr.  Pratt  to  Mr.  Day,  April  28,  1898.    Sen.  Doc.  62,  p.  341. 
"  Mr.  Pratt  to  Mr.  Day,  April  28,  1898.    Sen.  Doc.  62,  p.  342. 


THE   DIPLOMACY    OF   THE    CONSULATES      391 

On  April  30  Pratt  wrote  describing  his  final  interview  witK 
Aguinaldo.  After  stating  that  he  urged  upon  Aguinaldo  the  ne- 
cessity of  preventing  the  Filipino  forces  from  committing  ex- 
cesses and  was  told  that  once  in  the  field  he  "would  be  perfectly 
able  to  lead  them  as  our  commander  should  direct,"  Pratt  wrote :" 

"The  general  further  stated  that  he  hoped  the  United  States 
would  assume  protection  of  the  Philippines  for  at  least  long 
enough  to  allow  the  inhabitants  to  establish  a  government  of  their 
own,  in  the  organization  of  which  he  would  desire  American  ad- 
vice and  assistance.  These  questions  I  told  him  I  had  no  author- 
ity to  discuss/* 

On  June  2  Pratt  wrote  again,  calling  attention  to  the  report 
that  Aguinaldo  had  been  well  received  in  the  Philippines  and 
expressing  surprise  that  his  "cooperation  had  not  been  secured 
during  the  months  General  Aguinaldo  remained  awaiting  events 
in  Hong  Kong."  It  will  be  noted  that  these  letters  were  written 
by  Pratt  before  any  question  had  been  raised  as  to  the  propriety 
of  his  dealings  with  Aguinaldo  and  while  he  was  under  the 
pleasant  illusion  that  he  had  rendered  an  important  service  to 
his  country,  for  which  he  would  be  commended  and  rewarded. 
It  is  inconceivable  that  the  letter  of  April  30  could  have  been 
written  had  the  correspondence  between  Pratt  and  Dewey,  as 
was  subsequently  claimed,  contained  any  reference  to  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  Philippines. 

Pratt  attempted  to  keep  his  dealings  with  Aguinaldo  secret, 
but  Bray,  who  was  connected  with  the  Singapore  Free  Press  and 
was  working  with  St.  Clair,  its  editor,  to  further  the  interests 
of  the  Filipino  leaders,  prepared  an  article  describing  the  inter- 
im Mr.  Pratt  to  Mr.  Day,  April  30,  1898.  Sen.  Doc.  62,  p.  342. 
In  an  article  in  Collier's  Weekly,  April  13,  1901,  Pratt  said,  "From  the 
way  he  expressed  himself,  however,  I  realized  that  he  already  had  in  mind 
an  independent  government  in  the  Philippines  and  only  feared  lest  the  United 
States  should  abandon  the  islands  before  such  a  government  could  be  estab- 
lished." 

This  article,  written  after  the  capture  of  Aguinaldo,  shows  strong  preju- 
dice in  favor  of  the  insurgents.  On  April  7.  1913,  Mr.  Pratt  wrote  to  Presi- 
dent Wilson  that  "it  was  on  the  assumption  that  we  only  contemplated  a 
temporary  occupation  of  their  country,  that  the  Filipinos  entered  into  coop- 
eration with  us."    MSS.,  War  Dept 


392  THE    PHILIPPINES 

view  which  appeared  in  that  paper  on  May  4,  1898.  Pratt  sent 
a  copy  of  the  paper  to  Washington  with  the  statement  that  it  was 
substantially  correct,  notwithstanding  **a  certain  amount  of  con- 
jecture has  been  indulged  in  as  regards  my  action  in  the  matter 
and  that  of  the  Commodore."^" 

On  June  7  a  Singapore  paper  copied  an  article  entitled  "The 
Fate  of  the  Philippines"  from  the  London  Spectator,  in  which  the 
writer  expressed  the  hope  that  the  United  States  would  retain 
the  Philippines  and  join  Great  Britain  in  the  work  of  governing 
the  tropics.  The  suggestion  that  the  islands  could  be  garrisoned 
by  negro  troops  with  white  officers  and  easily  made  self-support- 
ing brought  a  vigorous  reply  from  Bray,  who  ridiculed  the  idea 
that  the  Filipinos  would  ever  consent  to  have  negro  troops  quar- 
tered in  their  country  and  asserted  that  the  only  possible  solution 
of  the  question  was  an  independent  government  under  the  pro- 
tection of  the  United  States.  "This,"  he  wrote,  "is  the  policy 
I  recommended  General  Aguinaldo  and  his  compatriots  to  ac- 
cept."^^  Pratt  forwarded  copies  of  these  articles  to  the  secretary 
of  state  with  the  comment  that  Bray's  opinion  was  deserving 
of  special  consideration. 

These  letters  and  cables  created  a  feeling  of  uneasiness  at 
Washington  and  Pratt  was  directed  by  cable  to  "avoid  unauthor- 
ized negotiations  with  Philippine  insurgents,"  and  in  reply  stated 
that  he  had  no  intention  to  negotiate  with  them  but  had  left  that 
to  Commodore  Dewey.  Pratt  now  anxiously  awaited  the  De- 
partment's opinion  of  his  course,  scarcely  believing  that,  as  he 
wrote  the  secretary,  "in  view  of  the  motives  which  prompted  it 
and  the  excellent  results  which  have  ensued,  that  it  can  be  alto- 
gether disapproved."^^ 


20  "Though  the  facts  are,  in  the  main,  correctly  given,  the  dates  are  not 
quite  accurate  and  a  certain  amount  of  conjecture  has  been  indulged  in  as 
regards  my  action  in  the  matter  and  that  of  the  Commodore."  Mr.  Pratt  to 
Mr.  Day,  May  5,  1898.    Sen.  Doc.  62,  p.  343. 

21  See  Sen.  Doc.  62,  pp.  348-350,  for  the  two  articles. 

22  On  July  28,  after  receiving  Secretary  Day's  despatch  of  June  16,  Pratt 
wrote :  "I  beg  to  repeat  that  ...  I  declined  even  to  discuss  with  General 
Aguinaldo  the  question  of  the  future  policy  of  the  United  States  with  regard 
to  the  Philippines,  that  I  held  out  no  hopes  to  him  of  any  kind,  committed 
the  Government  in  no  way  whatever,  and,  in  the  course  of  our  confidences, 


THE   DIPLOMACY   OF   THE   CONSULATES      393 

June  16,  immediately  after  sending  the  cablegram,  Secretary 
Day  wrote  to  Pratt  stating  his  understanding  of  what  had  been 
done  and  noting  particularly  that  the  consul  had  informed 
Aguinaldo  that  he  had  no  authority  to  speak  for  the  United 
States.  While  waiting  for  the  promised  full  report,  the  secre- 
tary assumed  that  the  consul  had  not  attempted 

"to  commit  this  government  to  any  alliance  with  the  Philippine 
insurgents.  To  obtain  the  unconditional  personal  assistance  of 
General  Aguinaldo  in  the  expedition  to  Manila  was  proper,  if 
in  so  doing  he  was  not  induced  to  form  hopes  which  it  might 
not  be  practicable  to  gratify.  This  government  has  known  the 
Philippine  insurgents  only  as  discontented  and  rebellious  subjects 
of  Spain  and  is  not  acquainted  with  their  purposes.  While  their 
contest  with  that  power  has  been  a  matter  of  public  notoriety, 
they  have  neither  asked  nor  received  from  this  government  any 
recognition.  The  United  States  in  entering  upon  the  occupation 
of  the  Islands  as  the  result  of  its  military  operations  in  that  quar- 
ter will  do  so  in  the  exercise  of  the  right  which  the  state  of  war 
confers,  and  will  expect  from  the  inhabitants,  without  regard 
to  their  former  attitude  toward  the  Spanish  Government,  that 
obedience  which  will  be  lawfully  due  from  them.  If  in  the  course 
of  your  conferences  with  General  Aguinaldo  you  acted  upon  the 
assumption  that  this  government  would  cooperate  with  him 
for  the  furtherance  of  any  plan  of  his  own,  or  that,  in  accepting 
his  cooperation  it  would  consider  itself  pledged  to  recognize  any 
political  claims  which  he  may  put  forward,  your  action  was  un- 
authorized and  can  not  be  approved."^' 

Unfortunately,  before  the  ominous  cable  of  June  16  had  put 
Pratt  on  his  guard  he  had  been  guilty  of  an  act  of  folly  which 
was  destined  to  close  his  career  as  a  representative  of  the  State 
Department.  He  had  been  the  object  of  a  serenade  by  a  Fili- 
pino  band  and  had  made  a  speech  in  French  to  an  audience  which 
understood  only  Spanish,  Tagalog  or  English.    On  June  8,  1898, 

never  acted  upon  the  assumption  that  the  Government  would  cooperate  with 
him — General  Aguinaldo — for  the  furtherance  of  any  plan  of  his  own,  nor 
that,  in  accepting  his  said  cooperation,  it  would  consider  itself  pledged  to 
recognize  any  political  claims  which  he  might  put  forward."  Sen.  Doc.  62, 
p.  358. 

23  Mr.  Day  to  Mr.  Pratt,  June  16,  1898.    Sen.  Doc.  62,  p.  354. 


394  THE   PHILIPPINES 

certain  Filipino  residents  in  Singapore — described  by  their 
spokesman,  Doctor  Santos,  as  "thirty  or  more  Filipinos,  nine  of 
the  higher  class,  fifteen  musicians,  and  the  remainder  of  the  mid- 
dle class," — assembled  before  the  consular  residence  and  "after  a 
little  quiet  music"  Doctor  Santos  read  an  address  to  the  consul 
which  expressed  the  "eternal  gratitude"  of  the  Filipinos  for 
the  moral  and  material  protection  which  Admiral  Dewey  had 
extended  to  General  Aguinaldo  and  their  thanks  to  the  consul 
"for  having  been  the  first  to  cultivate  relations  with  General 
Aguinaldo  and  arrange  for  his  cooperation  with  Admiral  Dewey, 
thus  supporting  our  aspirations." 
The  address  stated  that : 

"Our  countrymen  at  home  and  those  of  us  residing  here  .  .  . 
hope  that  the  United  States,  your  nation,  persevering  in  its  hu- 
mane policy,  will  efficaciously  second  the  program  arranged  be- 
tween you,  sir,  and  General  Aguinaldo,  in  the  port  of  Singapore 
and  secure  to  us  our  independence  under  the  protection  of  the 
United  States.""* 

Pratt's  formal  reply  contained  complimentary  words  for  the 
Filipinos  and  the  expressions  of  appreciation  proper  for  such 
an  interesting  occasion,  but  made  no  reference  to  Santos'  impli- 
cation that  there  had  been  an  arrangement  between  the  consul 
and  Aguinaldo  by  which  the  United  States  would  support  the 
insurgents  in  their  struggle  for  independence.  After  enthusi- 
astic vivcts  for  the  president  of  the  United  States,  Admiral 
Dewey,  Consul  Pratt,  General  Aguinaldo  and  the  Filipino  peo- 


2*  The  reports  of  the  serenade  and  English  translation  of  the  speeches 
from  the  Singapore  Free  Press  and  the  Straits  Times  are  printed  in  Sen  Doc. 
62,  pp.  351-353. 

Dr.  Santos  immediately  forwarded  copies  of  the  speech  and  an  account  of 
the  incident  to  Aguinaldo.  It  would  seem  that  the  serenade  was  not  unex- 
pected. "On  the  invitation  of  Mr.  Bray,"  says  Santos,  "we  ascended.  He 
(Mr.  Pratt)  received  us  in  his  private  office  and  it  was  imposing  to  see  that 
the  only  decoration  was  the  American  flag  which  covered  the  desk,  and  in  the 
center  a  carved  wooden  frame  holding  the  portrait  of  our  worthy  chief. 
After  the  speech  there  was  enthusiastic  applause  for  the  consul.  He  offered 
us  all  cigars,  glasses  of  very  fine  sherry,  and  lemonade  for  the  musicians 
and  the  majority."    Phil.  Insurg.  Recs.,  516,  4. 


THE    DIPLOMACY    OF   THE    CONSULATES      395 

pie,  and  the  presentation  by  Pratt  to  Santos  of  an  American 
flag^°  and  more  music  by  the  band,  the  ceremony  terminated. 

If  Mr.  Pratt  had  possessed  the  shghtest  knowledge  of  Filipino 
customs  he  would  have  regarded  the  incident  as  of  trifling  im- 
portance. But  his  vanity  led  him  to  regard  it  as  a  great  political 
event.  The  local  papers  published  glowing  accounts  of  the 
honor  which  had  been  paid  the  American  representative  and 
Pratt  forwarded  clippings  to  the  secretary  of  state  with  the 
suggestion  that  they  should  be  given  out  to  the  American  press. 
But  the  state  department  declined  to  cause  the  article  from  the 
Straits  Times  entitled  "Mr.  Spencer  Pratt's  Serenade,"  to  be  pub- 
lished in  the  American  press.    Secretary  Day  wrote  :^' 

"The  address  presented  to  you  by  the  twenty-five  or  thirty 
Filipinos  who  gathered  about  the  consulate  discloses  an  under- 
standing on  their  part  that  the  object  of  Admiral  Dewey  was 
to  support  the  cause  of  General  Aguinaldo  and  that  the  ultimate 
object  of  our  action  is  to  secure  the  independence  of  the  Philip- 
pines under  the  protection  of  the  United  States. 

"Your  address  does  not  repel  this  implication  and  it  moreover 
represents  that  General  Aguinaldo  was  'sought  out  by  you' 
whereas  it  had  been  the  understanding  of  the  Department  that 
you  received  him  only  upon  the  request  of  a  British  subject 
named  Bray  who  formerly  lived  in  the  Philippines-  Your  further 
reference  to  Aguinaldo  as  'the  man  for  the  occasion'  and  to  your 
'bringing  about'  the  'arrangement'  between  'General  Aguinaldo 
and  Admiral  Dewey  which  has  resulted  so  happily'  also  repre- 
sents the  matter  in  a  light  which  causes  apprehension  lest  your 
action  may  have  laid  the  ground  of  future  misunderstandings 
and  complications. 

"For  these  reasons  the  Department  has  not  caused  the  article 

25  The  Filipinos  always  wrote  their  confidential  letters  in  Tagalog.  Maj. 
Taylor  (Phil.  Insurg.  Recs.,  406,  7)  says:  "In  a  letter  written  in  Tagalog  to 
Aguinaldo  on  June  8  by  Santos,  he  described  the  American  Consul-Gen- 
eral  as  having  cried  out,  "Hurrah  for  General  Aguinaldo,  hurrah  for  the 
Republic  of  the  Philippines,'  and  then,  having  apparently  taken  several  drinks, 
he  passed  up  and  down  the  room  waving  the  American  flag  before  giving  it 
to  the  assembled  Filipinos." 

In  Santos'  version  of  Pratt's  speech  he  is  made  to  say  that  he  personally 
was  not  entitled  to  thanks  as  he  had  only  faithfully  followed  the  instructions 
from  his  government 

w  Mr.  Day  to  Mr.  Pratt,  July  20,  1898.   Sen.  Doc.  6s»  p.  356. 


396  THE    PHILIPPINES 

to  be  given  to  the  press  lest  it  might  seem  thereby  to  lend  a  sanc- 
tion to  views,  the  expression  of  which  it  had  not  authorized." 

On  August  2  the  Department  informed  Mr.  Pratt  that  it  noted 
with  pleasure  that  he  was  not  having  and  did  not  propose  to 
have  any  further  dealings  with  the  Philippine  insurgents. 

Ill 

But  as  St.  Clair  wrote  to  Bray,  "The  vital  thing,  and  nothing 
else  counts,  is  what  Dewey  said  and  did  when  he  at  last  met 
Aguinaldo.    That  is  the  thing,  all  else  is  empty  wind." 

What  Admiral  Dewey,  General  Aguinaldo  and  General  An- 
derson did  is  easily  ascertained.    But  what  did  they  sayf 

Dewey  asked  Aguinaldo  to  come  to  Hong  Kong,  but  before 
he  arrived  there  the  fleet  sailed  for  Manila.  With  the  admiral's 
consent  the  McCulloch  carried  Aguinaldo  and  thirteen  of  his 
companions  to  Cavite  where  they  arrived  nearly  three  weeks 
after  the  Spanish  fleet  had  been  destroyed.  Dewey  was  able  to 
take  Manila  at  any  time,  but  had  no  troops  with  which  to  gar- 
rison it.  After  an  interview  aboard  the  Olympia,  Dewey  told 
Aguinaldo  to  go  ashore  and  organize  his  army  and  gave  him 
some  guns  and  ammunition  with  which  to  equip  it.  He  soon  had 
twenty-five  or  thirty  thousand  men  and  was  so  successful  in 
fighting  the  Spaniards  that  they  were  driven  within  the  outer 
defenses  of  Manila.  With  success  Aguinaldo's  sense  of  im- 
portance expanded  and  he  proceeded  to  organize  a  government 
as  well  as  an  army.  On  May  24,  he  announced  himself  as 
dictator^'  and  on  July  18  proclaimed  a  form  of  dictatorial  gov- 
ernment, which  on  July  23  was  succeeded  by  the  Revolutionary- 
Government  with  a  paper  organization  of  executive,  congress 
and  courts.^*    In  a  proclamation  of  July  25  he  announced  that 

_  27  "I  again  assume  command  of  all  the  troops  in  the  struggle  for  the  at- 
tainment of  our  lofty  aspirations,  inaugurating  a  dictatorial  government  to  be 
administered  by  decrees  promulgated  under  my  sole  responsibility"  until  a 
regular  government  can  be  established. 

28  For  the  proclamations  of  June  18  and  June  23,  and  "message  to  foreign 
powers"  of  June  23,  see  Sen.  Doc.  62,  pp.  432-437.    Also  see  Capt  Taylor's 


THE   DIPLOMACY    OF   THE   CONSULATES      397 

the  Filipinos  no  longer  limited  themselves  "to  asking  for  assim- 
ilation with  the  political  constitution  of  Spain,  but  ask  for  com- 
plete separation  and  strive  for  independence,  completely  assured 
that  the  time  has  come  when  they;  can  and  ought  to  govern 
themselves." 

By  June  30,  1898,  when  General  Anderson  arrived  with 
troops,  the  insurgents  had  become  confident  and  were  determined 
to  fight  the  Americans  if  necessary  to  maintain  their  new  govern- 
ment. From  that  time  the  objects  of  the  Americans  and  Fili- 
pinos were  conflicting  and  friction  was  inevitable. 

The  controversy  centers  about  what  was  said  by  Admiral 
Dewey  and  General  Aguinaldo  at  their  first  interview  on  the 
Olympia.^^ 

During  the  hearing  on  Philippine  affairs^"  before  a  Committee 
of  the  Senate,  Admiral  Dewey  gave  an  interesting  account  of  his 
relations  with  the  Filipino  leaders : 

"I  should  think,"  said  he,  "that  about  a  month  before  leav- 
ing Hong  Kong,  that  is,  about  the  first  of  April,  when  it  became 
pretty  certain  that  there  was  to  be  war  with  Spain,  I  heard  that 
there  were  a  number  of  Filipinos  in  the  city  of  Hong  Kong  who 
were  anxious  to  accompany  the  squadron  to  Manila  in  case  we 
went  over.  I  saw  these  men  two  or  three  times  myself.  They 
seemed  to  be  all  very  young,  earnest  boys.  I  did  not  attach 
much  importance  to  what  they  said  or  to  themselves.  Finally 
before  we  left  Hong  Kong  for  Mirs  Bay  I  received  a  telegram 
from  Consul-General  Pratt  at  Singapore  saying  that  Aguinaldo 
was  there  and  anxious  to  see  me.  I  said  to  him,  'All  right,  tell 
him  to  come  on,'  but  I  attached  so  little  importance  to  Aguinaldo 
that  I  did  not  wait  for  him.  He  did  not  arrive  and  we  sailed  for 
Mirs  Bay  without  any  Filipinos." 

Dewey  did  not  take  the  Hong  Kong  Filipinos  very  seriously : 


Report  on  the  Organication  for  the  Administration  of  Civil  Government  by 
Emilio  Aguinaldo  (1903),  pp.  19-31. 

29  Admiral  Dewey  informs  me  that  some  Filipino  acted  as  interpreter  and 
that  members  of  his  staff  were  present  All  tlie  Americans  who  were  present, 
except  the  admiral,  are  dead. 

80  June  26,  1902,  Sen.  Doc.  331,  57  Cong.,  ist  Sess.,  Part  3;  Sen.  Doc.  62. 
p.  356. 


398  THE   PHILIPPINES 

"They  were  bothering  me,"  he  said.  "I  was  very  busy  getting 
my  squadron  ready  for  battle,  and  these  Httle  men  were  coming 
on  board  my  ship  at  Hong  Kong  and  taking  a  good  deal  of  my 
time,  and  I  did  not  attach  the  slightest  importance  to  anything 
they  could  do,  and  they  did  nothing;  that  is,  none  of  them  were 
with  me  when  I  went  to  Mirs  Bay.  There  had  been  a  good 
deal  of  talk,  but  when  the  time  came  they  did  not  go.  One  of 
them  didn't  go  because  he  didn't  have  any  tooth  brush" 

Such  an  excuse  naturally  left  a  bad  impression  on  the  mind 
of  the  American  commander,  who  was  not  familiar  with  Malay 
reasons  and  evasions.^^ 

Dewey's  first  official  reference  to  Aguinaldo  was  in  a  des- 
patch of  May  20,  in  which  he  informed  the  Navy  Department 
that  the  insurgent  leader  had  been  brought  down  from  Hong 
Kong  and  was  engaged  in  organizing  a  force  of  natives  which 
might  render  valuable  assistance.  He  was  immediately  cau- 
tioned that  it  was  "desirable  as  far  as  possible  and  consistent 
for  your  success  and  safety,  not  to  have  political  alliances  with 
the  insurgents  or  any  faction  in  the  islands  that  would  incur 
liability  to  maintain  their  cause  in  the  future."  Commodore 
Dewey  replied  on  June  3,  assuring  the  Department  that  he  had 
acted  from  the  beginning  in  the  spirit  of  these  instructions  and 
had  "entered  into  no  alliance  with  the  insurgents  or  with  any 
faction."^'' 

Dewey's  account  of  his  first  meeting  with  the  Filipino  general 
shows  the  patronizing  attitude  which  he  assumed.  Aguinaldo 
was  not  received  with  any  special  honors.^' 

"Aguinaldo  came  to  see  me.  I  said,  *Well  now,  go  ashore 
there,  we  have  got  our  forces  at  the  arsenal  at  Cavlte.    Go  ashore 

81  See  also,  Dewey,  Autobiography,  pp.  245-247. 

32  Dewey  added :  "This  squadron  can  reduce  the  defenses  of  Manila  at  any 
time,  but  it  is  considered  useless  until  the  arrival  of  sufficient  United  States 
forces  to  retain  possession."  Rcpt.  Bureau  of  Navigation,  1898,  p.  103.  In 
this  despatch  Dewey  stated  that  in  his  opinion  the  Filipinos  were  more  capable 
of  self-government  than  the  Cubans,  but  he  stated  later  that  he  thought 
neither  was  capable.  Sen.  Doc.  331,  57  Cong.,  ist  Sess.,  p.  2983;  Autobiog- 
raphy, Appendix  E. 

33  See  Admiral  Dewey's  testimony,  Con.  Rec,  Vol.  XXV,  57th  Cong.,  isi 
Sess.,  pp.  2928  et  seq. 


THE   DIPLOMACY    OF   THE   CONSULATES      399 

and  start  your  army/  He  came  back  in  the  course  of  a  few- 
hours  and  said,  'I  want  to  go  to  Japan.'  I  said,  'Don't  give  it 
up,  Don  Emilio/  I  wanted  his  help,  you  know.  He  did  not 
sleep  ashore  that  night.  He  slept  on  the  ship.  The  next  morn- 
ing he  went  on  shore,  still  within  my  lines,  and  began  recruiting 
men." 

In  order  to  aid  hini  to  "start  his  army"  Aguinaldo  was  given 
a  few  guns  and  allowed  to  help  himself  from  the  arms  which 
had  been  captured  at  Cavite.  Apparently  that  was  the  extent 
of  the  active  assistance  rendered  him.'* 

As  to  the  wishes  of  the  natives,  Dewey  testified,  "They  wanted 
to  get  rid  of  the  Spaniards;  I  do  not  think  they  looked  much  be- 
yond that."  He  did  not  know  what  the  future  policy  of  the 
government  would  be,  and  simply  used  his  best  judgment.  The 
first  that  Dewey  heard  of  independence  in  the  Philippines  was 
when  Aguinaldo  issued  his  proclamation  of  June  15. 

*T  attached  so  little  importance  to  this  proclamation  that  I 
did  not  even  cable  its  contents  to  Washington,  but  forwarded 
it  through  the  mails.  I  never  dreamed  that  they  wanted  inde- 
pendence. ...  I  was,"  he  says,  "waiting  for  troops  to  arrive, 
and  felt  sure  the  Filipinos  could  not  take  Manila,  and  I  thought 
that  the  closer  they  invested  the  city  the  easier  it  would  be  when 
our  troops  arrived  to  march  in.  The  Filipinos  were  our  friends 
assisting  us ;  they  were  doing  our  work." 

Up  to  the  time  the  army  arrived  Aguinaldo  did  everything  that 
Dewey  requested.  "He  was  most  obedient ;  whatever  I  told  him 
to  do  he  did.    I  saw  him  almost  daily." 

Having  been  instructed  to  report  fully  any  conferences,  rela- 
tions, or  cooperations,  military  or  otherwise,  which  he  had  had 
with  Aguinaldo,  the  admiral  on  June  27,  summarized  the  situ- 

8* Dewey  (Autobiography,  p.  247)  says:  "Aside  from  permitting  him  to 
establish  himself  ashore,  the  only  aid  rendered  him  was  a  gift  of  some  Mauser 
rifles  and  an  old  smooth-bore  gun  that  had  been  abandoned  by  the  Spanish. 
He  mounted  the  gun  on  a  float,  but  I  declined  to  grant  his  request  that  our 
launches  tow  it  across  the  bay.  In  short,  my  policy  was  to  avoid  any  en- 
tangling alliance  with  the  insurgents,  while  I  appreciated  that  pending  the 
arrival  of  our  troops  they  might  be  of  service  in  clearing  the  long  neck  of 
land  that  stretches  out  from  Cavite  Peninsula  to  the  environs  of  Manila." 


400  THE   PHILIPPINES 

ation  to  that  date  in  the  following  language  to  which  what  has 
been  quoted  will  serve  as  comment. 

"Aguinaldo,"  cabled  Dewey,^^  "insurgent  leader,  with  thirteen 
of  his  staff  arrived  May  19,  by  permission  on  Nanshan  [McCul- 
loch].  Established  self  Cavite,  outside  arsenal,  under  the  pro- 
tection of  our  guns,  and  organized  his  army.  I  have  had  several 
conferences  with  him,  generally  of  a  personal  nature.  Consist- 
ently I  have  refrained  from  assisting  him  in  any  way  with  the 
forces  under  my  command,  and  on  several  occasions  I  have  de- 
clined requests  that  I  should  do  so,  telling  him  the  squadron  could 
not  act  until  the  arrival  of  the  United  States  troops.  .  .  . 
Aguinaldo  has  acted  independently  of  the  squadron,  but  has 
kept  me  advised  of  his  progress.  .  .  .  My  relations  with 
him  are  cordial,  but  I  am  not  in  his  confidence.  The  United 
States  has  not  been  bound  in  any  way  to  assist  the  insurgents 
by  any  act  or  promises,  and  he  is  not  to  my  knowledge  committed 
to  assist  us." 

To  the  Schurman  Commission  he  gave  the  following  writ- 
ten statement  :^^ 

"I  never  directly  nor  indirectly  promised  the  Filipinos  inde- 
pendence. I  never  received  Aguinaldo  with  military  honors  or 
recognized  or  saluted  the  so-called  Filipino  flag.  I  never  con- 
sidered him  an  ally,  although  I  did  make  use  of  him  and  his  na- 
tives to  assist  me  in  my  operations  against  the  Spaniards." 

After  the  arrival  of  General  Anderson  with  the  first  expedi- 
tion Admiral  Dewey  had  very  little  to  do  with  Aguinaldo.  His 
relations  with  him  had  been  pleasant  because  there  had  been  no 
occasion  to  antagonize  him.  After  the  arrival  of  the  army  the 
relations  with  the  insurgents  changed  for  the  worse. 

In  the  meantime  while  Dewey  was  waiting  for  the  arrival  of 
the  troops,  Consul  Williams  was  exercising  his  diplomatic  powers 
upon  Aguinaldo  and  his  associates.  On  May  12  he  was  confident 
that  the  Filipinos  hoped  that  the  United  States  or  Great  Britain 

35  Autobiography,  Appendix  E,  p.  312. 

^^Rept  Phil.  (Schurman)  Com.,  1900,  I,  p.  121.  See  also  his  letter  to 
Senator  H.  C.  Lodge,  Cong.  Rec,  56th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  1329. 


THE   DIPLOMACY   OF   THE   CONSULATES      401 

'  would  acquire  the  islands.  "Officers  and  cabinet  ministers  of 
the  Philippine  Republic"  had  visited  him  and  expressed  their 
desire  to  swear  allegiance  to  America.  He  reported  that  when 
he  and  the  British  consul  visited  Cavite  they  moved  for  over 
a  mile  through  a  shouting  crowd,  anxious  to  shake  the  hand  of 
the  representatives  of  the  great  American  Republic.  He  believed 
that  it  would  be  easy  to  organize  a  civil  government  which  would 
be  gratefully  accepted  by  the  people.^''  On  May  twenty- fourth  he 
informed  the  secretary  of  state  that  Filipino  officers  had  visited 
him  during  the  darkness  of  the  night  to  inform  him  and  the  fleet 
of  their  operations.  Aguinaldo  executed  a  power  of  attorney  be- 
fore him  under  which  the  money  in  the  Hong  Kong  bank  was 
made  available  for  the  purchase  of  arms-  At  Aguinaldo's  head- 
quarters he  saw  soldiers  enlisting  and  was  informed  that  almost 
thirty-seven  thousand  insurgents  were  ready  to  join  the  American 
forces.^'  He  was  endeavoring  to  maintain  harmonious  relations 
with  the  insurgents  in  order  to  be  able  to  exercise  greater  influ- 
ence when  "we  reorganize  the  government."^'  He  declined  an  in- 
vitation to  attend  a  council  that  on  June  12  organized  a  pro- 
visional government  and  was  commended  for  his  good  judgment 
by  the  department.***  He  reported  that  the  insurgents  had  organ- 
ized a  form  of  government  but  that  "Aguinaldo  told  me  to-day 
that  his  friends  all  hoped  that  the  Philippines  would  be  held  as  a 
colony  of  the  United  States  of  America."*^  Immediately  after  his 
arrival  General  Anderson,  according  to  Williams,  asked  the  lat- 
ter "to  treat  with  General  Aguinaldo  as  to  American  interests."** 
About  a  month  after  Anderson  arrived  Williams  wrote  that 
"for  ultimate  objects"  he  had  made  it  his  study  to  keep  in  pleasant 
relations  with  the  insurgents. 


87  "Few  United  States  troops  will  be  needed  for  conquest,  and  fewer  still 
to  occupy."    Mr,  Williams  to  Mr.  Day,  May  12.  1898.    Sen.  Doc.  62,  p.  327. 

38  Mr.  Williams  to  Mr.  Day,  May  24,  1898.    Sen.  Doc.  62,  p.  328. 

39  Ibid.,  June  16,  1898.    Sen.  Doc.  62,  p.  329. 

«>  Mr.  Cridler  to  Mr.  Williams,  August  4,  1898.    Sen.  Doc.  62,  p.  330. 

"Your  course  while  maintaining  amicable  relations  with  the  insurgents  in 
abstaining  from  any  participation  in  their  so-called  provisional  government 
is  approved." 

<i  Mr.  Williams  to  Mr.  Day,  June  16,  1898.    Sen.  Doc.  62,  p.  329. 

*2  Mr.  Williams  to  Mr.  Day,  July  2,  1898.    Sen.  Doc.  62.  p.  330. 


402  THE   PHILIPPINES 

"My  argument  with  General  Aguinaldo  has  been,'*  he  wrote, 
"that  the  conditions  of  government  by  the  United  States  in  the 
Philippines  would  be  vastly  better  for  him  and  his  people  in 
honor,  advancement,  and  profits  than  could  exist  under  any  plan 
fixed  by  himself  and  Filipinos.  I  have  traversed  the  entire  ground 
of  government  with  him  in  council,  and  he  has  called  his  officials 
from  fifteen  provinces  to  meet  me  for  their  discussion,  all  stated 
as  friendly  but  unofficial  on  my  part.  Our  relations  are  cordial 
while  certain  antagonisms  have  arisen  between  the  General  and 
certain  other  Americans.  I  hope  to  bring  about  harmony  and 
cooperation."" 

Immediately  after  his  arrival.  General  Anderson  with  Admiral 
Dewey  called  unofficially  on  the  Filipino  leader."**  Aguinaldo 
immediately  asked  the  general  whether  "the  United  States  of 
the  North"  had  or  intended  to  recognize  his  government.  An- 
derson had  brought  the  first  news  to  Dewey  that  there  was  a 
sentiment  in  the  United  States  in  favor  of  conquering  and  re- 
taining the  islands  and  he  appreciated  the  political  importance 
of  his  dealings  with  the  insurgent  leader.  His  orders  required 
him  "to  effect  a  landing,  establish  a  base,  not  to  go  beyond  the 
zone  of  naval  cooperation,  to  consult  with  Dewey  and  to  wait 
for  Merrltt."*^  To  Aguinaldo's  question  he  replied  that  he  was 
acting  in  a  military  capacity  only;  that  he  had  no  authority  to 
recognize  a  government;  that  "we  had  come  to  whip  the  Span- 
iards and  that  if  we  were  successful  the  indirect  result  would 
be  to  free  them  from  Spanish  tyranny."  To  this  he  added, 
"As  we  were  fighting  a  common  enemy,  I  hoped  that  we  would 
get  along  amicably  together." 

Aguinaldo  was  not  satisfied.  "The  fact  is,"  says  General 
Anderson,  "that  he  hoped  and  expected  to  take  Manila  with 
Admiral  Dewey's  assistance  and  he  was  bitterly  disappointed 
when  our  soldiers  landed  at  Cavite." 


43  Mr.  Williams  to  Mr.  Day,  August  4,  1898.  Sen.  Doc.  62,  p.  331.  For 
Aguinaldo's  answer,  see  Seyi.  Doc.  62,  p.  397. 

^^Sen.Doc.  33i,^.2n(i. 

*5  For  General  Anderson's  orders,  see  his  letter  (Chicago  Record-Herald 
for  July  11,  1902)  in  reply  to  Admiral  Dewey's  criticisms.  Sen.  Doc.  331, 
pp.  2976-80. 


THE    DIPLOMACY    OF   THE    CONSULATES       403 

Aguinaldo  on  May  23,  1898,  had  announced  himself  as  abso- 
lute dictator.  On  June  12  he  issued  a  decree  proclaiming  the 
independence  of  the  Philippines.  Invitations  to  the  ceremony 
>vere  sent  to  Admiral  Dewey  and  his  officers  but  no  one  at- 
tended." 

A  few  hours  after  the  interview  with  Dewey  and  Anderson 
on  July  1,  two  of  the  latter's  staff  officers  while  walking  through 
the  streets  of  Cavite  were  arrested  and  taken  before  Aguinaldo, 
who  informed  them  that  strangers  could  only  visit  the  town  by 
his  permission,  which  permission,  however,  he  graciously  granted 
to  them.    After  this  incident  the  troops  were  immediately  landed. 

Aguinaldo  declined  an  invitation  to  witness  a  parade  on  the 
Fourth  of  July  because  he  had  been  invited  as  general  and  not 
as  president.  Immediately  thereafter  Anderson  wrote  to  him 
that,  while  he  hoped  to  maintain  amicable  relations,  he  had  taken 
Cavite  as  a  base  for  operations  and  requested  that  Aguinaldo 
instruct  his  officers  not  to  interfere  with  American  officers  in 
the  performance  of  their  duties  and  not  to  assume  that  Ameri- 
can officers  or  men  could  not  visit  Cavite  without  permission 
from  the  Filipino  leader. 

Soon  after  receiving  this  notice  Aguinaldo,  with  his  cabinet, 
military  staff  and  the  inevitable  band,  called  on  General  Ander- 
son and  presented  to  him  the  plan  of  an  autonomous  form  of 
government  which  it  was  said  Spain  was  willing  to  grant  the 
islands.  It  had  been  prepared  by  certain  Filipino  leaders  and 
was  accompanied  by  an  open  letter  from  Don  Pedro  Patemo, 
to  the  Filipino  people  advising  them  that  Spain,  rather  than  the 
United  States,  was  entitled  to  their  trust  and  confidence.    To 


*•  "Invitations  to  the  ceremony  of  the  declaration  of  independence  were 
sent  to  Admiral  Dewey,  but  neither  he  nor  any  of  his  officers  were  present. 
It  was,  however,  important  to  Aguinaldo  that  some  American  should  be  there 
whom  the  assembled  people  would  consider  a  representative  of  the  United 
States.  'Colonel'  Johnson,  ex-hotel  keeper  of  Shanghai,  who  was  in  the 
Philippines  exhibiting  a  cinematograph,  kindly  consented  to  appear  on  this 
occasion  as  Aguinaldo's  Chief  of  Artillery  and  the  representative  of  the  North 
American  nation.  His  name  does  not  appear  subsequently  among  the  papers 
of  Aguinaldo.  It  is  possible  that  his  position  as  Colonel  and  Chief  of  Artillery 
was  a  merely  temporary  one  which  enabled  him  to  appear  in  a  uniform  which 
would  befit  the  character  of  the  representative  of  a  great  people  upon  so 
solemn  an  occasion."   Taylor,  II  (71,  Ly.),  p.  338. 


404  THE    PHILIPPINES 

General  Anderson's  inquiry  whether  this  scheme  was  agreeable 
to  the  Filipinos,  Aguinaldo  replied  by  asking  whether  the  North 
Americans  intended  to  hold  the  Philippines  as  a  dependency. 
The  general  stated  that  he  was  not  informed  on  that  subject, 
but  ventured  the  not  wholly  accurate  statement  that  in  one  hun- 
dred twenty  years  the  United  States  had  established  no  colonies. 
Aguinaldo  replied  that  he  had  studied  attentively  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States  and  had  found  in  it  no  authority  for 
colonies.    He  therefore  had  no  fear  as  to  the  future.*' 

General  Anderson  arrived  in  the  islands  after  the  insurgents 
had  organized  and  proclaimed  their  government  and  determined 
to  try  for  absolute  independence.  Dewey  knew,  and  evidently 
cared  very  little  about  what  was  going  on  in  Filipino  political 
circles.  Anderson  on  land  was  brought  into  closer  relations  with 
the  insurgents  and  soon  learned  of  their  real  designs.  Early  in 
July  he  reported  to  Washington  that  the  Filipinos  expected  in- 
dependence and  that  an  attempt  to  establish  a  provisional  govern- 
ment would  probably  lead  to  a  conflict. 

IV 

The  opponents  of  the  policy  of  annexation  very  generally 
accepted  as  true  the  claim  of  Aguinaldo  and  his  followers  that 
the  American  consuls  at  Hong  Kong  and  Singapore,  and  Admiral 
Dewey  and  General  Anderson  at  Manila,  in  return  for  the  mili- 


*7  For  General  Anderson's  account  of  his  relations  with  the  insurgents,  see 
his  article  in  the  North  American  Review  (Feb.,  1900),  and  his  letter  pub- 
lished in  the  Chicago  Record-Herald  for  July  11,  1902.  The  correspondence 
with  Aguinaldo  is  in  Sen.  Doc.  62,  pp.  399-403;  Rept.  of  Maj.  Gen.  Com. 
Army,  1899,  Part  2,  pp.  335-44;  and  Sen.  Doc.  208,  56th  Cong.,  ist  Sess., 
Part  1,  pp.  4-20.  The  omissions  shown  by  stars  in  General  Anderson's  letter 
of  July  9,  1902  (see  Sen.  Doc.  208)  relate  to  criticisms  of  the  transport  serv- 
ice. This  document  contains  all  communications  with  Aguinaldo  to  March, 
1900,  and  also  Aguinaldo's  proclamations  and  other  manifestos. 

With  reference  to  the  Anderson-Aguinaldo  correspondence,  General  Mer- 
ritt  in  his  statement  to  the  Peace  Commission  at  Paris  said :  "It  is  correspond- 
ence between  General  Anderson  and  Aguinaldo,  and  relates  largely  to  Agui- 
naldo's growing  views.  The  whole  correspondence  was  deprecated  by  Ad- 
miral Dewey  before  I  got  there,  and  I  suppressed  the  whole  thing  after  I 
arrived,  because  it  was  not  the  wish  of  the  government  to  make  any  promises 
to  the  insurgents  or  act  in  any  way  with  them."    Sen.  Doc.  62,  p.  366. 


THE   DIPLOMACY    OF   THE    CONSULATES      405 

tary  cooperation  of  Aguinaldo  promised  that  the  United  States 
would  aid  him  in  establishing  an  independent  government  in  the 
Philippines. 

As  presented  by  Agonclllo  to  tlie  Peace  Commission  at  Paris 
in  December,  1898,  the  Filipino  claim  was  that: 

"At  the  time  of  Imploring  their  armed  cooperation,  both  the  com- 
mander of  the  Petrel  and  Captain  Wood  in  Hong  Kong,  before 
the  declaration  of  war,  the  American  consuls-general,  Mr,  Pratt 
in  Singapore,  Mr.  Wildman  in  Hong  Kong,  and  Mr.  Williams 
in  Cavite,  acting  as  international  agents  of  the  great  American 
nation,  at  a  moment  of  great  anxiety,  offered  to  recognize  the 
independence  of  the  Philippine  Nation  as  soon  as  triumph  was 
obtained."" 

In  the  Reseiia  Veridica  which  was  published  in  September, 
1899,  long  after  his  arrival  at  Cavite,  Aguinaldo  says  that  he 
was  received  with  the  honors  of  a  general,  and  that  after  the 
greetings  of  courtesy  he  asked  Admiral  Dewey : 

"if  all  the  telegrams  relative  to  myself  which  he  had  addressed 
to  the  consul  at  Singapore,  Mr.  Pratt,  were  true.  He  re- 
plied in  the  affirmative  and  added  that  'the  United  States  had 
come  to  the  Philippines  to  protect  the  natives  and  free  them 
from  the  yoke  of  Spain.'  He  said  moreover,  that  'America 
was  rich  In  territory  and  money  and  needed  no  colonies,'  con- 
cluding by  assuring  me  'to  have  no  doubt  whatever  about  the 
recognition  of  Philippine  Independence  of  the  United  States.* 
Thereupon  he  asked  me  if  I  could  induce  the  people  to  rise 
against  the  Spaniards  and  carry  on  a  rapid  campaign.  .  .  . 
The  Admiral  replied  that  he  was  delighted  at  my  sincerity  and 
believed  that  both  Filipinos  and  Americans  should  treat  each 
other  as  allies  and  friends  .  .  .  and  added  that  'so  he  had 
been  Informed,  the  United  States  would  recognize  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  Filipino  people,  guaranteed  by  the  word  of 
honor  of  the  Americans'     .     .     .     advising  me  to  form  at  once 

*8  Phil.  Insurg.  Recs.,  102,  I.  See  also  the  Proclamation  of  June  8,  1899. 
In  the  letter  to  President  McKinley  of  October  3,  1898.  Agoncillo  did  not 
claim  that  independence  had  been  promised.  For  Agoncillo's  statement  given 
to  General  Greene  on  September  15,  1898,  see  Sen.  Doc.  62,  p.  429. 


406  THE   PHILIPPINES 

a  Filipino  national  flag,  offering  in  virtue  thereof  id  recognize 
and  protect  it  before  the  other  nations,  which  were  represented 
by  the  various  squadrons  then  in  the  bay.  ...  I  announced 
that  I  would  take  up  my  residence  at  the  naval  headquarters  in 
the  Cavite  arsenal.  ...  In  the  same  month  of  July  the 
Admiral,  accompanied  by  General  Anderson,  presented  himself 
.  .  .  and  said,  'Documents  are  not  complied  with  when  there 
is  no  honor,  as  has  happened  with  your  agreement  with  the  Span- 
iards, who  have  failed  in  what  was  written  and  signed.  Trust  in 
my  word,  for  I  hold  myself  responsible,  that  the  United  States 
will  recognize  the  independence  of  the  country.  But  I  recommend 
to  you  to  keep  everything  that  we  have  talked  about  and  agreed 
upon  with  a  great  deal  of  secrecy  at  present.'  "*® 

AH  this  would  be  important  if  true,  but  there  is  no  longer 
any  question  but  that  Admiral  Dewey  was  correct  when  he  called 
Aguinaldo's  story  *'a  tissue  of  falsity."^*  In  the  Resena  Veridica 
the  original,  modest  claim  of  Aguinaldo  was  elaborated  and 
dressed  up  by  Buencamino  and  other  leaders  for  the  purpose  of 
influencing  public  opinion  in  the  United  States  and  elsewhere 
outside  of  the  Philippines.^^ 


49  Taylor,  4  MG.  E.  ^  ^ 

50  In  a  letter  written  by  Agtxinaldo  to  his  brother  on  the  day  of  this  inter- 
view he  said  {Phil.  Jnsurg.  Recs.,  12,  1)  :  "I  inform  you  that  we  arrived  here 
in  Cavite  at  eleven  o'clock  and  disembarked  at  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon 
after  our  conference  with  the  American  Admiral.  Everything  appears  to  be 
favorable  for  attaining  our  independence.  I  can  not  say  more  on  that  sub- 
ject as  it  would  take  too  long.  I  have  no  object  in  writing  this  except  to  ask 
you  and  your  companions  to  meet  at  once  and  arrange  the  best  way  to  entrap 
all  the  enemy  in  your  town,  employing  deceit,  for  instance,  etc  ...  The 
hour  has  arrived  for  the  PhiHppines  to  belong  to  her  sons.  •  .  •  Only  one 
step  and  we  shall  reach  Independence." 

51  The  Resena  Veridica  was  dated  September  23,  1899,  and  was  probably 
written  by  Buencamino  in  collaboration  with  the  other  political  leaders.  An 
English  translation  is  in  the  Cong.  Rec,  XXXV,  Pt.  6,  Appendix,  pp.  440-445. 
On  September  12,  1899,  Buencamino  wrote  from  the  Philippines  to  Dr. 
Apacible  at  Hong  Kong  a  letter  which  shows  the  way  in  which  the  Resena 
Veridica  was  prepared  and  distributed.  "This  work  is  entitled  Resena 
Veridica  de  la  Revolucion  Filipina,  in  which  Don  Emilio  relates  in  detail  his 
acts  with  Admiral  Dewey.  It  has  been  distributed  to  the  consuls  and  you  are 
ordered  to  reprint  it  there  translated  into  English  and  send  some  copies  to  the 
United  States,  even  though  only  a  thousand,  if  you  deem  it  advisable.  Send 
copies  also  to  Europe,  Seiior  Agoncillo  taking  charge  of  the  publication. 
.  .   .  This  is  an  order  of  the  Government."    Phil  Jnsurg.  Recs.,  391,  3. 

On  the  30th  of  the  same  month  he  wrote,  "We  have  not  distributed  them 
here  in^  order  that  Otis  may  not  counteract  the  eflfects  that  we  desire  to  pro- 
duce with  this  publication,  through  his  usual  machinations.  Nor  do  we  believe 


THE    DIPLOMACY    OF   THE    CONSULATES      407 

It  is  easy  to  trace  the  growth  of  this  hiytH  of  a  promise  of 
independence  from  its  inception  in  the  brain  of  "Aguinaldo's 
Englishman"  to  its  maturity  in  the  Reseiia  Veridica  and  the  for- 
mal statement  of  Agoncillo  at  Paris.  It  was  of  slow  but  steady 
growth.  Evidently  Bray  did  not  fully  grasp  the  possibilities  of 
an  interview  between  parties  ignorant  of  each  other's  language 
imtil  several  days  after  Aguinaldo  had  sailed  from  Singapore. 
The  meetings  with  Pratt  had  been  held  secretly  but  it  was  to 
Bray's  interest  that  his  part  in  the  transaction  should  be  made 
public  and  he  prepared  an  account  of  the  interviews  for  publica- 
tion in  the  Singapore  Free  Press.  St.  Clair,  the  editor  of  that 
paper,  had  been  induced  by  Bray  to  favor  the  Filipino  cause. 
Immediately  after  Aguinaldo  arrived  in  Singapore  he  was  taken 
by  Bray  to  call  on  the  editor  and  St. ,  Clair  says  that  he  was 
thereafter  fully  informed  of  the  progress  of  affairs. 

The  article  in  the  Free  Press,  prepared  very  soon  after  the 
interviews,  made  no  reference  to  any  promise  by  Pratt.  But 
Bray  and  Santos  were  soon  claiming  that  not  only  had  there 
been  a  promise  but  that  it  had  been  reduced  to  writing  and  duly 
signed  by  Pratt  and  Aguinaldo  and  approved  by  Dewey.  It 
seems  that  this  story  was  being  circulated  in  Hong  Kong  after 
Aguinaldo  had  sailed  for  Manila.  Mr.  Albert  G.  Robinson,  the 
correspondent  of  the  New  York  Evening  Post,  was  assured  by 
the  Filipino  junta  that  there  was  a  written  agreement  with  fif- 
teen clauses  and  that  it  was  to  be  effective  when  ratified  by 
Commodore  Dewey  and  President  McKinley.  According  to  the 
story  this  remarkable  document  provided,  among  other  things: 

it  advisable  to  make  this  pamphlet  public  in  those  colonies  before  your  arrival 
in  tlie  United  States."^  Ibid. 

On  this  letter  in  cipher  is  a  postcript  addressed  to  Aguinaldo's  secretary 
(Pablo  Ocampo)  : 

"At  last  moment,  Nota  bene— 

"Don't  deliver  iiny  copy  of  the  Reseiia  Veridica  to  the  consuls,  even  though 
it  was  so  directed  in  the  beginning  of  the  letter.  All  except  one,  which  is  for 
you,  will  be  sent  to  Hong  Kong,  Don  Pedro  de  la  Vina  being  bearer  of  the 
same,  as  also  of  other  documents.  The  copy  intended  for  you  is  neither  to 
be  divulged  nor  published,  for  strict  reserve  is  required  until  these  which  are 
being  sent  arrive  at  their  destination."    Ibid.,  461,  4, 

LeRoy  says  {The  Americans  in  the  Philippines,  I,  p.  180)  :  "The  Reseiia 
Veridica  is  so  inaccurate  and  uncandid  that  it  will  not  do  to  accept  any  state- 
ment resting  on  its  authority." 


408  THE   PHILIPPINES 

"1.     Philippine  independence  to  be  proclaimed. 

**2.  A  federal  republic  to  be  established  by  vote  of  the  rebels ; 
pending  the  taking  of  this  vote,  Aguinaldo  to  appoint  the  mem- 
bers of  that  government. 

"3.  The  federal  republic  to  recognize  a  temporary  interven- 
tion of  American  and  European  administrative  commissioners 
to  be  appointed  by  Commodore  Dewey. 

*'4.  The  American  protectorate  to  be  recognized  in  the  same 
terms  as  those  fixed  in  Cuba." 

Robinson  was  informed  that  Aguinaldo,  Bray,  the  editor  of 
the  Singapore  Free  Press,  and  all  the  other  parties  present  at 
the  interview  except  Pratt  claimed  that  such  a  formal  written 
agreement  was  entered  into  and  he  concluded  therefore  that  the 
question  was  largely  one  of  personal  veracity  between  Mr.  Pratt 
and  these  parties.^^ 

Of  course,  the  fact  that  no  such  writing  was  ever  produced 
is  conclusive  evidence  that  it  never  existed.  Aguinaldo  himself 
effectually  disposed  of  the  claim.  In  the  Resena  Veridica  he 
tells  why  the  agreement  which  he  says  was  made  was  not  reduced 
to  writing.  In  a  letter  written  about  November,  1898,  and  ad- 
dressed to  "Sefior  McKinley,  President  of  the  Republic  of  the 
United  States  of  North  America,"  Aguinaldo  wrote: 

"The  commander  of  the  McCulloch  telegraphed  me  also 
from  Hong  Kong  offering  in  the  name  of  Commodore  Dewey 
to  take  me  to  Cavite  in  order  to  raise  the  Filipinos  against  Spain. 

''Without  any  written  treaty, — counting  only  upon  the  sacred 
word  of  American  citizens,  I  went  to  Hong  Kong,  embarked  on 
the  McCulloch,"  etc.'^ 

The  editor  of  the  Singapore  Free  Press  was  not,  as  Robinson 
understood,  present  at  either  of  the  interviews  between  Pratt 
and  Aguinaldo.  Nor  had  he  ever  agreed  with  Bray's  claim.  In 
an  interesting  letter  to  Bray,  St.  Clair  wrote  :®* 

52  Robinson,  The  Philippines,  the  War,  and  the  People  (1901),  p.  41. 

^3  Phil.  Insurg.  Recs.,  441-2.  Evidently  this  letter  was  not  sent.  The  state- 
ment that  the  commander  of  the  McCulloch  telegraphed  Aguinaldo  is  cer- 
tainly untrue. 

e*P/tt7.  Insurg.  Recs.,  406,  5.    Taylor,  I,  p.  272. 


THE   DIPLOMACY.   OF   THE   CONSULATES      409 

"I  felt  it  my  duty  to  let  Pratt  know  that  you  still  hold  that 
you  and  Santos  hatve  evidence  that  will  controvert  his.  .  .  . 
Curiously  you  never  mentioned  to  me  anything  of  the  agreement 
as  having  taken  place  then,  nor  in  the  paper  you  communicated 
to  me  was  there  any  mention  of  one,  nor  did  Pratt  know  of  any. 
It  is  only  more  recently  that  the  fictioti  took  shape.  .  .  .  / 
would  like  to  urge  you,  from  a  practical  point  of  view,  to  drop 
any  such  foolishness.  The  vital  thing,  and  nothing  else  counts, 
is  what  Dewey  said  and  did  when  he  at  last  met  Aguinaldo.  That 
that  is  the  thing;  all  else  is  empty  wind.  .  .  .  Sink  every- 
thing into  Dewey-Aguinaldo  cooperation ;  that  was  on  both  sides 
honest.  Even  if  it  did  not  imply  actual  arrangement,  which 
of  course,  Dewey,  himself,  could  not  make.  That  here  you 
have  the  facts,  undenied — incontrovertible.  .  .  .  Dewey  is 
the  *key.* " 

On  June  12,  1899,  with  this  letter  in  his  possession.  Bray  had 
the  audacity  to  write  the  following  letter  to  Aguinaldo : 

"There  is  still  a  trump  card  to  be  played.  Did  you  not  say 
that  the  basis  of  any  negotiation  at  Singapore  was  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  Philippines  under  an  American  protectorate? 
This  is  what  Consul  Pratt  telegraphed  and  to  which  Dewey  and 
Washington  agreed ;  as  I  figured  up  the  price  of  the  telegram,  I. 
know  very  well  what  occurred,  and  I  am  ready  to  state  it  and  to 
swear  to  it  when  the  proper  time  comes.  There  are  five  of  us 
against  one  in  the  event  of  Consul  Pratt  receiving  instructions 
to  deny  it.  Furthermore  Mr.  St.  Clair  knows  what  happened 
and  I  am  certain  that  he  also  would  testify.  St.  Clair  still  has  the 
rough  draft  as  an  historical  relic,  and  St.  Clair  is  a  true  and 
loyal  friend  of  yours."" 

On  the  same  day  Bray  telegraphed  to  Senator  George  F.  Hoar 
that :" 

"As  the  man  who  introduced  General  Aguinaldo  to  the  Ameri- 
can Government,  through  the  consul  at  Singapore,  I  frankly  state 
that  the  conditions  under  which  Aguinaldo  promised  to  coop- 
erate with  Dewey  were  independence  under  a  protectorate." 

"5  Phil.  Insurg.  Rccs.,  398,  9. 

"PA»7.  Insurg.  Recs.,  453-4.    Taylor,  I,  273. 


410  THE   PHILIPPINES 

Self-serving  statements  made  by  the  insurgent  leaders  with 
reference  to  what  had  occurred  in  the  past  are  entitled  to  very 
little  consideration/''  They  wrote  down  whatever  they  thought 
would  bolster  up  their  case,  create  sentiment  in  their  favor 
abroad,  or  encourage  their  followers  at  home,  exactly  as  Euro- 
pean belligerents  did  a  decade  and  more  later.  But  contem- 
poraneous admissions  against  interest  are  pretty  certain  to  be 
true  and  have  a  recognized  value  in  the  law  of  evidence.  The 
Filipinos  had  acquired  the  Spanish  habit  of  making  elaborate 
srecords  of  all  their  political  and  military  transactions.  The 
acts  of  the  Hong  Kong  junta  were  carefully  recorded  in  detail 
in  the  records  of  their  meetings.^^  From  the  minutes  of  the 
meeting  held  on  May  4,  1898,  two  days  after  Aguinaldo  returned 
from  Singapore,  it  appears  that  he  explained  to  the  junta  the 
situation  which  had  developed  and  that  there  was  then  a  general 
discussion  of  the  advisability  of  his  returning  to  the  Philippines. 
Aguinaldo  then  knew  what  had  occurred  between  himself  and 
Pratt;  it  was  fresh  in  his  mind.  If  Pratt,  with  Dewey's  ap- 
proval, had  pledged  the  faith  of  the  United  States,  it  is  abso- 
lutely certain  that  Aguinaldo  would  have  reported  the  fact  to 
his  associates. 

It  was  for  all  of  them  the  one  big  thing  in  all  the  world.  And 
yet  Aguinaldo,  in  his  statement  to  the  junta,  made  no  reference 
to  any  covenant  with  Pratt  and  Dewey.  In  fact,  what  he  did 
report  was  inconsistent  with  the  existence  of  even  an  implied 
understanding.  According  to  his  report  the  conditions  under 
which  he  was  to  cooperate  with  the  American  forces  had  not 
at  liiat  time  been  determined.  Pratt  and  Aguinaldo  had,  as 
stated  in  the  minutes  of  the  meeting, 

"both  agreed  that  the  President  (Aguinaldo)  should  confer  with 
the  Admiral  commanding  the  Aimerican  squadron  in  Mirs  Bay 
and  if  the  latter  should  accept  his  propositions,  advantageous  in 

^' Those  who  accept  as  true  every  assertion  made  by  the  insurgents  with 
reference  to  the  acts  and  statements  of  Americans  must  also  believe  many 
things  discreditable  to  certain  American  public  men  who  were  not  in  the 
Philippines.    See  infra,  p.  508,  note. 

«8P/tt7.  Insurg.  Recs.,  53-2..^ 


THE    DIPLOMACY    OF   THE    CONSULATES      411 

his  judgment  to  the  Philippines,  he  would  go  to  said  country  in 
one  of  the  cruisers." 

Nothing  more. 

When  Aguinaldo  reached  Hong  Kong,  Dewey  had  sailed  for 
Manila.  He  then  talked  with  Consul  Wildman  and  reported 
that  he  "was  not  satisfied  with  such  interviews."  As  everything 
was  in  the  air,  Aguinaldo  "begged  the  committee  to  discuss  the 
advisability  of  his  going  to  the  Islands"  and  leaving  them  at 
Hong  Kong.  The  opinions  of  leading  members  of  the  junta 
were  entered  at  length  in  the  minutes  to  which  they  affixed 
their  signatures.  Sandico,  Garchitorena  and  Apacible,  thought 
that  Aguinaldo's  presence  in  the  Philippines  was  necessary  in 
order  to  prevent  dissension  among  the  people,  but  Aguinaldo 
insisted  that  he 

"considered  it  reckless  for  him  to  go  to  the  Philippines  without 
first  making  a  written  agreement  with  the  Admiral  as  it  might 
happen,  if  he  placed  himself  at  his  orders,  that  he  might  make 
him  subscribe  to  or  sign  a  document  containing  proposals  highly 
prejudicial  to  the  interests  of  the  country  from  which  might 
arise  the  following  two  very  grave  contingencies : 

"1.  If  he  should  accept  them  he  would  undoubtedly  commit 
an  unpatriotic  act  and  his  name  would  justly  be  eternally  cursed 
by  the  Filipinos. 

"2.  If  he  should  refuse,  then  the  break  between  the  two 
would  be  evident." 

To  escape  this  dilemma  he  proposed  that  a  committee  should 
go  to  the  Philippines,  see  Admiral  Dewey  and 

"ascertain  in  an  authentic  manner  what  the  intentions  of  the 
United  States  in  regard  to  that  country  are  and  if  his  interven- 
tion is  absolutely  necessary,  he  would  not  object  to  go  at  once 
to  the  Philippines." 

Hence  Aguinaldo  at  that  time  realized  that  he  had  no  definite 
arrangements  with  any  representative  of  the  United  States  and 
that  even  if  Pratt  and  Wildman  had  encouraged  him  to  return 


412  THE   PHILIPPINES 

to  Hong  Kong  he  understood  that  they  were  without  authority 
to  speak  for  the  United  States.  Neither  he  nor  the  junta  had 
any  illusions  as  to  the  powers  of  the  consuls.  They  did  believe, 
however,  that  Dewey  might  possibly  have  such  authority,  and 
Aguinaldo  desired  to  get  in  touch  with  him. 

The  objections  to  sending  a  committee,  instead  of  Aguinaldo, 
to  Manila,  which  were  then  made  by  Sandico,  Garchitorena, 
Apacible  and  Gonzaga,  and  the  policy  then  outlined,  were  fully 
set  forth  in  the  minutes  of  the  meeting,  and  signed  by  all  present. 
They  were  convinced  that  Dewey  would  furnish  arms  because 
the  fleet  alone  could  do  nothing  unless  it  operated  in  conjunction 
with  the  insurgents.  They  understood  the  situation  and  calcu- 
lated very  properly  upon  taking  advantage  of  Dewey's  neces- 
sities.^^ This  document  is  so  important  as  to  justify  further 
quotation. 

"The  authority  to  treat  which  the  President  desired  to  give 
to  the  other  chiefs,  without  reflecting  at  all  upon  their  personal 
qualifications,  they  did  not  believe  would  be  as  efficacious  as  his 
personal  intervention,  which  is  necessary  in  grave  affairs,  such 
as  those  the  subject  of  discussion;  there  would  be  no  better  oc- 
casion than  that  afforded  them  to  insure  the  landing  of  the  ex- 
peditionary forces  on  those  islands  and  to  arm  themselves  at  the 
expense  of  the  Americans  and  to  assure  the  situation  of  the 
Philippines  in  regard  to  our  legitimate  aspirations  against  those 
very  people.  The  Filipino  people,  unprovided  with  arms,  would 
be  the  victims  of  the  demands  and  exactions  of  the  United  States ; 
but,  provided  with  arms,  would  be  able  to  oppose  themselves  to 
them,  struggling  for  independence,  in  which  consists  the  true 
happiness  of  the  Philippines.  And  they  finished  by  saying  that 
it  made  no  difference  if  the  Spanish  governm.ent  did  demand 
the  return  of  the  four  hundred  thousand  pesos,  and  if  the  de- 
mand were  allowed  in  an  action,  since  the  object  of  the  sum  would 
be  obtained  by  the  Admiral  furnishing  the  Filipinos  the  arms 
which  they  required  for  the  struggle  for  their  legitimate  aspira- 
tions.    .     .     . 


S9  "As  a  matter  of  fact,"  says  Le  Roy,  "this  is  only  the  first  of  a  series  of 
events  and  documents  which  show  that  the  Filipinos  during  1898  and  1899 
looked  into  the  future  more  shrewdly  and  mapped  out  their  course  of  action 
in  a  less  haphazard  way  than  did  tiie  Americans."  The  Americans  in  the 
Philippines,  I,  p.  208,  note. 


THE   DIPLOMACY   OF   THE   CONSULATES      413 

"The  President,  with  his  prestige  in  the  Philippines,  would 
he  able  to  arouse  those  masses  to  combat  the  demands  of  the 
United  States,  if  they  colonized  that  country,  and  would  drive 
them,  if  circumstances  rendered  it  necessary,  to  a  Titanic  struggle 
for  their  independence,  even  if  they  should  succumb  in  shaking 
off  the  yoke  of  a  new  oppressor.  If  Washington  proposed  to 
carry  out  tlie  fundamental  principles  of  its  constitution,  there 
was  no  doubt  that  it  would  not  attempt  to  colonize  the  Philip- 
pines, or  even  to  annex  them.  It  was  probable  then  that  it  would 
give  them  independence  and  guarantee  it ;  in  such  case  the  pres- 
ence of  the  President  was  necessary,  as  he  would  prevent  dis- 
sensions among  the  sons  of  the  country  who  sought  office,  who 
might  cause  the  intervention  of  European  powers,  an  interven- 
tion which  there  was  no  reason  to  doubt  would  be  highly  preju- 
dicial to  the  interests  of  the  country.  .  .  .  What  injury 
could  come  to  the  Philippines,  even  if  we  admitted  that  the 
Admiral  would  not  give  arms  to  the  President  on  account  of  his 
refusal  to  sign  a  document  prejudicial  to  the  country,  after  he 
had  taken  all  means  to  provide  for  her  defense  ?  None.  Such 
an  act  of  the  President  could  not  be  censured,  but,  on  the  other 
hand,  would  be  most  meritorious  because  it  would  be  one  proof 
more  of  his  undoubted  patriotism."^" 

Aguinaldo  sailed  for  Manila  with  the  definite  understanding 
that  the  Americans  had  made  no  promises.  He  and  his  associ- 
ates hoped  that  after  reaching  the  islands  he  might  induce  the 
admiral  to  make  some  sort  of  terms  with  him.  They  understood 
perfectly  that  they  were  relying  on  their  own  influence  and 
their  skill  in  turning  the  situation  to  their  advantage. 


V 

It  thus  appears  from  the  statements  of  Pratt,  Wildman  and 
Aguinaldo  himself,  that  Bray's  assertion  that  a  written  agree- 
ment was  entered  into  at  Singapore  was  false.  Aguinaldo  never 
claimed  that  there  was  any  such  document.  The  minutes  of 
the  meeting  of  the  Hong  Kong  junta,  held  immediately  after 
Aguinaldo's  return,  prove  that  he  did  not  then  claim  that  there 


««PA»7.  Insurg.  Recs.,  SZ,  2.    Taylor,  I,  p.  231. 


414  THE   PHILIPPINES' 

had  been  even  an  oral  agreement  between  him  and  Pratt  or  any 
understanding  other  than  that  he  should  return  to  Hong  Kong, 
see  Dewey,  and  if  possible  arrange  for  the  cooperation  of  the 
insurgents.  He  proceeded  to  Hong  Kong  and  thence  to  Cavite 
for  that  purpose.  Our  knowledge  of  what  occurred  at  his  first 
interview  with  Dewey  rests  on  the  conflicting  statements  of 
Dewey  and  Aguinaldo.  The  former  made  his  statement  within 
a  few  days  after  the  meeting  in  a  formal  report  to  the  secretary 
of  the  navy.  Aguinaldo's  statement  in  the  Reseiia  Veridica 
was  made  in  September,  1899,  a  year  and  three  months  after 
the  event.  As  dressed  up  by  his  advisers  it  was  inherently 
improbable  and  unworthy  of  belief.  Admiral  Dewey  was  an 
experienced  naval  officer,  fully  informed  of  his  powers  and 
duties  and  aware  of  the  fact  that  political  questions  were  be- 
yond his  province.  He  delivered  the  insurgent  leader  on  shore 
and  supplied  him  with  arms,  but  it  is  inconceivable  that  he  as- 
sumed to  make  any  such  promises  or  representations  as  are 
set  forth  in  the  Reseiia  Veridica.  No  one  who  is  acquainted 
with  the  circumstances  and  the  records  now  believes  that  Dewey 
made  Aguinaldo  any  promises. 

It  is  equally  certain  that  the  insurgent  leaders  were  not  misled 
into  assisting  the  Americans  by  any  inferences  which  they  were 
justified  in  drawing  from  the  conduct  of  either  Pratt,  Wildman, 
Dewey,  or  Anderson.  It  has  been  believed  by  many  friends  of 
the  Filipinos  that  Aguinaldo  and  the  members  of  the  Hong  Kong 
junta  were  tricked  by  wiser  and  more  experienced  men,  but  we 
now  know  that  they  were  playing  their  own  game  with  open  eyes 
and  subtle  brains  alert  to  take  every  advantage  of  the  extraor- 
dinary conditions  which  had  arisen  in  the  Philippines.  Wild- 
man,  Williams  and  Pratt  thought  that  theirs  were  the  guiding 
hands.  To  Dewey  the  Filipinos  were  "little  brown  men,"  "mere 
boys,"  who  annoyed  him.  They  were  in  fact  a  type  of  men 
with  which  the  American  officers  were  unfamiliar  and  whose 
general  intelligence  and  skill  as  politicians  they  greatly  under- 
estimated. 

Long  before  the  United  States  decided  to  annex  the  Philip- 


THE   DIPLOMACY   OF   THE   CONSULATES      415 

pines  the  relations  with  the  insurgents  were  definitely  fixed.  Final 
instructions  to  demand  the  cession  of  the  entire  Archipelago 
were  sent  to  the  commissioners  at  Paris  on  November  11,  1898. 
Before  that  Aguinaldo  had  proclaimed  his  Republic  and  estab- 
lished his  capital  at  Malolos.  During  the  period  of  uncertainty 
which  extended  from  May  1  to  November  11,  neither  Aguinaldo, 
Dewey,  Anderson,  nor  the  people  of  the  United  States  had  any 
information  on  the  subject.  By  a  process  of  reasoning  or  in- 
stinct, Pratt  reached  the  conclusion  that  the  Filipinos  would 
be  supported  in  their  demand  for  independence.  Williams  as- 
sumed that  the  islands  would  be  annexed  and  governed  by  the 
United  States.  Wildman  evidently  believed  that  a  protectorate 
would  be  established.  Dewey  first  favored  retaining  Luzon. 
Washington  instructed  the  consuls  and  officers  not  to  talk  poli- 
tics and  in  the  meantime  maintained  absolute  silence-  Aguin- 
aldo and  his  associates  were  naturally  very  desirous  of  ascer- 
taining the  policy  of  the  United  States.  Like  most  Americans 
at  that  time,  they  inferred  from  the  history  of  America  that  it 
would  not  care  to  assume  the  burden  of  governing  a  distant 
territory.  Before  leaving  Hong  Kong  for  Cavite  Aguinaldo 
and  the  junta  satisfied  themselves  that  the  constitution  of  the 
United  States  conferred  no  power  to  hold  colonies.  The  conclu- 
sion, as  recorded  in  the  minutes  of  the  junta  on  May  4,  was 
that  if  the  American  government  "proposed  to  carry  out  the 
fundamental  principles  of  its  constitution,  there  was  no  doubt 
that  it  would  not  attempt  to  colonize  the  Philippines  or  even  to 
annex  them.  It  was  probable  then  that  it  would  give  them  inde- 
pendence and  guarantee  it." 

This  was  a  reasonable  deduction  from  the  facts  known  to  the 
Filipinos  and  they  knew  about  as  much  as  any  one  did  at  that 
time.  The  United  States  had  gone  to  war  to  free  the  Cubans 
and  the  Filipinos  with  their  limited  knowledge  of  history  might 
well  ignore  the  facts  which  distinguished  the  Cuban  from  the 
Philippine  situation.  The  important  thing  to  note  is  that  the 
Filipino  leaders  did  not  then  pretend  to  have  received  any  in- 
formation with  reference  to  the  American  policy.    They  reached 


416  THE    PHILIPPINES 

their  conclusions  by  reasoning  from  the  conditions  known  to 
them. 

The  meeting  of  the  junta,  the  minutes  of  which  have  been 
quoted,  was  held  three  days  after  the  destruction  of  the  Spanish 
fleet.  It  required  no  great  prescience  to  infer  that  Dewey,  being 
without  troops,  would  be  willing  to  encourage  the  insurgents 
to  attack  the  common  enemy,  and  might  aid  them  with  the  arms 
they  "required  for  the  struggle  for  their  legitimate  aspirations." 
The  arms,  at  least,  would  be  so  much  clear  gain.  If  later  the 
Americans  should  have  other  views  as  to  what  aspirations  were 
"legitimate"  the  arms  could  be  turned  against  them.  It  seemed 
a  perfectly  good  policy  because  under  it  both  parties  secured  the 
immediate  thing  desired  and  the  future  was  left  to  take  care  of 
itself.  The  Filipinos  had  everything  to  win  and  nothing  to  lose 
by  reviving  the  insurrection  under  such  conditions. 

There  was,  however,  one  dread  contingency, — the  United 
States  might  decide  to  withdraw  from  the  Philippines  and  leave 
the  Filipinos  to  fight  it  out  with  Spain.  That  must  be  avoided 
at  all  hazard.  "To  be  again  in  the  hands  of  Spain,"  wrote 
Agoncillo  to  Mabini  a  few  days  after  the  fall  of  Manila,  "will 
mean  a  long  and  bloody  war  and  it  is  doubtful  whether  the  end 
will  be  favorable  to  us.  A  treaty  of  peace  sanctioned  by  the 
other  powers  will  assure  the  dominion  of  Spain.  Spain  free 
from  Cuba  and  her  other  colonies  will  employ  all  her  energies  to 
crush  us  and  will  send  here  the  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand 
men  she  has  in  Cuba."®^ 

Until  the  American  policy  should  be  defined  the  Filipino  policy 
must  necessarily  be  tentative.  Aguinaldo  and  his  following  had 
already  determined  to  secure  absolute  independence  if  possible, 
but  many  influential  Filipinos  had  other  views  and  it  was  neces- 
sary to  act  with  tact  and  discretion.  Many  of  the  wealthy  upper 
class  favored  annexation,  but  they  were  skilfully  maneuvered 
out  of  position.  Before  leaving  Hong  Kong  two  proclamations 
were  prepared  for  circulation  in  the  Philippines,  one,  a  copy  of 
which  was  sent  to  Washington  by  Pratt,  bore  the  heading,  "Amer- 

'^^  Phil.  Insurg.  Recs.,  453,  3. 


THE   DIPLOMACY   OF!   THE   CONSULATES      417 

ica's  Allies,"  and  contained  the  words,  "Divine  Providence  places 
us  in  a  position  to  secure  our  independence.  .  .  .  Where  you 
see  the  American  flag  flying,  bear  in  mind  that  they  are  our 
redeemers."     The  other  contained  the  following: 

"This  is  the  best  opportunity  which  we  have  ever  had  for 
contriving  that  our  country,  all  the  Philippine  Archipelago,  may 
be  counted  as  another  star  in  the  great  republic  of  the  United 
States.  .  .  .  Now  is  the  time  to  offer  ourselves  to  that  nation. 
.     .     .     With  America  we  shall  be  rich,  civilized  and  happy."** 

Aguinaldo  is  understood  to  have  carried  these  proclamations 
to  the  Philippines,  but  neither  was  circulated.  Manifestly  he  was 
not  ready  to  announce  a  policy.  After  the  insurgent  army  was 
organized  the  native  people  were  informed  that  the  Americans 
would  aid  them  in  securing  independence,  but  Aguinaldo  at  all 
times  realized  that  it  might  be  necessary  to  accept  something  less. 

On  July  28,  1898,  Seiior  Regidor,  a  Filipino  residing  in  Lon- 
don, telegraphed  Agoncillo  that  President  McKinley  should  be 
requested  not  to  abandon  the  islands.  "Pledge  him  our  uncondi- 
tional adhesion,  especially  of  well-to-do  people.  To  return  to 
Spain,  in  whatever  form,  would  mean  annihilation,  perpetual 
anarchy.  .  .  .  Influence  Aguinaldo  to  accept  American  flag, 
flying  it  everywhere,  thus  obliging  them  to  remain."*'  Agoncillo 
replied  that  Aguinaldo's  government  aspired  to  independence. 
Regidor  then  wrote  to  J.  M.  Basa,  urging  that  a  protectorate  was 
the  only  feasible  policy.**  Upon  receiving  this  communication 
Basa  called  together  his  friends  in  Hong  Kong  and  they  adopted 
a  resolution  directing  that  a  congratulatory  message  be  sent  to 
President  McKinley.  Agoncillo  informed  Aguinaldo  of  what 
had  been  done  by  a  letter,  in  which  he  described  Basa  and  his 
friends  as  "boastful  patriots." 

"If  the  American  troops  leave  us  alone  there,"  he  wrote,  "the 
questions  which  will  arise  are  these :    Have  we  sufficient  arms  to 

®2  Phil.  Insurg.  Recs.,  1204-10.  J.  M.  Basa  enclosed  the  proclamation  in  a 
letter  of  May  16,  1898,  to  Jose  Basa  at  Manila,  recommending  that  it  be  given 
the  widest  possible  circulation. 

«3  Phil.  Insurg.  Recs.,  471,  4. 

'*Phil.  Insurg.  Recs.,  450,  2. 


418  THE   PHILIPPINES 

maintain  the  war  against  Spain  in  order  to  secure  our  inde- 
pendence? ...  If  you  think  that  we  have  not  sufficient 
strength  to  fight  against  them,  should  we  accept  independence 
under  an  American  protectorate;  and  if  so,  what  conditions  or 
advantages  should  be  given  to  the  United  States?  You  should 
carefully  consider  the  preceding  questions  .  .  .  and  your  de- 
cision be  notified  to  our  representatives  abroad  in  order  that 
they  may  know  what  they  must  do  in  their  negotiations."^^ 

On  August  7,  1898,  Aguinaldo  wrote  to  Agoncillo  definitely 
announcing  the  policy  he  then  had  in  mind : 

"Still  do  not  accept  any  contracts  or  give  any  promises  respect- 
ing protection  or  annexation,  because  we  will  see  first  if  we  can 
obtain  independence.  This  is  what  we  shall  endeavor  to  secure; 
meanwhile  if  it  should  be  possible  to  do  so,  still  give  them  to 
understand  in  a  way  that  you  are  unable  to  bind  yourself,  but  that 
once  we  are  independent  we  will  be  able  to  make  arrangements 
with  them."«« 

On  August  10,  1898,  Aguinaldo  wrote  to  Sandico : 

"The  policy  of  the  government  is  as  follows : 

"1.  To  struggle  for  the  independence  of  the  Philippines  as 
far  as  our  strength  and  our  means  will  permit.  Protection  or 
annexation  will  be  acceptable  only  when  it  can  be  clearly  seen 
that  the  recognition  of  our  independence,  either  by  force  of  arms 
or  diplomacy,  is  impossible."" 

And  two  weeks  later  he  wrote  Agoncillo : 

"You  must  bear  in  mind  that  the  policy  of  the  government  is 
to  obtain  absolute  independence,  and  if  perchance  we  should 
know  by  the  course  of  events  that  such  can  not  be  the  case,  we 
will  then  think  of  annexation  or  protection."^^ 

After  the  arrival  of  the  troops  Admiral  Dewey  ceased  to  have 

^f^Phil  Insurg.  Recs.,  471,  4.  On  July  21,  1898,  Agoncillo  wrote  to  Mabin! 
that  the  idea  that  the  purpose  of  the  American  government  was  to  grant 
independence  without  conditions  was  too  philosophical  to  be  true  and  that 
Don  Emilio  knew  what  he  thought  and  "I  shall  think  the  same;  that  is  to 
say  that  we  are  the  ones  who  must  secure  the  independence  of  our  country 
by  means  of  unheard-of  sacrifices  and  thus  work  out  its  happiness." 

«8PAj7.  Insurg.  Recs.,  Book  C,  1. 

s''  Phil.  Insurg.  Recs.,  S,  7. 

«8PM.  Insurg.  Recs.,  C,  1. 


THE   DIPLOMACY    OF   THE   CONSULATES      419 

any  relations  with  Aguinaldo.  General  Anderson  dealt  with  him 
as  the  commander  of  a  military  force  engaged  in  fighting  the 
common  enemy.  That  condition  necessitated  friendly  relations 
to  the  point  where  their  vital  interests  conflicted.  There  never 
was  any  real  cooperation.®"  The  Americans  merely  permitted 
the  insurgents  to  carry  on  military  operations  so  long  as  they  did 
not  conflict  with  their  own  plans.  On  July  22  General  Anderson 
informed  Aguinaldo  that  he  could  not  without  orders  from 
Washington,  recognize  his  civil  authority.'^"  The  burden  of 
Aguinaldo's  complaints  was  the  refusal  to  recognize  him  as  an 
ally  or  to  recognize  his  government,  but  he  never  in  any  of  his 
correspondence  with  Dewey,  Anderson,  Merritt  or  Otis  claimed 
that  he  had  been  promised  American  support  in  his  attempt  to 
establish  an  independent  republic  in  the  Philippines.  He  com- 
plained only  of  the  unfairness  and  injustice  of  the  refusal  to  per- 
mit his  army  to  enter  the  city  of  Manila,  which  it  had  assisted 
in  capturing.  He  refused  to  attend  the  Fourth  of  July  cere- 
monies because  not  invited  as  president.  His  military  operations 
were  carried  on  for  his  own  purposes.  He  attempted  unsuccess- 
fully to  capture  Manila  without  the  assistance  of  the  Americans. 
He  ignored  requests  for  assistance  in  obtaining  transportation 
and  complied  only  when  threatened  with  force. 

The  right  to  use  deceit  against  an  enemy  is  recognized  by  the 
laws  of  war.  The  original  plan  for  obtaining  arms  from  the 
Americans  which  could  be  used  against  them  if  the  "legitimate 
aspirations"  of  the  Filipinos  were  not  recognized  should  not  be 
too  severely  criticized.  At  least  there  is  nothing  in  the  modem 
history  of  European  nations  to  justify  them  in  throwing  stones 
at  Aguinaldo  and  his  associates.  But  conveying  information  to 
the  Spaniards  while  professing  friendship,  and  asserting  the 
existence  of  an  alliance  with  the  Americans,  can  not  be  justified 
even  by  the  law  of  necessity.  On  at  least  two  occasions  such 
information  was  conveyed  to  the  Spaniards.    On  July  30  Gen- 

••  Aguinaldo,  writing  to  Consul  Williams  on  August  1,  1898,  said  that  his 
people  were  claiming  that  the  "American  forces  have  shown  not  an  active, 
only  a  passive  cooperation."  Sen.  Doc.  62,  p.  398. 

""^Sen.  Doc.  62,  p.  393. 


420  THE  PHILIPPINES 

eral  Del  Pilar  informed  a  Spanish  officer  that  the  Americans 
would  attack  Manila  on  August  2,  and  General  Ricarte  gave 
warning  of  the  attack  of  August  13.''* 

The  verdict  of  history  must  be  that  the  United  States  was 
guilty  of  neither  false  pretenses,  breach  of  faith  nor  treachery 
toward  the  Filipino  insurgent  leaders.  Aguinaldo  was  not  so 
simple-minded  as  to  rely  on  the  statements  of  consuls,  and  he 
was  not  in  fact  misled  by  their  statements  or  their  actions.  In- 
stead of  trusting  the  Americans,  his  attitude,  at  least  from  the 
time  of  the  arrival  of  the  army,  was  unfriendly  and  suspicious. 

No  promises  were  made  by  Admiral  Dewey  or  by  any  respon- 
sible army  officer.  The  government  at  Washington  disapproved 
the  conduct  of  Pratt  and  Wildman,  but  its  disapproval  was  not 
made  public  until  after  the  treaty  of  peace  was  signed.  As  its 
policy  was  undetermined,  no  other  reasonable  course  was  possible. 
It  could  not  be  expected  to  communicate  its  disapproval  of  the 
alleged  acts  of  the  consuls  to  Aguinaldo.  However,  certain  of  the 
letters  sent  by  the  State  Department  to  the  consuls  might  very 
well  have  been  made  public,  and  it  would  have  been  better  had 
Admiral  Dewey  protested  against  Aguinaldo's  assumption  of 
civil  authority.  It  is  very  certain,  however,  that  the  course  of 
events  would  not  have  been  thereby  affected.  It  would  simply 
have  made  a  better  record  and  deprived  Aguinaldo's  friends  of 
one  of  their  arguments.'^ 

71  The  following  letter  from  a  Spanish  ofRcer  is  self-explanatory : 

"SiNGALON,  Aug.  10,  1898. 
"Senor  Don  Artemio  Ricarte : 

"My  Dear  Sir — I  have  received,  to-day  your  very  kind  letter  giving  warn- 
ing of  the  attack  on  Manila,  and  I  thank  you  for  your  personal  interest  in  me, 
which,  on  my  part  I  reciprocate.  I  assure  you  I  am  yours,  most  truly  and 
sincerely, 

**Luis  Martinez  Alcobendas." 

Phil,  Ittsurg.  Recs.,  1187,  5. 

'2  In  1904  a  leading  Filipino  wrote  to  Mr.  Le  Roy  as  follows : 

"In  my  judgment  the  Americans  who  held  the  first  conferences  with  some 
of  the  Filipinos  in  1898,  in  the  United  States,  in  Hong  Kong,  and  in  Singa- 
pore, ought  to  have  been  persons  of  high  standing,  duly  authorized  by  their 
government,  and  they  ought  to  have  spoken  plainly  and  set  forth  concretely 
what  was  in  the  thought  of  the  McKinley  Government.  .  .  .  Those  definite 
and  concrete  proposals  ought  to  have  been  expressed  without  ambiguities  or 
doubts,  but  with  absolute  plainness  and  blunt  frankness.  ...  It  appears 
as  though  certain  Americans,  and  even  military  and  naval  officers,  allowed  to 
outline  itself  in  perspective  the  future  absolute  independence  of  the  country, 


THE   DIPLOMACY   OF  THE  CONSULATES      421 

The  United  States  was  fighting  Spain,  and  the  Philippine 
Islands  were  Spanish  territory.  In  the  eye  of  international  law 
the  insurgents  were  rebellious  subjects  of  Spain,  but  subjects 
nevertheless.  After  Spain  ceded  the  territory  to  the  United 
States  the  inhabitants  owed  allegiance  to  the  new  sovereign. 
They  chose  to  exercise  their  fundamental  right  to  try  for  inde- 
pendence, and  failed. 

a  promise  more  or  less  indecisive  or  at  any  rate  lacking  formality ;  asked  and 
reasked  afterward  by  the  Democrats  during  the  presidential  campaign ;  all 
which  did  much  damage  and  deceived  the  people  of  only  moderate  education 
and  still  more  the  ignorant  who  to  this  day  believe  that  independence  is  the 
panacea  of  the  ills  and  backwardness  of  the  country.  .  .  .  And  it  was 
necessary  also  that  the  Democrats  should  not  have  supported  the  desire  for 
independence  of  many  Filipinos. 

To  the  latter  there  were  said  and  promised  many  things  which  could  not  be 
carried  out,  especially  independence,  by  Americans  who  were  speaking  and 
acting  according  to  their  own  judgment;  and  the  result  was  what  we  have  al- 
ready seen,  more  than  three  years  of  war  and  at  this  time  in  spite  of  peace  we 
still  have  trouble-brewers  abroad,  or  partisans  of  independence  who  really  are 
devoting  themselves  to  the  robbery  of  the  Filipinos."  Mr.  Le  Roy  describes 
the  writer  of  this  letter  as  "one  of  the  foremost  Filipinos  for  experience, 
legal  attainment,  and  a  character,  universally  recognized  as  the  highest."  The 
Americans  in  the  Philippines,  I,  p.  380,  note.  The  letter  was  printed  in  the 
issue  of  the  New  York  Evening  Post  of  May  17,  1904. 

Of  course  no  authorized  Americans  ever  held  conferences  with  the 
Filipinos  in  Hong  Kong,  Singapore,  or  the  United  States  during  1898.  The 
United  States  then  had  no  policy  with  reference  to  the  Filipinos  other  than 
that  conveyed  to  Pratt,  Wildman  and  Dewey,  to  have  no  political  dealings 
with  the  insurgent  leaders.  It  would  have  been  well  indeed  if  there  had  been 
a  little  plain  and  blunt  speaking  to  Aguinaldo  and  his  friends  then  and  later. 
In  fact,  most  of  the  difficulties  of  American  administration  in  the  Philippines 
during  the  past  sixteen  years  has  been  due  to  the  fear  of  injuring  the  sensi- 
bilities of  the  Filipinos  by  speaking  with  "absolute  plainness  and  bluntness." 


CHAPTER  XVI 
The  Period  of  Military  Occupation — Suspended  Sovereignty 

Military  Occupation— Powers  of  a  Military  Occupant— Merritt's  Instructions 
— The  Proclamation — Organization  of  Civil  Affairs — ^The  Peace  Protocol- 
Spanish  Claims  Thereunder — Relations  with  Insurgents — No  Joint  Occupation 
— Aguinaldo  Required  to  Withdraw  His  Troops — Consolidation  of  Civil 
Offices — The  Courts — Trade  and  Commerce — Prisons — Ownership  of  Bonds 
and  Money  in  the  Treasury — Spanish  Prisoners — Spanish  Priests  and  Nuns 
as  Prisoners — The  Chinese — Closing  up  Spanish  Afifairs — Difficulties  at  Iloilo 
— The  "Benevolent  Assimilation"  Proclamation — Aguinaldo's  Response — Con- 
ferences with  Insurgents — The  Schurman  Commission — The  Attack  on 
Manila. 

While  the  people  of  the  United  States  were  busy  with  the 
questions  of  national  policy  involved  in  the  acquisition  of  ter- 
ritory in  the  Far  East  the  army  was  governing  Manila  under 
military  law.  Until  the  treaty  of  peace  had  been  ratified  by  the 
proper  authorities  in  Spain  and  the  United  States,  and  the  fact 
duly  notified  and  proclaimed,  the  sovereignty  over  the  Philip- 
pines remained  vested  in  Spain,  subject  to  the  provision  of  the 
Peace  Protocol,  which  granted  to  the  United  States  possession 
of  the  city,  bay  and  harbor  of  Manila.  This  possession  carried 
with  it  the  right  and  the  duty  to  govern  the  territory  so  occu- 
pied. Spain  retained  the  right  to  govern  the  rest  of  the  Archi- 
pelago, and  a  Spanish  governor  continued  his  nominal  rule  from 
the  city  of  Iloilo.  As  the  terms  of  the  Peace  Protocol  implied  the 
possible  permanent  retention  of  Manila,  the  military  govern- 
ment from  the  first  naturally  thought  to  some  degree  at  least 
in  terms  of  permanency.  Hostilities  were  suspended,  and  the 
strong  temptation  to  exercise  jurisdiction  over  the  adjacent  ter- 
ritory for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  order  was  generally  re- 
sisted. 

The  instructions  which  General  Merritt  carried  with  him  to 

422 


\ 


MILITARY    OCCUPATION  423 

the  Philippines  assumed  that  the  occupation  of  Manila  would  be 
that  of  a  military  conqueror,  and.  his  powers  and  duties  were 
defined  and  announced  upon  that  theory.  The  original  occupa- 
tion was  under  the  articles  of  capitulation,  and  the  provisions 
of  the  Peace  Protocol,  by  which  the  city,  bay  and  harbor  of 
Manila  were  to  be  placed  under  the  control  of  the  United  States 
pending  the  determination  of  the  future  of  the  islands,  never 
really  controlled  the  action  of  the  military  authorities.  The  pos- 
session, from  the  time  of  the  capitulation  until  the  formal  trans- 
fer of  sovereignty  under  the  treaty  of  peace,  was  treated  as  a 
military  occupation,  and  it  was  assumed  that  the  powers  of  the 
authorities  were  derived  from  military  law. 

The  instructions  to  the  commanding  general,  dated  the  day 
before  the  first  expedition  sailed  from  San  Francisco,  stated  that 
the  army  of  occupation  was  being  sent  to  the  Philippines  for  the 
twofold  purpose  of  completing  the  destruction  of  the  power  of 
Spain  in  that  part  of  the  world  and  giving  order  and  security 
to  the  islands  while  they  were  in  the  possession  of  the  United 
States.  He  was  directed  immediately  upon  his  arrival  to  publish 
a  proclamation  announcing  that  the  Americans  came  not  to  make 
war  upon  the  people  or  upon  any  party  or  faction  among  them, 
but  to  protect  them  in  their  homes,  employments,  and  personal 
and  religious  rights. 

The  occupation  was  to  be  made  as  free  as  possible  from  sever- 
ity, although,  if  necessary  for  the  maintenance  of  law  and  order, 
the  commanding  general  was  authorized  in  his  discretion  to  re- 
move native  officials  and  establish  new  judicial  tribunals.  It  was 
announced  as  a  principle  of  public  law  that  the  first  effect  of  mili- 
tary occupation  of  an  enemy's  territory  is  the  severance  of  the 
former  political  relations  and  the  establishment  of  a  new  political 
power.  The  powers  of  a  military  occupant  are  absolute  and 
supreme  and  operate  immediately  upon  the  political  condition  of 
the  inhabitants,  but  the  ordinary  municipal  laws  of  the  conquered 
territory,  those  which  affect  the  private  rights  of  persons  and 
property  or  provide  for  the  punishment  of  crime,  continue  in 
force  until  suspended  or  superseded  by  the  acts  of  the  occupying 


424  THE   PHILIPPINES 

power.  In  practise  these  local  laws  are  not  usually  abrogated, 
but  are  administered  by  the  ordinary  tribunals  substantially  as 
they  were  before  the  occupation.  This  enlightened  practise  was 
as  far  as  possible  to  be  adhered  to  on  the  present  occasion. 

The  substance  of  these  instructions  was  embodied  in  a  procla- 
mation which  was  issued  by  General  Merritt  on  the  day  after  the 
surrender  of  the  city.  It  was  announced  that  the  municipal  law 
would  remain  operative  so  far  as  compatible  with  the  purposes 
of  military  government  and  would  be  administered  through  the 
ordinary  tribunals,  but  by  officers  appointed  by  the  government 
of  occupation.  A  provost-marshal-general  would  be  appointed 
for  the  city  of  Manila  and  the  outlying  districts,  with  deputy 
provost-marshal-generals  for  designated  subdivisions,  charged 
with  the  duty  of  making  arrests  and  bringing  offenders  before 
the  proper  courts.  The  port  of  Manila  and  all  other  ports  and 
places  in  the  Philippines  in  actual  possession  of  the  American 
land  and  naval  forces  would  be  open  while  such  occupation  con- 
tinued to  the  commerce  of  neutral  nations  in  articles  not  contra- 
band of  war  upon  the  payment  of  the  duties  in  force  at  the  time 
of  the  importation. 

All  churches  and  places  devoted  to  religious  worship  and  to 
the  arts  and  sciences,  all  educational  institutions,  libraries,  scien- 
tific collections  and  museums  would,  as  far  as  possible,  be  pro- 
tected, and  their  destruction  and  effacement,  save  when  required 
by  urgent  military  necessity,  would  be  severely  punished. 

The  army  thus  displaced  the  Spanish  officials  and  assumed  the 
government  of  the  city  and  its  environs.  The  management  of 
financial  afifairs  was  assigned  to  Brigadier-General  F.  V.  Greene, 
who  assumed  the  duties  of  the  Spanish  intendente  general  de 
hacienda.  Lieutenant-Colonel  C.  A.  Whittier  was  made  collector 
of  customs ;  Major  B.  C.  Bement,  collector  of  internal  revenue ; 
Brigadier-General  Arthur  MacArthur,  provost-marshal-general 
and  civil  governor  of  Manila;  Captain  Henry  Glass,  of  the  navy, 
captain  of  the  port,  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Jewell,  provost- 
judge.    A  military  commission  was  created,  to  try  cases  of  arson. 


MILITARY    OCCUPATION  425 

homicide  and  other  such  serious  offenses  and  their  equivalents 
in  Spanish  law. 

Health,  police  and  street  cleaning  departments  were  soon  in 
active  operation,  and  conditions,  which  had  been  necessarily  bad 
in  an  oriental  city  at  the  end  of  a  siege,  rapidly  improved. 

Three  days  after  having  taken  possession  of  the  city  under  the 
capitulation.  General  Merritt  learned  that  the  Peace  Protocol  had 
been  signed  at  Washington,  and  received  an  order  directing  that 
all  military  operations  against  the  enemy  should  be  suspended. 
The  protocol  was  signed  at  Washington  at  4 :30  on  the  afternoon 
of  August  12,  1898.  It  was  then  5  :30  in  the  morning  of  August 
13  at  Manila,  and  the  American  troops  were  already  in  position 
and  waiting  for  the  navy  to  open  fire  upon  the  defenses  of  the 
city.  The  president's  proclamation  announcing  the  suspension 
of  hostilities  was  at  once  communicated  to  the  Spanish  authori- 
ties, who  thereupon  declined  to  transfer  the  public  funds,  as 
required  by  the  capitulation,  on  the  ground  that  the  proclamation 
was  dated  prior  to  the  surrender.  General  Merritt  replied  that 
the  status  quo  which  must  be  observed  was  that  which  existed 
when  he  received  notice  of  suspension  of  hostilities.  The  funds 
were  then  delivered  under  protest  and  the  question  thus  raised 
was  disposed  of  adversely  to  the  Spaniards  by  the  treaty  of 
peace. 

After  getting  the  local  government  roughly  organized  and  un- 
der way,  General  Merritt  again  took  up  the  very  serious  question 
of  the  relations  with  the  Filipino  insurgents.  The  situation  was 
now  somewhat  more  favorable  to  the  Americans,  as  they  were 
no  longer  between  the  Spanish  and  the  Filipino  lines.  If  neces- 
sary, force  could  safely  be  used  to  compel  obedience. 

On  the  day  after  the  battle  General  Merritt  had  notified  Wash- 
mgton  that  the  insurgents  were  pressing  for  a  joint  occupation 
of  the  city,  and  requested  instructions  as  to  how  far  he  should 
go  in  enforcing  obedience  to  his  orders  in  this  and  other  matters 
of  the  same  nature.  The  reply  was  direct  and  positive.  The 
president  directed  that  there  must  be  no  joint  occupation  with 


426  THE   PHILIPPINES 

the  insurgents.  The  United  States  must  have  the  absolute  pos- 
session and  control  of  the  city,  bay  and  harbor,  as  upon  it 
would  rest  the  duty  of  preserving  the  peace  and  protecting  per- 
sons and  property  within  the  territory  occupied  by  its  military 
and  naval  forces.  The  insurgents  and  all  others  must  therefore 
recognize  the  military  occupation  and  authority  of  the  United 
States  and  the  cessation  of  hostilities  proclaimed  by  the  presi- 
dent. The  commanding  general  was  instructed  to  use  whatever 
means  in  his  judgment  was  necessary  to  this  end. 

The  statement  in  General  Merritt's  proclamation  that  the  Phil- 
ippines would  for  the  present  be  held  under  military  rule  greatly 
increased  the  agitation  of  the  insurgents.  Immediately  the  tone 
of  their  demands  was  raised.  A  commission  which  Aguinaldo 
had  sent  to  General  Anderson  to  treat  with  reference  to  the  with- 
drawal of  the  insurgents  from  the  city,  had  proposed  but  one, 
and  that  a  seemingly  reasonable  condition,  if  the  place  was  turned 
back  to  Spain — that  when  a  treaty  of  peace  was  signed  the  United 
States  would  reinstate  them  in  the  positions  they  were  now  re- 
quired to  give  up.  Immediately  after  the  issuance  of  Merritt's 
proclamation  these  commissioners  returned,  in  a  very  bad  hu- 
mor, with  ten  new  and  very  unreasonable  demands.  They  were 
now  informed  that  no  conditions  would  be  considered  until  after 
their  troops  had  been  withdrawn  beyond  the  lines  marked  on 
the  maps  which  were  delivered  to  them. 

Major-General  E.  S.  Otis  succeeded  General  Merritt  as  mili- 
tary governor  on  August  29,  1898,  and  on  the  following  day 
General  Merritt  sailed  for  Europe  to  give  the  Peace  Commission 
the  benefit  of  his  knowledge  of  the  situation.  Aguinaldo's  rather 
pathetic  letter  of  August  27  thus  came  to  General  Otis  for  con- 
sideration. Merritt  had  explained  to  Otis  that  the  difficulty 
seemed  to  be  that  Aguinaldo  did  not  think  it  prudent  to  give 
positive  orders  for  his  people  to  withdraw  for  fear  he  would 
not  be  obeyed.  The  Filipino  leader  was,  in  fact,  seeking  some 
easy  way  of  dealing  with  the  inevitable.  "I  appreciate  as  well 
as  yourself,"  he  had  written  from  Bacour,  "the  inconvenience  of 
a  dual  occupation  of  the  city  of  Manila  and  its  suburbs    .    .    , 


MILITARY   OCCUPATION  427 

but  you  ought  to  understand  that  without  the  long  siege  sustained 
by  my  forces  you  might  have  obtained  possession  of  the  ruins  of 
the  city,  but  never  of  the  Spanish  forces,  who  could  have  retired 
to  the  interior  towns.  I  do  not  complain  of  the  disowning  of 
our  help  in  the  capitulation,  although  justice  resents  it  greatly, 
and  I  have  to  bear  the  well-founded  blame  of  m.y  people.  I  do 
not  insist  on  the  retention  of  all  the  positions  conquered  by  my 
forces  within  the  city  limits  at  the  cost  of  much  blood,  of  inde- 
scribable suffering  and  much  money.  I  promise  to  retire  to  this 
line.  ,  .  .  Permit  me  to  insist,  if  you  will,  upon  the  restitu- 
tion of  the  possessions  which  we  are  now  giving  up,  if  in  the 
treaty  of  peace  between  Spain  and  the  United  States  they  ac- 
knowledge the  dominion  of  Spain  in  the  Philippines,  I  am  com- 
pelled to  insist  on  the  said  conditions  to  quiet  the  complaints  of 
my  chiefs  and  soldiers  who  have  exposed  their  lives  and  aban- 
doned their  interests  during  the  siege  of  Manila." 

After  delaying  long  enough  to  familiarize  himself  with  the 
situation,  General  Otis  on  September  8  sent  to  Aguinaldo  a  long 
communication,  in  which  he  reviewed  the  questions  at  issue,  gave 
the  insurgent  leader  some  very  good  advice,  and  peremptorily 
directed  that  his  forces  evacuate  the  entire  city,  including  its 
suburbs  and  defenses,  before  September  15,  in  default  of  which 
forcible  action  would  be  taken.  It  would  be  easy  to  criticize  the 
tone  and  language  of  this  letter.  It  showed  not  the  slightest 
consideration  for  the  susceptibilities  of  the  Filipinos.  It  was,  in 
fact,  a  frank  Anglo-Saxon  document.  Nevertheless  it  was  what 
was  required  by  the  situation.  The  Filipinos  expected  ultimately 
to  oppose  the  Americans  with  arms  and  were  playing  the  game 
of  negotiation  quite  skilfully.  A  Filipino  will  never  cease  urg- 
ing and  arguing  his  case  until  he  receives  an  ultimatum,  and  it 
must  be  an  ultimatum  which  he  clearly  recognizes.  When  nec- 
essary, he  generally  acquiesces  with  perfect  good  nature.  Gen- 
eral Aguinaldo  realized  that  he  must  remove  his  troops,  but  sent 
another  commission  to  beg  General  Otis  to  withdraw  the  letter 
and  substitute  a  simple  request,  unaccompanied  by  a  threat  to 
use  force.     General  Otis  refused  to  withdraw  his  letter,  but 


428  THE   PHILIPPINES 

finally  consented  to  write  another  which  Aguinaldo  could  show 
to  his  army.  This  was  done,  and  on  the  evening  of  the  appointed 
day  all  the  insurgent  organizations  withdrew  from  the  city.^ 

The  attempt  to  govern  the  city  by  merely  substituting  Ameri- 
can for  Spanish  officials  was  not  very  successful.  In  the  interest 
of  economy  and  efficiency  many  of  the  Spanish  offices  were 
abolished  and  others  were  consolidated.  The  result  was  a  grad- 
ual concentration  of  power  in  the  office  of  the  military  governor. 
It  was  found  impractical  to  continue  the  office  of  intendente 
general  de  hacienda,  in  which  General  Whittier  had  succeeded 
General  Greene  when  the  latter  left  for  the  United  States.  The 
duties  of  the  office  as  defined  by  the  Spanish  law  were  broader 
than  the  powers  which  were  to  be  exercised  by  the  American 
government,  as  it  included  matters  relating  to  the  entire  islands, 
such  as  the  customs  and  internal  revenue.  The  Spanish  colonial 
treasury  had  dealt  with  questions  of  general  as  well  as  local 
import.  The  funds  of  the  insular  government  and  of  the  city 
of  Manila  and  the  money  which  had  been  deposited  in  the  treas- 
ury by  private  individuals  had  been  commingled  and  could  not 
easily  be  segregated.  The  laws  of  the  military  government  were 
not  operative  beyond  the  limits  of  the  territory  under  its  con- 
trol. The  Spanish  officials  very  properly  claimed  that  financial 
matters  which  related  to  the  islands  generally,  in  which  Manila 
was  not  immediately  concerned,  were  still  under  their  control. 
This  dual  control  made  the  situation  very  difficult,  and  the  mili- 
tary governor  soon  found  it  necessary  to  bring  all  financial  mat- 
ters within  the  direct  control  of  his  office. 


1  Aguinaldo  managed  to  keep  his  men  ignorant  of  the  real  situation.  Gen- 
eral Otis  says  that  the  insurgents  marched  out  in  excellent  spirits,  cheering 
the  American  troops.  An  eye  witness  gives  the  following  account  of  an  inci- 
dent connected  with  the  withdrawal.  The  Filipinos  had  requested  that  they 
be  allowed  to  march  up  to  the  Luneta,  the  old  Spanish  execution  grounds. 

"Early  on  this  morning  that  part  of  the  insurgent  forces  which  would  make 
their  departure  by  the  Luneta  began  to  move.  The  columns  passed  from  the 
Calle  Real  into  the  Calle  Luis,  the  rank  and  file  in  blue  drilling,  lead  by  the 
famous  Pasig  band  of  ninety  pieces,  and  the  column  headed  by  Colonel 
Callies.  Down  to  the  Paco  Road  they  went,  to  the  Calle  Bagumbayan,  where 
they  soon  stood  beside  the  wall  where  so  many  of  their  comrades  had  en- 
dured Spanish  execution.  As  they  passed  the  Wyoming  regiment,  cheer  upon 
cheer  was  given  by  the  Wyoming  boys.  It  was  an  incident  long  remembered 
by  the  insurgents."    Faust,  Campaigning  in  the  Philippines,  p.  111. 


MILITARY    OCCUPATION  429 

The  management  of  the  Bureau  of  Internal  Revenue  also  pre- 
sented many  perplexing  problems.  Operating  under  many  de- 
crees, of  different  dates,  it  issued  cedulas,  executed  the  stamp 
laws  and  the  industrial  regulations,  and  collected  the  money 
belonging  to  the  city  as  well  as  to  the  central  government.  It 
was  not  easy  to  determine  what  particular  taxes  should  be 
collected  by  the  military  government.  Thus  the  railway  tax, 
imposed  by  the  Spanish  insular  government  for  services  ren- 
dered in  the  island  of  Luzon,  was  not  at  first  collected  by  the 
American  government,  as  the  services  rendered  by  the  railways 
were  not  confined  to  the  city. 

It  was  also  thought  to  be  doubtful  whether  the  cedulas  should 
be  issued  at  all,  because  they  were  supposed  to  confer  certain  ad- 
vantages upon  the  holders,  such  as  the  right  to  travel  about  the- 
islands.  The  cedtdas  were,  therefore,  at  first  not  collected,  but 
the  inhabitants  demanded  them  so  persistently,  as  a  means  o*f 
identification,  that  they  were  issued  finally  for  a  merely  nominal 
fee. 

The  officers  assigned  to  the  work  of  civil  government  found 
themselves  beset  with  all  kinds  of  difficulties.  The  old  Spanish 
system,  which  they  had  been  set  to  operate,  was  extremely  com- 
plicated. The  accumulation  of  uncodified  and  often  conflicting 
laws,  orders  and  decrees,  was  not  to  be  mastered  in  a  day  by 
military  officers  who  had  been  trained  under  a  different  system 
of  legislation  and  jurisprudence.  The  Royal  Decree  of  1894, 
under  which  the  limits  of  Manila  had  been  extended  to  include 
the  adjacent  villages  of  Ermita,  Malate,  Binondo,  Paco  and 
others,  recognized  and  retained  many  of  the  usages  and  cus- 
toms which  for  generations  had  formed  a  part  of  the  native  com- 
munity life.  Certain  of  the  city  offices  had  been  made  elective. 
Taxation  was  to  some  extent  controlled  by  the  municipal  council, 
subject  to  the  approval  of  the  governor-general.  It  was  found 
impossible  to  operate  this  kind  of  a  city  government,  and  munici- 
pal affairs  were  entrusted  to  the  provost-marshal-general,  who 
deposited  all   funds  received  from  any  source  in  the  general 


430  THE    PHILIPPINES 

treasury  and  drew  thereon  for  money  to  cover  the  necessary  city 
expenditures. 

Although  Spanish  sovereignty  was  supposed  to  continue,  sub- 
ject to  the  exigencies  of  military  occupation,  most  of  the  Spanish 
civil  officials  abandoned  their  offices  without  transferring  the 
property  and  records.  The  Spanish  army  officers  neglected  to 
make  proper  returns  of  their  troops  or  to  render  lists  of  public 
property,  as  required  by  the  capitulation.  The  Americans  were,, 
therefore,  obliged  to  discover  it  and  make  their  own  inventories; 
and  it  was  upon  these  that  the  property  was  finally  returned  to  tlie 
Spaniards,  as  required  by  the  Treaty  of  Paris. 

Many  of  the  judicial  officers  also  vacated  their  positions  and 
sailed  for  Spain  without  making  provision  for  the  care  of  the 
records  of  their  courts.  A  proclamation  of  August  14  suspended 
the  criminal  jurisdiction  of  the  audiencia  and  of  the  inferior 
local  courts.  On  August  22  it  was  ordered  that  crimes  committed 
by  or  against  persons  connected  with  the  army  should  be  deter- 
mined by  military  commissions  whose  sentences  were  "to  con- 
form to  the  laws  of  war  of  the  United  States  or  of  either  of  the 
states  or  the  customs  of  war."  In  a  few  instances  the  Spanish 
judges  opened  their  courts  without  previous  consultation  with 
the  military  authorities,  but  the  protests  of  the  Filipinos  led  to 
the  issuance  of  an  order  that  all  proceedings  should  be  suspended. 
The  courts  of  first  instance  were  then  closed. 

The  audiencia  claimed  the  right  to  remain  open  and  determine 
civil  and  criminal  cases  which  had  been  submitted  to  it  on  appeal 
before  the  surrender  of  the  city,  and  the  Spanish  chief  justice 
rather  persistently  urged  this  claim  upon  the  military  governor. 
He  was  informed  that  the  rule  that  the  ordinary  civil  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  courts  was  not  displaced  by  military  occupation  was 
subject  to  the  will  of  the  occupying  power,  and  that  the  func- 
tions of  the  audiencia  had  already  been  suspended  by  General 
Merritt's  proclamation.  Whether  it  was  advisable  to  continue 
the  suspension  was  a  matter  which  was  under  consideration.  It 
was  suggested  that  if  adequate  assurances  could  be  obtained  that 
the  resumption  of  its  customary  duties  would  not  operate  to 


MILITARY    OCCUPATION  431 

obstruct  the  operations  of  the  government,  the  ban  might  be 
removed. 

For  a  time  the  civil  courts  were  all  closed,  and  the  people  were 
subjected  to  serious  inconvenience.  After  conferring  with  the 
chief  justice  and  leading  Filipino  lawyers.  General  Otis  con- 
cluded to  authorize  the  old  courts  to  reopen  under  certain  restric- 
tions. On  October  7,  1898,  therefore,  an  order  was  issued  direct- 
ing that 

"the  civil  courts,  as  composed  and  constituted  by  the  laws  of 
Spain,  which  were  held  and  administered  prior  to  August  13, 
1898,  within  Philippine  territory  now  subject  to  United  States 
military  occupation  and  control,  are  permitted  to  resume  at  once 
the  exercise  of  the  civil  jurisdiction  conferred  by  Spanish  laws 
within  the  limits  of  that  territory;  subject,  however,  to  such 
supervision  by  the  military  government  of  the  United  States  here 
instituted  as  in  its  judgment  the  interests  of  that  government 
may  demand."* 

But  the  restrictions  placed  on  their  functions  were  not  satis- 
factory to  the  Spanish  judges,  and  they  gradually  abandoned 
their  work.  During  the  rest  of  the  period  now  under  considera- 
tion substantially  all  judicial  functions  were  exercised  by  provost- 
courts  and  military  commissions. 

The  blockade  had  paralyzed  trade  and  commerce,  and  the  food 
supply  of  the  city  was  rapidly  becoming  exhausted.  Manila  was 
then,  as  it  is  to-day,  the  commercial  as  well  as  the  political  center 
of  the  Archipelago.  The  trade  relations  of  the  islands  were  very 
close.  In  some  instances  they  were  dependent  upon  one  another 
for  the  necessities  of  life.  Certain  sections  cultivated  rice ;  others 
tobacco,  sugar  or  hemp;  others  raised  live  stock,  which  was  ex- 
changed for  foodstuffs  and  other  necessities.  These  products 
were  the  medium  of  exchange,  and  comparatively  little  money 
was  used.  The  principal  trade  of  Manila,  and  the  transporta- 
tion business  generally,  was  in  the  hands  of  European  and  Chinese 
merchants,  who  were  clamoring  for  the  opening  of  the  ports  and 
the  removal  of  the  restrictions  on  interisland  commerce.    Large 

»  Otis  Kept.  1899,  p.  12. 


432  THE   PHILIPPINES 

sums  of  money  had  been  advanced  by  these  people  on  the  security 
of  tobacco,  hemp  and  sugar  which  awaited  shipment  to  Manila. 
The  harbor  was  filled  with  Spanish  and  other  European  ship- 
ping. The  restrictions  on  trade  elsewhere  than  at  Manila  were 
imposed  by  the  Spanish  government,  which  was  at  liberty  to 
close  the  ports  to  outside  commerce  and  influence  if  it  chose  to 
do  so.  But  while  the  bulk  of  the  Spanish  forces  were  held  as 
prisoners  of  war  the  insurrection  had  spread  to  all  the  islands  in- 
cluding those  occupied  by  the  Moros.  The  Spaniards,  under  Gen- 
eral Rios,  were  concentrated  at  Iloilo  and  Zamboanga.  To  the 
protests  of  the  merchants  General  Otis  replied :  "A  government 
almost  in  extremis  mortiiis,  as  certainly  the  Spanish  government 
in  the  central  Philippine  Islands  must  be  considered  to  be  at 
present,  has  the  lawful  right  to  shut  temporarily  all  of  its  ports, 
whether  declared  of  entry  or  otherwise,  and  whatever  the  busi- 
ness interests  of  outside  merchants,  be  they  foreigners  or  citizens 
of  its  domain."' 

An  arrangement  was  made  with  General  Rios  under  which 
vessels  carrying  the  Spanish  or  American  flag  might,  subject  to 
the  provisions  of  the  Spanish  law,  trade  between  certain  inter- 
island  ports.  But  those  flying  the  Spanish  flag  dared  not  enter 
the  ports  which  were  in  the  possession  of  the  insurgents.  The 
interisland  commerce  which  was  free  and  undutiable  could  not  be 
thrown  open  to  foreign  ships.  The  result  was  that  many  of  the 
ships  which  had  formerly  sailed  under  the  Spanish  flag  made 
colorable  transfers  to  American  residents,  complied  with  the 
consular  regulations  and  received  American  registers. 

The  Spanish  tariff  regulations  were  complicated  and  very  diffi- 
cult to  understand.  The  orders  of  the  president  required  them 
to  be  maintained  in  force  with  as  little  change  as  possible.  Even 
slight  modifications  were  resented  by  the  merchants  who  had 
made  their  arrangements  and  their  purchases  on  the  theory  of 
the  perpetuity  of  Spanish  dominion.  An  executive  order  issued 
by  the  president  on  July  12,  1898,  before  the  capture  of  Manila, 
directed  that  upon  the  occupation  and  possession  of  any  ports 

»  Otis  Rept.  1899,  p.  45. 


MILITARY   OCCUPATION  433 

iand  places  in  the  Philippine  Islands  by  the  forces  of  the  United 
States,  the  tariff  of  duties  and  taxes  therein  prescribed  should  be 
levied  as  a  military  contribution.*  This  schedule  also  proved 
unsatisfactory,  and  on  September  29  it  was  ordered  that  its  en- 
forcement should  be  postponed  until  November  10,  and  that,  in 
the  meantime,  the  existing  tariffs  and  duties  should  be  main- 
tained, except  that  all  goods  and  merchandise  secured  or  pur- 
chased within  the  dominion  of  Spain  since  the  declaration  of 
;war  between  Spain  and  the  United  States  should  be  received 
upon  the  same  condition  as  to  tariff  and  duties  as  the  goods  and 
merchandise  of  neutral  nations. 

A  careful  revision  of  the  tariff  law  was  made  by  experts,  and 
the  new  duties  were  made  effective  November  10,  1898.  The 
revenues  were  collected  thereafter  under  this  schedule,  with  no 
more  friction  than  was  inevitable  under  the  circumstances. 

Some  difficulties  resulted  from  misunderstandings  with  the 
Spanish  authorities  over  permits  for  trading  at  certain  ports. 
By  this  time  Aguinaldo's  Malolos  government  was,  in  the  lan- 
guage of  General  Otis,  "reeling  off  decrees  and  constitutional 
provisions  at  a  rapid  rate."  The  insurgent  government  was 
greatly  in  need  of  money  and  obtained  it  by  imposing  an  export 
duty  of  ten  per  cent,  on  all  products  shipped  to  Manila  from 
ports  in  their  possession.  Under  such  conditions  commerce  natu- 
rally languished. 

Much  confusion  was  caused  by  the  lack  of  proper  prison  rec- 
ords. The  prisons  were  filled  to  overflowing  with  criminals  and 
persons  charged  with  various  crimes.  Many  persons  were  found 
in  Bilibid  prison  against  whom  no  charges  appeared  of  record. 
Some  had  evidently  been  thrown  into  prison  on  mere  suspicion 
or  for  some  personal  reason,  and  simply  forgotten.  The  pressure 
from  friends  and  relatives  for  the  release  of  prisoners  was  very 
great,  and  for  a  time  any  occupant  of  Bilibid  seems  to  have 


*The  Act  of  Congress,  July  1,  1902,  sec  2,  ratified,  approved  and  con- 
firmed the  action  of  the  president  as  set  forth  in  the  order  of  July  12,  1898, 
and  subsequent  amendments  whereby  a  tariff  of  duties  and  taxes  was  to_  be 
levied  and  collected  at  all  ports  and  places  in  the  occupation  and  possession 
of  the  armies  of  the  United  States. 


434  THE   PHILIPPINES 

been  given  the  benefit  of  the  doubt  and  released  on  the  slightest 
provocation.  A  number  of  notorious  criminals  were  thus  en- 
abled to  escape  punishment.  Subsequently  greater  care  was 
exercised  and  each  case  was  carefully  investigated.  This  exer- 
cise of  power  to  release  prisoners  who  had  been  regularly  con- 
victed and  sentenced  before  the  capitulation  of  the  city — ^that  is, 
in  effect,  to  retry  the  cases  without  the  use  of  the  original  evi- 
dence— was,  of  course,  without  legal  justification  and  was  cited 
by  the  Spanish  Commission  at  Paris  as  an  act  of  sovereignty 
justified  by  neither  the  Peace  Protocol  nor  the  articles  of  capitu- 
lation. 

Many  difficult  questions  of  a  purely  legal  nature  affecting  the 
rights  of  individuals  arose  during  this  early  period.  The  Spanish 
government  had  been  in  the  habit  of  receiving  from  individuals 
various  bonds  and  special  deposits  in  trust  or  as  security  for 
the  performance  of  personal  obligations,  and  it  was  claimed  that 
many  of  these  deposits  were  in  the  safes  and  vaults  which  con- 
tained the  public  funds  captured  by  the  United  States.  Private 
persons  promptly  filed  their  applications  for  the  return  of  money, 
bonds  and  securities  which  they  claimed  had  been  deposited 
in  exchange  for  Spanish  bonds  which  they  had  never  received, 
or  for  the  purpose  of  guaranteeing  the  performance  of  con- 
tracts which  they  had  entered  into  with  the  government.  The 
treasury  books,  in  fact,  showed  many  such  deposits,  some  of 
which  had  been  properly  designated  and  placed  in  the  vaults, 
so  that  ownership  could  be  determined.  The  aggregate  amount 
of  these  claims  exceeded  the  funds  in  the  treasury,  and  had 
they  been  recognized  as  an  obligation  of  the  United  States 
would  have  left  it  in  debt  to  the  claimants.  The  latter  were 
notified,  however,  that  the  title  to  all  these  funds  had  passed 
to  the  United  States  by  capture,  free  from  claims  against  the 
Spanish  government,  and  that  their  contracts,  although  tempo- 
rarily suspended,  would  revive  against  Spain  upon  the  cessation 
of  American  military  occupation  and  the  return  of  the  territory 
to  Spain.® 

8  Letter  of  October  6,  1898,  Otis'  Kept.  1899,  p.  37. 


MILITARY    OCCUPATION  435 

All  pending  claims  for  the  refund  of  taxes,  and  these  were 
many,  were  treated  as  demands  against  the  Spanish  government, 
in  which  the  United  States  was  not  interested.  The  United 
States  claimed  all  moneys  and  securities  found  in  the  Spanish 
treasury  at  the  inception  of  the  occupation  as  the  property  of 
the  public  enemy  and  did  not  acknowledge  the  validity  of  any 
liens  asserted  by  the  former  subjects  of  Spain.  Money  in  the 
treasury  at  the  time  it  was  surrendered  to  the  United  States  was 
treated  as  public  money  which  could  not  be  paid  out  in  liquida- 
tion of  Spanish  indebtedness  of  any  kind.  Only  taxes  which 
had  accrued  since  August  13,  1898,  were  collected  by  the  mil- 
itary government,  and  refunds  could  be  made  only  out  of  such 
funds. 

The  estates  of  many  individuals  charged  with  treason  had 
been  embargoed  and  taken  possession  of  by  the  Spanish  authori- 
ties. The  owners  now  sought  vigorously,  but  unsuccessfully,  to 
impose  a  liability  for  their  property  upon  the  United  States  gov- 
ernment. Under  the  Spanish  law  the  title  to  an  embargoed 
estate  remained  in  the  individual  owner,  but  the  use  and  profit 
of  the  estate  was  vested  in  the  Spanish  government  as  long  as 
the  embargo  continued  in  effect.  The  continuance  of  the  em- 
bargo depended  upon  a  pardon  or  the  result  of  a  trial.  If  the 
owner  was  convicted  of  the  offense  charged,  his  property  was 
confiscated ;  if  he  was  acquitted,  it  was  returned  to  him.  Turning 
the  situation  into  terms  of  American  law,  the  estate  in  such  a 
case  was  held  in  trust  by  the  Spanish  government  for  its  sole 
use  and  benefit  with  remainder  vested  in  the  parties  formerly 
holding  the  unqualified  fee  and  depending  upon  a  contingency 
involving  due  conviction  of  the  crime  of  disloyalty.  The  United 
States  during  its  occupancy  under  the  truce  with  Spain,  which 
provided  only  for  a  temporary  cessation  of  hostilities,  was  a 
trustee  for  Spain  and  "would  be  recreant  to  its  trust  should  it 
knowingly  divert  without  just  cause  under  the  law  any  properties 
which  would  again  inure  to  the  dominion  of  Spain  upon  a  return 
of  Spanish  sovereignty."  Should  the  possession  of  the  United 
States  be  declared  permanent,  the  question  would  present  a  dif- 


436  THE   PHILIPPINES 

ferent  aspect.  In  the  meantime  the  temporary  occupancy  of  the 
United  States  did  not  impose  upon  it  any  obligation  to  redress 
or  even  to  investigate  alleged  grievances  of  Spanish  subjects 
against  their  government.  All  sequestered  estates  were,  there- 
fore, taken  possession  of  by  the  provost-marshal  and  adminis- 
tered for  the  benefit  of  the  United  States,  and  in  the  final  adjust- 
ment of  affairs  they  were  returned  to  their  owners. 

The  Spanish  military  prisoners  w^ere  a  source  of  much  annoy- 
ance and  no  little  menace  to  the  health  and  safety  of  the  city. 
While  the  future  of  the  islands  was  uncertain  they  could  not  be 
expatriated  without  the  consent  of  both  Spain  and  the  United 
States.  If  Spain  retained  the  islands,  the  troops  would  probably 
be  needed  there.  Many  of  them  were  sick  and  required  special 
care  and  consideration.  The  necessary  articles  and  appliances 
were  furnished  by  the  Americans,  and  the  health  of  the  soldiers 
soon  commenced  to  improve.  But,  having  no  employment,  their 
conduct  was  such  as  to  cause  the  Spanish  officers,  as  well  as  the 
American  authorities,  considerable  uneasiness.  The  old  antip- 
athy between  the  Spanish  soldiers  and  the  Filipinos,  which  dur- 
ing the  early  days  of  the  occupation  had  been  very  intense,  was 
rapidly  succeeded  by  a  friendliness  which  seemed  rather  unnat- 
ural. The  Spanish  soldiers  were  a  trifle  too  anxious  to  frat- 
ernize with  the  insurgents,  and  their  officers  were  required  to 
keep  the  men  better  organized,  as  contemplated  by  the  articles  of 
capitulation.  But  their  authority  had  been  greatly  diminished. 
A  request  by  General  Rizzo  for  authority  to  impose  punishments 
authorized  by  the  Spanish  military  code  upon  his  troops  was 
refused,  as  the  Americans,  being  responsible  for  the  care  of  the 
prisoners,  felt  that  they  must  "see  that  they  receive  humane  treat- 
ment in  accordance  with  the  dictates  and  spirit  of  their  own 
military  code."  General  Otis  was  authorized  to  permit  Spanish 
officers  who  were  disabled  to  depart  for  Spain,  and  a  consider- 
able number  availed  themselves  of  the  privilege." 


_^  Congress  appropriated  $1,500,000  for  the  expense  of  returning  Spanish 
prisoners  and  their  families  to  Spain.  H.  R.  Doc.  264,  55th  Cong.,  3d  Sess., 
p.  1.    According  to  Sastron  (p.  563),  29,418  Spaniards  were  thus  returned. 


MILITARY   OCCUPATION  437 

The  disposition  of  the  Spanish  native  troops  held  as  prisoners 
presented  serious  difficulties.  The  Spanish  authorities  pro- 
posed to  disband  them,  but  this  could  not  be  permitted.  About 
three  thousand  of  these  troops  had  deserted  to  the  insurgents 
before  the  surrender  of  the  city.  Of  those  remaining,  some  came 
from  the  southern  islands  and  others  from  the  surrounding  coun- 
try; and  all,  after  having  served  the  Spaniards,  werQ  afraid  to 
return  to  their  homes.  Ultimately  the  most  of  them  were  dis- 
charged at  Manila  and  found  their  way  into  the  insurgent  ranks, 
where  they  became  the  most  efficient  of  Aguinaldo's  troops. 

General  Otis  was  in  constant  correspondence  with  the  insur- 
gent leader  with  reference  to  various  matters.  The  Vatican  and 
the  Catholic  world  generally  were  much  disturbed  by  rumors  of 
the  manner  in  which  the  Filipinos  were  treating  their  prisoners, 
and  the  United  States  was  appealed  to  for  aid  in  securing  the 
release  of  the  members  of  the  religious  orders  and  the  nuns.  The 
correspondence  which  resulted  is  very  instructive  to  the  student 
of  Filipino  character  and  illustrates  well  the  lack  of  grasp  which 
their  leaders  had  on  the  principles  of  international  law.  General 
Otis,  in  a  very  fatherly  and  condescending  communication  re- 
plete with  good  but  vmappreciated  advice,  expressed  the  fear  that 
the  imprisonment  of  the  Spanish  clergy  and  nuns  would  create 
an  unfavorable  impression  in  the  great  world. as  to  the  nature 
of  Filipino  culture.  General  Aguinaldo  in  reply  expressed  his 
appreciation  of  the  American's  consideration  for  the  reputation 
of  his  government  and  disclaimed  any  intention  of  holding  nuns 
or  women  and  children  as  prisoners.  Such  as  were  with  his 
troops,  he  said,  were  free  to  go  as  their  interests  and  desires  dic- 
tated. As  to  the  clergy  and  civil  officials,  he  conceded  that  inter- 
national law  did  not  permit  of  their  being  made  prisoners  of 
war,  but  in  this  instance  all  of  these  people  had  borne  arms 
against  the  Filipinos,  and  the  friars  had  been  the  means  of 
sending  many  patriotic  Filipinos  into  banishment  or  to  languish 
in  prison.  The  friars,  it  was  said,  had  cheated  the  government, 
the  Vatican  and  foreign  public  opinion  and  had  made  themselves 
masters  of  the  lives,  honor  and  property  of  the  people  and  were 


438  THE   PHILIPPINES 

the  primary  cause  of  the  revolution.  To  free  them  would  be 
neither  just  nor  politic,  as  they  would  proceed  at  once  to  the 
work  of  inciting  a  counter-revolution.  He,  therefore,  proposed 
to  hold  the  civil  officials  until  the  deported  and  imprisoned  Fili- 
pinos obtained  their  liberty,  and  the  friars  until  the  Vatican  rec- 
ognized the  rights  of  the  native  Filipino  clergy.  The  public 
interest  and  the  peace  of  the  Filipino  people,  according  to  Agui- 
naldo,  required  this,  and  "international  law  will  have  to  give  way 
before  the  just  cause  of  a  country  of  a  million  of  souls,  because 
this  cause  is  one  of  humanity,  civilization  and  progress.  My 
people  demand  these  measures,  and  I  can  not  but  comply  with 
their  will."  Many  who  have  occupied  higher  places  in  history 
than  the  Filipino  chief  have  applied  the  same  doctrine,  while  not 
so  frankly  stating  it. 

There  was  indeed  respectable  authority  for  the  view  that  all 
who  follow  an  army,  including  civil  officials,  newspaper  corre- 
spondents and  sutlers,  may  be  made  prisoners  of  war,  and  as 
General  Otis'  arguments  proved  ineffective,  the  subject  was  for 
the  time  abandoned.'' 

The  sudden  inrush  of  Chinese  seemed  to  the  new  government 
to  require  special  and  immediate  attention.  Many  of  these  peo- 
ple had  retired  to  China  during  the  revolution  and  were  merely 
returning  to  their  homes,  while  others  were  newcomers  who  were 
attracted  by  the  prospects  for  trade  under  the  new  conditions. 
The  Spanish  laws  in  force  at  the  time  seemed  inadequate  to 
Americans,  who  thought  of  Chinese  immigration  in  terms  of 
Pacific  coast  sentiment.  Thousands  of  the  Chino-Filipinos  were 
the  descendants  of  ancestors  who  had  settled  in  the  Philippines 
generations,  even  centuries,  before  American  occupation.  They 
had  intermarried  with  the  Filipinos,  and  Chinese  and  Filipino 
and  Spanish  names  were  inextricably  interwoven.  Many  of  the 
leading  men  of  the  country  carried  in  their  physiognomy  the 
unmistakable  evidence  of  Chinese  blood. 

The  Chinese  controlled  a  great  part  of  the  leading  business 
of  the  islands  and  during  recent  times  they  had  been  frequently 

^  For  the  correspondence,  see  Gen,  Oti^  Report,  1899,  pp.  22-29. 


MILITARY    OCCUPATION  439 

the  holders  of  valuable  concessions,  particularly  such  as  could 
only  be  obtained  by  liberal  donations  to  Spanish  officials.  The 
lower  classes  were  found  in  most  of  the  occupations  of  life,  ex- 
cept farming.  While  the  Filipinos  were  normally  indolent  and 
not  eager  for  wealth,  the  Chinese  were  always  wide  awake  and 
very  active.  Notwithstanding  this  intermixture  of  the  races 
and  centuries  of  association,  there  remained  considerable  race 
antagonism. 

The  Chinaman,  when  away  from  home,  has  no  political  ambi- 
tion and  is  always  willing  to  take  advantage  of  his  neighbor's 
troubles  to  put  money  into  his  own  purse.  The  common  China- 
men were  sympathetic  Spaniards,  Filipino  patriots,  or  enthusi- 
astic Americantstas,  as  the  immediate  circumstances  seemed  to 
require.  But  they  were  useful  people  in  the  Philippines,  and  it 
might  have  been  as  well  to  allow  the  existing  Spanish  laws  to 
remain  in  force,  at  least  until  the  future  of  the  islands  was  de- 
termined. However,  within  a  month  after  the  occupation  of 
Manila  the  laws  relative  to  the  admission  of  Chinese  into  the 
United  States  were  by  an  order  of  the  military  governor  made 
effective  in  the  Philippines.^  An  oriental  people,  of  all  others 
the  best  adapted  to  aid  in  stimulating  the  slumbering  resources 
of  the  country,  were  thus  excluded  by  the  application  of  prin- 
ciples which  in  the  United  States  had  been  thought  necessary 
to  protect  the  white  race  against  the  competition  of  the  yellow. 

Soon  after  the  treaty  of  peace  was  signed  the  Spanish  au- 
thorities manifested  great  anxiety  to  close  their  affairs  in  the 
islands.  Until  the  treaty  was  ratified  it  was  impossible  to 
make  definite  arrangements  with  reference  to  property  matters, 
but  the  prisoners  were  gradually  sent  home,  and  on  January  31, 
1899,  a  board  of  officers'  was  named  to  act  with  a  similar  Span- 
ish board  to  "clear  the  accounts  of  the  Spanish  government  in 


8  Otis  Report,  1899,  p.  34. 

•Maj.  Chas.  McClure,  Chief  Paymaster;  Maj.  C.  U.  Guatenbein,  Second 
Oregon  Volunteers,  and  Lieutenant  M.  A.  Hildreth,  First  North  Dakota 
Volunteers.  There  were  three  Spanish  boards.  Sastron,  the  author  of  the 
Spanish  history  of  the  war,  was  president  of  the  Spanish  civil  board.  The 
reports  of  the  American  board  are  in  Otis'  Report,  1899,  Appendix  R,  and 
MacArthur's  Report,  1900,  Appendix  N. 


440  THE   PHILIPPINES 

the  Philippines."  This  board  commenced  work  immediately  and 
after  a  great  deal  of  labor  secured  the  data  upon  which  the 
final  adjustment  was  made. 

In  the  meantime  the  Spanish  government  of  the  islands  was 
being  administered  by  General  Rios,  from  Iloilo,  in  the  island 
of  Panay.  Rios  realized  that  he  might  not  be  able  to  hold  Iloilo 
against  an  attack  of  the  insurgents  and  asked  to  be  permitted 
to  turn  the  city  over  to  the  United  States  authorities  and  retire 
to  Zamboanga.  He  was  informed  that  nothing  could  be  done 
until  the  commission  then  sitting  at  Paris  had  determined  the 
future  of  the  Archipelago. 

Soon  after  the  treaty  of  peace  was  signed  General  Otis  re- 
ceived a  petition  from  certain  merchants  of  Iloilo,  asking  for 
American  protection.  In  response  to  a  request  for  instructions 
he  was  directed  from  Washington  to  send  the  necessary  troops 
to  preserve  the  peace  and  protect  life  and  property,  but  to 
be  conciliatory,  as  it  was  "most  important  that  there  should 
be  no  conflict  with  the  insurgents."^^  As  the  treaty  of  peace 
was  not  yet  effective  and -the  protocol  suspending  hostilities 
was  in  full  force,  the  sending  of  this  expedition  was  unau- 
thorized. However,  as  the  Spaniards  and  the  merchants  of 
Iloilo  were  requesting  that  American  troops  should  be  sent 
to  take  possession  of  the  city,  there  seemed  no  particular  reason 
why  events  should  not  be  allowed  to  take  their  natural  course. 
But  the  Spanish  force  evacuated  Iloilo  on  December  24,  and 
when,  on  December  28,  General  Marcus  P.  Miller,  with  two  thou- 
sand five  hundred  American  troops,  arrived  in  front  of  the  city, 
they  found  a  native  organization  in  possession  and  evidently  in 
sympathy  with  the  Malolos  government.  General  Miller's  original 
instructions,  prepared  before  the  evacuation  by  the  Spanish  was 
known,  required  him  to  be  conciliatory  but  firm;  to  make  no 
great  display  of  force  and  to  seek  to  gain  possession  by  peace- 
able and  leisurely  negotiations."  If  this  course  proved  ineffective. 


10  These  instructions  were  dated  December  21,  1898.    The  instructions  to 
proclaim  American  sovereignty  over  the  Archipelago  bear  the  same  date. 
"  Otis'  Report,  1899,  pp.  57-59. 


MILITARY   OCCUPATION  441 

he  was  to  report  to  Manila  and  await  instructions.  He  was  now 
informed  that  under  the  changed  conditions  it  was  necessary  to 
occupy  Iloilo  at  once  and  that  the  manner  of  doing  so  must  be 
left  to  his  discretion,  avoiding  a  conflict  if  possible,  but  accept- 
ing it  if  necessary, ^^ 

The  government  which  the  natives  had  set  up  at  Malolos  had 
passed  under  the  control  of  the  radicals,  who  favored  a  conflict 
with  the  Americans,  and  Aguinaldo  hoped  that  it  would  be  pre- 
cipitated at  Iloilo,  where  it  would  serve  to  fire  the  hearts  of  the 
Visayans,  who  thus  far  had  been  notably  lukewarm  in  his  cause. 
By  the  same  token  it  was  important  from  the  American  point 
of  view  to  avoid  hostilities  at  Iloilo.  The  treaty  was  under  dis- 
cussion in  the  Senate  and  the  final  vote  was  very  uncertain. 
Admiral  Dewey,  with  his  usual  good  sense  and  caution,  advised 
the  abandonment  of  the  movement,  but  General  Otis,  while  fa- 
voring every  possible  effort  at  conciliation,  declined  to  recall  the 
troops. 

General  Miller  reported  that  he  found  the  city  quiet.  Had 
he  acted  with  decision,  the  people  would  doubtless  have  acqui- 
esced in  American  occupation,  as  they  had  made  no  provision 
for  defense.*'  But  they  soon  gained  confidence  and  took  their 
stand  with  the  Malolos  government.  On  the  day  of  his  arrival 
the  general  announced  that  the  United  States  had  succeeded, 
by  virtue  of  conquest  supplemented  by  treaty  stipulations,  to 
all  the  rights  of  Spain  in  the  islands,  and  invited  a  conference 
with  representatives  of  the  people  of  Iloilo.  A  committee  rep- 
resenting those  in  control  replied  that  they  must  confer  with 
Aguinaldo  before  acting,  as  any  other  course  would  endanger 
their  lives  and  property.  This  privilege  being  denied  them,  they 
asked  for  time  to  consider  the  demand,  and  on  December  30 
submitted  their  final  answer.  It  was  signed  by  R.  Lopez,  as 
"President  of  the  Federal  Government  of  the  Visayas,"  and  an- 


"  Gen.  Otis  to  Gen.  Miller,  Dec.  28,  1898 ;  Otis'  Report,  p.  60. 

18  One  of  the  newspaper  men  who  accompanied  Gen.  Miller's  expedition 
stated  {Harper's  History,  pp.  74-77)  that  he  went  on  shore  at  once  and  found 
no  troops  in  the  town,  and  no  flag  flying.  The  insurgents  evidently  expected 
the  troops  to  land. 


442  THE   PHILIPPINES 

nounced  that  "in  conjunction  with  the  people,  the  army  and  com- 
mittee will  insist  upon  our  pretensions  not  to  consent  in  our 
present  situation  to  any  foreign  interference  without  express  or- 
ders from  the  Central  Government  of  Luzon,  upon  which  we 
state  once  more  that  we  depend,  and  with  which  we  are  one  in 
ideas,  as  we  have  been  until  now  in  sacrifices." 

The  merchants  who  had  petitioned  for  the  troops  had  expe- 
rienced a  change  of  heart  and  now  besought  General  Miller  to 
consider  their  large  interests  and  the  results  to  them  of  a  con- 
flict between  the  Americans  and  the  natives.  Events  in  Manila 
and  to  the  north  were  rapidly  drifting  toward  a  crisis,  but  Gen- 
eral Otis  was  determined  that  hostilities  should  not  be  com- 
menced by  his  troops,  and  General  Miller  was  instructed  to  pro- 
ceed slowly  and  await  the  progress  of  events. 

Some  time  before  the  treaty  of  peace  was  signed  Admiral 
Dewey  recommended  that  in  order  to  quiet  the  spirit  of  unrest 
the  president  should  issue  a  proclamation  in  which  he  should 
announce  the  policy  of  the  United  States  and  explain  to  the  Fili- 
pinos that  it  was  the  intention  to  interfere  as  little  as  possible 
in  their  internal  affairs  and  to  grant  increased  powers  and  priv- 
ileges as  fast  as  they  were  capable  of  exercising  them — ^thus 
clearly  outlining  the  policy  which  has  since  been  pursued. 

Immediately  after  the  signing  of  the  treaty  of  peace  the  presi- 
ident  issued  such  a  proclamation,  in  which  the  policy  of  the 
United  States,  as  far  as  it  had  been  determined,  was  announced." 
General  Otis  on  December  29  sent  a  translation  of  the  proclama- 
tion to  General  Miller,  who  on  January  6,  1899,  published  it 
at  Iloilo.  He  reported  to  General  Otis  that  a  copy  had  been 
sent  to  the  committee  of  the  natives,  but  that  no  answer  had 
been  received.  In  fact,  a  public  meeting  had  been  held  to  dis- 
cuss the  proclamation  and  the  intention  announced  of  resorting 
to  arms.     General  Miller  reported  "that  the  people  laughed  at 

**This  proclamation  was  issued  a  month  before  the  beginning  of  hostili- 
ties. Nevertheless  Mr.  Thayer  (Life  and  Letters  of  John  Hay,  II,  p.  137) 
says:  "Even  when  the  United  States  was  engaged  in  wiping  out  certain 
tribes  of  recalcitrant  Filipinos,  the  Major  [McKinley]  announced  that  we 
vrerc  bent  on  'benevolent  assimilation.' " 


MILITARY    OCCUPATION  443 

it  (the  proclamation).  The  insurgents  call  us  cowards  and  are 
fortifying  the  old  fort  at  the  point  of  the  peninsula  and  are 
mounting  old  smooth-bore  guns  left  by  the  Spaniards.  They  are 
entrenching  everywhere,  bent  on  having  one  fight,  and  are  confi- 
dent of  victory."" 

General  Miller  remained  quietly  in  front  of  Iloilo  until  after 
the  beginning  of  hostilities  at  Manila  on  February  4.  The  de 
facto  native  government  continued  to  administer  civil  affairs 
and  collect  the  customs  taxes,  much  to  the  disgust  of  the  Amer- 
ican officials  designated  for  that  purpose,  who  were  required  to 
remain  on  board  the  ships. 

General  Otis,  recognizing  that  Iloilo  was  not  in  the  legal  pos- 
session of  the  Americans  and  that  Spanish  authority  remained 
intact  until  the  treaty  was  ratified  and  proclaimed,  directed  that 
the  commerce  of  the  port  should  not  be  interfered  with,  and  this 
action  was  subsequently  approved  by  the  president.** 

Unfortunately,  the  military  government  did  not  adhere  con- 
sistently to  this  policy.  The  executive  order  of  July  12,  1898, 
following  the  rule  of  international  law  and  the  ordinary  practise 
of  the  American  government,  directed  that  tariff  duties  should 
be  collected  at  ports  in  the  occupation  and  possession  of  the 
United  States  forces.  The  occupation  of  the  city,  bay  and  har- 
bor of  Manila  was  provided  for  by  the  protocol  of  August  12, 
1898.  Until  the  exchange  of  ratifications  of  the  treaty  a  tech- 
nical state  of  war  existed,  but  under  the  provisions  of  the  pro- 
tocol hostile  operations  could  not  be  conducted  by  either  bellig- 
erent. Beyond  the  city,  bay  and  harbor  of  Manila  the  entire 
Archipelago  was,  in  legal  contemplation,  in  the  possession  of 
Spain.  Cebu,  like  Iloilo,  was  in  the  actual  possession  oi  a.  de 
facto  native  insurgent  government,  which  was  collecting  the 
duties  on  goods  delivered  at  the  port.  The  government  at  Ma- 
nila In  this  instance  disregarded  the  rule  announced  for  the  con- 
trol of  affairs  at  Iloilo  and  required  a  merchant  at  Manila  to 

*»  Repts.  War  Dept.  1899,  I,  Pt.  5.  p.  328.  John  F.  Bass'  account  of  the 
Iloilo  meeting  in  Harper's  Hist.,  p.  75. 

"General  Corbin  to  General  Otis,  Jan.  16,  1899;  Otis'  Report,  1899,  pp. 


444  THE   PHILIPPINES 

pay  the  duty  a  second  time  on  a  cargo  of  rice  which  he  had 
shipped  from  Saigon,  Indo-China,  to  Cebu.  The  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States  finally  held  that  this  collection  was  illegal 
and  that  the  amount  collected  should  be  returned  to  the  shipper.^^ 
The  hasty  publication  of  the  president's  proclamation  at  Iloilo 
was  unfortunate  in  view  of  the  fact  that  General  Otis  had  de- 
cided that  under  the  circumstances  it  required  editing  for  local 
consumption.  An  unsuccessful  effort  was  made  to  inform  Gen- 
eral Miller  of  this  intention.  The  result  was  that  the  translation 
issued  by  General  Otis  at  Manila  differed  from  that  published 
at  Iloilo  in  that  it  omitted  certain  words  and  phrases  which  it 
was  feared  would  tend  to  excite  the  natives.  General  Otis  has 
been  severely  criticized  for  his  action  in  respect  to  this  proclama- 
tion. The  remarkable  thing  is  that  in  a  matter  of  such  impor- 
tance and  on  which  he  and  Dewey  disagreed  he  should  have  acted 
without  consultation  with  Washington. 

"After  fully  considering  the  president's  proclamation,"  he 
says,  "and  the  temper  of  the  Tagalogs,  with  whom  I  was  daily 
discussing  political  problems  and  the  friendly  intentions  of  the 
United  States  government  toward  them,  I  concluded  that  there 
were  certain  words  and  expressions  therein,  such  as  'sovereignty,' 
*the  right  of  cession,'  and  those  which  directed  immediate  occu- 
pation, etc.,  though  most  admirably  employed  and  tersely  express- 
ing the  actual  conditions,  might  be  advantageously  used  by  the 
Tagalog  war  party  to  incite  widespread  hostility  among  the  na- 
tives. The  ignorant  classes  had  been  taught  to  believe  that  cer- 
tain words,  as  'sovereignty,'  'protection,'  etc.,  had  peculiar  mean- 
ing, disastrous  to  their  welfare,  and  signified  a  future  political 
domination  like  that  from  which  they  had  recently  been  freed. 
It  was  my  opinion,  therefore,  that  I  would  be  justified  in  so 
amending  the  paper  that  the  beneficent  object  of  the  United 
States  government  would  be  brought  clearly  within  the  compre- 
hension of  the  people,  and  this  conclusion  was  the  more  readily 
reached  because  of  the  radical  change  of  the  past  few  days  in 

i^Macleod  v.  United  States,  229  U.  S.  416  (1913),  reversing  45  Ct  of 
CI.  339. 


MILITARY    OCCUPATION  445 

the  constitution  of  Aguinaldo's  government,  which  could  not 
have  been  understood  at  Washington  at  the  time  the  proclama- 
tion was  prepared." 

Therefore,  instead  of  printing  the  president's  instructions  in 
full.  General  Otis  issued  a  proclamation  of  his  own,  in  which  he 
quoted  the  following  language  of  the  president : 

"Finally,  it  should  be  the  earnest  and  paramount  aim  of  the 
Administration  to  win  the  confidence,  respect  and  affection  of 
the  inhabitants  of  the  Philippines  by  insuring  to  them  in  every 
possible  way  the  full  measure  of  individual  rights  and  liberty, 
which  is  the  heritage  of  a  free  people,  and  by  proving  to  them 
that  the  mission  of  the  United  States  is  one  of  beneficent  as- 
similation, which  will  substitute  the  mild  sway  of  justice  and 
right  for  arbitrary  rule.  In  the  fulfillment  of  this  high  mission, 
while  upholding  the  temporary  administration  of  affairs  for  the 
greatest  good  of  the  governed,  there  will  be  sedulously  main- 
tained the  strong  arm  of  authority  to  repress  disturbance  and  to 
overcome  all  obstacles  to  the  bestowal  of  the  blessings  of  good 
and  stable  government  upon  the  people  of  the  Philippine  Islands." 

Speaking  for  himself,  General  Otis  said : 

"From  the  tenor  and  substance  of  the  above  instructions  of 
the  President,  I  am  fully  of  the  opinion  that  it  is  the  intention 
of  the  United  States,  while  directing  affairs  generally,  to  appoint 
the  representative  men  now  forming  the  controlling  element  of 
the  Filipinos  to  civil  positions  of  trust  and  responsibility,  and 
it  will  be  my  aim  to  appoint  thereto  such  Filipinos  as  may  be 
acceptable  to  the  supreme  authorities  at  Washington.  It  is  also 
my  belief  that  it  is  the  intention  of  the  United  States  govern- 
ment to  draw  from  the  Filipino  people  so  much  of  the  military 
force  of  the  islands  as  is  possible  and  consistent  with  a  free  and 
well-constituted  government  of  the  country,  and  it  is  my  desire 
to  inaugurate  a  policy  of  that  character.  I  am  also  convinced 
that  it  is  the  intention  of  the  United  States  government  to  seek 
the  establishment  of  a  most  liberal  government  for  the  islands, 
in  which  the  people  themselves  shall  have  as  full  representation 
as  the  maintenance  of  law  and  order  will  permit,  and  which  shall 
be  susceptible  of  development  on  lines  of  increased  representa- 
tion and  the  bestowal  of  increased  powers  into  a  government  as 


446  THE   PHILIPPINES 

free  and  independent  as  is  enjoyed  by  the  most  favored  provinces 
of  the  world."^" 

While  the  friendl}-  and  well  disposed  Filipinos  were  pleased 
with  the  proclamation,  the  militant  element  of  the  community 
received  it  with  derision.  The  leading  native  newspapers  de- 
nounced it  as  a  mere  subterfuge,  designed  to  quiet  the  people 
until  measures  could  be  inaugurated  to  put  into  effect  all  the 
odious  practises  which  Spain  had  employed.  The  radicals,  Gen- 
eral Luna  and  Senor  Mabini,  were  at  that  time  the  dominating 
influences  in  the  Malolos  government.  On  January  5,  1899,  Ag- 
uinaldo  issued  a  proclamation  which  was  nothing  less  than  a 
declaration  of  war  against  the  United  States.  After  reciting  his 
version  of  events  from  the  time  of  his  departure  from  Singapore, 
he  said : 

"My  government  can  not  remain  indifferent  in  view  of  such 
a  violent  and  aggressive  seizure  of  a  portion  of  its  territory  by 
a  nation  which  has  arrogated  to  itself  the  title,  champion  of  op- 
pressed nations.  Thus  it  is  that  my  government  is  disposed  to 
open  hostilities  if  the  American  troops  attempt  to  take  forcible 
possession  of  the  Visayan  Islands.  I  denounce  these  acts  before 
the  world  in  order  that  the  conscience  of  mankind  may  pro- 
nounce its  infallible  verdict  as  to  who  are  the  true  oppressors  of 
nations  and  the  tormentors  of  human  kins." 

A  few  days  later,  on  June  8,  another  proclamation,  addressed 
"To  my  brothers,  the  Filipinos,  and  to  all  the  respectable  Consuls 
and  other  Foreigners,"  was  issued  and  published  in  certain  Ma- 
nila papers.    In  it  Aguinaldo  said : 

"As  in  General  Otis'  proclamation  he  alluded  to  some  instruc- 
tions issued  by  His  Excellency  the  President  of  the  United  States, 
referring  to  the  administration  of  the  matters  in  the  Philippine 
Islands,  I,  in  the  name  of  God,  the  root  and  fountain  of  all  jus- 
tice, and  that  of  all  the  right  which  has  been  visibly  granted  to  me 

^^Otis  Rept.,  1899,  pp.  66-69.  For  the  proclamations,  see  Sen.  Doc.  331, 
pp.  776-8.  For  General  Otis'  testimony  regarding  the  incident,  see  Ibid.,  pp. 
764-8.    For  General  Miller's  statement,  see  Cong.  Rec.  XXXV,  Pt.  6,  p.  6026. 


MILITARY   OCCUPATION  447 

to  direct  my  dear  brothers  in  the  difficult  work  of  our  regenera- 
tion, protest  most  solemnly  against  this  intrusion  of  the  United 
States  government  on  the  sovereignty  of  these  islands. 

"I  equally  protest  in  the  name  of  the  Filipino  people  against 
the  said  intrusion  because,  as  they  have  granted  their  vote  of 
confidence  appointing  me  President  of  the  nation  although  I  do 
not  consider  that  I  deserve  such,  therefore  I  consider  it  my  duty 
to  defend  to  death  its  liberty  and  independence. 

"Finally,  I  protest  against  such  an  unexpected  act  of  sover- 
eignty of  the  United  States  in  these  islands,  in  the  name  of  all 
the  proceedings  which  I  have  in  my  possession  Vv'ith  regard  to 
my  relationship  with  the  United  States  authorities,  which  un- 
mistakably prove  that  the  United  States  did  not  take  me  from 
Hong  Kong  to  fight  the  Spaniards  for  their  benefit,  but  for  the 
benefit  of  our  liberty  and  independence,  for  which  purpose  the 
said  authorities  verbally  promised  me  their  most  decided  assist- 
ance and  efficacious  cooperation ;  and  so  should  you,  all  my  dear 
brothers,  understand,  in  order  that  we  may  united  act  according 
to  the  idea  of  our  liberty  and  independence,  which  were  our  most 
noble  desires,  and  assist  with  your  work  to  obtain  our  aim  with 
the  strength  which  our  old  convictions  may  afford  and  must  not 
go  back  in  the  way  of  glory  which  we  have  obtained."^' 

This  proclamation,  printed  in  Spanish  and  Tagalog  and  widely 
distributed,  produced  a  serious  effect  upon  the  people.  The  sen- 
timent of  antagonism  toward  the  Americans  now  became  prac- 
tically unanimous.  The  few  intelligent  people  who  honestly  be- 
lieved that  the  Filipino  people  would  be  happier  and  more 
prosperous  under  a  government  imposed  by  the  United  States 
than  under  an  experimental  government  conducted  by  inexpe- 
rienced leaders  and  ambitious  military  officers  swollen  by  their 
temporary  importance  were  for  the  time  silenced  by  considera- 
tions of  personal  safety. 

A  few  days  after  the  publication  of  the  "beneficent  assimila- 
tion" "proclamation  Aguinaldo,  as  the  result  of  negotiations  com- 
menced some  time  before  at  the  instance  of  conservative  Fill- 


ip These  proclamations  are  printed  in  Otis'  Report,  1899,  pp.  76-79.  It 
seems  that  the  first  proclamation,  which  contained  a  virtual  declaration  of 
war,  was  as  far  as  possible  withdrawn  from  circulation.  The  second,  while 
more  rabid  in  tone,  omitted  that  provision  and  modified  the  statement  with 
reference  to  the  alleged  promise  of  independence.    See  Le  Roy,  I,  p.  404. 


448  THE   PHILIPPINES 

pinos,  appointed  a  commission  to  visit  Manila  in  the  interests  of 
peace.^"  How  sincere  his  desire  for  peace  was  is  shown  by  a 
code  of  instructions  to  soldiers  issued  on  the  day  of  the  appoint- 
ment of  the  commissioners  in  which  patriots  were  told  to  observe 
their  fellow  countrymen  in  order  to  see  whether  they  are  Amer- 
ican sympathizers  and  "whenever  they  are  assured  of  the  loyalty 
of  the  converts  they  shall  instruct  them  to  continue  in  the  char- 
acter of  an  American  sympathizer  in  order  that  they  may  receive' 
good  pay,  but  without  prejudicing  the  cause  of  our  country. 
In  this  way  they  can  serve  themselves  and  at  the  same  time  serve 
the  public  by  communicating  to  the  committee  of  chiefs  and  offi- 
cers of  our  army  whatever  news  of  importance  they  may  have."^^ 
Numerous  lengthy  conferences  led  to  the  usual  negative 
results.  Mabini,  who  drew  the  instructions  of  the  Filipinos 
and  controlled  their  actions,  desired  the  withdrawal  of  the 
American  forces  from  before  Iloilo  and  the  recognition  of 
independence  under  some  sort  of  a  protectorate.  It  was  all 
very  general  and  indefinite.  The  sovereignty  of  the  United 
States  was  not  a  subject  for  consideration  by  military  officers, 
and  the  insurgent  commissioners,  having  nothing  definite 
to  offer,  were  helpless.^^  On  January  29  the  commissioners 
held  their  final  meeting  and  adjourned  sine  die. 


20  The  Filipino  commission  was  composed  of  Florentino  Torres,  Eufrasio 
Flores  and  Manuel  Arguelles.  General  Otis  appointed  Brigadier-General  R. 
P.  Hughes,  Colonel  James  F.  Smith  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  E.  H.  Crowder 
to  confer  with  them. 

^^  House  Doc.  2,  56  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.,  Part  2,  200.  These  instructions  as 
to  the  method  to  be  pursued  by  the  Sandatahan  (bolo  men)  within  the  city 
make  interesting  reading. 

22  Sen.  Doc.  331,  57th  Cong.,  ist  Sess.,  pp.  2709-2751,  where  the  official 
minutes  of  the  conference  are  printed.  Aguinaldo  gives  some  account  of  the 
negotiations  in  his  Reseiia  Veridica.  For  the  position  of  the  conservative 
party  at  that  time,  see  Judge  Torres'  statement.  Kept.  War  Dept.,  1901,  I, 
Part  4,  p.  120.  General  Otis  wrote:  "With  the  insurgent  representatives  it 
was  one  continued  plea  for  some  concession  which  would  satisfy  the  people. 
One  of  them  was  a  man  of  excellent  legal  ability,  who  had  occupied  an  im- 
portant judicial  position  at  Cebu  under  the  Spanish  Government  for  a  number 
of  years.  He  had  recently  arrived  in  Manila,  and  on  the  invitation  of  Agui- 
naldo had  visited  Malolos.  He  was  animated  with  a  desire  to  restore  har- 
monious relations,  or  at  least  to  effect  a  temporary  peace  until  the  existing 
excitement  could  be  allayed,  when  the  people  might  listen  to  reason.  He 
secured  the  appointment  of  Aguinaldo's  board  and  was  named  thereon  as  the 
most  important  member,  but  he  was  so  circumscribed  by  specific  instructions 
that  he  could  not  accomplish  anything.    I  charged  him  with  playing  a  false 


MILITARY    OCCUPATION  449 

Two  days  previously  Aguinaldo  had  notified  General  Otis 
that  he  had  proclaimed  the  Philippine  Republic  and  that  it 
had  been  enthusiastically  received  by  the  people.  With 
what  under  the  circumstances  was  sublime  impudence  he 
expressed  the  sincere  hope  that  the  general  would  inform 
the  United  States  government  of  his  desire  for  the  prompt 
recognition  by  the  United  States  of  the  latest  member  of 
the  family  of  nations. 

War  was  now  inevitable.  The  Filipinos  knew  that  General 
Otis  had  been  ordered  not  to  begin  the  war.  Their  troops 
had  become  so  arrogant  that  it  was  with  the  utmost  difficulty 
that  the  American  soldiers  could  be  prevented  from  resenting 
their  taunts  and  insults.  Colonel  Barry,  the  adjutant-gen- 
eral, was  sent  to  Malolos  to  try  and  impress  Aguinaldo  with 
the  dangers  of  the  situation,  but  he  was  not  accorded  the 
honor  of  an  interview.  Mabini  was  gracious,  but  assured 
Barry  that  the  people  were  greatly  excited  and  could  not 
be  controlled  beyond  a  certain  point.  While  protesting 
friendliness  and  a  desire  for  peace,  Aguinaldo  and  his  ad- 
visers had  long  before  this  determined  to  bring  about  a  rupture. 
Within  the  city  of  Manila  their  agents  were  organizing  the 
disaffected  element  into  clubs  and  lodges,  preparatory  to  an 
uprising  in  connection  with  the  contemplated  attack  from  with- 
out. By  taunts  and  insults  of  every  description  it  was  sought  to 
induce  the  American  soldiers  to  become  the  aggressors.*'    It  is 

part,  basing  the  charge  upon  a  knowledge  of  his  legal  acquirements.  He  con- 
fessed that  he  was  fully  aware  of  the  untenable  position  he  occupied,  and  was 
powerless  under  the  circumstances.  He  was  an  adept  at  legal  fiction  and 
could  discover  pregnants  both  negative  and  positive  in  every  international 
postulate."    General  Otis'  Report,  p.  83. 

Seiior  Torres  was  subsequently  appointed  an  associate  justice  of  the 
Supreme  Court  and  still  holds  that  responsible  position.  He  is  universally 
respected  by  Americans  and  Filipinos. 

See  also  House  Doc.  No.  2,  56th  Cong.,  znd  Sess.,  Part  2,  p.  202. 

23  In  his  report  dated  May  14,  1900,  General  Otis  said :  "I  desire  to  correct 
an  erroneous  impression  which  appears  to  prevail  .  .  .  that  war  with  the 
insurgents  was  initiated  by  the  United  States  government,  or  that  the  attitude 
or  conduct  of  its  troops  in  Manila  was  the  cause  of  hostilities,  unless  possibly 
it  may  be  held  that  their  failure  to  resent  insult  or  punish  hostile  demonstra- 
tion constantly  recurring  in  their  midst  encouraged  the  already  openly  avowed 
eremy  in  the  belief  that  it  could  easily  slaughter  them  within  the  city  which 
»t  had  invested,  and  thereby  incited  him  to  action.  War  with  the  insurgents  of 


450  THE   PHILIPPINES 

reasonably  certain  that  a  day  was  designated  for  an  uprising, 
when  the  city  was  to  be  fired  and  all  Americans  put  to  the  sword. 

Early  in  January,  1899,  Admiral  Dewey  suggested  to  the  presi- 
dent that  a  commission  should  be  sent  from  the  United  States 
to  study  the  general  situation  in  the  Philippines  and  recom- 
mend a  policy  to  be  pursued.  After  consultation  with  General 
Otis,  President  McKinley  appointed  Jacob  C.  Schurman, 
President  of  Cornell  University;  Charles  Denby,  for- 
merly United  States  Minister  to  China;  Dean  C.  Worcester; 
Rear- Admiral  George  Dewey;  and  Major-General  E.  S. 
Otis,  as  the  members  of  what  became  known  as  the  Schur- 
man Commission.  At  the  time  of  the  appointment  of  this 
commission  no  definite  policy  for  the  government  of  the 
islands  had  been  adopted  or  even  seriously  considered  by 
President  McKinley.  The  United  States  in  dealing  with  the 
Filipinos  was  still  free  to  grant  them  independence,  to  estab- 
lish a  protectorate  over  them,  to  confer  upon  them  a  colonial 
form  of  government,  or  to  admit  them  to  the  dignity  of  a 
territory  or  even  a  state  in  the  Union.  Nothing  had  been 
settled  except  that  Spain  should  cede  to  the  United  States 
the  sovereignty,  which  for  three  hundred  years  she  had  ex- 
ercised over  the  islands.^* 

With  conditions  as  they  were  in  Manila  it  was  inevitable 
that  there  would  soon  be  a  collision  between  the  troops  and 
the  insurgents.  The  Americans  were  doing  everything  pos- 
sible to  prevent  hostilities,  at  least  until  the  arrival  of  the 
regular  regiments  that  were  on  the  way.  The  Filipinos  had 
determined  to  declare  war  and  attack  the  Americans.    Their 


the  Philippines  was  forced  upon  us  and  was  unavoidable.  No  nation  but  the 
United  States  would  have  permitted  an  unfriendly  force  of  large  numerical 
strength  to  throw  up  intrenchments  and  erect  fortifications  in  the  immediate 
proximity  of  its  troops,  as  did  the  insurgents  during  several  weeks  preceding 
their  attack  on  Manila,  without  considering  it  an  act  of  war  and  adopting 
measures  to  arrest  it.  By  all  law  and  approved  precedent  the  United  States 
would  have  been  justified  in  arresting  these  insurgent  demonstrations  by 
demand,  to  be  followed  with  the  application  of  force  if  demand  was  insuf- 
ficient ;  and  had  that  course  been  adopted  no  wrong  could  have  been  imputed 
to  the  United  States."  House  Doc.  2,  56th  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.,  Part  2,  p.  199; 
Otis'  Kept,  1899-1900,  p.  3. 

2*  Schurman,  Filipino  Affairs,  A  Retrospect  and  Outlook  (1902),  p.  4. 


MILITARY   OCCUPATION  451 

troops  were  constantly  pressing  upon  the  American  lines 
and  apparently  inviting  trouble,  with  the  officers  encouraging 
instead  of  restraining  them. 

The  spirit  in  which  the  leaders  were  acting  appears  in 
correspondence  between  General  Aguinaldo  and  one  of  his 
best  officers,  Colonel  Cailles.  On  January  10,  1899,  the  lat- 
ter, who  had  taken  up  a  position  beyond  the  line  which  had 
been  agreed  upon,  wrote  that  the  Americans  had  requested 
him  to  withdraw  his  forces  fifty  paces,  but  he  wrote,  "I  shall 
not  draw  back  a  step  and  in  place  of  withdrawing  I  shall 
advance  a  little  farther.  He  .  .  .  brings  a  letter  from 
his  American  General  in  which  he  speaks  as  a  friend.  I  said 
that  from  the  day  I  knew  that  Macquinley  opposed  our  inde- 
pendence I  do  not  want  to  have  dealings  with  any  Americans. 
War,  war  is  what  we  want.  The  American  after  this  speech 
went  off  pale."  Replying  to  this  Aguinaldo  said:  "I  ap- 
prove and  applaud  what  you  have  done  with  the  Americans 
and  zeal  and  valor  always,  also  my  beloved  officers  and  sol- 
diers here.  I  believe  that  they  are  playing  us  until  the  ar- 
rival of  their  reinforcements,  but  I  shall  send  an  ultimatum 
and  shall  be  always  on  the  alert."^^ 

Three  days  later  Cailles  desired  to  know  the  result  of  the  ulti- 
matum and  also  what  rewards  the  government  contemplated  "for 
the  forces  that  will  be  able  first  to  enter  Manila."  The  reply,  in 
the  handwriting  of  Aguinaldo,  informed  the  gallant  colonel  that, 
"Those  who  will  be  the  heroes  will  have  as  their  rewards  a  large 
quantity  of  money,  extraordinary  rewards,  promotions,  crosses 
of  Biak-na-bato,  Marquis  of  Malate,  Ermite,  Count  of  Manila, 
etc.,  besides  the  congratulations  of  our  idolizing  country  on  ac- 
count of  their  being  patriotic,  and  more,  if  they  capture  the  regi- 
ments with  their  generals,  and  if  possible  the  chief  of  them  all 
who  represents  our  future  enemies  in  Manila."^' 

Aguinaldo  had  for  the  moment  evidently  forgotten  that 


25  Telegraphic  Correspondence  of  Aguinaldo,  p.  39.     Edited  by  Captain 
R.  Taylor,  pamphlet  (1903). 
2*  Tel.  Cor,  of  Aguinaldo,  p.  40. 


452  THE   PHILIPPINES 

his  constitution  prohibited  the  granting  of  titles  of  nobility. 
Probably  he  never  took  Mabini's  paper  government  very 
seriously  or  even  was  aw^are  of  the  contents  of  the  elaborate 
documents  that  he  signed  at  Mabini's  dictation.  It  is  cer- 
tain that  he  never  permitted  such  matters  seriously  to  inter- 
fere with  his  projects,  and  had  Cailles  succeeded  in  captur- 
ing "the  regiments  with  their  generals"  he  would  probably 
have  secured  his  title  of  nobility.^^ 

On  February  2  a  company  of  Filipinos  deliberately  came 
within  the  American  lines  and  took  possession  of  a  small 
village,  but  on  the  demand  of  General  Mac  Arthur  they  were 
withdrawn.  Notice  was  served  on  the  commander  that  such 
violations  of  the  agreement  would  not  be  thereafter  endured. 
About  8:30  on  the  night  of  February  4  four  Filipinos  ap- 
proached within  five  yards  of  an  American  outpost  near  the 
San  Juan  bridge  and  ignoring  the  command  to  halt  were 
fired  upon  by  the  sentry.  A  Filipino  detachment  near  by 
returned  the  fire,  and  the  firing  soon  became  general  along 
the  entire  line.  In  the  early  morning  the  naval  ships  began 
sending  shells  into  the  Filipino  lines.  During  the  day  of  the 
fifth,  which  was  Sunday,  there  was  severe  fighting.  The 
Americans  advanced  steadily,  and  by  evening  the  Filipinos 
had  been  driven  from  their  lines  and  were  badly  demoralized. 
The  American  loss  was  fifty  killed  and  one  hundred  eighty- 


27  In  this  connection  an  entry  in  the  interesting  diary  kept  by  Simeon 
Villa,  one  of  Aguinaldo's  companions  in  his  flight  toward  the  mountains, 
throws  a  flood  of  light  upon  the  character  of  Aguinaldo.  "On  a  moonlight 
night,"  records  the  diarist,  "the  honorable  President  (and  others)  were  dis- 
cussing the  matter ;  and  once  the  independence  of  the  country  is  declared,  we 
shall  take  a  trip  to  Europe  with  an  allowance  of  a  million  dollars  to  pay  our 
expenses."  On  another  occasion,  "After  supper  the  honorable  President  in 
conversation  with  B.  and  V.  and  Lieutenant  Carrasco,  told  them  that  as  soon 
as  the  independence  of  the  country  was  declared,  he  would  give  each  one  of 
them  an  amount  of  land,  equal  to  what  he  himself  will  take  for  the  future  of 
his  own  family;  that  is,  he  will  give  each  one  of  the  three  men  13,500  acres  of 
land  as  a  recompense  for  their  work.  ...  In  all  probability  they  will  be 
located  in  the  San  Jose  Valley,  Province  of  Nueva  Ecija,  and  the  principal 
products  will  be  coffee,  cacao,  sugar,  rice,  and  cattle." 

This  diary  was  published  by  the  government  in  1902  under  the  title  of 
Flight  and  Wanderings  of  Etnilio  Aguinaldo.  See  Senate  Doc,  331,  57th 
Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  Part  3,  pp.  1980-2060. 


MILITARY    OCCUPATION  453 

four  wounded.     General  Otis  estimated  the  enemy's  casual- 
ties at  three  thousand,  but  no  exact  figures  were  available. 

The  fact  that  the  outbreak  occurred  just  before  the  date 
set  for  the  vote  in  the  Senate  on  the  ratification  of  the  treaty 
with  Spain  was  probably  a  mere  coincidence,  but  to  the  sus- 
piciously inclined  it  suggested  design.  The  Anti-Imperialists 
and  their  friends  in  the  Senate,  ever  ready  to  think  the  worst 
of  their  countrymen,  charged  that  the  conflict  had  been  de- 
liberately brought  on  by  the  Americans  in  order  to  influence 
the  vote  on  the  treaty.^^  There  is  no  credible  evidence 
to  show  that  the  Filipinos  timed  the  attack  with  reference 
to  the  vote  on  the  treaty.  Their  representatives  abroad  cer- 
tainly had  advised  an  attack  before  the  arrival  of  the  Ameri- 
can forces,  and  Agoncillo  hurriedly  left  Washington  for  Can- 
ada on  the  night  of  Feburary  4,  under  circumstances  which 
suggested  flight.  But  there  is  nothing  to  show  that  he  had 
any  information  other  than  what  he  could  have  acquired 
from  a  New  York  newspaper  which  published  an  account  of 
the  outbreak  about  midnight  of  February  4.^^  Having  learned  of 
the  attack,  Agoncillo  probably  thought  it  advisable  to  be  in  Mon- 
treal instead  of  Washington,  The  circumstances  of  the  firing  at 
San  Juan  bridge  were  inconsistent  with  the  theory  of  a  pre- 
arranged incident  advised  by  Agoncillo  to  intimidate  the  Senate 
by  knowledge  that  the  Filipinos  intended  to  go  to  war.  The 
Filipinos  at  that  particular  hour  were  unprepared  for  attack  or 
defense.  The  expected  battle  came  when  they  were  off  their 
guard,  most  of  the  higher  officers  being  absent  at  Malolos  or  en- 
joying themselves  at  various  entertainments  in  the  vicinity.  How- 
ever, Aguinaldo  had  the  draft  of  a  declaration  of  war  ready,  and 


28  See  the  speeches  of  Sen.  Rawh'ns,  April  23,  1902.  Con.  Rec,  XXXV, 
Part  5.  p.  4573,  and  Sen.  Patterson,  Ibid.,  p.  5915.  The  attempt  to  manipulate 
the  records  to  the  discredit  of  the  American  authorities  was  a  failure.  See 
the  record  contained  in  a  speech  by  Sen.  Spooner,  Cong.  Rec,  XXXV,  Part  6, 
pp.  6107-6108. 

29  Manila  is  13  hours  west  of  Washington.  Otis'  message,  filed  at  Manila 
at  8:32  a.  m.,  February  6,  was  received  at  Washington  at  10:52  p.  m.  on 
February  5.  The  New  York  Herald  contained  the  first  news  before  midnight 
of  February  4,  which  was  February  5  in  Manila. 


454  THE   PHILIPPINES 

*'at  the  first  tick  of  the  telegraph  reporting  the  trouble  in  front 
of  Manila,  it  was  reeled  off  the  old  press  at  Malolos."^" 

30  Le  Roy,  II,  p.  19,  note.  For  this  document  see  Otis'  Report,  1899,  p.  95, 
Sen.  Doc.  208,  Part  1,  pp.  104-106.  A  facsimile  of  the  original  declaration  is 
in  Harper's  History,  p.  123. 


CHAPTER  XVII 
The  Filipino  Rebellion  and  the  Days  of  the  Empire 

Nature  of  the  War — Filipinos  Misjudged — Aguinaldo  at  Zenith  of  Power — 
The  Malolos  Congress  His  Creature — Character  of  Leaders — Encouraged  and 
Misled  by  Americans — Democrats  Vote  SuppHes  for  War — Bitter  Opposition 
by  Anti-Imperialists — MiHtary  Situation  at  Manila — State  Volunteers  Remain 
— New  United  States  Volunteers — Campaign  to  the  North — Capture  of  Ma- 
lolos, Calumpit  and  San  Fernando — Minor  Movements  Near  Manila — Law- 
ton's  Campaign  Toward  San  Maguil  de  Mayuma — Fight  at  Zapote  River — 
Situation  in  the  Vasayas  and  to  the  South — The  Occupation  of  Jolo — Spanish 
Relations  with  Moros — The  Bates  Agreement — The  Republic  of  Negros — 
Special  Military  Government — Arrival  of  Schurman  Commission — Negotia- 
tions with  Insurgents — Statement  of  American  Intentions — Efforts  at  Con- 
ciliation— The  Insurgents  Confident  of  Foreign  Intervention — Aguinaldo  In- 
clined to  Peace — Influence  of  Mabini  and  Agoncillo — The  Congress  Votes  for 
Peace — Pacification  in  Sight — Reversal  of  Policy  by  Luna — The  End  of 
Filipino  Government — Negotiations  for  Peace  End  in  Failure — Military 
Despotism — Final  Campaign  in  the  North — Searching  for  the  Enemy — Escape 
of  Aguinaldo — Death  of  General  Lawton — End  of  Organized  Warfare — Gen- 
eral MacArthur  Succeeds  General  Otis — Character  and  Work  of  General  Otis 
— New  Phase  of  the  Insurrection — Guerrilla  Warfare — Attitude  of  Munici- 
palities— People  of  Luzon  Support  Guerrillas — Beginning  of  Educational 
Work. 

The  attempt  by  the  Filipinos  to  overthrow  the  American  power 
in  the  Philippines  is  commonly  referred  to  as  an  insurrection.  It 
was,  in  fact  a  rebellion.  Its  legal  statics  was  correctly  stated  by 
Apolinario  Mabini,  the  "brains  of  Aguinaldo's  government" — in 
an  article  published  in  La  Independencia  after  he  had  retired 
from  Aguinaldo's  cabinet.  "Our  present  war  with  the  Ameri- 
cans," he  wrote,  "is  in  fact  and  in  law  a  revolution,  and  not  an 
international  war,  because  at  no  time  did  we  ever  succeed  in  ex- 
pelling either  the  Spaniards  or  the  Americans  who  took  the  place 
of  the  former.  It  can  not  be  denied  that  the  Treaty  of  Paris 
legitimates  the  grant  to  the  United  States  of  the  right  of  Spain 
to  the  Philippines,     .     .     .     it  is  also  unquestionable  that  were 

455 


456  THE   PHILIPPINES 

it  not  for  the  cession,  Spain  could,  if  she  felt  sufficiently  strong 
again,  lawfully  make  war  upon  us  to  recover  her  old  empire, 
unless  she  be  obliged  to  recognize  our  independence." 

After  thus  recognizing  the  title  of  the  United  States  and  the 
legality  of  her  use  of  force  to  suppress  the  revolt  Mabini 
adds :  "We  here  use  as  the  criterion  of  legality  not  absolute 
but  relative  justice,  established  by  tacit  concurrence  of  the 
Great  Powers,  baptized  by  the  pompous  name  of  Interna- 
tional Law  for  their  own  glory  and  aggrandizement  and  to 
the  prejudice  and  ruin  of  weak  nations."  Rebelling  thus 
against  the  lawful  authority  of  their  sovereign,  they  w^ere 
like  all  other  rebels,  obliged  to  appeal  to  principles  asserted 
to  be  over  and  beyond  the  law  and  to  justify  their  actions 
by  the  successful  use  of  force. 

When  the  Schurman  Commission  was  appointed  the  w^ar 
with  Spain  was  over,  and  it  was  expected  that  most  of  the 
army  would  soon  be  returned  to  the  United  States.  The 
commission  was  instructed  to  study  conditions  and  recom- 
mend a  suitable  government  for  the  people.  This  w^ork  had 
now  to  be  subordinated  to  purely  military  considerations. 

The  general  situation  w^as  decidedly  unpleasant.  The  ef- 
forts of  the  Americans  in  Manila  to  avoid  an  armed  conflict 
had  failed.  The  war  was  a  sort  of  by-product  of  the  war 
with  Spain.*  And  yet  it  came  as  a  surprise  to  most  Ameri- 
cans. That  these  people,  insignificant  in  numbers  and  re- 
sources, would  seriously  attempt  to  oppose  the  military 
power  of  the  United  States  did  not  seem  within  the  range 

1  The  idea  prevailed  very  generally  that  the  uprising  might  have  been  pre- 
vented if  the  situation  had  been  handled  with  greater  firmness.  Mr.  Whitelaw 
Reid,  in  an  address  at  Princeton  University  in  the  autumn  of  1899,  on  Our 
Duty  in  the  Philippines,  said  that  the  difficulties  then  existing  in  the  islands 
were  largely  of  our  own  making.  "We  have  not  the  knowledge  to  say  just 
who,  or  whether  any  man  or  body,  is  wholly  at  fault.  What  we  do  know  is 
that  the  course  of  hesitation  and  inaction  which  the  nation  pursued  in  face 
of  an  openly  maturing  attack  was  precisely  the  policy  sure  to  give  us  the 
greatest  trouble,  and  that  we  are  now  paying  the  penalty.  If  the  opposite 
course  had  been  taken  at  the  outset, — unless  all  the  testimony  from  foreign 
observers,  and  from  our  own  officers  is  at  fault. — there  would  have  been 
either  no  outbreak  at  all,  or  only  one  easily  controlled  and  settled  to  the  gen- 


MAJOR-GENERAL    LEONARD    WOOD 


45^  THE   PHILIPPINES 

....  ;.,  Spain  could,  if  she.  felt  snf^rirtinv  strong 

make  war  upon  us  to  recover  pire, 

i  to  recognize  our  independence.  " 

•aizing  the  title  of  the  United  S  e 

^c  o£  force  to  suppress  the  re^  j 

re  use  as  the  criterion  of  legality  not  absolute 

e  justice,  established  by  tacit  concurrence  of  the 

•'•    '  '-^:''  '  '   -    '  -    '  -~ipous  name  of  Interna- 

aggrandizement  and  to 

tsations."     Rebelling  thus 

r  sovereign,  they  were 

•  ■  T^'-inciples  asserted 

i*y  their  actions 

the  war 

(  of  the 
•«.     Th** 

tJOW  to  .,     .  - _,.^.iiS. 

The  -W  unpleasant.    The  ef- 

fji«t«  of  tl>  V  to  avoid  an  armed  conflict 

'  ■•    '  ort  of  by-product  of  the  war 

c  as  a  surprise  to  most  Ameri- 

ignificant  in  numbers  and  re- 

>MHjrcc  attempt  to  oppose   the   military 

pHver  oi  i  1'  ?  ^^Q^  seem  within  the  range 

""      ' '  '^ing  might  have  been  pre- 

lirmness.    Mr.  Whitelaw 

...v  autumn  of  ^^'"'<^    '-  '"i-- 

s  then  existing 

not  the  knowlc 

y  at  fault.    What  ^ 

^  which  the  nation  {  .e 

.^3  preusety  the  policy  sure  to  give  us  the 

e  now  paying  the  penalty.     If  the  oppo.site 

i-  oatset, — unless  all  tlie  testimony  from  foreign 

AT?  officers  is  at   fault.— there  would  have  been 

i-v  one  easily  controlled  and  settled  to  the  gen- 


THE    FILIPINO    REBELLION  457 

of  reasonable  probability.  They  had  fought  well  against 
the  Spaniards,  but  they  had  shown  no  special  military  ca- 
pacity. The  general  feeling  of  the  army  and  navy  toward 
them  was  that  of  condescending  tolerance.  Their  qualities 
and  characteristics  were  misjudged  even  by  those  who  were 
presumably  best  qualified  to  judge.  The  American  military 
leaders  were  without  experience  with  Malays,  but  in  one 
respect  their  instincts  were  more  nearly  correct  than  the 
reasoned  theories  of  the  civilians.  They  knew  the  value  of 
firmness  and  decisiveness  in  dealing  with  such  people.  But 
all  equally  misjudged  the  resisting  qualities  of  the  Fili- 
pinos and  attached  excessive  importance  to  the  efficacy  of 
fine  phrases  and  fervid  assurances  of  good  intentions.  Mr. 
John  Foreman,  an  Englishman  who  had  lived  in  the  Philip- 
pines for  many  years,  Informed  the  Peace  Commission  at 
Paris  that  the  Tagalogs  were  of  an  easy  plastic  nature  and 
could  easily  be  induced  to  accept  a  new  system  of  govern- 
ment. The  Visayans,  he  thought,  would  require  more  pres- 
sure. General  Merritt  advised  the  Peace  Commission  that 
the  Filipinos  would  submit  to  American  government  without 
serious  opposition.  The  reverse  of  all  this  proved  to  be  the 
truth.  The  Tagalogs  were  not  plastic;  they  refused  to  ac- 
cept American  sovereignty,  and  the  Visayans  required  the 
least  pressure. 

While  the  Americans  were  pursuing  a  policy  of  patience, 
conciliation  and  abnegation,  the  Filipino  leaders  were  busily 
engaged  in  consolidating  their  power  and  extending  the 
scope  of  their  influence.  The  government  which  they  erected 
on  paper  was  designed  for  effect  and  for  use  in  the  future 
rather  than  the  immediate  present,  when  military  considerations 
were  all-important.  Aguinaldo  was  at  the  zenith  of  his 
power.  Attempts  at  rebellion  against  his  authority  had 
been  ruthlessly  suppressed.  The  Congress  of  Malolos  was  ready 
to  make  him  dictator.    Manila,  although  governed  by  the  Amer- 

eral  satisfaction  of  most  of  the  civilized  and  semi-civilized  inhabitants  of  the 
islands."    American  and  English  Studies,  I,  p.  180. 


458  THE   PHILIPPINES 

iscans,  was  so  completely  under  his  influence  that  on  the  days 
named  by  him  for  celebrations  and  fiestas,  all  doors  were  closed 
and  business  was  suspended.  His  governors  ruled  in  most  of  the 
provinces.  Even  to  the  south  the  Visayans,  after  some  hesitation, 
had  very  generally  accepted  his  authority.  From  enthusiastic  in- 
dividuals in  Europe  there  came  to  Aguinaldo  greetings  and  assur- 
ances of  the  "sympathy  of  all  liberal  and  noble  nations." 

It  is  idle  to  assert  that  the  mass  of  the  people  of  Luzon 
and  the  central  islands  were  not  at  that  time  in  sympathy 
with  the  attempt  to  drive  the  Americans  from  the  country 
and  establish  an  independent  government.  How  and  by 
what  methods  they  had  been  brought  to  that  way  of  think- 
ing is  not  at  present  very  important.  During  such  social  up- 
heavals majorities  are  often  less  important  than  minorities. 
In  fact,  revolutions  are  generally  the  work  of  able,  active 
and  energetic  minorities,  and  in  the  beginning  the  revolt 
against  American  power  in  the  Philippines  was  no  exception 
to  this  general  rule. 

The  Filipino  leaders  were  probably  as  patriotic  and  dis- 
interested as  are  most  revolutionary  leaders,  and  among 
them  were  about  the  same  proportion  of  demagogues,  self- 
servers  and  ambitious  upstarts  as  are  connected  with  all 
popular  uprisings.  Very  little  that  is  complimentary  can 
be  said  of  the  political  judgment  and  good  sense  of  the  Fili- 
pino leaders.  They  were  shrewd,  skilful  politicians  who 
took  advantage  of  the  presence  of  the  Americans  in  the 
Philippines,  but  they  misjudged  the  magnitude  of  the  enter- 
prise in  which  they  engaged.  They  were  inexperienced,  and 
generally  ignorant  and  they  overestimated  the  part  they  were 
playing  in  the  history  of  the  world.  They  believed  that 
European  nations  were  greatly  agitated  by  the  contest  in  the 
Philippines  and  that  the  great  Powers  would  certainly  come 
to  their  assistance.  They  thought  that  the  eyes  of  the  world 
were  upon  them,  and  Aguinaldo  and  his  group  of  impromptu 
statesmen  and  generals  for  their  brief  day  strutted  about 
the  remote  islands  believing  that  they  were  actors  upon  a 


THE    FILIPINO    REBELLION  459 

great  world  stage.  They  were  also  possessed  by  the  idea 
that  the  majority  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  and 
even  of  the  soldiers  of  the  army  privately  justified  them  in 
their  uprising. 

And  there  was  some  justification  for  this  illusion.  Many 
American  newspapers,  without  much  more  sense  of  propor- 
tion than  that  possessed  by  the  Filipinos  themselves,  were 
calling  Aguinaldo  the  "savior  of  his  country"  and  "the  Wash- 
ington of  the  Orient."  Enterprising  editors  solicited  his 
views  on  the  issues  of  the  day  for  publication  in  America 
and  political  managers  informed  him  that  his  influence  would 
be  of  material  value  in  the  coming  presidential  election  in 
the  United  States.  Having  no  proper  standard  by  which  to 
measure  the  value  of  such  expressions,  Aguinaldo  and  his 
advisers,  hot  unreasonably,  attached  undue  importance  to 
them  and  fatuously  threw  the  gauge  of  battle  at  the  feet  of 
one  of  the  great  Powers  of  the  world. 

The  sovereignty  of  the  Philippines,  having  passed  to  the 
United  States,  it  was  necessary  that  order  should  be  restored. 
The  nation  had  no  other  reasonable  choice.  It  was  an  un- 
pleasant task,  but  it  had  to  be  performed.  The  Democratic 
leaders,  having  aided  in  determining  the  immediate  policy 
of  the  country  by  voting  for  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  with 
Spain,  were  not  in  a  position  to  oppose  the  legislative  meas- 
ures which  were  necessary  in  order  to  suppress  the  revolt. 
The  attempt  to  keep  the  immediate  question  of  supporting 
the  war  measures  distinct  from  that  of  the  general  policy 
of  the  future  was  only  partially  successful.  As  the  campaign 
in  the  Philippines  advanced,  the  Anti-Imperialists  became 
daily  more  violent,  illustrating  by  their  conduct  the  extremes 
to  which  men  are  sometimes  driven  by  circumstances  which, 
to  their  great  disgust,  they  are  unable  to  control.*  Some 
of  them  worked  themselves  into  that  condition  of  mind  where 


2  Senator  Hoar  supported  the  administration  during  the  war  with  Spain 
and  attacked  his  old  friend  Norton  for  advising  Harvard  students  that  it 
was  not  their  duty  to  enter  it.  For  the  correspondence,  see  Life  of  Charles 
Eliot  Norton,  II,  Appendix  D,  p.  457  (1913). 


460  THE   PHILIPPINES 

facts  lose  their  importance.  They  were  determined  to  be- 
lieve only  the  worst  of  their  countrymen  who  were  fighting 
in  distant  lands.  They  were  avid  for  evil  reports.  Having 
by  a  process  of  reasoning  from  general  principles  reached 
the  conclusion  that  only  evil  could  result  from  the  policy 
of  the  administration,  they  refused  to  allow  their  conclu- 
sions to  be  disturbed  by  mere  facts.  They  were  in  the  con- 
dition of  mind  of  Lord  Palmerston  when  he  said,  with  refer- 
ence to  the  Turks,  that  he  "believed  all  that  was  said  on 
the  one  side  and  nothing  upon  the  other,  and  no  arguments 
or  facts  could  shake  his  convictions." 

Carl  Schurz  wrote  to  Charles  Francis  Adams  :^  *T  have 
carefully  and  laboriously  studied  what  has  happened  in  all 
its  details  and  bearings,  and  that  study  has  profoundly  con- 
vinced me  that  the  story  of  our  attempted  conquest  of  the 
Philippines  is  a  story  of  deceit,  false  pretenses,  brutal  treach- 
ery to  friends,  unconstitutional  assumption  of  power,  be- 
trayal of  the  fundamental  principles  of  our  democracy, 
wanton  sacrifice  of  our  soldiers  for  an  unjust  cause,  cruel 
slaughter  of  innocent  people  and  thus  of  horrible  blood  guilti- 
ness without  parallel  in  the  history  of  republics ;  and  that  such  a 
policy  is  bound  to  bring  upon  this  republic  danger,  demor- 
ahzation,  dishonor  and  disaster."* 

This  picture  of  despair  would  not  be  complete  without  a 
sample  patch  from  the  poets. 

"Tempt  not  our  weakness,  our  cupidity," 

pleaded  William  Vaughn  Moody  in  his  Ode  in  Time  of  Hesita- 
tion. 


3  Bancroft's  Life  of  Schurz,  III,  p.  446.  See  also  Schurz's  Speeches  at  the 
University  of  Chicago  on  January  4,  at  Philadelphia  on  April  7,  and  at  Cooper 
Union,  September  28,  1900. 

*  Charles  Eliot  Norton  wrote  to  Frederick  Harrison  that  the  accession  to 
the  presidency  of  Mr.  Roosevelt  might  result  in  a  change  of  policy,  as  he  was 
not,  like  McKinley,  "possessed  of  a  cruel  spirit  of  Christian  self-righteous- 
ness." This  war  of  ours  "is  even  more  criminal  and  in  a  profound  sense 
more  disastrous  than  the  war  in  South  Africa."  Life  and  Letters  of  Charles 
Eliot  Norton,  11,^  p.  312. 

^  "It  is  all  a  miserable  affair,  a  kind  of  world's  comi-tragedy  with'  a  begin- 
ning of  fine  humanitarian  pretensions."   Ibid.,  p.  281. 


THE   FILIPINO    REBELLION  461 

"For,  save  we  let  the  island  men  go  free, 
These  baffled  and  dislaureled  ghosts 
Will  curse  us  from  the  lamentable  coasts 
Where  walk  the  frustrate  dead. 
.    .    .    Oh  ye  who  lead 
Take  heed ! 
Blindness  we  may  forgive,  but  baseness  we  will  smite.'* 

For  the  soldier  fallen  in  the  Philippines  the  poet  was  will- 
ing to 

"Let  the  great  bells  toll 
Till  the  clashing  air  is  dim. 
Did  we  wrong  his  parted  soul 
We  will  make  it  up  to  him. 
Toll !    Let  him  never  guess 
What  work  we  set  him  to. 
Laurel,  laurel,  yes; 
He  did  what  we  bade  him  do." 

To  the  soldier  his  meed  of  praise,  but  never  a  whispered 
hint  but  that  the 

".     .     .    fight  he  fought  was  good; 
Never  a  word  that  the  blood  on  his  sword  was  his  coun- 
try's own  heart's  blood."'* 

Nevertheless  the  country  went  quietly  and  seriously  about 
the  work  of  suppressing  the  revolt  and  restoring  order  in 
the  Philippines.* 

It  does  not  fall  within  the  scope  of  this  work  to  give  a 
detailed  account  of  the  military  operations  which  resulted 

5  Poems  and  Poetic  Dramas,  pp.  25,  29,  Boston,  1912. 

«  Under  date  of  November  29,  1898,  John  Hay  wrote  to  Whitelaw  Reid, 
then  a  member  of  the  Peace  Commission,  "There  is  a  wild  and  frantic  attack 
now  going  on  in  the  press  against  the  whole  Philippine  transaction.  Andrew 
Carnegie  really  seems  to  be  off  his  head.  He  writes  me  frantic  letters,  sign- 
ing them  'Your  Bitterest  Opponent.'  He  threatens  the  President,  not  only 
with  the  vengeance  of  the  voters,  but  with  practical  punishment  at  the  hands 
of  the  mob.  He  says  henceforth  the  entire  labor  vote  of  America  will  be  cast 
against  us,  and  that  he  will  see  that  it  is  done.  He  says  the  Administration 
will  fall  in  irretrievable  ruin  the  moment  it  shoots  down  one  insurgent  Fili- 
pino. He  does  not  seem  to  reflect  that  the  Government  is  in  a  somewhat 
robust  condition  even  after  shooting  down  several  American  citizens  in  his 
interest  at  Homestead.  But  all  this  confusion  of  tongues  will  go  its  way. 
The  country  will  applaud  the  resolution  that  has  been  reached,  and  you  iJuill 
return  in  the  role  of  conquering  heroes  with  your  'brows  bound  wiih  oak."* 
Thayer's  Life  of  John  Hay,  II,  p.  198. 


462  THE   PHILIPPINES 

in  the  destruction  of  Aguinaldo's  army  and  the  suppression 
of  the  insurrection.  A  brief  reference  to  the  general  course 
of  events  must  suffice. 

At  the  time  of  the  outbreak,  General  E.  S.  Otis  had  at 
Manila  about  fourteen  thousand  men  ready  for  active  service. 
General  Aguinaldo  had  between  twenty  and  thirty  thousand 
fairly  well  armed  men  and  an  indefinite  number  of  irregulars, 
armed  with  bolos  and  other  primitive  weapons.  The  terms 
of  enlistment  of  the  state  volunteers  would  expire  when  the 
treaty  of  peace  was  ratified  and  they  would  then  become 
legally  entitled  to  their  discharges.'^  The  volunteers  had  not 
enlisted  to  fight  insurgents,  but  under  the  circumstances  it 
was  impossible  to  send  them  home,  and  they  were  simply 
held  until  new  regiments  could  be  organized  and  sent  to  the 
islands.  The  soldiers  generally  submitted  gracefully  to  what 
they  regarded  as  a  patriotic  duty.^ 

After  the  fighting  on  February  5,  1899,  the  Americans 
waited  as  patiently  as  possible  for  reinforcements  to  arrive. 
It  was  necessary  to  hold  the  waterworks,  upon  which  the 
city  was  dependent,  and  as  its  location  was  far  in  advance 
of  the  line  and  exposed  to  flank  attacks,  measures  were  taken 
to  drive  the  Filipinos  from  the  vicinity  of  Pasig.  This  was 
accomplished  by  a  provisional  brigade  under  the  command 
of  Brigadier-General  Lloyd  Wheaton.  There  was  also  more 
or  less  constant  irregular  fighting  along  the  entire  line.^  On 
February  22,  the  insurgents  made  a  determined  attempt  to 
burn  the  city  of  Manila.  In  this  they  came  very  near  being 
successful,  as  a  number  of  them  succeeded  in  entering  the 
city  and  burning  a  large  part  of  the  Tondo  district.^" 

7  The  treaty  was  ratified  April  11.  1899. 

8  President  McKinley  in  his  message  to  Congress  December  5,  said :  "I 
recommend  that  Congress  provide  a  special  medal  of  honor  for  the  volun- 
teers, regulars,  sailors,  and  marines  who  voluntarily  remained  in  the  service 
after  their  terms  of  enlistment  had  expired."  See  also  Alger's  The  Spanish- 
American  War,  pp.  374-5. 

8  General  Frederick  Funston  in  his  interesting  Memoirs  of  Two  Wars 
gives  a  graphic  account  of  events  on  the  line  during  this  period. 

^^Rept.  War  Dept.,  1899,  I,  Part  5,  6-20.  Testimony  of  Gen.  Hughes. 
Senate  Doc.  331,  pp.  506,  507.  Luna's  Report,  Tel.  Corp.  Aguinaldo,  pp.  46,  47, 
is  absurdly  inaccurate. 


THE   FILIPINO    REBELLION  463 

Aguinaldo's  army  under  General  Luna  was  concentrating  for 
the  protection  of  his  capital  at  Malolos.  Early  in  March  Con- 
gress authorized  the  enlistment  of  thirty  new  regiments  of  Na- 
tional Volunteers,  to  be  organized  without  reference  to  states, 
and  officered  by  the  president  of  the  United  States.  While  they 
were  organizing,  regiments  of  regulars  were  rushed  to  Manila, 
and  by  the  latter  part  of  March  the  Eighth  Army  Corps,  under 
Major-General  E.  S.  Otis,  twenty-four  thousand  strong,  was 
ready  to  take  the  offensive.  The  second  division,  under  Major- 
General  Arthur  Mac  Arthur,  was  north  of  a  line  which  extended 
from  a  point  on  the  bay  near  Caloocan,  eastward  from  La  Loma 
Church  to  the  Deposito  and  the  waterworks,  and  thence  to  the 
Pasig  River  at  San  Pedro  Macati.  The  First  Division,  under 
Major-General  H.  W.  Lawton,  held  the  country  south  of  the 
Pasig  River. 

On  March  25  Mac  Arthur's  division  moved  northward  for  the 
capture  of  Malolos.  The  brigades  of  Brigadier-General  Irving 
Hale  and  Brigadier-General  Harrison  G.  Otis  were  in  advance, 
with  that  of  General  Wheaton  in  the  rear  as  a  support.  The 
line  of  advance  covered  about  eight  miles.  The  country  was 
low  and  marshy,  intersected  by  numerous  tidal  estuaries.  From 
the  shore  of  Manila  Bay  the  land  here  rises  gradually  toward  the 
east.  Beyond  Caloocan  the  foothills  fall  away  and  a  wide  and 
fertile  valley  extends  northward  through  which  flow  numerous 
sluggish  and  troublesome  rivers.  Beyond  the  swamps  the  coun- 
try was  densely  populated  and  highly  cultivated.  The  villages 
which  nestled  among  the  bamboo  thickets  and  banana  planta- 
tions housed  an  astonishing  number  of  people.  The  streams 
were  lined  with  dense  clumps  of  bamboo  trees,  which  made  per- 
fect cover  for  troops  acting  on  the  defensive.  Much  of  the 
country  was  devoted  to  the  cultivation  of  rice,  and  during  the 
wet  season  it  was  impossible  for  troops  to  pass  over  it.  A  rice 
field  is  laid  out  like  a  checker-board,  the  lines  being  drawn  by 
narrow  embankments  of  earth  from  two  to  three  feet  in  height. 
In  the  planting  and  growing  season  the  intervening  spaces  are 
covered  with  water,  in  which  the  plowing  is  done  and  the  rice 


464  THE    PHILIPPINES 

is  cultivated.  During  the  dry  season  the  ground  bakes  hard, 
and  the  embankments  make  very  good  defensive  works. 

The  roads  which  ran  through  the  country  were  mostly  of  a 
primitive  character  and  soon  became  impossible  for  the  passage 
of  troops.  The  embankment  of  the  railroad  which  ran  north 
from  Manila  to  Dagupan  was  used  as  a  highway  by  both  Ameri- 
can and  Filipino  troops.  The  latter  took  full  advantage  of  the 
natural  defenses  of  the  country.  During  most  of  the  march  of 
twenty  miles  from  Manila  to  Malolos  the  army  moved  in  line 
of  battle.  Although  there  was  constant  fighting  there  were  no 
general  engagements  of  massed  troops.  Crossing  a  river  was 
often  a  serious  undertaking,  but  in  no  instance  were  the  Fili- 
pinos able  to  more  than  delay  the  steady  advance  of  the  Ameri- 
can troops.  The  Filipinos,  who  were  armed  with  Mausers,  were 
able  to  do  effective  execution  while  out  of  range  of  the  Spring- 
field rifles  with  which  the  American  volunteer  regiments  had  been 
supplied  by  a  generous  and  wealthy  country.  After  seven  days 
of  hard  marching  and  almost  continuous  fighting  the  Americans 
entered  Aguinaldo's  capital  city.** 

In  possession  of  Malolos,  Mac  Arthur  rested  quietly  for  sev- 
eral weeks.  The  Filipino  lines  had  been  pushed  back  a  few 
miles,  but  otherwise  conditions  were  not  materially  changed. 
The  enemy  was  as  active  as  ever.  When  the  Americans  ad- 
vanced, they  retreated;  when  the  Americans  retired,  they  ad- 
vanced. 

From  Malolos  north  the  next  important  place  was  Calumpit, 
which  Buencamino  had  marked  for  "the  sepulture  of  the  Ameri- 
cans." In  the  possession  of  trained  troops  the  place  would  have 
been  very  difficult  to  capture.  The  Filipinos  had  taken  every 
advantage  of  the  natural  features  of  the  locality  and  defended 
it  with  courage.  The  town  lay  in  a  rectangle  formed  by  the 
railroad,  the  Rio  Grande  de  la  Pampanga,  the  Calumpit  and 
Bagbag  Rivers,  which  were  supposed  to  be  unfordable.  The 
railroad  embankment  had  been  gashed  with  trenches  cut  across 

11  Col.  Harry  C.  Egbert,  in  command  of  the  22nd  Infantry,  was  killed  near 
Malinta. 


THE   FILIPINO    REBELLION  465 

and  thus  converted  into  formidable  defensive  works.  The  Fili- 
pinos had  twelve  thousand  well-armed  troops  and  several  pieces 
of  good  modern  artillery.  Before  reaching  Calumpit  General 
Hale's  brigade  fought  a  severe  battle  at  Quingua,  where  Colonel 
Stotsenberg  of  the  Nebraska  regiment  was  killed.  After  severe 
fighting  and  under  a  heavy  fire  the  troops  finally  crossed  the 
Calumpit  River.  Wheaton's  brigade  advanced  along  the  rail- 
road embankment.  A  span  of  the  bridge  had  been  destroyed  by 
the  Filipinos,  and  a  few  officers  and  men  gallantly  swam  the 
river  just  as  Hale's  men,  who  had  found  a  ford,  approached  and 
assisted  in  driving  the  Filipinos  out  of  the  entrenchments.  The 
Americans  were  now  in  possession  of  Calumpit,  but  the  Filipinos 
were  still  in  force  on  the  north  bank  of  the  broad  and  deep  Rio 
Grande,  where  they  had  constructed  elaborate  field  fortifications. 
Near  the  end  of  the  railroad  bridge  they  had  three  pieces  of  artil- 
lery and  one  rapid-fire  gun.  Under  a  heavy  fire  Privates  White 
and  Trembley  of  the  Kansas  regiment  swam  the  river  and  fas- 
tened a  rope  to  a  stake  on  the  Filipino  entrenchments,  by  means 
of  which  rafts  loaded  with  troops  were  pulled  across.  They 
were  soon  in  possession  of  the  Filipino  works.^^ 

On  May  4  the  northward  movement  was  continued  over  a 
country  which  was  more  difficult  than  any  that  had  previously 
been  encountered.  "It  is,"  wrote  a  correspondent,  "a  country 
which  only  an  adventurous  huntsman  would  venture  over  in 
search  of  the  wildest  fowl  that  inhabited  its  dark  fens — a  land 
of  moors  and  tarns  difficult  to  cross  in  most  peaceful  times — a 
horrible  place  for  an  army  with  artillery,  baggage  and  accoutre- 
ments and  with  an  entrenched  enemy  to  dispute  the  passage 
through  every  river  and  swamp.  Into  this  country  of  desolate 
moors  and  dangerous  bogs  the  American  army  now  plunged." 

The  enemy  was  resourceful  and  active.    At  one  place  the  road 

*2Gen,  Fvmston's  Memories  of  Two  Wars,  pp.  281,  282,  says:  "I  had 
initiated  this  enterprise  and  felt  tnat  I  must  see  it  through.  I  could  not  but 
consider  the  outcome  as  doubtful  and  knew  mighty  well  that  if  I  should  send 
a  small  force  across  and  sacrifice  it  I  would  be  damned  in  my  home  state  all 
the  rest  of  my  life  and  held  up  to  scorn  by  all  the  corner-grocery  tacticians 
in  the  country."  So  the  colonel  of  the  regiment,  with  eight  men,  crossed  on 
the  first  raft 


466  THE    PHILIPPINES 

as  it  approached  a  stone  bridge  was  found  to  be  honeycombed 
with  conical  pits,  in  the  bottoms  of  which  sharp  bamboo  stakes 
were  stuck,  the  whole  covered  with  bamboo  nets  over  which 
earth  had  been  carefully  spread.  At  one  point  where  the  Fili- 
pinos made  a  stand,  the  troops  advanced  through  swamps  waist- 
deep,  across  mud-bottomed  esteros,  in  which  they  often  sank  to 
their  waists,  under  a  galling  fire,  until  they  had  thus  crossed 
eleven  such  streams. 

On  the  night  of  May  4  General  Luna  abandoned  San  Fer- 
nando Pampanga,  after  burning  much  of  the  town,^'  and  on  the 
following  day  it  was  occupied  by  the  Americans.  On  May  16 
General  Funston,  who  had  been  promoted,  relieved  General 
Wheaton  in  command  of  the  First  Brigade.  The  advance  north 
now  ceased  for  a  time,  but  there  was  almost  constant  fighting 
in  the  neighborhood  of  San  Fernando.  On  July  16  the  Fili- 
pinos in  force  made  a  determined  attack  on  the  place,  but,  as 
usual,  were  driven  off  with  heavy  loss. 

While  these  operations  were  going  on  in  the  north.  General 
Hall,  who  had  remained  in  command  of  the  troops  near  Manila, 
captured  the  mountain  town  of  Antipolo  and  drove  the  Filipinos 
from  the  Morong  Peninsula.  During  the  early  part  of  April 
General  W.  H.  Lawton  led  an  expedition  up  the  Pasig  River 
and  about  the  shores  of  the  Laguna  de  Bay,  with  no  results  other 
than  the  acquisition  of  a  certain  amount  of  geographical  infor- 
mation.^* 

While  General  MacArthur  was  preparing  to  advance  on  Ca- 
lumpit,  his  flank  and  line  of  communication  were  seriously 
threatened  by  the  Filipinos  operating  from  the  east.  General 
Lawton  was  now  recalled  to  Manila  and  placed  in  charge  of 
an  expedition  which  was  to  proceed  north  along  the  base  of  the 
mountains  east  of  Mac  Arthur's  position,  and  thus  support  him 
by  striking  the  extreme  right  of  the  Filipinos  and  preventing  the 
concentration  of  their  forces.    It  was  anticipated  that  these  move- 


^3  Luna  generally  burned  the  towns  before  retreating,  injuring  only  his 
own  people. 

14  Lawton's  Report,  Kept.  War  Dept,  1899,  I,  Part  5,  pp.  20-74. 


THE   FILIPINO    REBELLION  467 

ments  would  drive  the  insurgents  out  of  the  Tagalog  provinces 
and  into  the  north  country,  where  the  people  were  supposed  to 
be  unfriendly  to  them.  Lawton  started  on  April  22,  and  after 
a  march  through  very  difficult  country,  during  which  he  had  a 
number  of  spirited  engagements,  reached  Baluiag,  where  he  was 
detained  for  several  days  while  MacArthur  was  trying  to  locate 
the  elusive  enemy.  On  May  14  Lawton  advanced  and  captured 
San  Maguil  de  Mayuma.  From  there  he  moved  rapidly  on  to 
San  Isidro,  of  which  he  took  possession  on  May  17.  Aguinaldo, 
who,  with  what  was  left  of  his  government,  had  been  at 
San  Isidro,  now  retired  to  Cabanatuan,  a  few  miles  to  the  north- 
east. Soon  thereafter  the  most  of  Lawton's  troops  were  sent  to 
join  MacArthur  at  Calumpit,  and  he  returned  to  Manila. 

General  Otis  had  not  deemed  it  necessary  to  hold  possession 
of  the  country  between  Manila  and  Cavite,  and  on  the  with- 
drawal of  the  American  troops  it  had  been  promptly  reoccu- 
pied  by  the  Filipinos.  By  June  they  had  become  very  demon- 
strative, and  it  was  thought  necessary  to  throw  them  back 
again.  They  had  constructed  strong  works  in  front  of  San  Pe- 
dro Macati  and  at  Parafiaque,  on  the  bay  south  of  Manila.  With 
four  thousand  men  General  Lawton,  after  a  severe  preliminary 
fight  on  the  Bacour  road,  found  the  Filipinos  strongly  entrenched 
at  the  Zapote  River,  where  during  the  insurrection  of  1896  they 
had  defeated  the  Spaniards.  Here  on  June  13  Lawton  fought 
one  of  the  severest  engagements  of  the  war,  driving  the  Fili- 
pinos out  and  thus  clearing  the  way  from  Manila  to  Cavite." 

The  southern  islands  were  also  gradually  brought  under  con- 
trol. The  Visayans,  except  in  the  island  of  Panay,  never  offered 
any  very  serious  organized  resistance.  Aguinaldo's  agents  were 
active  and  secured  their  formal  adherence  to  the  Philippine  Re- 
public, but  the  insurrection  as  a  military  proposition  was  never 
so  formidable  in  the  south  central  islands  as  in  Luzon.  Iloilo 
was  taken  on  February  11,  after  it  had  been  set  on  fire  by  the 
Filipinos." 


"  Kept.  War.  Dept.,  1900,  T.  Part  5,  pp.  273-385. 

^°  Claims  for  damages  caused  by  fire  were  subsequently  made  to  the  United 


468  THE   PHILIPPINES 

The  mixed  Filipino  population  which  occupied  the  northern 
shores  of  the  great  Moro  island  of  Mindanao  cast  their  lot  with 
the  Tagalogs.  At  Zamboanga  the  Moro,  Tagalog  and  Visayan 
factions  struggled  with  one  another  for  control.  In  the  spring  of 
1899  the  insurgents  at  Zamboanga  seized  several  Spanish  gun- 
boats and  thus  obtained  possession  of  a  number  of  quick-firing 
guns,  rifles  and  much  ammunition.  In  November  the  faction 
which  then  had  the  upper  hand  delivered  Zamboanga  to  one  of 
the  American  naval  officers. 

Early  in  the  year  1900  American  troops  were  sent  to  Cotta- 
batu,  Basilan  and  Davao.  At  Cottabatu  the  Moros  rose  against 
the  Filipino  agents,  established  a  government  of  their  own  and 
with  conscious  merit  notified  the  Americans  that  they  had  de- 
stroyed their  tormentors  and  hoped  for  their  reward  in  the  favor 
and  protection  of  the  United  States. 

Evidently  the  Spaniards  who  were  stationed  in  the  southern 
islands  did  not  expect  to  be  immediately  relieved  by  American 
troops,  as  soon  after  the  treaty  of  peace  was  ratified  they 
delivered  the  town  of  Siassi  to  the  Sultan  of  Sulu,  and  were  pre- 
paring to  deliver  Jolo  to  the  same  eager  potentate,  when,  in  May, 
1899,  General  Otis,  much  to  the  disgust  of  the  sultan,  sent  a 
regiment  of  infantry  to  the  Moro  country.  The  sultan,  who 
had  recently  returned  from  a  journey  to  Mecca  and  was  resid- 
ing at  Siassi,  did  not  respond  with  enthusiasm  to  an  invitation 
to  call  on  the  American  commander  at  Jolo.  Although  friendly 
relations  were  finally  established,  the  situation  throughout  the 
entire  southern  archipelago  was  dangerous  and  unsatisfactory. 
Early  in  July  General  Bates  was  directed  to  establish  some  kind 
of  a  working  agreement  with  the  sultan.  He  found  this  quasi 
monarch  under  the  delusion  that  after  the  departure  of  the  Span- 
iards he  had  become  a  real  sovereign.  Spanish  sovereignty  over 
the  Sulu  Archipelago  had  been  conceded  in  numerous  treaties  to 
which  European  states  were  parties,  and  in  1878  the  sultan, 
in  consideration  of  certain  money  payments,  had  acknowledged 

States  government  by  foreign  residents  of  Iloilo,  but  were  disallowed.    See 
For.  Rel,  1903,  pp.  479-483. 


THE   FILIPINO    REBELLION  469 

that  fact  and  agreed  to  become  a  loyal  Spanish  subject.  As  the 
United  States  had  succeeded  to  the  rights  of  Spain,  her  sover- 
eignty over  the  country  could  not  be  questioned.  But  Spain  had 
granted  certain  special  privileges  to  the  sultan  which  left  him 
with  some  semblance  of  sovereign  rights,  and  the  American  gov- 
ernment thought  it  advisable  to  recognize  and  continue  these 
concessions.  Spain  had  never  pursued  a  definite  policy  with 
regard  to  the  sultan,  his  dominion,  or  the  trade  of  the  Archi- 
pelago, and  great  uncertainty  existed  as  to  the  extent  and  nature 
of  the  obligations  which  she  had  assumed. 

General  Bates  was  instructed  to  arrange  to  continue  the  money 
payments  to  the  sultan  according  to  the  terms  of  his  agreements 
with  Spain,  to  promise  not  to  interfere  with  the  religion  or  the 
social  or  domestic  customs  of  the  people,  to  respect  the  rights 
and  dignities  of  the  sultan  and  his  advisers,  to  protect  the  sul- 
tan and  his  people  from  interference  by  foreign  nations,  and  to 
agree  that  the  United  States  would  not  interfere  in  the  internal 
economy  and  political  administration  of  the  country  unless  in 
response  to  requests  for  assistance  and  guidance.  But  the  United 
States  must  exercise  absolute  control  over  the  places  which  it 
actually  occupied.  The  sultan  was,  among  other  things,  re- 
quired to  acknowledge  the  sovereignty  of  the  United  States,  to 
fly  the  American  flag,  to  permit  the  United  States  to  occupy  and 
control  such  places  on  the  island  as  it  deemed  advisable,  to  sup- 
press piracy  and  crime,  and  to  prevent  the  purchase  of  rifles  by 
his  people. 

The  sultan,  who  was  also  sultan  of  North  Borneo  and  in  re- 
ceipt of  a  substantial  honorarium  from  the  North  Borneo  Trad- 
ing Company,  had  rather  lofty  ideas  of  his  earning  capacities.*' 
But  an  agreement  was  finally  signed  and  transmitted  to  Wash- 
ington, where  it  was  approved,  with  the  reservation  that  the 
provision  that  any  slave  should  have  the  right  to  purchase  his 


i^In  1911  the  sultan,  after  a  visit  to  Singapore,  applied  to  the  authorities 
at  Manila  for  an  increase  of  his  annual  payment,  on  the  ground  of  the  "gen- 
eral increase  of  the  cost  of  living."  He  was  inclined  to  attribute  the  increase 
to  the  influence  of  the  American  trusts. 


470  THE   PHILIPPINES 

freedom,  should  not  be  deemed  to  authorize  the  existence  of 
slavery  in  the  Sulu  Archipelago/® 

A  unique  situation  developed  in  the  great  island  of  Negros, 
which  lies  in  the  central  and  Visayan  part  of  the  Archipelago. 
Negros  was  the  home  of  the  wealthy  sugar  planters.  About  the 
time  that  the  Peace  Protocol  was  signed  at  Washington  the  peo- 
,ple  of  Negros  rose  against  the  Spanish  government.  It  seems  to 
have  been  an  independent  movement,  having  no  connection  with 
the  Tagalog  organization,  of  which  Aguinaldo  was  the  head. 
Some  sort  of  an  arrangement  was  made  with  the  Spaniards, 
under  which  they  assumed  to  relinquish  their  authority  to  the 
natives,  who  in  return  stipulated  to  protect  the  Spanish  civil  and 
military  officers  from  harm.  The  natives  then  proceeded  to  es- 
tablish an  independent  government,  which  they  called  the  Repub- 
lic of  Negros.  A  full  complement  of  officers  was  elected,  and  the, 
new  government  took  charge  of  affairs.  But  faction,  the  bane 
of  every  native  government,  soon  wrought  its  downfall.  A  com- 
mittee representing  the  intelligent  people  of  the  island  waited 
upon  Captain  Glass  of  the  cruiser  Charleston  and  requested  that 
he  should  land  marines  and  raise  the  American  flag.  This  he 
refused  to  do,  because  under  the  terms  of  the  Peace  Protocol  hos- 
tilities had  been  suspended  and  the  island  was  still  Spanish  ter- 
ritory. The  troubles  of  the  infantile  republic  continued  to  in- 
crease, and  soon  after  the  transfer  of  sovereignty  to  the  United 
States  a  delegation  journeyed  to  Manila  and  requested  the  mili- 
tary governor  to  take  charge  of  the  island  in  the  name  of  the 
United  States.  Colonel  James  F.  Smith  was  thereupon  appointed 
military  governor  of  Negros,  with  instructions  to  assist  the 
people  in  forming  a  government  for  the  administration  of  the 


18  President  McKinley  in  his  message  of  Dec,  5,  1899,  said :  "The  agree- 
ment by  Gen.  Bates  was  made  subject  to  confirmation  by  the  President  and 
to  future  modifications  by  the  consent  of  the  parties  in  interest  I  have  con- 
firmed said  agreement,  subject  to  the  action  of  the  Congress,  and  with  the 
reservation  which  I  have  directed  shall  be  communicated  to  the  Sul'tan  of 
Jolo,  that  this  agreement  is  not  to  be  deemed  in  any  way  to  authorize  or  give 
the  consent  of  the  United  States  to  the  existence  of  slavery  in  the  Sulu 
Archipelago."    Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  X,  p,  172. 

This  treaty  was  of  no  advantage  to  the  United  States  and  was  later 
abrogated. 


THE   FILIPINO    REBELLION  471 

internal  affairs  of  the  island.  They  evidently  still  hoped  to  re- 
main separated  from  the  rest  of  the  Archipelago.  Soon  after 
Colonel  Smith  arrived  in  Negros  a  convention  of  elected  dele- 
gates met  at  Bacolod  and  after  some  two  months'  labor  prepared 
a  constitution  for  the  island  and  requested  that  it  be  submitted 
to  the  president  of  the  United  States  for  approval.  This  con- 
stitution was  an  elaborate  affair,  but  as  the  form  and  phraseology 
was  that  of  an  American  constitution  it  is  reasonable  to  assume 
that  it  was  largely  the  work  of  Americans. 

The  government  which  the  Filipinos  had  organized  for  them- 
selves was  a  failure,  and,  pending  the  action  of  the  president  on 
the  new  constitution,^^  General  Otis,  on  July  22,  1899,  directed 
that  a  military  government  should  be  established  in  Negros  which 
would  give  the  people  as  large  a  measure  of  control  of  their  local 
affairs  as  was  practicable.  As  outlined  in  the  order,  there  was 
to  be  a  military  governor  appointed  by  the  military  governor  of 
the  Philippines,  a  civil  governor  and  an  advisory  council.  The 
military  governor  should  appoint  secretaries  of  the  treasury, 
interior,  agriculture,  public  instruction,  an  auditor  and  an  attor- 
ney-general, all  with  carefully  defined  powers.  The  civil  gov- 
ernor should  be  elected  by  the  people,  should  preside  over  the 
advisory  council  and  perform  generally  the  duties  of  a  civil 
subordinate  of  the  military  governor.  The  advisory  council 
should  consist  of  eight  members  elected  by  the  people  within 
defined  territorial  districts.  In  order  to  be  qualified  to  vote  at 
any  election  a  person  was  required  to  be  a  resident  of  Negros, 
a  male  citizen  over  twenty-one  years  of  age,  able  to  speak,  read 
or  write  imderstandingly  the  English,  Spanish  or  Visayan  lan- 
guage, or  be  the  owner  of  real  estate  worth  five  hundred  dollars 
or  pay  a  rental  on  real  property  of  the  value  of  one  thousand 
dollars. 

The  advisory  council  was  given  the  ordinary  powers  of  a  local 
legislature  and  was  authorized  specifically  to  devise  and  adopt  a 
uniform  system  of  taxation  which  would  result  in  distributing 
the  burderls  of  government  as  nearly  equal  as  possible  among  the 


^*  No  action  was  ever  taken. 


472  THE  PHILIPPINES 

people.  Municipal  governments,  with  the  usual  powers  of  such 
bodies,  were  to  be  organized.  The  judges  were  to  be  appointed 
by  the  military  governor,  and  their  modes  of  procedure,  terms 
of  office  and  compensation  were  to  be  fixed  by  the  advisory  coun- 
cil, with  the  approval  of  the  military  governor.  Free  public 
schools,  in  which  the  English  language  should  be  taught,  were 
required  to  be  established  in  the  populous  districts  of  the  island. 

The  local  government  thus  instituted  under  military  supervi- 
sion, proved  quite  successful  and  became,  to  some  extent,  a  model 
upon  which  the  provincial  governments  throughout  the  islands 
were  subsequently  organized.  President  McKinley  commented 
upon  it  in  his  message  of  December  5,  1900,  and  in  the  instruc- 
tions to  the  Philippine  Commission  he  directed  that  special  atten- 
tion should  be  given  to  the  government  then  existing  in  the  island 
of  Negros,  "which  has  been  instituted  with  the  approval  of  the 
people  of  that  island."^" 

For  a  time  all  went  well,  but  the  trouble  at  Iloilo,  near  by,  made 
the  people  uneasy,  and  during  December  certain  agents  of  Agui- 
naldo's  government  arrived  in  Negros  with  what  purported  to 
be  copies  of  a  letter  from  Doctor  Blumentritt,  the  Austrian  eth- 
nologist, and  "information"  that  in  January  absolute  indepen- 
dence would  be  granted  by  Congress.^^  Negros,  it  was  said, 
would  then  be  properly  punished  for  her  subserviency  to  the 
Americans.    The  people  were  for  a  short  time  shaken  from  their 

20  In  speaking  of  the  military  government  of  the  island  of  Negros,  Presi- 
dent McKinley  said,  "A  notable  beginning  has  been  made  in  the  establishment 
of  a  government  in  Negros  which  is  deserving  of  special  consideration.  This 
was  the  first  island  to  accept  American  sovereignty.  Its  people  unreservedly 
proclaimed  allegience  to  the  United  States  and  adopted  a  constitution  looking 
to  the  establishment  of  a  popular  government.  It  was  impossible  to  guar- 
antee to  the  people  of  Negros  that  the  constitution  so  adopted  should  be  the 
ultirnate  form  of  government.  .  .  .  The  government  actually  set  up  by 
the  inhabitants  of  Negros  evidently  proved  unsatisfactory  to  the  natives 
themselves.  A  new  system  was  put  into  force  by  order  of  the  Major  General 
commanding  the  Department"  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  X, 
p.  170. 

The  full  text  of  the  proposed  constitution  for  the  island  of  Negros  is 
printed  in  the  Report  of  the  Schurman  Commission,  I,  p.  202.  General 
Smith's  report  on  the  Negros  Government  is  found  in  War  Dept.  Kept.,  1900, 
I,  Part  10,  Appendix  T  T. 

21  Doctor  Blumentritt  endeared  himself  to  the  Filipinos  by  his  long-range 
labors  on  their  behalf.  On  his  death,  in  1914,  the  Assembly  published  a 
volume  in  honor  of  his  memory. 


THE   FILIPINO    REBELLION  473 

moorings,  but  the  uprising  which  resulted  was  suppressed  with- 
out great  difficulty. 

After  the  capture  of  Malolos  it  was  believed  that  the  Fili- 
pinos must  appreciate  the  fact  that  future  military  success  on 
an  effective  scale  was  for  them  impossible,  and  that  the  more  rea- 
sonable of  the  leaders  could  be  induced  to  listen  to  the  repre- 
sentations of  the  American  government.  The  Schurman  Com- 
mission arrived  in  Manila  on  March  4,  1899.  It  had  sailed  from 
the  United  States  before  the  beginning  of  hostilities,  with  instruc- 
tions to  study  the  general  situation  and  by  conciliatory  measures 
to  assist  the  military  authorities  in  restoring  order  preparatory 
to  the  introduction  of  civil  government.^^  Arriving  at  Manila 
after  war  had  commenced,  the  commissioners  soon  found  them- 
selves transformed  into  a  sort  of  peace  commission  and  en- 
gaged in  negotiations  with  the  emissaries  of  an  active  military 
force.  They  earnestly  endeavored  to  gain  the  confidence  of  the 
people  and  convince  them  of  the  humane  and  beneficent  purpose 
of  the  United  States.  In  this  they  were  to  some  extent  suc- 
cessful, although  subsequent  events  over  which  they  had  no  con- 
trol rendered  their  work  ineffective.  According  to  Doctor  Schur- 
man,^^  "Having  satisfied  them  that  American  sovereignty  was 
only  another  name  for  the  liberty  of  the  Filipinos,  we  set  in 
motion,  through  their  agency,  currents  of  good-will,  amity  and 
reconciliation,  which  overflowed  the  domains  of  the  Philippine 
Republic,  gradually  spread  throughout  Luzon  and  the  Visayas, 
and  reached  even  the  well-guarded  camps  of  the  insurgents  in 
arms." 

They  did  indeed  come  very  near  bringing  the  insurrection  to 
a  close.  After  consulting  with  leading  Filipinos  in  Manila  and 
carefully  studying  the  various  proclamations  and  documents  in 
which  the  natives  had  expressed  their  desires  and  aspirations,  a 
proclamation  was  prepared,  printed  in  English,  Spanish  and 
Tagalog,  and  circulated  very  extensively  throughout  the  island. 


22  Instructions  of  the  President,  Rept.  (Schurman)  Phil.  Com.  (1900),  I, 
p.  184. 

'^^  Philippine  Affairs,  A  Retrospect,  etc.  (1902),  p.  6. 


474  THE  PHILIPPINES 

This  was  the  first  formal  authorized  statement  to  the  public  of 
the  general  principles  upon  which  America  proposed  to  govern 
the  country.^*  It  was  objected  to  as  dealing  in  generalities  which 
might,  after  the  Spanish  custom,  be  ignored  after  the  insurgents 
had  laid  down  their  arms. 

But  the  proclamation  had  a  very  decided  effect  upon  Filipino 
opinion.  The  leading  people  in  Manila  were  satisfied  with  it  and 
at  once  commenced  active  work  designed  to  put  an  end  to  the 
war.  Probably  at  their  instigation,  Colonel  Arguellos  came  from 
Aguinaldo  asking  for  a  suspension  of  hostilities  in  order  that 
the  scattered  Filipino  Congress  could  be  collected  to  consider 
conditions  of  peace.  This  was  denied  by  General  Otis.  Argu- 
ellos' report  of  the  conference  with  the  American  commissioners 
was  so  satisfactory  that  he,  with  another  officer,  was  sent  back 
to  Manila  with  a  letter  signed  by  Mabini  asking  for  a  suspension 
of  hostilities  and  for  an  armistice  of  three  weeks.  With  these 
parties  the  commission  discussed  the  situation  with  such  effect 
that  Arguellos  expressed  himself  as  satisfied  and  willing  to  ac- 
cept the  sovereignty  of  the  United  States.  In  reply  to  his  request 
for  the  details  of  a  plan  of  government  which  would  be  adopted, 
the  commission  outlined  what  they  would  recommend  to  the 
president,  and  later  Secretary  Hay's  reply  was  submitted  to 
them.*"  The  conference  accomplished  nothing.  The  Filipinos 
demanded  independence  in  some  form,  and  that,  of  course,  could 
not  be  conceded  by  the  commission,  or  even  by  the  president. 
They  were  informed  that  the  matter  of  the  sovereignty  of  the 

^^'Rept.  (Schurman)  Phil.  Com.,  1900,  I,  p.  3.  For  a  reply  prepared  by 
Mabini,  see  Harper's  History,  p.  158,  and  Sen.  Hoar's  speech  in  the  Senate  on 
April  17,  1900. 

25  On  May  5,  1899,  Secretary  Hay  telegraphed,  "You  are  authorized  to  pro- 
pose that  under  the  military  power  of  the  President,  pending  action  of  Con- 
gress, government  of  the  Philippines  shall  consist  of  a  Governor-General 
appointed  by  the  President ;  Cabinet  appointed  by  the  Govenor-General ;  a 
general  advisory  council  elected  by  the  people;  the  qualifications  of  electors 
to  be  carefully  considered  and  determined ;  and  the  Governor-General  to 
have  absolute  veto;  Judiciary  strong  and  independent;  principal  judges 
appointed  by  the  President.  The  Cabinet  and  judges  to  be  chosen  from 
natives  or  Americans,  or  both,  having  regard  to  fitness.  The  President  ear- 
nestly desires  the  cessation  of  bloodshed,  and  that  the  people  of  the  Philip- 
pines at  an  early  date  shall  have  the  largest  measure  of  self-government  con- 
sistent with  peace  and  good  order." 


THE   FILIPINO   REBELLION  475 

United  States  could  not  be  discussed,  and  that,  "after  a  careful 
consideration  and  study,  it  was  the  opinion  of  the  Commission 
that  the  Philippine  people  were  not  capable  of  independent  self- 
government,  and  that  independence  for  which  some  of  them  said 
they  were  fighting  was,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Commission,  an 
ideal  at  present  impossible,  not  only  because  of  their  unfitness 
for  it,  but  because  of  their  inability  to  preserve  it  among  the 
nations  even  if  it  were  granted."^* 

Colonel  Arguellos,  upon  his  return,  seems  to  have  expressed 
his  satisfaction  with  the  American  attitude  a  trifle  too  enthusi- 
astically, and  for  his  treasonable  sentiments  and  advice  was 
expelled  from  the  army  and  sentenced  to  twelve  years'  impris- 
onment.^'^ Nevertheless,  there  were  among  Aguinaldo's  advisers 
a  few  sane  men  who  agreed  with  the  discredited  emissary.  We 
may  fairly  assume  that  such  men  as  Arellano  and  Torres  re- 
garded the  Philippine  Republic  as  a  temporary  expedient  for 
bridging  a  period  which  would  be  followed  by  some  form  of 
government  under  American  control.  As  early  as  June,  1898, 
Arellano,  then  acting  as  secretary  for  foreign  affairs,  had  out- 
lined a  plan  for  cooperation  with  the  Americans  and  had  ad- 
vised a  correspondent  to  "avoid  all  doing  and  undoing,  and  when 
America  has  established  a  stable  government  it  will  be  time 
enough  to  make  laws." 

In  October  of  the  same  year  Arellano  and  Pardo  de  Tavera 
had  urged  that  the  United  States  be  asked  to  acknowledge  the 
independence  of  the  islands  under  a  protectorate,  and  the  plan 
had  been  approved  by  Aguinaldo  and  his  cabinet.  But  a  radi- 
cal leader  named  Sandico  is  said  to  have  induced  Aguinaldo  to 
abandon  this  plan  by  assuring  him  that  the  Japanese  govern- 
ment had  agreed  to  aid  the  Filipinos  in  their  struggle  for  abso- 
lute independence.  Nothing  more  clearly  shows  the  incapacity 
of  the  Filipino  leaders  for  large  affairs  than  their  childish  belief 
that  foreign  powers  would  involve  themselves  in  war  with  the 


*»Rept.  Phil.  Com.,  1900,  I,  p.  7.     For  Secretary  Hay's  letter  of  May  S, 
see  Ibid.,  p.  9. 

*^  No  attempt  was  made  to  execute  the  sentence. 


476  THE   PHILIPPINES 

United  States  on  behalf  of  a  people  in  whom  they  had  not  the 
remotest  financial  or  political  interest.^^ 

Aguinaldo  was  also  encouraged  by  letters  from  Agoncillo  from 
Washington  assuring  him  that  the  majority  of  the  American 
people  favored  the  independence  of  the  Filipinos. 

Arellano  and  Pardo  de  Tavera  withdrew  from  the  cabi- 
net, and  the  radicals,  under  the  lead  of  Mabini  were  left  in  con- 
trol. If  we  are  to  believe  Buencamino,  after  the  capture  of  Ma- 
lolos  in  April,  1899,  the  majority  of  the  congress  began  to  see  the 
advantages  of  Arellano's  plan  for  a  protectorate.  But  so  long 
as  Mabini  controlled  the  policy  of  the  government  there  was  no 
possibility  of  the  acceptance  of  American  sovereignty.  This 
remarkable  young  man,  of  fragile  and  paralytic  frame,  but  of 
a  keen,  subtle  and  logical  intellect,  was  a  fierce,  irreconcilable 
hater  of  the  American  government.  With  him  no  compromise 
was  possible.^^  But  the  proclamation  issued  by  the  commission, 
following  the  military  successes  of  MacArthur  and  Lawton,  so 
encouraged  the  conservatives  that  they  took  the  aggressive. 
Early  in  May  whatever  was  available  of  the  congress  was  as- 
sembled at  San  Isidro,  and  voted  for  ending  the  war  and  for 
peace  on  the  basis  of  the  announcement  which  had  been  made  by 


28  On  November  15,  1899,  Aguinaldo,  or  probably  Mabini  over  Aguinaldo's 
signature,  wrote  to  one  of  the  chiefs  that  "The  quadruple  alliance  between 
France,  Russia,  Germany  and  Spain  is  a  fact.  Before  December  we  will 
know  our  fate.  Throughout  Europe  there  is  sympathy  for  our  cause.  Amer- 
ican Democrats  are  already  in  our  favor."    Rept.  War  Dept.,  1901. 

On  May  16,  1899,  Sandico  (the  officer  who  in  February  had  issued  the 
order  to  the  faithful  in  Manila  to  rise,  slay  and  spare  no  one  of  the  white 
blood)  issued  an  appeal  in  which  he  said,  "The  latest  Eastern  question  may 
bring  about  an  international  conflict  which  would  oblige  America  to  abandon 
her  policy  with  regard  to  the  Philippines.  The  justice  of  our  cause,  together 
with  the  circumstance  that  you  have  aided  America  to  banish  and  destroy  the 
Spanish  Government  in  these  islands,  has  won  the  sympathy  of  the  press  of 
Europe  and  Japan,  in  fact  that  of  all  nations.  .  .  .  We  should  exhaust 
all  the  resources  of  diplomacy,  put  in  play  before  foreign  countries  every 
inducement  which  we  can  offer  with  the  aid  of  the  tribune  and  the  press,  now 
giving  up  coaling  stations,  and  now  offering  concessions  to  commerce  and 
concessions  to  build  railroads  and  to  mine."    Ihid.,  p.  361. 

Flores,  the  Secretary  of  War,  called  it  "this  palpitating  international 
question." 

29  For  a  study  of  Mabini's  life  and  character,  see  an  article  by  Jorge 
Bocobo,  an  intelligent  young  Filipino,  educated  in  the  United  States,  in  tile 
magazine,  The  Filipino  People,  for  August,  1913. 


THE   FILIPINO    REBELLION  477 

the  Schurman  Commission.'**  Mabini  now  retired,  and  his  place 
was  taken  by  Pedro  Patemo,  with  Felipe  Buencamino  for  his 
leading  supporter.  The  first  act  of  the  new  cabinet  was  to 
authorize  Buencamino,  Maximo  Paterno,  Torres,  Pablo  Ocampo, 
Arsenio  Hererra,  Jose  Albert  and  two  military  officers  to  proceed 
to  Manila  and  negotiate  a  peace.'^ 

The  American  commissioners  thus  had  good  reasons  to  re- 
joice over  the  apparent  success  of  their  policy.  The  Philippine 
Republic  itself  had  been  won  over.  The  congress  had  voted  for 
peace,  and  Aguinaldo  had  acquiesced.  The  irreconcilable  Mabini 
was  out  and  a  cabinet  in  sympathy  with  the  new  policy  was  in 
power.  But  the  unfortunate  land  was  not  to  be  thus  easily  paci- 
fied. General  Luna  and  other  military  leaders  succeeded  in  re- 
versing the  policy  which  Aguinaldo's  government  had  adopted. 
"In  its  patriotic  effort  to  bring  about  peace,"  says  Doctor  Schur- 
man, "the  Philippine  Republic  itself  suffered  collapse.  Done 
to  death  by  its  own  false  friends,  I  shall  never  forget  that  its 
last  expiring  voice  was  for  peace  and  reconciliation  on  the  basis 
of  the  proclamation  issued  by  our  Commission.  But  what  the 
congress,  cabinet  and  president  of  the  Philippine  Republic  so 
unanimously  resolved,  Luna,  the  general  commanding  their  army, 
as  completely  frustrated.  He  arrested  the  delegates  who  had 
been  so  solemnly  authorized  by  congress,  cabinet  and  president 
to  proceed  to  Manila,  accused  them  of  treason  and  sentenced 
some  to  imprisonment  and  others  to  death."^^ 

Luna  and  the  military  party  thus  made  it  impossible  for  the 
commissioners  who  had  been  appointed  to  proceed  to  Manila, 

80  By  this  time  the  congress  had  become  badly  demoralized.  But  sixteen 
members  were  present,  and  fifteen  voted  for  the  new  peace  policy. 

81  Later  Buencamino  wrote  to  Gen.  MacArthur,  "Don  Felipe  Buencamino 
and  Don  Pedro  Paterno,  without  any  previous  agreement,  saw  a  door 
through  which  they  could  enter  into  friendly  and  harmonious  relations  with 
the  Americans.  All  the  members  of  the  congress  adopted  the  policy  with  the 
exception  of  o  few  partisans  of  Mabini,  who  was  at  that  time  president  of 
the  cabinet.  Hence,  it  is  that  at  the  first  meeting  of  congress  in  San  Isidro 
Nueva  Ecija,  the  first  day  of  May,  1899,  it  was  resolved  to  change  the  war 
policy  for  one  of  peace  with  the  United  States."  Kept.  War  Dept.,  1901, 
Part  2,  p.  118. 

82  Philippine  Affairs,  p.  13.  See  testimony  of  Dr.  Jose  Albert  before  the 
Phil.  Com.,  May  30,  1899.    Kept.  Schurman  Com.  (1890),  II,  pp.  127-129. 


478  THE   PHILIPPINES 

but  shortly  thereafter  Aguinaldo  named  other  representatives,'* 
who  met  the  American  commissioners  on  May  22,  1899,  and 
again  urged  an  armistice.  Seiior  Barretto  claimed  that  the  con- 
gress which  had  voted  to  end  the  war  had  been  so  reduced  in 
numbers  that  it  was  not  really  representative  of  the  people,  and 
that  some  sort  of  a  constituent  assembly  ought  to  be  called  to  con- 
sider a  matter  of  such  grave  importance  to  the  country.  He 
frankly  stated  that  the  leaders  feared  to  take  the  responsibility 
of  making  peace.  He  expressed  himself  as  satisfied  with  the 
plan  outlined  for  a  provisional  government  and  with  the  state- 
ment contained  in  the  telegram  from  Secretary  Hay  of  May  4, 
but  said  that  the  Filipinos  w^ere  not  willing  to  trust  the  American 
Congress  with  the  power  of  devising  a  permanent  form  of  gov- 
ernment at  some  time  in  the  future.  As  that  was  necessary,  the 
conference  resulted  in  nothing  but  an  interesting  exchange  of 
views. 

The  conservative  leaders  now  abandoned  Aguinaldo  and  found 
their  way  to  Manila,  where  the  best  of  them  thereafter  aided  the 
Americans  in  the  work  of  establishing  order  throughout  the  coun- 
try. The  congress  was  heard  of  no  more.  General  Luna  him- 
self was  killed  by  Aguinaldo's  guards  in  front  of  the  convent  at 
Cabanatuan,^*  and  Aguinaldo  took  the  active  command  of  what 

S3  General  Gregario  del  Pilar,  Gracio  Gonzago  and  Alberto  Barretto. 

3*Mabini's  account  of  the  death  of  Luna  (published  after  Mabini's  death) 
is  printed  in  El  Commercio  for  July  23,  1902,  and  in  part  in  Le  Roy,  II, 
p.  94,  note,  from  which  the  following  extracts  are  taken : 

"Aguinaldo  telegraphed  to  Luna  asking  him  to  come  to  see  him  in  Caba- 
natuan  to  confer  with  him ;  but  when  Luna  arrived  in  the  appointed  place, 
he  did  not  find  Aguinaldo  in  his  residence,  and  was  traitorously  assassinated 
by  the  soldiers  on  guard  there  ...  I  can  not  believe  even  now  that  Luna 
was  working  for  the  overthrow  of  Seiior  Aguinaldo  from  the  elevated  posi- 
tion which  he  occupied;  but  it  is  certain  that  he  aspired  to  be  chief  of  the 
Cabinet  in  place  of  Sefior  Paterno,  with  whom  he  was  not  in  agreement 
because  the  autonomous  program  of  the  latter  was  an  infraction  of  the 
fundamental  law  of  the  State  and  as  such  constituted  a  punishable  offense. 
.  .  .  When  ...  he  received  the  telegram  from  Sefior  Aguinaldo  sum- 
moning him  to  Cabanatuan,  Luna  may  perhaps  have  thought  that  the  object 
of  the  conference  would  be  the  new  Cabinet :  he  did  not  expect  that  they  were 
planning  to  assassinate  him  -  ••  Senor  Aguinaldo,  in  order  to  get  rid  of 
Luna,  rnade  use  of  the  same  soldiers  whom  Luna  had  punished  for  infractions 
of  discipline;  Seiior  Aguinaldo,  then,  slew  discipline,  destroying  his  own 
army,  .  ,  .  The  fall  of  Luna,  coming  back  with  full  force  upon  the  head 
of  Aguinaldo,  caused  in  turn  his  own  moral  death,  a  thousand  times  more 
bitter  than  physical  death." 


THE   FILIPINO    REBELLION  479 

remained  of  the  army.  Henceforth  selfish  ambition,  ignorance 
and  folly  controlled  events.  All  semblance  of  law  and  justice 
disappeared.  A  military  despotism  took  the  place  of  the  Phil- 
ippine Republic,  which  "never  again  pretended  to  live."  Doctor 
Schurman  well  says,  "Such  an  unholy  carnival  of  militarism, 
despotism,  brigandage,  cruelty  and  wholesale  intimidation  of 
peaceful  and  unoffending  inhabitants  as  the  disorganized  insur- 
gent bands  have  since  enacted  in  different  parts  of  the  Philippine 
Islands  is  without  parallel  in  Occidental  history  and  finds  a  par- 
allel in  Asia  alone."^" 

All  efforts  at  conciliation  having  thus  failed,  it  was  necessary 
to  plan  another  campaign  in  the  North.  During  the  rainy  season, 
which  ordinarily  extends  well  into  the  month  of  September,  mili- 
tary operations  in  that  section  had  been  suspended.  The  new 
volunteer  regiments  began  to  arrive  in  October,  1899.^®  The 
principal  Filipino  forces  were  scattered  over  the  plains  of  Tar- 
lac,  Pangasinan,  Bulacan  and  Nueva  Ecija.  Back  of  them  to  the 
north  were  the  mountains,  into  which  they  expected  to  retire  in 
the  event  of  disaster.  If  American  troops  could  be  thrown  be- 
tween the  Filipinos  and  the  foothills  it  would  be  thereafter 
merely  a  matter  of  beating  the  bush  and  combing  the  nipa  swamps. 
All  other  military  operations  were  now  made  subordinate  to 
this.  The  plan  was  very  simple.  General  MacArthur  was  to 
capture  the  town  of  Angelis  and  then  proceed  north  along  the 
line  of  railroad.  General  Lawton  was  to  move  up  the  Rio 
Grande  from  Calumpit  to  San  Fernando,  prepared  to  swing  to 
the  west  if  occasion  required.  Another  force  was  to  come  by  sea 
and  land  at  San  Fabian,  on  the  coast  near  Dagupan,  the  end  of 
the  railroad. 

These  plans  were  successfully  carried  out  during  the  latter 
part  of  the  year  1899.  The  campaign  presents  little  of  interest 
to  the  gen'^iral  reader,  and  its  military  lessons  may  be  learned 

''^Philippine  Affairs  (1902),  p.  14.  No  one  who  has  examined  the  records 
of  the  Fihpino  government  and  army  and  the  correspondence  and  orders  of 
the  officers  will  claim  that  this  language  is  too  strong. 

*^The  effective  force  at  the  end  of  November,  1899,  was  41,500.  Two  rep- 
ments  had  been  sent  to  the  southern  islands,  13,000  more  arrived  in  Decem- 
ber and  5,500  in  January,  1900,  making  55,000  in  all.  Otis'  Report,  1900,  p.  14. 


480  THE   PHILIPPINES 

from  the  elaborate  reports  of  the  officers  who  were  in  charge  of 
the  operations.^^  It  was  mostly  a  search  for  the  enemy.  The  Fili- 
pino military  organizations  w^ere  broken  up  and  whenever  occa- 
sion required  the  units  were  absorbed  by  the  friendly  towns.  But, 
unfortunately,  Aguinaldo  and  a  small  body  of  his  soldiers  suc- 
ceeded in  getting  through  the  lines  and  escaping  into  the  moun- 
tains. 

At  this  time,  in  their  desperation,  new  plans  were  devised  by 
the  insurgents'  leaders  for  the  destruction  of  Manila  from  within, 
but  their  efforts  were  frustrated  by  the  vigilance  of  the  American 
authorities.  While  the  northern  country  was  thus  being  cleaned 
up  expeditions  were  sent  from  Manila  to  the  province  of  Cavite, 
and  up  the  Mariquina  Valley  to  the  east.  On  December  19  Gen- 
eral Lawton  was  killed  near  San  Mateo  and  the  army  suffered 
the  loss  of  one  of  its  most  efficient  and  distinguished  leaders. 

As  there  were  no  large  bodies  of  insurgents  remaining,  the 
American  troops  were  now  distributed  in  small  detachments,  and 
the  work  of  organizing  the  country  for  peace  was  commenced. 
Some  roads  were  constructed  for  military  purposes  and  others  in 
order  to  make  it  possible  for  the  natives  to  market  their  products. 
Early  in  the  spring  of  1900  the  military  authorities  ceased  to 
operate  the  railroad  from  Manila  to  Dagupan  and  it  was  returned 
to  its  owners.  The  war,  so  far  as  it  was  a  contest  between  organ- 
ized forces,  was  at  an  end. 

On  May  5,  1900,  General  E.  L.  Otis  was  relieved  as  military 
governor  and  was  succeeded  by  General  Arthur  MacArthur.  The 
duties  which  General  Otis  had  been  called  upon  to  perform  were 
such  as  had  fallen  to  the  lot  of  no  other  American  army  officer. 
They  were  complicated  and  onerous  and  called  for  the  combined 
qualities  of  a  soldier  and  a  statesman.  The  conditions  were 
unique  in  American  history.  It  had  not  been  customary  in  pre- 
vious American  experience  or  in  the  British  service  under  such 
circumstances  to  combine  the  military  and  civil  functions  in  one 
person.    In  India,  Java  and  other  conquered  countries  the  civil- 

s^'Le  Roy,  II,  Ch.  XIX,  gives  a  detailed  account  of  these  military  opera- 
tions. 


THE   FILIPINO   REBELLION  481 

ian  administrator  always  accompanied  the  military  commander. 
Clive,  originally,  Hastings  and  the  empire  builders  were  generally 
civilians.  Sir  Stamford  Raffles,  who  did  such  remarkable  con- 
structive work  in  Java,  was  a  young  East  India  Company  civil 
servant,  with  whom  served  Auchmulty  and  Gillespie  as  military 
commanders.  In  Manila  the  United  States  government  con- 
ferred all  power  upon  the  military  commander,  who  had  thus 
to  deal  with  war,  politics,  diplomacy,  finance,  jurisprudence  and 
military  and  civil  government.  His  powers,  although  prac- 
tically absolute,  were  never  seriously  abused.  General  Otis' 
plans  for  crushing  the  insurrection  were  executed  successfully. 
The  administration  of  civil  affairs  was  creditable  and  as  effi- 
cient as  that  of  the  early  days  of  the  civil  government  which  suc- 
ceeded it.  He  made  mistakes,  of  course,  and  he  offended  many 
persons.  He  had  not  the  personal  qualities  out  of  which  popular 
military  heroes  are  made.  He  never  rushed  about  on  a  charger, 
and  certainly  used  his  pen  more  than  his  sword.  He  succeeded  in 
getting  into  unpleasant  relations  with  Admiral  Dewey  and  with 
certain  members  of  the  commission,  and  the  tendency  has  been 
"to  write  him  down."  He  was,  in  fact,  somewhat  dry  and  unre- 
sponsive and  very  much  over-addicted  to  detail.  He  became 
unpopular  with  the  newspaper  correspondents  and  the  editors. 
Military  governors  are  not  generally  favorites  with  local  jour- 
nalists, who  object  to  being  ridden  with  a  check-rein.  Nor  did 
the  policy  which  General  Otis  was  requijed  to  pursue  toward  the 
Filipinos  meet  with  the  approval  of  the  correspondents  or  the 
local  newspapers,  which  were  edited  by  ex-soldiers  with  ideas  of 
their  own  as  to  the  proper  way  to  govern  a  dependency.  The 
prevalent  local  view  was  that  all  Americans  living  under  the 
flag  in  any  territory,  no  matter  where  that  territory  was  located, 
were  entitled  to  all  their  home-made  constitutional  rights,  regard- 
less of  the  condition  of  the  subject  people,  and  that  any  policy 
which  lowered  their  legal  status  to  a  level  with  a  servile  race 
would  result  in  disaster  to  America  and  also  mislead  and  de- 
ceive the  natives.   They  saw  nothing  but  disaster  in  the  policy 


482  THE   PHILIPPINES 

of  "the  Philippines  for  the  Filipinos."  Otis  was  charged  with 
being  too  optimistic  and  with  not  understanding  the  real  situa- 
tion, and  thus  misleading  the  authorities  at  Washington. 

As  usual  in  such  cases,  the  censorship  of  the  news  was  not 
pleasing  to  those  immediately  affected  by  it.  At  one  time  the 
correspondents  combined  and  sent  a  "round  robin"  from  Hong 
Kong  which  created  something  of  a  sensation  in  the  United 
States.  It  is  not  necessary  to  assume  that  in  such  controversies 
the  men  in  authority  and  who  are  bearing  the  burden  of  respon- 
sibility are  always  wrong  and  that  the  newspaper  correspondents 
are  always  right.  General  Otis  was  subjected  to  some  merited 
and  much  unmerited  criticism  and  abuse,  but  when  all  the  diffi- 
culties are  taken  into  consideration  every  fair-minded  and  un- 
prejudiced person  will  now  concede  that  his  administration  was 
reasonably  successful.  Of  him  General  Funston  says  :^^  "While 
always  civil,  he  was  a  very  reserved  man  and  an  indefatigable 
worker,  who  took  upon  himself  the  decision  of  all  sorts  of  minor 
matters  ordinarily  left  by  a  general  officer  to  the  members  of  his 
staff.  One  would  about  as  soon  think  of  cracking  a  joke  in  his 
presence  as  of  trying  to  pull  his  beard.  It  should  not  be  inferred 
that  he  was  of  the  pompous  type,  for  he  was  anything  but  that, 
being  a  most  simple  and  unaffected  man,  though  without  the  sav- 
ing grace  of  humor." 

It  then  seemed  that  to  General  MacArthur  was  left  merely 
the  work  of  gathering  up  the  odds  and  ends  of  the  insurrection 
and  organizing  governments  in  the  distracted  country,  but  soon 
after  he  succeeded  to  power  the  insurrection  entered  upon  what 
was  by  far  the  most  annoying  and  troublesome  phase  of  its  exist- 
ence. At  a  council  held  by  the  Filipino  leaders  at  Bayambong 
in  November,  1899,  it  was  decided  to  disband  what  remained  of 
the  army  and  to  organize  the  people  in  each  province  for  pro- 
longed guerrilla  warfare.  A  good  idea  of  the  plan  is  obtained 
from  one  of  the  orders  issued  by  Aguinaldo  which  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  American  authorities.  Luzon  was  divided  into  dis- 
tricts, each  under  a  politico-military  commander,  upon  whom  was 

^^  Memories  of  Two  Wars,  p.  159. 


THE   FILIPINO    REBELLION  483 

conferred  the  "full  and  extraordinary  powers"  to  impose  contri- 
butions and  adopt  all  such  measures  as  might  seem  to  him  "for 
the  good  service  of  the  country."  The  troops  in  each  district 
"were  instructed  henceforth  to  maneuver  in  flying  columns  and 
in  guerrilla  bands.^" 

Detailed  and  systematized  instructions  for  conducting  guerrilla 
warfare  were  prepared  by  that  valiant  warrior  of  the  pen,  Isa- 
bello  de  los  Reyes,  under  the  direction  of  the  Filipino  Revolu- 
tionary Committee  in  Madrid  and  forwarded  to  the  Philippines/" 

This  production  is  well  worth  careful  reading.  It  opened  with 
the  statement  that  the  object  of  the  guerrilla  warfare  which  was 
to  be  inaugurated  was  to  convince  the  "American  Imperialists 
who  sought  to  reduce  the  Filipinos  to  slavery  and  confiscate  their 
rich  archipelago"  that  their  nefarious  purpose  could  never  be 
accomplished.  The  success  of  the  Sultan  of  Sulu,  "through  his 
fanatical  perseverance,"  in  securing  a  fair  degree  of  indepen- 
dence*^ was  referred  .to  as  an  encouraging  fact.  The  guerrillas 
were  instructed  not  to  give  battle,  as  disease  would  soon  destroy 
the  Americans.  However,  while  awaiting  this  much  desired  con- 
summation, the  Americans  were  to  be  constantly  worried  and 
■when  possible  destroyed  root  and  branch. 

It  must  be  conceded  that  the  system  was  effective  for  the  pur- 
pose for  which  it  was  devised.  Uniforms  were  thereafter  dis- 
carded, and  soldiers  appeared  now  in  the  field  as  fighting  men 
and  now  within  the  American  lines  as  amigos — peaceful  natives 
engaged  in  tilling  the  soil  and  eager  to  assist  in  the  capture  of 
the  friends  whom  they  called  bandits. 

The  work  of  capturing  these  guerrillas  was  even  more  strenu- 
ous, dangerous  and  demoralizing  than  regular  warfare.*^  The 
service  required  the  highest  degree  of  endurance,  fortitude  and 

89  Order  of  May  6,  1900,  to  Pantaleone  Garcia.  House  Doc.  2,  36th  Cong., 
^nd  Sess.,  Part  3,  p.  59.    Rcpt.  War  Dept.,  1900,  Part  1,  p.  59.  ^ 

*o  A  translation  of  this  extraordinary  document  is  printed  in  House  Doc. 
2,  pp.  72-76. 

<i^  So  the  Filipino  leaders  construed  the  Bates  Agreement  with  the  sultan. 

*2  Between  November  1,  1899,  and  September  1,  1900,  the  American  casual- 
ties were  268  killed,  751  wounded,  and  55  captured.  The  Filipino  loss,  so  far 
as  reported  during  the  same  period,  was  3,227  killed,  694  wounded  and  2,864 
captured. 


484  THE   PHILIPPINES 

valor.  The  Filipinos  conducted  their  irregular  warfare  with 
skill  and  a  considerable  degree  of  success,  and  thus  succeeded  in 
postponing  for  a  few  months  the  day  of  complete  submission. 
During  that  time  they  made  life  very  unpleasant  for  the  Ameri- 
cans and  subjected  their  own  people  to  untold  miseries. 

The  municipalities  which  had  been  organized  under  American 
military  supervision  were  centers  of  insurgent  activities.*^  It  was 
from  them  that  the  serious  opposition  to  pacification  came.  The 
acceptance  of  American  authority,  which  was  involved  in  the 
holding  of  municipal  office,  was  never,  with  the  people,  more 
than  a  mere  form.  In  fact,  the  municipal  politicos  seem  to  have 
regarded  the  oath  of  loyalty  to  the  United  States  as  a  perform- 
ance which  had  a  real  value,  because  it  tended  to  throw  the 
Americans  off  their  guard.  Their  hearts  were  always  with  their 
friends  in  the  hosca,  to  whom  they  rendered  every  assistance  in 
their  power.  The  offices  of  municipal  president  and  councilmen 
were  the  best  possible  vantage  grounds  for  their  purposes.  Most 
of  the  towns  had  complete  secret  insurgent  municipal  govern- 
ments, which  operated  simultaneously  and  within  the  same  sphere 
as  the  American  organized  local  government,  and  in  many  in- 
stances the  offices  were  held  by  the  same  persons.  The  officials 
acted  thus  openly  in  behalf  of  the  United  States  and  secretly  in 
behalf  of  the  insurgents,  apparently  with  equal  solicitude  for 
the  interests  of  both.  Their  actions  present  a  very  curious  study 
in  the  psychology  of  the  Oriental.  In  such  matters  as  the  peace 
of  the  town,  the  regulation  of  markets,  labor  on  roads,  streets 
and  bridges,  and  the  opening  and  conducting  of  schools,  these 
men  were  very  active  and  accepted  with  alacrity  the  guidance 
and  assistance  of  the  Americans.  At  the  same  time  they  were 
collecting  contributions  and  supplies,  recruiting  men  and  sending 
military  information  to  the  Filipino  leaders  in  the  field.  Nearly 
every  town,  regardless  of  the  fact  of  American  occupation,  was 
thus  a  base  for  insurgent  military  activities.  When)  closely 
pressed  a  band  of  guerrillas  simply  dissolved  and  reappeared  as 

*8  See  Robinson,  The  Philippines,  etc.,  pp.  292-313. 


THE   FILIPINO   REBELLION  485 

peaceful  citizens  of  a  near-by  barrio.  It  is  doubtful  whether  the 
skill  with  which  the  system  was  operated  has  ever  been  equaled. 
As  General  MacArthur  well  said,  "The  people  seemed  actuated 
by  the  idea  than  in  all  doubtful  matters  of  politics  or  war,  men 
are  never  nearer  right  than  when  going  with  their  own  kith  and 
kin  regardless  of  the  nature  of  the  action  or  of  its  consequences." 

There  was  at  this  time  almost  complete  unanimity  of  action 
on  the  part  of  the  native  population  in  the  provinces  of  the  islands 
not  inhabited  by  the  Moros  and  uncivilized  tribes.  The  excep- 
tions were  found  among  the  comparatively  few  educated  and 
intelligent  people  whose  material  interests  were  involved  and 
whose  knowledge  of  the  world  enabled  them  to  form  a  fairly  just 
and  reasonable  judgment  upon  such  affairs.  But  the  common 
people  had  been  so  stirred  by  the  events  of  the  war  and  by  the 
appeals  of  the  radical  leaders  that  they  refused  absolutely  to 
follow  the  leadership  of  the  conservatives.  This  unanimity  of 
sentiment  had  been  brought  about  by  various  means.  Intimida- 
tion and  fear  were  doubtless  potent  factors,  but  they  were  not 
alone  sufficient  to  account  for  the  apparently  spontaneous  actions 
of  several  millions  of  people.  "It  is  not  improbable,"  wrote  Gen- 
eral MacArthur,  very  truly  if  somewhat  ponderously,  "that  the 
adhesive  principle  comes  from  ethnological  homogeneity  which 
induces  men  to  respond  for  a  time  to  the  appeals  of  consanguine- 
ous leadership  even  when  such  action  is  opposed  to  their  own  in- 
terests and  convictions  of  expediency." 

It  is  a  remarkable  fact  that  throughout  this  period  of  confu- 
sion and  disorganization  the  Filipinos  were  anxious  to  assist  the 
army  officers  in  their  laudable  efforts  to  introduce  a  system  of 
primary  education  for  the  common  people.  But  Americans  were 
inclined  to  attach  excessive  importance  to  this  ambition  for  edu- 
cation. The  people  were  and  are  eager  to  acquire  knowledge,  but 
principally  because  they  regard  it  as  a  means  by  which  they  are 
to  obtain  the  satisfaction  of  their  ambition  to  control  their  own 
affairs.  As  American  interests  and  Filipino  aspirations  in  this 
respect  ran  on  the  same  lines,  it  was  easy  to  work  together.  The 


I 


486  THE   PHILIPPINES 

educational  work  which  was  commenced  by  American  officers  in 
the  municipahties  was  enthusiastically  seconded  by  even  the  most 
disloyal  natives.  They  desired  particularly  to  have  the  children 
taught  the  English  language,  as  they  appreciated  its  practical 
advantages  for  the  purposes  they  had  in  view. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 


The  End  of  the  Military  Re'gime 


BUILDING  A  GOVERNMENT 

Policy  of  the  Administration — Civil  Government  in  Occupied  Territory- 
Unpopularity  of  the  Policy — Elihu  Root,  Secretary  of  War — War  Depart- 
ment in  Charge — War  Powers  of  President — Civil  Government  by  Civilian 
Agents — Constitutional  Questions — Theories  of  National  Power — Power  to 
Acquire  and  Hold  Territory — The  Political  Precedents — Secretary  Root's 
Theory — The  Insular  Cases — The  United  States  Philippine  Commission — The 
President's  Instructions — Principles  of  Government  Adopted — Questions  for 
Consideration — Legislative  Power  of  Commission — Reception  in  Manila — 
Local  Conditions — Building  a  Government — Further  Efforts  at  Reconciliation 
— Presidential  Election  in  the  United  States — Final  Blow  at  the  Insurrection 
— Deportations — Organization  of  Federal  Party — Early  Legislation — Civil 
Service  Law — Reorganization  of  the  Judicial  System — Municipal  Code — Pro- 
vincial Government  Law — The  Beginnings  of  Baguio — Tour  of  the  Islands 
— Organization  of  Provincial  Governments — The  Spooner  Law — Capture  of 
Aguinaldo. 

In  his  message  of  December  5,  1899,  President  McKinley 
informed  Congress  that  there  seemed  to  be  no  good  reason 
why  steps  should  not  be  taken  at  once  to  organize  local  gov- 
ernments essentially  popular  in  the  parts  of  the  territory  of  the 
Philippines  which  were  already  under  the  control  of  the  army. 

The  Schurman  Commission  urged  the  importance  of  insti- 
tuting civil  governments  in  the  provinces  and  towns  at  the 
earliest  possible  date,  but  the  work  had  been  delayed  by  the 
insurrection.  Although  the  native  government  and  the  organized 
forces  by  which  it  had  been  supported  were  now  dispersed,  it  was 
clear  that  it  would  take  an  indefinite  time  to  capture  or  extermi- 
nate all  the  irregular  bands  which  continued  to  operate  in  certain 
localities.  Race  hatred  and  personal  bitterness  were  increasing. 
The  feelings  and  sympathies  of  the  people  were  overwhelmingly 
anti- American.   But  the  Filipinos  had  eaten  of  the  fruit  of  war, 

487 


488  THE   PHILIPPINES 

and  found  it  very  bitter.  It  was  the  duty  of  the  statesmen  to  pro- 
vide something  which  would  inspire  them  with  hope  and  confi- 
dence and  direct  their  attention  to  the  task  of  rebuilding  the 
country.  Military  government  always  has  the  defects  of  its 
qualities  and  it  is  necessarily  harsh  and  unpopular.  It  was 
believed  that  the  prospect  of  immediate  peace  under  a  lib- 
eral and  popular  system  of  government  would  tend  to  weaken 
the  attachment  to  what  was  manifestly  a  lost  cause.  Procla- 
mations and  promises  alone  would  not  do.  So  many  Spanish 
promises  had  been  broken  that  the  Filipinos  had  become  skeptical. 
It  was  important  that  some  at  least  of  the  American  promises 
should  at  the  earliest  possible  time  be  translated  into  accomplished 
facts. 

The  political  conditions  in  the  United  States  also  seemed 
to  require  that  such  a  course  should  be  pursued.  The  pol- 
icy of  the  administration  was  on  trial  before  the  country, 
and  it  is  absurd  to  criticize  politicians  or  statesmen  for  giv- 
ing consideration  to  matters  which  will  affect  the  probability 
of  their  continuing  in  office.  Out  of  office  they  can  do 
nothing;  in  office  they  may  be  able  to  carry  out  their  pol- 
icies. The  successful  establishment  of  civil  governments  in 
parts  even  of  the  Philippines  would  be  conclusive  evidence 
of  progress  toward  the  fulfilment  of  the  prediction  that  the 
insurrection  would  soon  be  ended  and  that  the  common 
people  would,  if  given  the  opportunity,  willingly  accept 
American  control.  There  were  thus  good  reasons,  some  of 
them  political,  others  arising  out  of  the  condition  of  affairs 
in  the  islands,  why  the  work  of  organizing  local  governments 
should  not  wait  until  the  military  authorities  had  captured 
every  outlaw  and  by  disciplinary  measures  taught  the  Fili- 
pinos to  love  the  flag. 

The  policy  adopted  was  not  popular  with  the  army  or  with 
the  newspaper  correspondents  who  taught  the  home  people 
what  they  should  think  with  reference  to  the  Philippines, 
and  it  caused  much  unpleasant  friction  between  the  civil  and 
military  authorities.     The  former  felt  that  their  work  was 


THE   END    OF   THE   MILITARY    REGIME        489 

constantly  belittled  and  impeded,  and  the  latter  resented  the 
injection  of  civilians  into  a  situation  which  in  their  judg- 
ment would  for  many  months  be  purely  military.  General 
MacArthur  felt  that  the  appointment  of  the  commission 
showed  a  lack  of  appreciation  of  his  capacity  to  establish 
civil  governments  as  well  as  control  the  military  situation. 
At  that  distance  from  home  many  of  the  officers  seemed 
unable  to  accept  the  theory,  never  questioned  in  the  United 
States,  of  the  legal  subordination  of  the  military  to  the 
civil  power.' 

The  hasty  institution  of  civil  governments  in  some  in- 
stances resulted  unfortunately,  but  it  is  far  from  clear  that 
the  evils  of  continuing  military  government  would  not  have 
been  greater  than  those  which  were  incidental  to  a  too  rapid 
progress  in  the  right  direction. 

The  Schurman  Philippine  Commission  for  some  reason 
had  been  required  to  report  to  the  secretary  of  state.  The 
management  of  the  new-  dependencies  was  now  transferred 
to  the  War  Department.  Elihu  Root  became  secretary  of 
war  in  1899,  and  thereafter  until  1904  Philippine  affairs 
were  under  his  personal  direction  and  control.  Mr.  Root 
was  a  great  lawyer,  a  profound  student  of  public  and  consti- 
tutional law,  and  a  constructive  statesman  of  the  first  order. 
The  government  of  the  Philippines  as  it  exists  to-day  is  largely 
his  creation,  and  his  efficient  work  in  establishing  and  main- 
taining peace  in  the  Archipelago  was  given  due  weight  when, 
in  1913,  he  was  granted  the  Nobel  prize. 

The  president  derived  his  power  to  govern  the  territory 
from  his  constitutional  authority  as  commander-in-chief  of 
the  army  and  navy,  and  this  power  continued  after  the  rati- 
fication of  the  treaty  of  peace  and  until  such  time  as  Congress 
assumed  jurisdiction  and  control  of  the  territory.''    But  his  au- 

1  This  question  is  always  a  live  one  in  dependencies  unless  the  civil  gov- 
ernor is  by  law  also  commander-in-chief,  as  in  such  colonies  as  Ceylon  and 
Hong  Kong.  For  the  famous  contest  between  Lord  Curzon  and  Lord  Kitch- 
ener over  the  organization  of  the  India  government,  see  Fraser,  Lord  Curson 
in  India  and  After,  Chap.  XIL 

a  Cross  v.  Howard,  16  Howard  (U.  S.)  164. 


490  THE   PHILIPPINES 

thorlty  was  simply  that  of  a  military  commander  and  was  much 
less  comprehensive  than  that  of  Congress.  The  immediate  ques- 
tion was  how,  in  the  exercise  of  the  war  power,  to  give  the 
Philippines  the  benefit  of  civil  government  while  awaiting 
the  action  of  Congress. 

The  military  authority  of  a  president  includes  executive, 
legislative  and  judicial  power.  Not  infrequently  a  single 
military  order  includes  all  these  powers, — the  exercise  of 
legislative  power  by  prescribing  a  rule  of  action,  of  judicial 
power  by  determining  a  right,  and  executive  power  by  the 
enforcement  of  the  rules  prescribed  or  the  rights  determined. 
As  said  by  Secretary  Root,  "It  is  indeed  the  combination  of 
all  these  powers  in  a  single  individual  which  constitutes  the 
chief  objection  to  any  unnecessary  continuance  of  military 
government."^  As  the  war  power  could  be  exercised  through 
civil  agents  as  well  as  military  officers,  it  was  determined  that 
the  legislative  power  should  be  vested  in  civil  agents  who  should 
act  in  accordance  with  legislative  forms  and  that  the  judicial 
power  should  be  exercised  by  courts  established  and  regulated 
by  the  enactments  of  the  legislative  authority. 

The  ratification  of  the  treaty  with  Spain  without  the  usual 
provision  determining  the  future  status  of  the  ceded  terri- 
tory and  its  inhabitants  gave  rise  to  numerous  important  con- 
stitutional questions  which  could  not  be  settled  definitely 
until  they  could  be  brought  before  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States.  They  were  not  in  fact  decided  by  that  august 
tribunal  until  March  21,  1901.  In  the  meantime  the  adminis- 
tration under  the  guidance  of  Secretary  Root  had  to  pro- 
ceed upon  its  own  judgment  and  trust  that  its  action  would  meet 
with  the  approval  of  the  country  and  subsequently  of  the 
courts.* 

The  all  important,  immediate  question  was  whether,  upon 
the  cession  of  the  territory,   the   Constitution  of  the   United 


^Rept.  Secy,  of  War,  1901.     (Five  Years  of  the  War  Dept,  1899-1903, 
p.  199.) 

*  See  notes,  p.  496,  infra. 


ELIHU  ROOT 


490  TtIS:   'Pn'  ■  '''S 

the.  nimander  and  was  much 

l((!j»>  ^3.    The  immediate  ques- 

*—  ■,..      .   v.ic  war  power,  \o  give  the 

civil  government  while  awaiting 

on  of  Congress. 

"'    ^  ■  !>f   a  president   includes   executive, 

w.v.  y.  owcT.     Not  infrequently  a  single 

der  inr  :!  these  powers, — the  exercise  of 

teiri&lative  power  by  prescribing  a  rule  of  action,  of  judicial 

power  by  determining  at'   '  d  executive  power  by  the 

enforcement  of  the  m^  s  i  'or  the  rights  determined. 

As  said  by  Secret  oed  the  combination  of 

all  '  'lich  constitutes  the 

.'  — e.  of  military 

;ed  through 

-vcpsL  t^aia'd  .  rmined  that 

-.  who  should 

power  d 

l^  the  enactments  of  the  legislative  authorii - 

The  ratification  of  the  treaty  with  Spain  wiiraut  the  usual 
provision  determining  the  future  status  ox  the  ceded  terri- 
tory and  its  inhabitants  gave  rise  to  numerous  important  con- 
stitutional questions  which  could  not  be  settled  definitely 
until  they  could  be  brought  before  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States.  They  were  not  in  fact  decided  by  that  august 
tribunal  until  March  21,  1901.  In  the  meantime  the  adminis- 
tration under  the  guidance  of  Secretary  Root  had  to  pro- 
ceed upon  its  own  i.  "  ■  and  trust  that  its  action  would  meet 
with  the  approvn  country  and  subsequently  of  the 
courts.* 

The  all  important,  immediate  question  was  whether,  upon 
'     '      '--■-'  :'      Constitution  of  the  United 

ars  of  the  War  Dept..  1899-1903, 
'  )6^  infra. 


COPYRIGHT,  HARRIS  &  EWINQ 


THE    END    OF   THE   MILITARY    REGIME        491 

States  with  all  its  requirements  and  limitations,  became  at 
once  effective  therein  by  its  own  force,  regardless  of  the 
action  of  Congress.  In  the  popular  language  of  the  day, 
did  the  Constitution  follow  the  flag?  These  questions  were 
agitating  the  country  even  before  the  treaty  was  signed. 
The  two  extreme  views  were  expressed  very  clearly  by 
Senator  Vest  of  Missouri  and  Senator  Piatt  of  Connecticut 
during  a  debate  in  the  Senate/  On  December  6,  1898,  in 
contemplation  evidently  of  the  signing  of  the  treaty,  the  for- 
mer introduced  a  resolution  to  the  effect  "that  under  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States,  no  power  is  given  to  the 
Federal  Government  to  acquire  territory  to  be  held  and  gov- 
erned permanently  as  colonies." 

Senator  Piatt's  resolution  asserted  that  the  United  States  is  a 
nation  with  all  the  powers  of  a  nation.* 

The  United  States  had  always  held  territory  which  was 
for  a  time  out  of  the  Union,  and  the  Constitution  recognized 
that  such  territory  might  be  held  as  its  property-  The  power 
to  hold  implies  the  power  to  acquire  such  territory,  and  the 
Supreme  Court  had  held  that  the  power  was  also  implied 
from  the  express  power  to  make  war  and  treaties.  "The 
Constitution,"  said  Chief  Justice  Marshall,'"  "confers  abso- 
lutely on  the  government  of  the  Union  the  powers  of  making 
war  and  of  making  treaties;  consequently  that  government 
possesses  the  power  of  acquiring  territory  by  conquest  or  by 
treaty."  Under  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution  Congress 
may  either  sell  the  territory  which  it  so  acquires,  hold  and 
govern  it  by  such  rules  and  regulations  as  it  deems  wise  to 
make,  or  carve  it  up  into  numerous  states  and  admit  them 
into  the  Union.  It  follows  that  until  new  states  are  created 
out  of  the  national  territorial  property  and  admitted  into  the 
Union  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  is  not  in  force 


'For  the  conflicting  views  of  jurists,  see  Thayer,  12  Harvard  Law  Rev. 
464,  March,  1899;  Baldwin,  Ibid.,  393;  Burgess,  14  Pol.  Set.  Guar.  1.  March, 
1899;  Woolsey,  Ann.  Am.  Acad.  Pol.  and  Soc.  Set.  Supp..  p.  15,  April  7,  1899. 

«  Cong.  Ree.,  Dec.  19.  1898,  pp.  321.  et  seq. 

'  American  and  Ocean  Insurance  Co.  v.  Canter,  1  Pet  (U.  S.)  511. 


492  THE   PHILIPPINES 

in  such  territory.  The  McKinley  administration  had  good 
Jeffersonian  authority  for  proceeding  on  the  assumption  that 
the  Constitution  did  not  apply  to  the  new  territory  until 
it  had  been  extended  thereto  by  Congress  in  the  exercise 
of  its  powers  to  "make  all  needful  rules  and  regulations  re- 
specting the  territory  or  other  property  belonging  to  the 
United  States." 

It  followed  strictly  the  political  precedents  in  the  history 
of  the  country.  The  treaty  under  which  Louisiana  was  ac- 
quired from  France  in  1803  contained  a  provision  with  ref- 
erence to  the  politicial  status  of  the  inhabitants  but  left  Con- 
gress to  determine  when  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the 
United  States  should  be  made  applicable  in  the  new  terri- 
tory. The  Act  of  Congress  of  October  31,  1803,  provided 
that  "until  the  expiration  of  the  present  session  of  Con- 
gress, unless  provision  for  the  temporary  government  for 
the  said  territory  be  sooner  made  by  Congress,  all  the  mili- 
tary, civil  and  judicial  powers  exercised  by  the  officers  of 
the  existing  government  of  the  same  shall  be  vested  in  such 
person  and  persons  and  shall  be  exercised  in  such  man- 
ner as  the  president  of  the  United  States  shall  direct  for 
maintaining  and  protecting  the  inhabitants  of  Louisiana  in 
the  free  enjoyment  of  their  liberty,  property  and  religion."* 
This  statute  was  construed  to  mean  that  the  local  laws  should 
remain  in  force  until  changed  by  Congress.  Albert  Gallatin, 
then  secretary  of  the  treasury,  wrote  to  the  territorial  governor, 
"that  the  existing  duties  on  imports  and  exports  which  by  the 
Spanish  law  are  now  levied  within  the  province,  will  continue 
until  Congress  shall  have  otherwise  provided."* 

Early  in  the  next  year  Congress  extended  the  laws  of  the 
United  States  relating  to  customs  duties  to  Louisiana  and 
organized  a  territorial  government  by  an  act  which  specifi- 


8  U.  S.  Stat  at  Large  (Pet.  Ed.),  II,  245. 

8  See   Magoon,   Law  of   Civil   Government  under  Military    Occupation, 
p.  159. 


THE   END    OF   THE   MILITARY    REGIME        493 

cally  enumerated  the  provisions  of  the  bill  of  rights  of  which 
the  inhabitants  of  the  territory  should  have  the  benefit.*® 

Upon  the  acquisition  of  Florida  in  1819,  a  part  of  Mexico 
in  1848,  the  Gadsen's  Purchase  in  1853,  and  Alaska  in  1867, 
it  was  assumed  that  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the  United 
States  did  not  extend  to  the  new  territory  without  express 
action  by  Congress.  The  Act  of  April  30,  1900,  expressly 
extended  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  over  the  new 
territory  of  Hawaii.  In  each  of  these  instances  the  treaty 
of  cession  provided  that  the  inhabitants  should  in  due  time 
be  admitted  to  the  full  rights  of  citizens  of  the  United  States, 
while  the  treaty  with  Spain  merely  reserved  to  Congress  the 
right  to  determine  the  civil  rights  and  political  status  of  the 
inhabitants  of  the  ceded  territory.  In  neither  case  could  the 
inhabitants  become  citizens  without  the  action  of  Congress. 

Under  these  political  precedents  the  administration  was 
justified  in  assuming  that  the  Constitution  was  not  self-op- 
erating in  the  newly  acquired  territory.  Any  government 
instituted  by  the  president  under  the  war  power,  necessarily 
would  be  temporary  and  it  was  not  essential  that  the  tem- 
porary government  should  be  so  framed  as  to  provide  a 
model  for  future  congressional  action.  It  was,  however, 
desirable  that  the  president's  action  should  conform  to  the 
constitutional  theory  upon  which  Congress  would  act.  Sec- 
retary Root  proceeded  to  frame  a  government  for  the  Phil- 
ippines on  the  theory  that  the  United  States  as  a  nation 
possessed  and  might  lawfully  exercise  all  the  powers  in  re- 
spect to  such  territory  which  any  other  nation  could  have 
exercised  in  respect  to  territory  and  people  so  acquired.  The 
inhabitants  of  the  territory  were  subject  to  the  complete 
sovereignty  of  the  United  States,  and  the  sovereign  was 
subject  only  to  the  legal  limitations  on  its  powers  which 
were  found  in  the  treaty.  The  legal  rights  of  the  inhabitants 
also  were  determined  by  the  treaty  and  not  by  a  constitu- 

"  United  Stat,  at  Large  (Pet  Ed.),  II,  p.  283. 


494  THE   PHILIPPINES 

tion  which  had  been  established  by  the  people  of  the  United 
States  for  themselves  and  to  meet  conditions  existing  on 
the  American  continent.  They  had,  however,  acquired  a 
moral  right  to  be  governed  by  the  United  States  according 
to  the  principles  of  justice  and  freedom  which  underlay  the 
American  system  of  government,  and  it  was  the  duty  of  the 
United  States  to  make  the  interests  of  the  people  the  first 
and  controlling  consideration  in  all  administration  and  legis- 
lation which  concerned  them.^^ 

'  On  the  theory  that  the  laws  of  the  United  States  did  not 
apply  to  the  new  territory  until  extended  thereto  by  Con- 
gress the  administration  proceeded  to  collect  duties  on  goods 
imported  into  the  United  States  from  Porto  Rico  and  the 
Philippines,  thus  treating  them  as  foreign  countries  within 
the  contemplation  of  the  tarifif  law.  The  Supreme  Court 
subsequently  held  that  this  could  not  be  done,  because  im- 
mediately upon  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  of  peace  the 
islands  ceased  to  be  foreign  territory.  In  considering  the 
litigation  with  reference  to  the  tariff  laws  it  is  necessary 
to  distinguish  the  period  before  the  ratification  of  the  treaty, 
the  period  from  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  to  the  passage 
of  the  Foraker  Act  on  April  12,  1900,  and  the  time  subse- 
quent to  the  enactment  of  that  law.  During  the  first  period 
the  duties  and  customs  were  legally  determined  and  collected 
under  the  executive  orders  of  the  president  in  the  exercise 
of  the  war  power.  In  the  first  of  the  so-called  Insular  Cases, 
decided  May  27,  1901,  the  Supreme  Court  held  that  the 
United  States  had  the  right  to  acquire  territory  by  treaty, 
that  the  treaty  of  cession  did  not  extend  the  Constitution 
and  laws  of  the  United  States  over  such  territory,  and  that 
territory  thus  acquired  could  not  be  considered  as  foreign 
territory.  It  followed  that  the  duties  could  not  be  collected 
under  the  Dingley  Tariff  Law  on  goods  coming  from  Porto 
Rico  to  the  United  States.  ^^ 


^^  Report  Secy,  of  War,  1899  (Five  Years  of  the  War  Dept.,  pp.  31-38). 
«  De  Lima  v.  Bidwell,  182  U.  S.  1. 


THE   END   OF   THE    MILITARY   REGIME        495 

Porto  Rico  and  the  Philippines,  therefore,  were  not  for- 
eign territory.  But  were  they  domestic  territory  in  the  sense 
that  they  came  within  the  commercial  union?  Congress, 
assuming  that  Porto  Rico  was  foreign  territory  within  the 
meaning  of  the  revenue  laws,  had  by  the  Foraker  Act  estab- 
lished a  schedule  of  duties  which  should  be  paid  on  goods 
coming  therefrom  to  the  United  States.  In  order  to  sustain 
this  statute  the  court  held  that  within  the  meaning  of  the 
revenue  clauses  of  the  Constitution  requiring  all  duties,  im- 
posts and  excises  to  be  uniform  throughout  the  United  States, 
Porto  Rico  while  not  foreign  territory  was  not  for  all  pur- 
poses to  be  regarded  as  domestic  territory.  It  was  territory 
appurtenant  to  and  belonging  to  the  United  States,  and  the 
Foraker  Act  was  therefore  constitutional.^'  This  conclusion 
was  reached  by  various  processes  of  reasoning  and  was  much 
criticized  by  students  of  constitutional  law  and  political  sci- 
ence, and  the  general  public.  It  was  claimed  that  as  four 
justices  believed  that  the  Constitution  was  extended  by  its 
own  force  to  the  new  territory  and  four  other  justices  be- 
lieved that  an  Act  of  Congress  was  necessary  so  to  extend  it 
and  the  reasoning  of  the  justice  who  wrote  the  prevailing 
opinion  was  not  concurred  in  by  any  of  his  associates,  no 
constitutional  doctrine  was  declared  by  a  majority  of  the 
court.^*  But  the  reasoning  by  which  a  court  reaches  its  con- 
clusion is  no  part  of  a  judicial  decision.  Many  a  correct  de- 
cision is  reached  by  an  erroneous  course  of  reasoning.  So 
far  as  the  binding  effect  of  the  decision  is  concerned  it  is 
from  a  legal  point  of  view  entirely  immaterial  that  a  majority 
of  the  members  of  the  court  were  unable  to  agree  on  a  single 
reason  for  the  decision.  The  conclusion  embodied  in  the 
judgment  was  that  of  the  majority,  and  the  decision  itself 
was  that  of  the  court.  The  various  conflicting  reasons  given 
for  the  insular  decisions  are  therefore  of  interest  only  to 
students  of  the  development  of  constitutional  law.*" 

"Downes  v.  Bidwell,  182  U.  S.  244  (1901). 

'*  Latane.  America  as  a  World  Power,  Chap.  VIII. 

"In  O'Campo  v.  Cabiaiiis,  15  Phil.  Kept.  625,  the  court  said:  "There  caa 


496  THE   PHILIPPINES 

The  questions  involved  in  these  cases  were  not  determined 
by  the  court  until  the  work  of  organizing  the  temporary 
government  in  the  Philippines  was  well  under  way  and 
until  after  the  people  at  the  presidential  election  of  1900  had 
placed  the  seal  of  their  approval  upon  the  policy  which  was 
being  pursued  by  the  administration.  There  was,  therefore, 
some  truth  in  the  assertion  that  the  constitutional  questions 
connected  with  the  acquisition  of  the  Philippines  were  set- 
tled on  commercial  and  political  grounds  before  they  came 
before  the  court,  just  as  similar  great  questions  of  public 
policy  have  been  and  doubtless  in  the  future  will  be  settled/^ 
Congress  was,  therefore,  left  free  to  provide  a  government 
for  the  Philippines  subject  only  to  the  restrictions  of  the  Con- 
stitution which  go  to  the  very  root  of  its  power  to  act  at  all 
irrespective  of  time  and  place/'^ 

In  April,  1900,  the  president  appointed  the  United  States 
Philippine  Commission,  which  was  designed  to  supplement 
the  work  of  the  army  and  establish  a  civil  government  which 
should  exist  until  Congress  assumed  charge.  The  members 
of  the  new  commission  were  not  so  well  known  to  the  pub- 
lic as  those  of  the  Schurman  Commission  had  been.  The 
president,  Mr.  William  H.  Taft,  of  Ohio,  had  been  solicitor- 
general  of  the  United  States  and  was  well  and  favorably 
known  to  the  legal  profession  as  a  United  States  circuit 
judge.  Neither  of  the  other  members  had  more  than  a  local 
reputation.  They  were,  however,  all  men  of  high  standing 
in  the  states  from  which  they  came.     Mr.  Luke  L.  Wright 

be  but  one  decision  by  a  court,  and  it  must  be  the  result  of  the  concurrent 
judgment  of  a  majority  of  the  justices  constituting  that  court.  The  legisla- 
ture can  not  compel  the  minds  of  men.  The  law  has  no  mandamus  to  the 
logical  faculties." 

16  The  impression  made  on  many  people  was  that  expressed  by  Mr. 
Dooley : 

"But  there  is  one  thing  that  I'm  sure  about" 

"What's  that?"  asked  Mr.  Hennessey. 

"That  is,"  said  Mr.  Dooley,  "no  matter  whether  th'  Constitution  follows 
the  flag  or  not  th'  Supreme  Court  follows  th'  illiction  returns."  The  wit 
justifies  the  irreverence. 

"De  Lima  v.  Bidwell,  182  U.  S.  1 ;  Downes  v.  Bidwell,  182  U.  S.  244; 
Hawaii  v.  Mankichi,  190  U.  S.  197;  Dorr  v.  United  States,  195  U.  S.  138; 
Rasmussen  v.  United  States,  197  U.  S.  516. 


THE    END    OF   THE    MILITARY    REGIME        497 

had  been  attorney-general  of  Tennessee,  but  had  held  no 
other  public  office.  Mr.  Henry  C.  Ide,  of  Vermont,  was  a. 
lawyer  and  had  served  creditably  as  chief  justice  of  Samoa 
during  the  period  of  the  joint  American,  English  and  Ger- 
man protectorate.  Mr.  Dean  C.  Worcester  was  assistant  pro- 
fessor of  zoology  at  the  University  of  Michigan  and  was  the 
only  member  who  had  the  advantage  of  any  personal  knowledge 
of  the  islands,  having  visited  them  on  two  previous  occasions 
on  scientific  expeditions  and  recently  as  a  member  of  the  Schur- 
man  Commission.  Mr.  Bernard  Moses  was  professor  of  history 
at  the  University  of  California  and  had  written  several  books 
on  Spanish-American  history.  All  these  men  served  their  coun- 
try and  the  Philippines  faithfully  and  well.  !Mr.  Taft  became 
civil  governor,  secretary  of  war  and  president  of  the  United 
States.  Mr.  Wright  became  tlie  first  governor-general  of  the 
Philippines,  the  first  American  ambassador  to  Japan,  and  secre- 
tary of  war  during  the  last  days  of  President  Roosevelt's  admin- 
istration. Mr.  Ide  became  governor-general  and  minister  to 
Spain.  Mr.  Worcester  remained  a  member  of  the  commission 
and  secretary  of  the  interior  until  1913.  Mr.  Moses,  after  serv- 
ing as  commissioner  and  secretary  of  public  instruction,  resigned 
and  returned  to  the  University  of  California. 

The  Instructions  which  were  prepared  by  Secretary  Root 
for  the  guidance  of  this  commission  constitute  a  very  noble 
state  paper.  The  general  principles  therein  announced  were 
such  as  would  naturally  control  in  any  government  for  which 
America,  with  her  traditions,  was  responsible.  They  were 
prepared  in  the  full  light  of  modern  colonial  history  and  with 
ample  knowledge  of  the  most  advanced  theory  and  practise  of 
colonial  government.  There  was  at  that  time  little  to  be 
learned  from  the  Dutch,  French  or  German  systems  which 
could  be  made  applicable  in  the  Philippines.  Obviously  the 
German  military  and  bureaucratic  methods  were  inapplicable, 
being  equally  unadapted  to  the  American  or  Filipino  char- 
acter. The  French  system  of  assimilation  to  the  metropoli- 
tan country  was  equally  impossible.    The  much  advertised 


498  THE   PHILIPPINES 

work  of  the  Dutch  in  Netherlands  India  did  not  stand  the 
acid  test  of  modern  principles  of  conduct.  Their  reputation 
as  governors  of  tropical  countries  rested  on  the  fact  that  for 
a  number  of  years  by  brute  force  and  medieval  methods  they 
had  "made  a  colony  pay."  They  stood  "for  no  nonsense" 
about  the  rights  of  the  natives. 

The  policy  outlined  in  the  Instructions  embodied  the  prin-' 
ciple  which  in  recent  years  had  controlled  British  colonial 
policy  and  the  language  of  some  of  the  paragraphs  reads 
like  a  paraphrase  of  sections  of  Queen  Victoria's  proclama- 
tion when  in  1858  Great  Britain  assumed  the  government  of 
India/^  The  government  actually  organized  for  the  Philippines 
resembled  somewhat  that  of  a  British  Crown  colony,  with  the 
principle  of  native  representation  which  had  been  tried  with  in- 
different success  in  some  of  the  English  tropical  colonies,  such 
as  Jamaica  and  Mauritius.^^ 

The  United  States  had  determined  to  govern  the  Philip- 
pines on  lines  designed  to  lead  to  complete  self-government 
and  ultimately  to  independence,  should  the  people  of  the 
territory  when  that  time  came  so  desire.  In  the  mean- 
time the  problem  was  to  take  a  community,  which  in  some 
respects  resembled  India,  in  some  Egypt,  and  in  others  Cey- 
lon and  Jamaica,  and  devise  a  government  therefor  which 
would  secure  the  peace,  order  and  justice  of  a  British  Crown 
colony,  give  the  natives  a  practical  part  in  the  work  of  the 
government,  as  in  India,  and  inculcate  political,  social  and 
economic  doctrines  which,  as  in  Egypt,  were  designed  to  train 
the  people  for  the  future  control  of  their  affairs.^'* 

The  exploitation  of  the  natives  of  tropical  colonies  for 
the  benefit  of  foreigners  was  no  longer  in  theory  permitted 
by  any  colonizing  power.    The  controlling  principle,  there- 
in See  supra,  pp.  56,  57. 

^^Parl.  Blue  Book,  p.  9412,  July,  1899.  Reinsch,  Colonial  Government, 
p.  219 ;  Bruce,  The  Broad  Stone  of  Empire,  I,  Chap.  VIII. 

20  The  original  plan  of  government  devised  by  Secretary  Root  did  not 
include  a  bicameral  legislative  body  such  as  was  provided  for  by  the  Act  of 
Congress  of  July  1,  1902.  The  Filipinos  were  represented  on  the  commissioa 
by  natives  appointed  by  the  president 


THE   END    OF   THE   MILITARY   REGIME        499 

fore,  must  be  that  the  new  government  should  have  for  its 
primary  object  the  well-being  of  the  native  people.  It  must 
be  a  government  of  service.  Therefore  the  commission  was 
solemnly  enjoined  to  remember  that  the  government  which 
they  were  establishing  was  designed  not  for  the  satisfaction 
of  the  Americans  nor  for  the  expression  of  their  theoretical 
views,  but  for  the  happiness  and  prosperity  of  the  people 
of  the  Philippine  Islands.  The  measures  adopted  must  be 
made  to  conform  to  their  customs,  their  habits,  and  even 
their  prejudices,  to  the  fullest  extent  consistent  with  the 
indispensable  requisites  of  just  and  efficient  government. 
This  particular  instruction,  which  has  been  faithfully  ob- 
served to  the  present  day,  was  the  cause  of  considerable 
hard  feeling  on  the  part  of  members  of  the  rough  and  ready 
American  element  which  was  obsessed  with  the  idea  that  the 
conquerors  should  have  first  consideration. 

The  work  of  organization  was  to  begin  at  the  bottom  by 
establishing  village  or  municipal  governments  in  which  the 
natives  should  be  given  the  opportunity  to  manage  their  own 
local  affairs  to  the  fullest  extent  of  which  they  were  capable  and 
subject  only  to  such  supervision  and  control  as  might  be  neces- 
sary to  maintain  law,  order  and  loyalty.  Next  in  ordei*  should 
come  the  organization  of  governments  in  the  larger  adminis- 
trative divisions,  corresponding  to  counties,  departments,  or 
provinces,  which  should,  as  far  as  practicable,  be  composed 
of  municipalities^^  having  natural  geographical  limits  and  in- 
habited by  people  speaking  the  same  language.^^  In  distributing 
power  among  these  local  governments,  the  presumption  was  to 
be  in  favor  of  the  smaller  subdivisions.  All  power  which  could 
be  exercised  properly  by  these  local  governments  should  be  con- 
ferred upon  them,  and  only  powers  of  a  more  general  character 
should  be  granted  to  the  provincial  governments.  The  idea  was 
to  create  a  system  in  which  the  central  government  should  have 

21 A  Philippine  municipality  is  a  territorial  district  in  which  there  may  be 
several  villages. 

22  It  was  upon  this  principle  that  the  Spaniards  had  fixed  the  boundaries 
of  the  existing  provinces,  and  few  changes  were  found  necessary. 


500  THE    PHILIPPINES 

direct  administration  over  matters  of  general  concern  and  such 
control  only  over  the  local  governments  as  was  necessary  to  se- 
cure and  enforce  faithful  and  efficient  administration  by  local 
officers. 

The  municipal  officers  were  to  be  selected  by  the  people, 
and  in  the  larger  divisions  loyal  and  competent  natives  were 
to  be  given  the  preference  in  appointment  to  office.  It  was 
recognized  that  in  the  first  instance  it  would  be  necessary 
to  fill  many  offices  with  Americans  who  after  a  time  might 
be  replaced  by  natives.  As  soon  as  practicable  a  system  for 
ascertaining  the  merit  and  fitness  of  candidates  for  office 
should  be  devised. 

The  attention  of  the  commission  was  directed  especially 
to  certain  vital  questions  which  required  immediate  consid- 
eration. Probably  the  most  important  was  that  of  the  claim 
of  ownership  by  the  monastic  orders  of  certain  large  tracts 
of  agricultural  lands.  These  lands  had  by  a  decree  of  the 
Philippine  Congress  been  arbitrarily  confiscated.  A  thor- 
ough investigation  was  directed  to  be  made  of  the  titles  of 
lands  claimed  by  individuals  or  religious  orders  and  of  the 
justice  of  the  claims  and  complaints  of  the  people,  to  enable 
the  commission  to  recommend  some  wise  and  peaceable  measure 
for  the  settlement  of  the  controversy.  As  far  as  substantial 
rights  permitted  technicalities  were  to  be  disregarded,  but  it  had 
to  be  remembered : 

"That  the  provision  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris,  pledging  the 
United  States  to  the  protection  of  all  rights  of  property  in 
the  islands,  and  as  well  the  principle  of  our  own  Govern- 
ment which  prohibits  the  taking  of  private  property  without 
due  process  of  law  shall  not  be  violated;  that  the  welfare  of 
the  people  of  the  islands,  which  should  be  a  paramount  con- 
sideration, shall  be  attained  consistently  with  this  rule  of 
property  right;  that  if  it  becomes  necessary  for  the  public 
interest  of  the  people  of  the  islands  to  dispose  of  claims  to 
property  which  the  Commission  finds  to  be  not  lawfully 
acquired  and  held,  disposition  shall  be  made  thereof  by  due 
legal  procedure,  in  which  there  shall  be  full  opportunity  for 


THE   END    OF   THE    MILITARY    REGIME        501 

fair  and  impartial  hearing  and  judgment;  that  if  the  same 
public  interests  require  the  extinguishment  of  property  rights 
lawfully  acquired  and  held  due  compensation  shall  be  made 
out  of  the  public  treasury  therefor;  that  no  form  of  religion 
and  no  minister  of  religion  shall  be  forced  upon  any  com- 
munity or  upon  any  citizen  of  the  islands ;  that  upon  the  other 
hand  no  minister  of  religion  shall  be  interfered  with  or  mo- 
lested in  following  his  calling,  and  that  the  separation  be- 
tween state  and  church  shall  be  real,  entire,  and  absolute." 

The  system  of  education  which  had  been  inaugurated^  by  the 
military  authorities  was  to  be  promoted  and  extended,  giving  at- 
tention first  to  free  primary  education,  which  would  fit  the  peo- 
ple for  citizenship  and  the  ordinary  avocations  of  a  civilized 
community.  Instruction  should  be  given  in  every  part  of  the 
islands  in  the  language  of  the  people,  but  full  opportunity  should 
be  given  to  all  of  the  people  to  acquire  the  use  of  the  English 
language.  The  subject  of  taxation  was  to  be  left  for  considera- 
tion by  the  civil  government  which  was  to  be  established  under 
the  auspices  of  the  commission.  In  dealing  with  the  unciv- 
ilized tribes  the  course  followed  by  the  United  States  in  dealing 
with  the  American  Indians  was  to  be  adopted.  These  wild  people 
were  to  be  allowed  to  retain  their  tribal  organizations,  subject 
to  firm  and  wise  regulations  designed  to  prevent  barbarous  prac- 
tises and  uncivilized  customs. 

Until  September  1,  1890,  the  commission  was  to  devote  its 
attention  to  these  investigations.  On  that  date  the  part  of  the 
power  of  the  government  which  was  of  a  legislative  nature  should 
be  transferred  from  the  military  governor  to  the  commission  and 
be  thereafter  exercised  by  it  under  rules  and  regulations  pre- 
scribed by  the  secretary  of  war  until  the  establishment  of  a  com- 
plete civil  central  government,  or  until  Congress  should  other- 
wise provide.  The  legislative  power  thus  conferred  included  the 
making  of  rules  and  orders  having  the  effect  of  law  for  raising 
revenue  by  taxation,  customs  and  imposts;  the  appropriation 
and  expenditure  of  such  funds;  the  establishment  of  an  educa- 
tional system  and  a  civil  service ;  the  organization  and  establish- 


502  THE   PHILIPPINES 

ment  of  courts,  of  municipal  and  departmental  governments,  and 
all  other  matters  of  a  civil  nature  for  which  the  military  gov- 
ernor was  then  competent  to  provide  by  rules  or  orders  of  a  leg- 
islative character. 

The  commission  was  also  authorized  to  appoint  such  officers 
as  it  should  provide  for  in  the  judicial,  educational  and  civil 
service  systems  and  in  the  municipal  and  provincial  governments. 
This  was  a  grant  of  a  portion  of  the  executive  power.  Until 
the  complete  transfer  of  control  to  the  civil  power  the  military 
governor  should  remain  the  chief  executive  head  of  the  govern- 
ment and  exercise  the  executive  power  not  assigned  to  the  com- 
mission, subject  to  the  rules  and  orders  enacted  by  the  commis- 
sion in  the  exercise  of  its  legislative  power.  The  municipal  and 
departmental  governments  were  to  continue  to  report  to  the 
military  governor  and  to  be  subject  to  his  administrative  con- 
trol under  the  direction  of  the  secretary  of  war.  This  control, 
however,  was  to  be  confined  within  the  narrowest  limits  consist- 
ent with  honest  and  efficient  government,  the  maintenance  of 
order  and  the  protection  of  individuals.  The  military  forces 
should  be  subject  at  all  times  to  the  call  of  the  civil  officers  for 
the  maintenance  of  order  and  the  enforcement  of  their  authority. 
Wherever  civil  governments  were  instituted  such  military  posts 
and  garrisons  as  the  commander  deemed  requisite  should  be  con- 
tinued for  the  suppression  of  disorder. 

This  government  was  to  be  instituted  in  a  country  which  was 
practically  without  what  is  commonly  called  native  institutions, 
such  as  exist  in  India,  China,  Java  and  the  Malay  country  gen- 
erally. Such  as  originally  existed  had  long  since  been  displaced 
or  radically  modified  by  the  Spaniards.  Fortunately  the  reforms 
which  the  Filipinos  had  been  demanding  were  in  harmony  with 
the  fundamental  ideas  of  government  in  the  United  States. 
What  the  Filipinos  expressly  desired  in  the  way  of  reforms 
was  what  Americans  would  naturally  expect  to  establish.  Hence, 
the  changes  made  by  the  new  government  were  really  much  less 
radical  than  they  appeared  to  the  world. 

The  laws  and  customs  of  the  natives  were  to  be  interfered 


THE   END    OF   THE   MILITARY   REGIME       503 

"With  as  little  as  possible.  Even  their  prejudices  were  to  be  re- 
spected. But  they  were  to  be  made  to  understand  that  there 
are  certain  great  principles  of  government  which  lie  at  the  base 
of  the  American  system  and  which  are  essential  for  the  rule  of 
law  and  maintenance  of  individual  freedom.  In  all  else  America 
said: 

"The  law  that  ye  make  shall  be  law  after  the  rule  of  your 
lands." 

But  there  were  certain  practical  rules  of  government  which 
had  been  found  essential  for  the  protection  of  these  great  pri- 
mary principles  of  liberty,  and  when  these  came  in  conflict  with 
local  customs  and  laws  the  latter  must  be  set  aside.  Upon  every 
branch  of  the  government  of  the  Philippines  there  was  imposed 
the  inviolable  injunction: 

"That  no  person  shall  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty  or  property 
without  due  process  of  law;  that  private  property  shall  not  be 
taken  for  public  use  without  just  compensation;  that  in  all  crim- 
inal prosecutions  the  accused  shall  enjoy  the  right  to  a  speedy 
and  public  trial,  to  be  informed  of  the  nature  and  cause  of  the 
accusation,  to  be  confronted  with  the  witnesses  against  him,  to 
have  compulsory  process  for  obtaining  witnesses  in  his  favor, 
and  to  have  the  assistance  of  counsel  for  his  defense;  that  ex- 
cessive bail  shall  not  be  required,  nor  excessive  fines  imposed, 
nor  cruel  and  unusual  punishment  inflicted ;  that  no  person  shall 
be  put  twice  in  jeopardy  for  the  same  offense,  or  be  compelled 
in  any  criminal  case  to  be  a  witness  against  himself;  that  the 
right  to  be  secure  against  unreasonable  searches  and  seizures 
shall  not  be  violated ;  that  neither  slavery  nor  involuntary  servi- 
tude shall  exist  except  as  a  punishment  for  crime;  that  no  bill 
of  attainder  or  ex-post- facto  law  shall  be  passed;  that  no  law 
shall  be  passed  abridging  the  freedom  of  speech  or  of  the  press, 
or  the  rights  of  the  people  to  peaceably  assemble  and  petition 
the  government  for  a  redress  of  grievances;  that  no  law  shall 
be  made  respecting  an  establishment  of  religion  or  prohibiting 
the  free  exercise  thereof,  and  that  the  free  exercise  and  enjoy- 
ment of  religious  profession  and  worship  without  discrimina- 
tion or  preference  shall  forever  be  allowed." 


504  THE   PHILIPPINES 

With  the  exception  of  those  relating  to  trial  by  jury  and  the 
right  to  carry  arms,  substantially  all  the  provisions  of  the  Bill  of 
Rights  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  were  thus  to  be 
respected  in  the  Philippines. 

The  commissioners  arrived  in  Manila  on  June  4,  1900,  and 
were  received  with  proper  ceremonies  by  the  military  authori- 
ties and  by  representatives  of  the  Filipinos.  There  was,  how- 
ever, a  notable  lack  of  genuine  enthusiasm  in  their  reception 
which  might  well  have  chilled  the  ardor  of  the  newcomers.  The 
Filipinos,  while  anxious  to  be  relieved  from  the  severities  inci- 
dent to  military  government,  were  not  willing  to  commit  them- 
selves irrevocably  to  the  uncertainties  represented  by  the  pro- 
posed civil  government.  Many  interesting  things  might  be 
written  on  the  undisclosed  pages  of  the  book  of  Fate,  and  until 
they  could  see  the  page  upon  which  the  results  of  the  coming 
presidential  election,  then  but  five  months  away,  were  recorded, 
they  deemed  it  wise  to  be  non-committal.  The  leading  Filipinos 
were,  therefore,  formally  courteous.  The  common  people  were 
sullen  or  indifferent.  The  American  army's  enthusiasm  was  con- 
fined strictly  within  the  terms  of  the  regulations. 

Before  entering  upon  the  work  of  creating  a  government  it 
was  necessary  for  the  commissioners  to  solve  the  more  prosaic 
problem  of  habitations  for  themselves  and  their  families.  This 
was  no  easy  task  in  the  Manila  of  1900.  All  the  "palaces"  were 
in  possession  of  the  generals,  and  an  inspection  of  the  available 
habitations  tended  to  raise  doubts  as  to  the  advantages  of  a 
colonial  policy.^^  Even  the  president  of  the  commission  seems 
to  have  had  some  misgivings  as  to  whether  the  career  of  a  great 
pro-consul  was  going  to  be  as  attractive  as  it  had  seemed  from 
the  other  side  of  the  Pacific. 

But  the  commission  soon  learned  to  accept  small  favors  with 
a  respectful  show  of  courtesy,  as  we  find  them  reporting  to  the 
secretary  of  war  that  they  had  been  courteously  received  and 
"after  about  a  month"  had  been  "furnished  comfortable  offices 


23  Moses,   Unofficial  Letters  of  an  Official's  Wife,  p.  5.     Williams,  The 
Odyssey  of  the  Philippine  Commission,  p.  54. 


THE   END    OF   THE    MILITARY    REGIME        505 

in  the  Ayuntamiento."  The  civilian  attaches  of  the  commission, 
who  seem  to  have  been  rather  unsophisticated  in  the  w^ays  of  the 
military  world,  found  themselves  in  a  strange  atmosphere.  One 
of  them  solemnly  recorded  in  his  diary  the  interesting  fact  that 
"there  are  more  captains,  majors  and  colonels  here  than  we  had 
any  idea  existed."  The  city  of  Manila  was,  in  fact,  a  huge  mili- 
tary camp  swarming  with  khaki-clad  soldiers.  "They  patrol  the 
streets,  guard  the  public  buildings  and  perform  all  the  functions 
of  government.  We  go  to  bed  to  the  sound  of  taps  and  wake 
to  hear  the  bugles  sounding  reveille.  Military  authority  is  su- 
preme— omnipotent.  To  be  on  the  street  after  ten  at  night  is 
presumptive  evidence  of  treason;  any  one  found  abroad  after  that 
hour  without  a  pass  being  hustled  to  the  guard-house.  The  talk 
you  hear  is  of  'insurrectos*  and  of  fighting  here  and  fighting  there. 
Manila  itself,  while  perfectly  quiet,  is  disturbed  by  constant  ru- 
mors of  contemplated  attacks.  It  was  currently  reported  and 
believed  that  a  demonstration  against  the  city  was  to  follow  the 
arrival  of  the  Commission — ^just  a  little  something  to  show  how 
welcome  we  were.  Thus  far,  however,  nothing  has  happened. 
We  find  the  army  view  of  the  situation  decidedly  pessimistic. 
They  think  it  will  take  years  to  crush  the  insurrection  and  restore 
public  order.  This  would  mean  the  indefinite  continuance  of 
military  rule — a  prospect  much  more  alluring  to  many  of  our 
officers  than  the  advent  of  civil  government."^* 

Official  calls  having  been  duly  received  and  returned  with 
proper  ceremony,  and  the  wearing  of  frock  coats  and  top  hats 
officially  condemned,^'  the  commission  settled  down  to  business 

2*  Williams,  The  Odyssey  of  the  Philippine  Commission,  p.  51. 

25  A  good  deal  of  amusement  has  been  got  out  of  the  clothes  problem 
in  Manila.  _  In  Spanish  days  the  frock  coat  and  top  hat  were  universally  worn 
by  all  dignitaries  who  were  not  entitled  to  wear  a  uniform.  The  Filipinos  to 
some  extent  still  indulge  in  that  dignified  but,  for  the  tropics,  uncomfortable 
habit  ^  Under  date  of  July  15,  1900,  Mr.  Williams  wrote,  "The  other  day  the 
commissioners  made  some  formal  calls  dressed  in  frock  coats  and  silk  hats, 
and  returned  to  the  Ayuntamiento  heated  throughout  and  dripping  with  per- 
spiration. When  they  went  into  session  Judge  Taft,  as  chairman,  called  for 
a  resolution  to  the  effect  that  thereafter,  no  matter  what  the  occasion,  frock 
coats  and  silk  hats  be  neither  worn  nor  required.  With  some  slight  protest 
from  Commissioner  Ide,  whose  residence  in  Samoa  has  won  him  the  position 
of  censor  in  matters  of  official  etiquette,  the  resolution  was  adopted.  If  ad- 
hered to  it  will  prove  quite  a  departure  from  the  pomp  and  the  splendor  with 


506  THE  PHILIPPINES 

in  those  comfortable  but  delayed  quarters  in  the  Ayuntamlento 
for  which  they  were  so  grateful.  There  in  the  dignified  Palacio. 
fronting  the  Plaza  where  stood  the  bronze  statue  of  Charles  IV, 
with  its  stately  stairway,  resounding  corridors  and  lofty  though 
dilapidated  apartments,  under  the  pictorial  gaze  of  many  gor- 
geously appareled  Spanish  dignitaries  of  the  era  which  had 
passed  as  in  a  night,  they  commenced  the  tedious  nerve-wreck- 
ing and  health-destroying  labor  of  building  a  state  on  American 
lines  upon  the  ruins  of  a  semi-oriental  province. 

The  prospects  were  not  very  encouraging.  The  army  was  un- 
sympathetic. To  the  natives  the  commission  represented  the 
undesired  rule  of  a  conquering  foreign  power.  Infinite  patience, 
good  judgment  and  skilful  diplomacy  only  would  gain  their  con- 
fidence. A  brief  general  statement  of  the  purposes  of  the  com- 
mission was  Issued. ^^  The  people  were  assured  that  the  commis- 
sioners were  men  of  peace,  who  would  confine  their  work  to 
regions  where  there  was  no  longer  resistance  to  American  arms, 
and  that  they  could  rely  on  the  justice  and  clemency  of  the 
United  States.  Buencamino  published  a  full  stenographic  report 
of  an  interview  with  the  commission,  in  which,  the  plans  of  the 
government  were  quite  fully  stated.^^  Two  days  in  each  week 
were  set  aside  for  open  sessions  and  the  people  were  invited  to 
appear  and  give  the  commission  the  benefit  of  criticisms  and 
suggestions  as  to  necessary  legislation.     Many  Filipinos  availed 

which  officialdom  arrayed  itself  in  old  days."  The  Odyssey  of  the  Philippine 
Commission,  p.  63. 

Thereafter  until  the  arrival  of  Governor-General  Harrison  in  1913,  this 
rule  of  self-denial  was  very  generally  adhered  to.  According  to  the  news- 
papers, Governor-General  Harrison  cabled  from  Nagisaki  that  he  would 
arrive  in  Manila  wearing  a  "cutaway  coat  and  a  silk  hat,"  thereby  causing 
great  consternation  in  Manila  and  the  resurrection  of  top  hats  of  remote 
vintage. 

American  prestige  has,  in  fact,  suffered  considerably  from  excessive  inat- 
tention to  such  matters.  Democracy  as  operated  in  the  western  states  is  not 
always  appreciated  in  the  Orient.  One  governor-generar  delivered  his  inau- 
guration address  clothed  in  "the  simple  dress  of  an  American  citizen  of  the 
Philippines,"  that  is,  like  a  barber  in  the  United  States.  Army  and  naval 
officers  in  full  uniform  and  Supreme  Court  justices  in  silk  robes  appeared 
more  dignified  than  the  new  chief  magistrate  in  his  neglige;  but  probably 
they  were  not  so  comfortable. 

2«  Rept.  Phil.  Com.,  1900,  Ex.  A. 

2T  Published  in  El  Diario  de  Manila,  August  3,  1900. 


THE   END    OF   THE   MILITARY   REGIME        507 

themselves  of  this  opportunity.  Mabini,  then  a  prisoner  in  Ma- 
nila, was  wheeled  into  the  audience  room  and  delivered  a  long 
speech  on  the  general  principles  of  freedom  and  liberty  and  the 
inherent  right  of  individuals  and  races  to  shape  their  own  des- 
tiny. His  reply  to  an  inquiry  by  the  president  of  the  commis- 
sion was  destined  to  be  often  quoted  as  illustrating  the  imprac- 
ticable character  of  even  the  most  intellectual  type  of  Filipinos. 

"But  suppose,"  said  Mr.  Taft,'^^  "the  Americans  should  with- 
draw and  this  freedom  of  which  you  speak  be  granted  you,  what 
then?  Your  country  is  composed  of  many  scattered  islands, 
some  of  them  inhabited  by  savages,  and  all  of  them  by  people 
speaking  different  dialects  and  without  any  cohesion  of  ideas  or 
experience  in  government.  You  occupy  an  exposed  and  coveted 
position  in  the  path  of  world  commerce,  and  would  doubtless 
be  called  upon  very  soon  to  defend  your  nationality.  You  have 
many  foreigners  living  here,  for  whose  lives  and  property  you 
would  be  held  accountable,  not  only  from  outside  interfer- 
ence, but  from  the  ambitions  and  jealousies  of  your  own  people. 
To  protect  your  country  from  these  dangers  you  would  need 
an  army  of  considerable  strength  and  at  least  the  nucleus  of  a 
navy.  All  these  things,  together  with  the  necessary  expenses  of 
government,  would  cost  a  great  deal  of  money.  Your  country 
and  people  are  poor  and  your  industries  paralyzed.  Waiving, 
therefore,  all  question  of  your  ability  to  govern  yourselves,  I 
would  ask  how  you  propose  to  raise  the  revenues  necessary  to 
preserve  and  administer  such  a  government  ?** 

To  this  inquiry  Mabini  simply  shrugged  his  shoulders  and  re- 
plied, "The  question  of  revenue  is  a  mere  detail" 

Subjects  for  special  investigation  and  study  were  assigned  to 
the  several  members  of  the  commission,  Mr.  Taft  taking  the 
friar  and  land  questions  and  the  civil  service.  A  list  of  questions 
covering  the  moral,  economic  and  educational  phases  of  the  re- 
ligious questions  was  sent  to  prominent  Filipinos  and  attracted 
much  attention,  as  the  questions  related  to  what  the  natives 
regarded  as  the  most  vital  of  all  subjects.** 

28  Williams'  Odyssey,  p.  70. 

«»£/  Diario  Dc  Manila,  Sept.  3,  1890. 


508  THE   PHILIPPINES 

While  the  work  of  investigation,  consultation  and  legislation 
proceeded  in  Manila,  the  guerrillas  continued  active  in  the  prov- 
inces. It  was  absolutely  necessary  that  order  should  now  be 
restored,  and  as  preliminary  to  severe  measures  it  was  decided 
to  try  the  effect  of  extreme  clemency.  On  June  21,  1900,  Gen- 
eral MacArthur,  as  military  governor,  issued  an  order  tender- 
ing complete  immunity  for  the  past  and  liberty  of  action  for  the 
future  to  all  who  had  been  in  insurrection  against  the  United 
States  who  should  within  ninety  days  formally  renounce  their 
connection  with  the  insurgents  and  accept  the  sovereignty  of  the 
United  States  in  the  Philippines.  Those  who  accepted  the  bene- 
fits of  this  amnesty  would  be  given  transportation  to  their  homes. 
To  provide  in  some  measure  for  the  Filipino  soldiers  who  during 
a  time  would  be  destitute,  the  government  offered  to  pay  thirty 
pesos  to  each  man  who  surrendered  a  rifle  in  good  condition. 
The  results  were  not  commensurate  with  the  liberality  of  the 
terms  offered.  Only  five  thousand  persons,  of  all  grades  of  the 
civil  and  military  service,  presented  themselves  and  took  the 
oath.  Among  the  number,  however,  were  Don  Pedro  Paterno, 
former  president  of  the  Philippine  Cabinet;  General  Ambrosia 
Flores,  former  secretary  of  war,  and  several  of  the  most  active 
of  the  military  officers.*" 

When  the  amnesty  expired,  on  September  21,  the  situation 
had  undergone  but  little  change.  The  disorganized  Filipinos 
struggled  on  in  the  forlorn  hope  that  W.  J.  Bryan  would  be 
elected  president  in  November.  Even  during  the  preceding  year 
the  insurgent  leaders  encouraged  their  followers  by  asserting  that 
the  majority  of  the  American  people  were  in  favor  of  acknowl- 
edging their  independence,  and  that  the  Democratic  party  would 
elect  its  candidate  for  presldent.^^    Mr.  Bryan  devoted  a  great 

3°  Paterno,  of  Bijik-na-bato  fame,  immediately  became  for  a  time  an  enthu- 
siastic Americanista.  For  an  account  of  his  famous  fieste  to  celebrate  the 
amnesty,  see  Williams,  Odyssey  of  the  Philippine  Commission,  p.  66.  Report 
of  General  MacArthur,  House  Doc.  2,  pp.  69-77. 

3^  The  Filipino  leaders  claimed  that  they  were  being  encouraged  by  promi- 
ment  Americans  to  continue  their  resistance. 

On  May  1,  1900,  Santos,  reporting  to  Aguinaldo  on  the  work  of  agents 
in  the  United  States,  wrote  that  Apacible,  Sexto  Lopez  and  Del  Pan  met  in 
Toronto  in  February  and  proceeded  to  the  United  States,  where  tliey  "sue- 


THE   END    OF   THE   MILITARY   REGIME        509 

part  of  his  letter  of  acceptance  to  the  question,  and  succeeded  in 
making  the  present  and  future  of  the  Philippines  a  party  ques- 

ceeded  in  interviewing  Bryan,  who  happened  to  be  in  New  York.  Senor 
Raff  (Sexto  Lopez)  said  that  Bryan  feared  being  present  at  a  conference  lest 
he  might  be  called  a  traitor  by  members  of  his  own  party,  and  also  by  those 
of  the  opposite  or  'imperialist*  party,  who  are  quite  proud  of  the  victories 
they  have  gained  against  our  people  over  there.  Nevertheless,  Raff  was  able 
to  be  present  and  talk  at  some  of  the  anti-imperialist  meetings,  our  political 
friends  introducing  him  as  a  friend  from  the  committee  (at  Hong  Kong) 
and  as  an  advocate  of  the  cessation  of  the  war  over  there,  in  order  that  our 
sacred  rights  may  be  given  consideration  by  them.  And  as  Bryan  could  not 
personally  take  part  in  the  conference,  he  sent  a  most  trusted  person,  his 
right-hand  man,  Doctor  Gardner.  The  results  of  the  conference  between 
Senor  Raff  and  Doctor  Gardner,  the  latter  acting  in  the  name  of  Bryan,  are 
as  follows: 

"That  we  may  fight  on,  and  Bryan  will  never  cease  to  defend  our  sacred 
rights.  That  we  must  never  mention  Bryan's  name  in  our  manifestos  and 
proclamations,  lest  the  opposite  party  might  say  he  is  a  traitor.  That  we  are 
in  the  right;  and  hence  he  promised  in  the  name  of  Bryan  that  if  this  Senor 
Bryan  is  victorious  in  the  presidential  campaign  he  will  recognize  our  inde- 
pendence without  delay.  Your  honored  self  can  easily  conclude  from  all  the 
foregoing  that  Setior  Del  Pan,  after  the  receipt  of  these  promises,  concurred 
with  him ;  and  he  returned  to  inform  Senor  Apacible  about  the  results  of  the 
conference.  So  these  two  studied  over  the  plan  of  the  policy  to  be  adopted 
and  carried  out.  I  write  you  what  their  opinions  are,  viz. :  First,  that  they 
•will  reside  there,  pending  the  outcome  of  the  presidential  contest,  aiding  the 
propaganda  and  enlivening  it  until  November,  the  date  set  for  the  desired 
thing.  Owing  to  what  Doctor  Gardner  said  and  promised  in  the  name  of 
Bryan,  some  one  ought  to  stay  there  in  order  that  Bryan  may  be  approached, 
if  he  is  elected,  so  he  can  sign  the  recognition  of  our  independence ;  and  this 
should  be  done  at  once,  lest  in  his  excitement  over  the  victory  he  should  for- 
get his  promise.  Third,  For  carrying  out  the  two  propositions  just  men- 
tioned, they  request  2,000  pounds  sterHng,  that  is,  $20,000  in  silver,  to  be  used 
for  the  propaganda,  for  paying  newspapers  and  for  bribing  senators — this 
last  clause  is  somewhat  dangerous  and  impossible.  And  fourth,  that  the 
money  must  be  spent  immediately,  and  that  you  should  be  informed  not  to 
mention  the  name  of  Bryan  in  the  manifestos  and  proclamations. 

"In  order  to  answer  quickly  and  decisively  that  proposition,  and  as  I  did 
not  have  the  desired  money  here,  I  answered  as  follows:  'Plan  approved; 
for  the  sake  of  economy  we  have  decided  that  one  of  the  two  retire,  but 
before  doing  so  make  arrangements,  establish  communications  with  leaders 
of  Bryan's  party,  and  he  who  remains  should  thus  cultivate  the  relations; 
he  who  is  to  retire  will  locate  himself  in  Paris  near  Seiior  Katipalad  (Agon- 
cillo),  with  whom  he  will  secretly  discuss  political  problems  that  may  arise. 
So  he  will  watch  for  the  opportune  moment  of  Bryan's  election,  in  order  to 
go  immediately  to  Hayti  (United  States)  and  formally  arrange  the  contract 
with  Bryan." 

The  insurgent  leaders  were  active  in  distributing  encouraging  "news" 
among  their  adherents.    Major  Taylor  says : 

"There  are  a  number  of  these  publications  among  the  papers  captured 
from  the  insurgents,  and  the  adoption  of  this  method  of  propaganda  seems  to 
have  been  nearly  coincident  with  Aguinaldo's  orders  declaring  guerrilla  war- 
fare. It  does  not  seem  likely  that  the  matter  contained  in  them  was  supplied 
by  a  Filipino,  for  if  it  was  he  assumed  a  general  acquaintance  among  the 
people  with  American  politics  and  American  methods  which  they  were  far 
from  possessing. 

"In  these  publications  the  Filipinos  were  assured  that  the  Imperialists  were 


SIO  THE   PHILIPPINES 

tion,  if  not  the  "paramount  issue"  in  the  campaign.  The  Demo- 
cratic platform  in  1900  announced  that : 

"We  declare  again  that  all  governments  instituted  among  men 
derive  their  just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the  governed;  that 
any  government  not  based  upon  the  consent  of  the  governed  is 
a  tyranny,  and  that  to  impose  upon  any  people  a  government  of 
force  is  to  substitute  the  methods  of  imperialism  for  those  of  a 
republic. 

"We  assert  that  no  nation  can  long  endure  half  republic  and 
half  empire,  and  we  warn  the  American  people  that  imperialism 
abroad  will  lead  quickly  and  inevitably  to  despotism  at  home. 

"We  condemn  and  denounce  the  Philippine  policy  of  the  pres- 
ent administration. 

"The  Filipinos  can  not  be  citizens  without  endangering  our 
civilization;  they  can  not  be  subjects  without  imperiling  our 
form  of  government;  and  as  we  are  not  willing  to  surrender  our 
civilization  or  to  convert  the  Republic  into  an  empire,  we  favor 

kept  in.  power  only  by  the  lavish  contributions  of  the  'trusts,'  whatever  they 
may  have  been;  but  the  people  of  the  United  States  were  growing  weary 
of  their  domination  and  were  about  to  return  to  the  true  principles  of  Wash- 
ington and  Jefferson.  The  illustrious  Americans  'Crosvy  Sticcney  and  Vart- 
ridge'  were  all  laboring  for  the  cause  of  PhiUppine  independence.  Long  lists 
of  American  cities  were  given  in  which  the  illustrious  orators,  Mr.  Crosby 
and  Mr.  Schurts  had  addressed  applauding  crowds  upon  the  necessity  of 
throttUng  the  'trusts'  because  they  opposed  recognition  of  the  rights  of  the 
Filipinos.  In  August,  1900,  'News  from  our  agents  in  America*  informed  its 
readers  that — ■ 

"'W.  J.  Bryan  has  stated  in  a  speech  that  his  first  act  upon  being  elected 
president  will  be  to  declare  the  independence  of  the  Philippines.' 

"On  June  16,  1900,  Gen.  Riego  de  Dios,  acting  head  of  the  Hong  Kong 
junta,  wrote  to  Gen.  I.  Torres  (P.  I.  R.,  530),  the  guerrilla  commander  in 
Bulacan  Province,  and  assured  him  that  a  little  more  endurance,  a  little  more 
constancy,  was  all  that  was  needed  to  secure  the  attainment  of  their  ends. 
According  to  their  advices  the  Democratic  party  would  win  in  the  approach- 
ing elections  in  the  United  States,  and — 'it  is  certain  that  Bryan  is  the  incar- 
nation of  our  independence.* 

"The  number  of  men  opposed  to  the  policy  of  the  administration  was  said 
to  be  continually  increasing. 

"The  attitude  of  those  who  protect  us  can  not  be  more  manly  and  reso- 
lute. 'Continue  the  struggle  until  you  conquer  or  die,'  Mr.  Beecher  of  the 
League  of  Cincinnati  writes  us.  'I  shall  always  be  the  champion  of  the  cause 
of  justice  and  of  truth,'  says  Mr.  Winslow,  of  the  Boston  League.  'Not  even 
threats  of  imprisonment  will  make  me  cease  in  my  undertaking,*  Doctor 
Denziger  assures  us._  'I  shall  accept  every  risk  and  responsibility,'  says  Doc- 
tor Leverson.  'If  it  is  necessary,  I  shall  go  so  far  as  to  provoke  a  revolution 
in  my  own  country,'  repeats  Mr.  Udell.  'It  is  necessary  to  save  the  Republic 
and  democracy  from  the  abyss  of  imperialism*  is  cried  by  all,  and  the  sound 
of  this  cry  is  ever  rising  louder  and  louder."  Taylor,  13,  15  and  16,  KK.  E. 
Quoted  in  Worcester,  I,  Chap.  X. 


THE   END    OF   THE    MILITARY    Rl^GIME        511 

an  immediate  declaration  of  the  Nation's  purpose  to  give  the 
Filipinos,  first,  a  stable  form  of  government;  second,  independ- 
ence, and,  third,  protection  from  outside  interference,  such  as  has 
been  given  for  nearly  a  century  to  the  Republics  of  Central  and 
South  America." 

The  Republican  platform  approved  what  the  administration 
had  done  and  promised  to  the  Filipinos  the  largest  measure  of 
self-government  consistent  with  their  welfare.^^ 

The  reelection  of  McKinley  was  a  deathblow  to  the  Anti- 
Imperialist  movement  in  the  United  States.  It  was  also  a  bitter 
disappointment  to  the  insurgent  leaders  in  the  Philippines.  Very 
soon  after  the  election  the  commission  announced  that  there  was 
very  little  life  left  in  the  remains  of  the  insurrection  and  that  "no 
one  breathed  more  freely  and  took  more  enjoyment  in  the  result 
as  announced  than  the  conservative  Filipino  people."'^ 

The  opportune  moment  was  now  seized  to  strike  a  final  blow 
at  what  remained  of  the  insurrection.  More  than  a  year  earlier 
General  MacArthur  had  urged  General  Otis  to  inaugurate  a  more 
drastic  policy.^*  The  clemency  shown  captured  soldiers,  and 
particularly  the  people  who  rendered  assistance  to  the  guerrillas, 
seems  to  have  been  misconstrued.  Such  extreme  leniency  had 
been  regarded  as  evidence  of  conscious  weakness  and  had  induced 
grave  doubts  in  the  minds  of  the  Filipinos  as  to  the  wisdom  of 
casting  in  their  lots  with  a  power  which  at  any  time  might  decide 
to  abandon  the  islands.  From  his  point  of  view  the  native  might 
very  reasonably  conclude  that  it  were  better  to  be  a  patriot  and 
stand  well  with  the  insurgent  leaders,  who  punished  disloyalty 
by  death,  than  to  adhere  to  the  foolish  Americans,  who,  at  the 

"  See  the  Republican  and  Democratic  text-books  for  1900. 

»»  Kept.  Phil.  Com.,  1901,  p.  34. 

The  reports  as  to  conditions  sent  by  the  military  governor  and  subse- 
quently by  the  commission  were  often  unduly  optimistic.  The  inevitable 
tendency  was  to  overrate  the  value  of  the  friendly  assurances  of  the  natives 
with  whom  they  were  in  personal  contact  and  to  underestimate  the  strength 
of  their  natural  and  racial  dislike  of  the  conquering  Americans.  Every  ori- 
ental is  an  expert  in  the  art  of  dissimulation,  and  even  the  Spaniard  does  not, 
when  he  presents  you  with  his  house,  expect  you  to  take  him  literally  and 
demand  a  deed  thereof. 

^*Rept.  War  Dept.,  1900,  I,  Part  8,  pp.  59,  60. 


512  THE   PHILIPPINES 

worst,  did  no  more  than  disarm  and  admonish  the  citizen  discov- 
ered trafficking  with  the  guerrillas.  The  insurgent  leaders  ad- 
hered inflexibly  to  the  rule  that  every  native  who  resided  within 
the  limits  of  the  Philippines  owed  active  allegiance  to  their  cause, 
and  the  observance  of  the  doctrine  was  enforced  through  secret 
agents  even  within  the  limits  of  American  garrisons.  Punish- 
ments, even  capital,  were  administered  without  resistance  by  the 
victims.  A  strange  mixture  of  apathy,  ignorance,  timidity  and 
loyalty  which  incite  our  pity  induced  most  of  the  people  to  acqui- 
esce in  this  assumed  authority.  Even  assassination  was  accepted 
apparently  as  a  legitimate  exercise  of  power.  Many  indi- 
viduals marked  for  death  would  not  appeal  to  the  Americans  for 
the  protection  which  was  at  hand,  or  give  the  information  which 
would  insure  their  safety. 

On  December  20,  1900,  there  was  issued  another  proclamation 
designed  to  inform  the  people  that  in  the  future  the  strict  rules 
of  war  would  be  enforced  against  all  who  violated  them.  The 
law  relating  to  occupied  places  was  something  of  a  revelation  to 
them. 

"The  white  population,"  says  General  MacArthur,  "especially 
the  part  thereof  residing  in  Manila,  was  perhaps  quite  as  much, 
if  not  more,  surprised  at  the  views  propounded  and  the  penalties 
prescribed  than  the  natives.  The  Filipino  military  leaders  prob- 
ably had  never  before  been  informed  of  the  existence  of  such 
a  law  and  the  possible  application  thereof  to  their  own  actions. 
As  an  educational  document  the  effect  was  immediate  and  far- 
reaching.  From  the  date  of  its  issuance  secret  resistance  and 
apathy  began  to  diminish,  and  kidnaping  and  assassination  were 
much  abated.  In  a  very  short  time  these  malign  influences  were 
to  a  great  extent  superseded  by  cooperation  and  active  interest 
in  American  affairs.  Rarely  in  war  has  a  single  document  been 
so  instrumental  in  influencing  ultimate  results."^^ 

'5  House  Doc.  2,  syih  Cong.,  ist  Sess..  Part  2,  pp.  91,  93.  For  the  order  di- 
recting strict  enforcement  of  the  law  as  outlined  in  the  proclamation,  see  p.  93. 
"In  December  Gen.  MacArthur  issued  a  proclamation  warning  all  who  were 
aiding  and  abetting  the  insurrections  by  furnishing  funds  and  other  assist- 
ance that  they  would  be  severely  dealt  with.  Many  persons  suspected  of  com- 
plicity in  offenses  of  this  description  were  imprisoned,  and  it  ceased  to  be 
regarded  as  an  innocent  amusement  to  enjoy  life  within  American  garrisons 
and  assist  the  guerrillas  in  the  woods  and  mountains."  Rept.  Phil.  Com.,  1901. 


THE   END    OF   THE   MILITARY   REGIME        513 

To  remove  any  lingering  doubts  from  the  minds  of  those  who 
were  skeptical  as  to  the  seriousness  of  the  government  a  number 
of  the  most  active  politicians  and  military  leaders  were  banished 
to  the  island  of  Guam  until  such  time  as  conditions  in  the  Philip- 
pines should  justify  their  retum.^^  All  persons  captured  in  the 
field  were  thereafter  to  be  retained  in  custody. 

The  policy  declared  in  this  proclamation  and  the  removal  of 
the  leading  agitators  encouraged  conservative  Filipinos  to  organ- 
ize for  effective  peace  work.  This  movement  resulted  in  the 
creation  of  the  first  Filipino  political  party  under  American  gov- 
ernment. Manifestly  such  a  party  might  become  an  important 
factor  for  crystallizing  such  sentiment  as  existed  favorable  to 
the  United  States  and  thus  advance  the  work  of  pacification. 
Both  the  military  governor  and  the  members  of  the  commission 
encouraged  the  organization  of  this  party.^' 

Soon  after  the  amnesty  proclamation  of  December  20  was 
issued,  Arellano,  Torres,  Buencamino  and  others  met  in  Manila 
and  adopted  certain  principles  which  for  a  time  appeared  satis- 
factory to  the  intelligent  natives.  The  organization  included  the 
leading  men  of  the  islands  who  were  not  under  arms,  many  of 
whom  are  still  serving  the  government  with  distinction  to  them- 
selves and  their  countrymen.  Their  platform  called  for  the  rec- 
ognition of  American  sovereignty,  guarantees  for  personal  prop- 
erty and  religious  rights,  local  self-government,  free  education, 
a  legislative  body  with  a  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives, 
representation  in  the  American  Congress,   a  governor-general 


««  Gen.  Order  No.  4,  Jan.  4,  1901.  Under  this  order  Ricarte,  Pio  Del  Pilar, 
Mabini,  Pablo  Ocampo,  Trias,  Manuel  E.  Roxas  and  others  were  sent  to 
Guam.  During  the  month  of  January,  1901,  many  others  of  the  irreconcilables 
were  also  deported. 

37  "There  was  an  organized  political  party  in  1900  called  the  Federal  party, 
which  advocated  permanent  annexation  of  the  Philippines  to  the  United 
States,  to  become  later  a  state  of  the  Union.  That  party  I  think  lived  about 
two  years.  They  found  more  opposition  in  this  country  than  in  the  Philip- 
pines. They  did  not  find  any  one  in  the  United  States  from  the  President,  then 
Governor  of  the  Islands,  down,  who  ever  entertained  the  idea  of  bringing  the 
Philippines  into  the  Union  as  a  State.  In  fact.  President  Taft,  testifsang 
before  the  Insular  Committee  at  that  time,  said :  *I  never  encouraged  the 
idea* — the  hope  of  Statehood."  Testimony  of  Manuel  Quezon,  before  Com* 
on  Ins.  Affairs,  Feb.  24,  1913.    Hearing  on  H.  R.  200049  (Jones  Bill). 


514  THE   PHILIPPINES 

with  the  power  of  veto,  governors  of  provinces  to  be  appointed 
by  the  governor-general  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Sen- 
ate, a  judiciary  to  be  appointed  by  the  governor-general,  and, 
uhimately,  the  admission  of  the  islands  as  a  state  of  the  Ameri- 
can Union.^* 

Three  months  after  assuming  its  legislative  duties  the  com- 
mission was  able  to  report  that  forty-seven  laws  had  been  enacted. 
A  year  later  Secretary  Root  called  the  attention  of  Congress  to 
two  hundred  and  sixty-three  Philippine  statutes,  and  expressed 
the  hope  that  the  work  of  the  commission  would  "receive  the 
approval  which  I  believe  it  merits  for  its  high  quality  of  con- 
structive ability,  its  wise  adaptation  to  the  ends  desirable  to  be 
accomplished,  and  its  faithful  adherence  to  the  principles  con- 
trolling our  government." 

The  most  important  of  these  statutes  were  the  results  of  patient 
study  of  actual  conditions  by  the  military  and  civil  authorities. 
While  having  no  greater  legal  force  than  the  orders  of  a  military 
commander,  they  were  for  all  practical  purposes  statutes.  They 
had  been  publicly  introduced  into  the  formal  body  which  the 
president  had  designated  to  exercise  the  legislative  power,  sub- 
ject to  his  approval,  and  had  been  duly  printed,  discussed  and 
passed  according  to  the  ordinary  procedure  of  legislative  bodies. 

The  Philippines  thus 'at  that  early  date  had  all  the  practical 
advantages  of  having  the  legislative  separated  from  the  execu- 
tive authority;  the  laws  matured  under  the  influence  of  public 
discussion  and  deliberation;  the  laws  certain,  permanent  and 
known ;  and  the  public  money  expended  only  pursuant  to  previous 
appropriations  duly  made,  so  that  official  accountability  could  be 
enforced  by  a  rigid  system  of  audit,  testing  the  accounts  of  all 
disbursing  officers  from  the  lowest  to  the  highest  by  reference 
to  a  fixed  standard  of  lawful  authority .^^ 

The  idea  was  universally  prevalent  that  the  personnel  of  the 

38  Dr.  Pardo  de  Tavero,  Filipe  Buencamino,  and  Florentine  Torres  subse- 
quently wrote  detailed  accounts  of  the  organization  and  purposes  of  the 
Federal  party.  See  H.  Doc.  2,  56  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.,  Pt.  2,  p.  114,  for  these 
statements  and  also  the  platform  of  the  party.  The  party  was  short  lived, 
being  succeeded  by  the  Progresista  party. 

^^Rept.  Secy,  of  War,  1901. 


THE   END    OF   THE   MILITARY    REGIME        515 

Spanish  government  had  been  dishonest  in  the  handling  of  pub- 
He  money.  Undoubtedly  there  were  faithful  and  honest  Spanish 
officials,  but  the  system  under  which  they  worked  made  no  pro- 
vision for  proper  salaries  and  the  government  sent  its  appointees 
out  with  the  implied  understanding  that  they  might  acquire 
wealth  by  well  understood  methods.  The  official  class  had  come 
to  the  conclusion  that  public  money  like  holy  water  was  free. 

The  Filipinos  were  familiar  with  that  system  and  assumed 
that  every  official  would  appropriate  a  certain  portion  of  the 
money  which  came  into  his  hands.  To  them  it  seemed  as  natural 
for  an  official  to  steal  as  for  a  fruit  bat  to  eat  fruit.  It  would 
take  time  and  careful  training  to  eradicate  this  idea.  After  ten 
years  of  American  rule  a  district  engineer,  when  asked  if  the 
people  of  his  province  at  last  believed  that  he  honestly  expended 
all  public  funds,  replied  that  they  did  but  that  they  could  not  yet 
understand  why  he  was  so  foolish  as  to  do  so.  Some  progress,  at 
least,  had  been  made. 

One  of  the  very  last  things  an  oriental  grasps  is  the  western 
idea  of  the  sacredness  of  public  funds  and  the  Filipino  was  an 
oriental  who  had  been  trained  in  a  very  bad  school  of  official 
morality.  To  institute  a  popular  government  under  such  condi- 
tions and  secure  officers  who  would  honestly  collect  and  ex- 
pend the  taxes  was  no  easy  task.  It  was  indispensable  that 
officials  should  be  obtained  or  developed  who  would  be  honest  and 
efficient  according  to  American  standards.  The  greater  number 
of  officials  would  be  natives.  The  elective  officers  in  the  munici- 
palities would  be  such  as  the  electors  chose  to  select.  The  in- 
structions of  the  president  required  that  when  practicable  Fili- 
pinos should  be  given  the  preference  in  appointments  to  office. 
But  such  natives  as  were  then  qualified  to  hold  office  had 
been  trained  in  the  Spanish  service,  and  it  was  to  be  ex- 
pected that  some  of  these  men,  when  trusted  with  official  control 
over  the  affairs  of  their  fellow  citizens,  would  be  guilty  of 
financial  irregularities.  It  was  hoped  that  after  a  time  with 
the  better  salaries  and  the  example  of  honest  American  of- 
ficers a  higher  standard  of  official  integrity  would  be  developed. 


516  THE   PHILIPPINES 

There  was  also  grave  danger  that  Americans  unaccustomed  to 
power  over  such  people  and  as  yet  without  the  spirit  which  is 
developed  in  an  established  service  such  as  that  of  the  English 
in  India  and  Egypt,  would  occasionally  prove  unable  to  with- 
stand the  subtle  temptations  of  the  country.  Many  of  them  were 
in  the  islands  with  the  reasonable  and  proper  hope  and  expecta- 
tion of  accumulating  a  comi)etence.  Far  from  home  and  its  as- 
sociations and  without  the  restraints  of  a  settled  community, 
subject  to  the  temptations  offered  in  a  country  of  loose  official 
morals  by  persons  seeking  to  escape  lawful  burdens  or  obtain 
fraudulent  advantages,  it  would  be  surprising  indeed  if  some  of 
them  did  not  prove  unworthy.  To  avoid  as  far  as  possible  the 
dangers  inseparable  from  such  conditions  it  was  necessary  that 
a  system  of  selection  should  be  devised  which  would  eliminate 
favoritism  and  politics,  provide  adequate  salaries,  liberal  leaves 
of  absence,  and  cultivate  an  interest  in  and  an  enthusiasm  for 
the  service.  It  was  equally  essential  that  the  system  adopted 
should  be  administered  with  impartiality,  because  "in  no  part 
of  the  world  does  rumor  of  injustice  or  fraud  or  underhand 
methods  in  the  administration  of  public  office  receive  so  much 
credit  as  in  the  Orient."**  The  commission,  therefore,  as  one 
of  its  first  legislative  acts  passed  a  civil  service  law  which  was, 
in  fact,  much  superior  to  the  one  in  force  in  the  United  States." 


^oRept.  Phil.  Com.,  1900,  p.  36. 

41  Act  No.  5  (Sept.  19,  1900).  Printed  in  Rept.  Phil.  Com.,  1900,  p.  13 
et  seq. 

This  important  fact  escaped  the  notice  of  even  the  chairman  of  the  Senate 
Committee  on  the  Philippines. 

The  following  extract  from  the  testimony  taken  by  the  Senate  Committee 
on  the  Philippines  during  the  winter  of  1914-15  is  interesting.  Former  Vice- 
Governor  Gilbert  was  on  the  stand. 

Senator  Lane.  "Yes,  was  he  covered  in  under  the  civil  service  or  was  it 
an  appointment?" 

The  Chairman  (Senator  Hitchcock).  "None  of  them.  /  do  not  think  there 
is  any  civil  service  in  the  Philippine  Islands." 

Mr.  Gilbert  "Oh,  yes,  sir,  we  have  had  a  civil  service  law,  which  has 
been  observed,  I  think  I  may  say,  very  scrupulously,  for  many  years.     .    .    ." 

Senator  Crawford.  "That  has  been  generally  true  ever  since  the  Commis- 
sion first  went  there.    It  is  a  merit  system." 

Mr.  Gilbert.  "It  was  one  of  the  earliest  systems  that  was  established." 
Hearings  on  H.  R.  18459,  p.  604. 


C.   S.   ARELLANO,  CHIEF  JUSTICE,   SUPREME  COURT  OF  THE   PHILIPPINES 


:iaccustamcd  to 

■'oui  the  spirit  which  is 

"    that  of  ihe  EngUsh 

^   jve  unable  to  with- 

)•.    Many  of  them  were 

nper  hope  and  expecta- 

.i  vv-i,  .  from  home  and  its  as- 

...:  ->ut  the  :  .  a  settled  community, 

.ot  to  the  leiTtptations  oflFered  m  a  cotmtry  of  loose  official 

'  '"ng  to  t  /  f  ul  burdens  or  obtain 

-  V.V..  .  vonld  iA    ,  -"g  indeed  if  some  of 

1  not  prt  To  ;  far  as  possible  the 

daiiger.-^  inseparable  was  necessary  that 

^  ould  eliminate 

.    ,  liberal  leaves 

eaMiqiTJTHq  sht  ^o  ffiiioD  aMSaqya  .SaiTg^i  ks»*i5^^4[^i<>tjii^ffi  .lor, 

at  tiie  system  adopted 
^llou:a  '.•  V       -e  'in  no  jiart 

of  the  \%  ^,  :a  or  underhand 

methods  in  the  administraticm  of/  public  office  receive  so  much 
credit  as  in  the  Orieitt."**    ^  mission,  therefore,  as  one 

of  its  first  lep--  ^-   •    •   ■-'      -   ^cu  i  uvll  service  law  which  was, 
in  fact,  mnci  \  one  in  force  in  the  United  States.*^ 


"  Pritited  in  Fcpt.   -'lu!.  Com.,  1900,  p.  13 

tib«  tiOtk»  of  even  the  chairman  of  the  Senate 

I  taken  bj'  the  Sena.te  Committee 

■    Pii.   . ;  ■  i 5  is  interesting.    JFormer  Vice- 

iior  Gilbert  w:o. 

ator  Lane.    *' .  :t?«red[  la  tinder  the  civil  service  or  was  it 

-,v''»o«Btment?" 

■p  ,-if  them.    /  do  not  think  there 

\  we  lu.\-  'vil  service  lav  has 

*y,  very  :  -'v,  for  many  y<.  .     ." 

-  '  ue  ever  since  tti<^  v  .tnmis- 

V  v.«i^T*i.  .T:>,.-.enis  that  was  established." 


THE   END   OF   THE   MILITARY   REGIME        517 

Another  important  matter  which  required  immediate  atten- 
tion was  the  reorganization  of  the  judicial  system.  There  was 
much  criticism  of  the  personnel  of  the  courts  as  organized  by  the 
military  government/^  The  framing  and  enactment  of  a  new 
statute  was  attended  with  considerable  excitement.  It  is  notori- 
ously difficult  to  induce  any  interested  body  or  faction  in  Manila 
to  act  upon  any  public  matter  at  the  proper  time.  When  legisla- 
tion in  which  they  are  vitally  interested  is  pending,  they  ordi- 
narily ignore  requests  to  appear  until  the  question  has  been  set- 
tled and  the  legislature  is  ready  for  the  final  vote,  when  they 
suddenly  appear  and  excitedly  ask  for  a  continuance  until  they 
can  have  an  opportunity  to  investigate  matters.  The  lawyers, 
organized  under  the  title  of  the  College  of  Advocates,  ostenta- 
tiously refused  to  attend  the  public  sessions  of  the  commission 
because  some  eight  months  had  not  been  sufficient  time  for  them 
to  begin  to  study  the  proposed  law.  The  commission  thus  was 
deprived  of  the  benefit  of  their  valuable  advice  and  assistance. 

Under  the  new  act  permanent  judges  were  to  be  appointed  by 
the  commission  in  all  the  courts.  The  Supreme  Court,  consist- 
ing of  a  chief  justice  and  six  associate  justices,  was  to  sit  at 
Manila,  Iloilo  and  Cebu.  Courts  of  first  instance  were  to  be 
held  in  each  of  fourteen  judicial  districts,  and  certain  municipali- 
ties were  to  have  municipal  courts.*^  As  organized  the  members 
of  the  Supreme  Court  were  Cayetano  S.  Arellano,  Chief  Justice; 
and  Florentino  Torres,  Victorina  Mapa,  Joseph  F.  Cooper, 
James  F.  Smith  and  Charles  A.  Willard,  Associate  Justices. 
Senor  Arellano  had  been  chief  justice  of  the  former  court,  and 
was  the  Filipino  of  all  others  upon  whom  the  various  military 
governors  had  relied  for  assistance  in  establishing  peace,  law 
and  order.  Sefior  Torres,  who  at  the  time  of  his  appointment 
was  attorney-general,  had,  like  the  chief  justice,  worked  faith- 
fully along  the  same  lines.  Sefior  Mapa  was  a  Visayan  from 
Iloilo  who  had  not  previously  taken  an  active  part  in  public  af- 


*2  See  Kept.  War  Dept.,  1900,  I,  Part  10,  p.  19,  for  comments  of  Lieut.  CoL 
Crowder,  the  military  secretary. 

<»Acts  Nos.  136  and  140  (June  12,  1901),  defined  the  judicial  districts. 


518  THE   PHILIPPINES 

fairs.  Justice  Smith  at  the  time  of  his  appointment  was  Col- 
lector of  customs  and  had  been  a  brigadier-general  of  volun- 
teers and  military  governor  of  Negros. 

The  Spanish  code  of  criminal  procedure  had  been  amended 
by  General  Order  58,  issued  April  23,  1900,  so  as  to  abolish  the 
old  inquisitorial  methods  and  conform  to  American  procedure.** 
The  work  was  so  well  done  that  it  has  since  been  but  slightly 
amended.*^  A  code  of  civil  procedure  w^hich  it  was  hoped  would 
relieve  the  people  from  the  oppressive  burdens  of  the  old  system 
was  enacted/® 

The  selection  of  the  judges  for  the  courts  of  first  instance 
was  attended  with  much  agitated  discussion.  "Believing  the 
judiciary  a  critical  point  in  our  administration,"  wrote  a 
contemporaneous  observer,  "the  commission  proposed  making 
a  somewhat  clean  sweep  of  the  present  personnel  and  nam- 
ing men  of  tried  standing  from  the  States.  This  has  driven 
the  native  press  into  paroxysms.  They  say  the  Filipino  judges 
stood  by  the  American  government  during  the  time  of  trial  and 
that  they  are  now  to  be  ousted  without  any  proof  of  guilt  or  in- 
competency; that  if  they  have  done  wrong  then  let  charges  be 
brought  against  them.  Our  American  press  while  violent  enough 
in  its  opposition  to  appointing  Filipinos,  is  pro-military  and  con- 
demns the  Commission  for  overlooking  the  judicial  merits  of 
various  volunteer  army  officers  whose  commissions  expire 
shortly."*'     Against  the  protest  of  many  interested  parties,  it 


**  For  a  summary  of  the  changes  made,  see  Kept.  War  Dept.,  1900,  I,  Part 
10,  p.  17  et  seq. 

<5  "The  preparation  of  a  reformed  code  of  criminal  procedure  was  largely 
the  work  of  Judge  Young,  who  was  also  a  member  of  the  board  convened  to 
frame  the  new  municipal  law  (General  Order  No.  40)."  Rept.  Lt.  Col.  E.  H. 
Crowder,  Mil.  Secy.,  Sept.  20,  1900.    Rept.  War  Dept.,  1900,  I,  p.  20. 

46  Act  No.  190  (August  7,  1901.  For  a  description  of  the  old  system,  see 
p.  246,  supra;  also,  Williams,  Odyssey,  p.  92. 

47  Williams,  Odyssey,  p,  252.  "The  American  bar  of  Manila  is  also  up  in 
arms,  and  is  literally  pawing  the  air  because  the  Commission  has  provided 
that  Spanish  shall  continue  the  official  language  of  the  Courts  until  1906. 
They  want  English  substituted  at  once  even  though  it  would  result  in  elimi- 
nating practically  every  Filipino  from  the  practice.  Their  attitude  has  the 
support  of  the  American  papers,  and  is  condemned  utterly  by  the  Spanish- 
Filipino  press." 


THE   END    OF   THE   MILITARY   REGIME        519 

was  determined  that  the  Spanish  language  should  be  the  official 
language  of  the  courts  until  1906/* 

The  president's  instructions  required  the  organization  of  mu- 
nicipal governments  at  as  early  a  date  as  possible.  But  the 
previous  enactment  of  a  new  municipal  code  was  necessary.  In 
1893  Minister  Maura  wrote  that  "the  local  institutions  of  the 
Philippines  have  arrived  at  such  a  state  of  decadence  and  mis- 
understanding that  those  of  their  members  who  have  not  been 
corrupted  are  atrophied  and  useless."  The  new  Maura  Law  was 
in  effect  in  only  a  few  localities.  Municipal  governments  had 
been  provided  for  by  General  Order  Number  43.*"  On  further 
considerations  the  military  governor  had  on  January  29,  1900, 
appointed  the  always  willing  and  efficient  Chief  Justice  Arellano 
and  Attorney-General  Torres  and  the  three  American  judges,  a 
board  charged  with  the  duty  of  devising  a  complete  system  of 
municipal  government  adapted  to  the  new  conditions,  under 
which  the  people  might  control  their  own  local  affairs  through 
officers  of  their  own  selection.  This  board  drafted  a  law'"  of 
which  it  said: 

"For  the  first  time  the  Filipino  people  are  to  exercise  the  right 
of  suffrage  in  the  election  of  municipal  officers,  a  right  only 
slightly  restricted  by  conditions  which  have  been  imposed  for 
the  purpose  of  rewarding  as  well  as  encouraging  the  people  in 
their  just  and  natural  aspirations  to  become  educated  and  worthy 
to  enjoy  all  the  benefits  of  civilization." 

When  the  commission  arrived  in  the  islands,  a  few  towns  had 
applied  for  organization  under  this  code,  but  none  in  fact  had 
been  organized.^*  At  the  request  of  the  commission  no  new 
applications  were  received,  and  matters  were  held  in  abeyance 
until  it  should  assume  its  legislative  functions.  In  the  mean- 
time the  order  was  printed  in  Spanish,  Tagalog  and  Visayan 

*8  The  date  was  extended  and  Spanish  is  still  the  official  language  of  the 
courts. 

"  Series  of  1899. 

"0  Gen.  Order  No.  40,    Series  of  1900,  promulgated  March  29,  1900. 

*^  See  Lt.  Col.  Crowder's  report  on  municipal  governments,  Rept.  War 
DepU,  1900,  I,  Part  10,  p.  28  et  scq. 


520  THE   PHILIPPINES 

and  widely  distributed  and  discussed  by  the  people.  Some  fifty 
towns,  which  had  applied  early,  were  organized  so  that  when 
the  commission  undertook  to  draft  a  new  code,  it  had  the  benefit 
of  much  advice  and  some  experience  under  the  existing  law.  The 
new  law  which  was  passed  in  1901,  was  based  upon  Order  Num- 
ber 40.''' 

This  beginning  the  work  of  introducing  popular  government 
at  the  bottom  and  working  upward  was  much  criticized  by  those 
who  believed  in  what  had  been  described  as  "Oriental  govern- 
ment under  the  control  of  a  system  of  sentry  boxes," — the  method 
by  which  the  Dutch  had  governed  Netherlands  India.  Neverthe- 
less it  was  strictly  logical  and  in  accord  with  the  teachings  of 
history.  In  primitive  communities  the  unit  of  government  is 
always  a  group  of  people  living  as  a  small  community  and  gov- 
erning themselves  on  democratic  principles."'  It  was  in  the  local 
communities  that  "governments  essentially  popular"  would  be 
most  likely  to  succeed,  because  the  people  had  already  some  ex- 
perience in  self-government. 

Another  act  which  provided  for  the  organization  of  provincial 
governments,  was  general  in  form  and  required  a  special  act  to 
put  it  into  effect  in  any  particular  province. 

Having  provided  the  machinery  for  local  government,  the 
commission's  next  task  was  to  put  it  in  operation  in  the  pacified 
provinces.  The  president's  instructions  were  to  organize  the 
mimicipalities  first.  But  matters  had  moved  so  rapidly  that  it 
was  decided  to  establish  provincial  governments  first  and  ap- 
point the  provincial  governors  chairmen  of  committees  to  or- 
ganize municipalities. 

The  organization  of  these  governments  was  made  the  occasion 
for  a  somewhat  spectacular  tour  about  the  islands.  The  mem- 
bers of  the  commission  had  been  kept  closely  confined  to  Manila 

52  Kept.  Phil.  Com.,  1900,  p.  53 ;  Ihid.,  1901,  p.  154. 

5*  It  is  a  curious  fact  that  despotisms  usually  embrace  democracies.  In 
speaking  of  the  political  system  of  the  East,  Sir  Charles  Elliott  {Letters  front 
the  Far  East,  p.  4)  says :  "The  political  system  nearly  always  consists  of  a 
democracy  beneath  a  despotism  which  allows  surprisingly  free  play  to  indi- 
vidual careers,  although  progressive  movements  rarely  succeed  unless  aided 
from  without." 


THE   END    OF   THE   MILITARY   REGIME        521 

and  from  personal  observation  knew  little  of  the  actual  condi- 
tions in  distant  provinces.  It  was  an  opportunity  for  them  to  see 
the  country  and  cultivate  friendly,  personal  relations  with  the 
people  who  never  visited  the  capital  city.  So  the  commission 
with  its  accessories  and  impedimenta  traveled  to  the  places  where 
provincial  governments  were  to  be  organized  and  after  full  in- 
vestigation of  local  conditions  proceeded  to  exercise  its  execu- 
tive and  legislative  functions  on  the  spot.  Probably  never  be- 
fore since  the  days  when  new  laws  sprang  from  the  mouths  of 
peripatetic  monarchs  had  a  fully  equipped  legislature  wandered 
about  the  country  seeking  evils  to  be  remedied. 

It  was  the  first  of  many  such  official  tours.  It  is  customary 
in  India  for  the  governors  to  travel  throughout  the  country  for 
purposes  of  inspection  with  elaborate  trains,  living  in  tents  and 
holding  solemn  durbars.  The  Philippine  Commission  in  a  very 
democratic  way  visited  the  people,  slept  in  their  houses,  ate  at 
their  tables,  and  met  their  leading  men  and  women  on  a  basis  of 
perfect  social  equality.  The  Filipinos  were  greatly  flattered  by 
the  visits  and  by  the  attentions  paid  them  as  individuals  and  ex- 
erted themselves  to  justify  their  reputation  for  hospitality.  These 
inspection  trips  are  so  important  a  part  of  the  life  of  a  high 
government  official  in  the  Philippines  that  a  somewhat  detailed 
description  of  the  methods  of  procedure  is  justified.  On  all 
such  occasions  the  real  wear  and  tear  results  from  the  social 
activities.  The  play  is  the  killing  work ;  the  dancing,  dining  and 
eating,  the  serious  danger  to  health  and  happiness.  The  baile  is 
an  official  dance  held  in  the  town  hall  or  school  building  when 
available,  and  is  always  opened  with  the  stately  rigodon  led  by 
the  ranking  visiting  official  with  the  wife  of  the  ranking  local 
official.  A  crowded  ballroom  in  the  tropics  presents  few  tempta- 
tions to  a  normal  middle-aged  American  of  even  average  avoir- 
dupois. The  members  of  the  commission  who  made  this  first 
grand  tour  of  the  islands  were  large  men  physically,"*  but  they 


'*The  aggrregrate  weight  of  the  five  members  of  the  commission  and  its 
secretary  was  1,362  pounds,  an  average  of  227  pounds  each.  The  Filipinos, 
who  are  small  people,  regarded  the  commission  as  an  imposing  spectacle. 


522  THE   PHILIPPINES 

had  a  lofty  sense  of  duty  which  enabled  them  during  two  months 
to  participate  in  from  one  to  five  banquets  a  day,  make  many 
speeches,  hold  trying  public  sessions,  organize  and  launch  local 
governments,  and  dance  with  the  ladies  until  after  midnight. 

During  February  and  March,  1901,  the  commission  visited 
provinces  north  of  Manila  and  were  received  with  great  en- 
thusiasm by  the  native  people/"  The  general  method  of  pro- 
cedure was  the  same  in  all  the  provinces.  Upon  arriving  at  the 
capital  the  commission  would  consult  with  the  American  army 
officer  stationed  there  with  reference  to  conditions,  candidates 
for  office,  and  other  matters  which  might  enable  them  to  carry 
on  an  intelligent  discussion  with  the  people.  It  then  met  in  con- 
vention with  the  presidentes,  municipal  counselors  and  principal 
men  who  had  been  summoned  to  the  meeting.  The  important 
towns  of  the  province  were  generally  well  represented.  Mr.  Taft 
as  president  of  the  commission  would  state  the  purposes  of  the 
visit  and  explain  the  provisions  of  the  provincial  government 
law.  The  provisions  to  be  inserted  in  the  special  act  for  the 
province  relating  to  the  capital,  boundaries,  salaries  of  officials, 
and  other  local  matters,  would  be  fully  discussed  and  if  in  the 

55  The  party  consisted  of  Commissioners  Taft,  Worcester,  Wright  and 
Moses,  with  Arthur  F.  Fergusson,  Secretary  of  the  Commission,  and  a  full 
complement  of  subordinates.  With  them  went  Chief  Justice  Arellano,  Dr. 
Pardo  de  Tavera,  Senores  Flores  and  Herrera,  representing  the  federal  party, 
and  representatives  of  the  American  and  Spanish-Filipino  press.  One  of  the 
private  secretaries  thus  described  the  procedure : 

"Our  progress  along  the  railroad  was  a  continuous  ovation.  The  first 
stop  was  at  Bocaue,  where  a  throng  of  people  and  two  bands — ^both  playing 
at  once — heralded  our  arrival.  A  number  of  leading  citizens,  dressed  in 
customary  official  black,  said  they  were  glad  to  see  us,  to  which  Judge  Taft 
responded,  nosotros  tambien.  General  Flores  then  made  a  short  talk  in 
Tagalog,  the  purport  of  which  was  that  if  the  people  behaved  themselves 
things  would  come  their  way.  The  crowd  in  the  meantime  gazed  at  us  in 
petrified  silence  broken  only  when  the  train  started,  by  vivas  for  La  Comision 
Civil,  for  America,  and  various  other  entities.  At  Guiguinto  we  had  more 
music  and  more  speeches,  De  Tavera  getting  into  the  game  here  with  some 
good  advice  to  the  populace.  .  .  ,  The  above  proceeding  was  repeated 
with  variations  as  to  speakers  at  Malolos  and  Calumpit  ...  At  San 
Fernando,  where  we  left  the  train,  the  military  added  their  pageantry  to  that 
of  the  natives,  the  place  being  decked  in  holiday  attire.  Carriages  were  in 
waiting  and  we  were  conducted  in  state  through  a  succession  of  streets 
spanned  by  triumphal  arches  of  palm  and  bamboo.  The  schools  had  been 
dismissed  and  the  children,  each  with  a  tiny  American  flag  stuck  stiffly  up  in 
front,  were  lined  up  to  greet  us."  Williams,  The  Odyssey  of  the  Philippine 
Commission,  p.  146.  ' 


THE   END    OF   THE   MILITARY   REGIME        523 

judgment  of  the  commission  a  provincial  government  should 
be  established,  the  first  officers  were  appointed  and  sworn  in. 

These  formal  hearings  were  supplemented  by  public  receptions, 
investigations,  dances  and  banquets,  which  were  not  the  least 
important  of  the  means  by  which  the  commission  cultivated  the 
good  will  of  the  Filipinos. 

The  southern  trip  extended  from  March  4  to  May  3  and  was 
a  repetition  with  local  variations,  of  the  experiences  in  the  north- 
em  provinces.  In  describing  one  of  the  innumerable  hailes,  Mr. 
Williams  wrote: 

"There  was  the  usual  crowd  of  men  in  official  black  bowing 
and  smiling,  with  a  background  of  dainty  femininity  bedecked 
with  jewels  and  fine  raiment.  It  was  a  scene  full  of  color,  with 
no  hint  of  that  grim  figure,  scarcely  out  of  sight,  which  had  so 
lately  traced  its  course  in  blood  and  flame  across  the  lives  of  the 
people.  The  situation  seemed  a  bit  unreal.  It  was  hard  to 
understand  why  the  passionate  hatreds  of  war  had  left  no  ap- 
parent bitterness  in  their  wake." 

This  was  explained  by  one  of  the  guests  who  spoke  of  life  under 
the  Spaniards  when  the  Filipinos  were  treated  as  inferiors  and 
permitted  no  participation  in  public  affairs;  of  the  coming  of 
the  Americans  and  the  insurrection  waged  by  ambitious  leaders 
who  misrepresented  the  character  and  purposes  of  the  Ameri- 
cans; of  the  discovery  that  American  soldiers  and  officers  were 
willing  to  be  the  friends  of  the  people ;  that  a  provincial  govern- 
ment had  just  been  organized,  and  that  the  "Commission  had 
honored  them  with  a  visit  and  had  given  personal  assurance  not 
only  that  we  held  no  animosity  against  them  but  would  help  them 
to  realize  their  legitimate  aspirations."" 

"Williams.  Odyssey,  pp.  171-2. 

"The  reception  which  was  accorded  the  Commission  by  the  educated  people 
and  the  common  people  alike  was  most  gratifying.  It  is  easy  to  discredit  the 
sincerity  of  such  manifestations  and  it  must  be  admitted  that  an  Oriental 
people  like  tliis  are  much  more  demonstrative  and  love  to  sliow  their  feelings 
in  fiestas,  music,  flowers,  and  arches  more  than  an  Occidental  people,  but  the 
evidences  of  the  sincerest  interest  in  our  work  and  of  a  real  cordial  welcome 
were  too  many  to  be  doubted.  The  interest  which  was  taken  in  the  discussion 
varied,  of  course,  in  different  provinces.    But  in  all,  the  attention  given  to  the 


524  THE   PHILIPPINES 

The  party  visited  all  the  southern  provinces  including  the  Moro 
country  where  friendly  relations  were  established  with  the  Sul- 
tan of  Sulu  who  had  recently  become  famous  in  America  as  the 
hero  of  a  comic  opera.  The  provinces  of  Surigao  and  Misamis 
were  carved  out  of  sections  of  Mindanao  and  given  provincial 
governments.^'' 

The  first  week  in  May  found  the  commission  back  in  Manila 
busily  engaged  in  organizing  governments  in  the  remaining  prov- 
inces of  Luzon  and  preparing  for  the  coming  installation  of  the 
central  civil  government. 

The  commission  was  seriously  embarrassed  in  its  work  by  limi- 
tations upon  its  legislative  power.  Many  subjects  which  required 
consideration  were  deemed  beyond  the  war  powers  of  the  presi- 
dent. There  were  some  strict  constructionists  who  doubted  the 
validity  of  many  things  which  were  being  done,  even  the  action 
of  the  president  in  creating  the  commission.  In  order  to  re- 
move such  doubts  Congress  was  urged  to  confirm  what  had  been 
done  and  specifically  to  authorize  the  commission  to  enact  laws 
with  reference  to  public  lands,  mining,  franchises,  and  other  mat- 
ters deemed  necessary  for  the  development  of  the  country. 

On  March  2,  1901,  Congress  took  its  first  halting  step  toward 
the  performance  of  its  constitutional  duty  to  provide  rules  and 
regulations  for  the  new  territory.^^  The  Spooner  Act,  however, 
did  little  more  than  approve  what  the  president  had  done  by 
virtue  of  the  war  power  and  authorize  him  to  continue  govern- 
ing the  islands.  It  provided  that  "all  military,  civil  and  judicial 
powers  necessary  to  govern  the  Philippine  Islands  acquired  from 
Spain  .  .  .  shall,  until  otherwise  provided  by  Congress  be 
vested  in  such  person  and  persons  and  shall  be  exercised  in  such 
manner  as  the  President  of  the  United  States  shall  direct  for 


proceedings  was  unusual  and  the  gratitude  of  the  people  for  the  establish- 
ment of  civil  governments  was  certain  and  clear."  Report  of  Governor  Taft, 
Feb.  1,  1902  {Kept.  Phil.  Com.,  1900-3,  p.  136). 

5'  Williams  records  that  proper  notice  of  the  arrival  of  the  commission 
had  not  been  given  to  Surigao  and  there  was  some  trouble  in  arranging  for 
the  public  reception  owing  to  the  fact  that  five  of  the  presidentes  were  in  jail 
charged  with  furnishing  supplies  to  the  insurgents. 

58  The  so-called  Spooner  Amendment  to  the  Army  App.  Bill.  See  Rept. 
Phil.  Com.,  1900-3,  p.  274. 


THE   END    OF   THE   MILITARY    REGIME        525 

the  establishment  of  civil  government  and  for  maintaining  and 
protecting  the  inhabitants  of  such  islands  in  the  free  enjoyment 
of  their  liberty,  property  and  religion."  But  v^^hat  was  thus 
granted  in  general  terms  was  so  limited  by  provisos  as  to  prac- 
tically destroy  the  value  of  the  legislation. 

Congress  was  very  anxious  to  conserve  the  public  domain  in 
the  Philippines  and  protect  it  from  the  exploiters  who  were  as- 
sumed to  be  hovering  over  the  islands.  After  stating  that  until 
a  permanent  government  should  be  established  full  reports  of 
all  legislative  proceedings  should  be  made  to  Congress  and  re- 
ports as  to  general  conditions  to  the  president,  it  provided  "that 
no  sale  or  lease  or  other  disposition  of  the  public  lands  or  the  tim- 
ber thereon,  or  the  mining  rights  therein,  shall  be  made,"  thus 
specifically  denying  to  the  commission  the  powers  which  it 
deemed  most  necessary  for  the  public  welfare.  Franchises  ap- 
proved by  the  president  were  authorized  to  be  granted,  but  they 
must  contain  a  reservation  of  the  right  to  alter,  amend,  or  repeal, 
and  only  such  should  be  granted  as  in  the  judgment  of  the  presi- 
dent were  clearly  necessary  for  the  immediate  good  of  the  islands 
and  indispensable  for  the  interest  of  the  people,  and  which  could 
not  without  great  mischief  be  postponed  until  the  establishment 
of  permanent  civil  government.  Every  franchise  granted  under 
this  carefully  guarded  authority  should  terminate  one  year  after 
the  establishment  of  such  civil  government.  This  legislation  did 
nothing  toward  bettering  conditions."' 

While  at  Jolo  the  commission  had  learned  of  the  capture  of  the 
insurgent  leader.  Aguinaldo  had  played  no  particular  part  in  the 
guerrilla  operations  which  were  carried  on  after  he  disappeared 
into  the  wilderness  in  December,  1899.    He  had,  however,  kept 

^^  "Word  has  come  of  the  passage  by  Congress  of  the  so-called  Spooner 
Bill  relating  to  Philippine  affairs  and  it  is  a  great  disappointment.  .  .  . 
The  law  effectually  ties  the  hands  of  the  Commission  so  far  as  developing 
the  resources  of  the  Islands  is  concerned,  without  which  development  no  gen- 
eral prosperity  can  be  expected.  The  whole  thing  illustrates  how  foolish  our 
representatives  can  be  when  dealing  with  something  which  does  not  affect 
their  chance  of  re-election,  and  concerning  which  they  have  no  knowledge, 
nor  the  ambition  to  acquire  it.  No  action  whatever  was  taken  to  relieve  us 
of  our  unfortunate  currency  muddle."  Williams,  Odyssey,  p.  163  (March  31, 
1901). 


526  THE   PHILIPPINES 

in  irregular  communication  with  some  of  his  adherents.  Thus  in 
January,  1900,  he  received  a  letter  from  Hong  Kong.  In  April 
he  was  in  Abra  in  consultation  with  General  Tinio,  but  in  May, 
to  avoid  capture,  he  returned  to  the  Cagayan  Valley.®"  In  Au- 
gust or  September,  1900,  he  reached  the  little  town  of  Palanan  on 
the  isolated  northeastern  coast  of  Luzon  where  on  March  24, 
1901,  he  was  captured  by  a  small  party  led  by  General  Funston.*^ 
Aguinaldo  was  brought  to  Manila  and  treated  with  courtesy  and 
consideration  by  General  MacArthur.  He  immediately  asked  for 
Mabini  (who  had  been  sent  to  Guam)  and  Chief  Justice  Arellano 
who  had  been  his  first  secretary  of  foreign  affairs.  With  the 
chief  justice  he  examined  the  laws  which  had  been  passed  by 
the  commission  and  studied  the  plans  of  the  United  States  for 
the  government  of  the  islands,  and  being  convinced  that  the 
Americans  had  only  the  welfare  of  the  Filipinos  at  heart,  took 
the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  United  States,  which  he  ever  after 
faithfully  observed.  With  the  assistance  of  Arellano,®^  he  pre- 
pared and  issued  a  proclamation  to  the  Filipino  people,  in  which 
he  said : 

"The  time  has  come,  however,  when  they  (the  Filipinos)  find 
their  advance  along  this  path  impeded  by  an  irresistible  force, — 
a  force  which  while  it  restrains  them,  yet  enlightens  the  mind 
and  opens  another  course  by  presenting  to  them  the  cause  of 
peace.  This  cause  has  been  joyfully  embraced  by  a  majority  of 
our  fellow  countrymen,  who  are  already  united  around  the 
glorious  and  sovereign  banner  of  the  United  States.  In  this 
banner  they  repose  their  trust,  in  the  belief  that  under  its  pro- 
tection our  people  will  attain  all  the  promised  liberties  which 
they  are  even  now  beginning  to  enjoy.  The  country  has  declared 
unmistakably  in  favor  of  peace;  so  be  it.     Enough  of  blood f 

60  See  Kept.  War  Dept,  1900, 1,  Part  6,  pp.  706-720;  Part  5,  p.  2011.  Villas' 
Diary  tells  of  Aguinaldo's  narrow  escape. 

61  Gen.  Funston  (Memories  of  Two  Wars,  Chap.  VII)  gives  a  graphic 
account  of  this  remarkable  exploit. 

62  At  Cebu,  on  April  18,  1901,  Williams  wrote:  "Chief  Justice  Arellano, 
who  had  returned  to  Manila  from  Iliolo,  rejoined  us  here.  He  came  to  sub- 
mit to  the  Commission  the  draft  of  a  proposed  proclamation  prepared  by 
Aguinaldo".  To  Arellano  belongs  largely  the  credit  for  influencing  Aguinaldo 
to  take  tlie  oath  of  allegiance,  his  return  to  Manila  being  almost  coincident 
with  Aguinaldo's  capture."    Odyssey,  p.  222. 


THE   END    OF   THE   MILITARY   REGIME        527 

enough  of  tears  and  desolation.  ...  By  acknowledging  and 
accepting  the  sovereignty  of  the  United  States  throughout  the 
entire  Archipelago,  as  I  now  do,  without  any  reservation  what- 
soever, I  believe  that  I  am  serving  thee,  my  beloved  Country. 
May  happiness  be  thine." 

.With  the  capture  of  Aguinaldo,  the  institution  of  provincial 
governments,  and  the  organization  of  executive  departments,  the 
military  government  of  the  Philippines  came  to  an  end.  The 
legislative  power  had  been  vested  in  the  commission  since  Sep- 
tember 1,  1900.  The  president  of  the  commission  was  now  ap- 
pointed civil  governor  and  on  July  4,  1901,  a  civil  government 
for  the  islands,  under  the  immediate  control  of  the  secretary  of 
war,  was  formally  inaugurated. 


THE  END 


INDEX 


INDEX 

Agoncillo,  Felipe,  Filipino  representative  abroad :  proposes  treaty  with  United 
States,  385;  letter  to  Peace  Commission,  405;  correspondence  with 
Aguinaldo,  418. 

Aguinaldo,  Emilio:  insurrection  of  1896,  193;  negotiations  with  Primo  de 
Rivera,  199 ;  signs  pact  of  Biak-na-bato,  201 ;  withdraws  to  Hong  Kong, 
204;  care  of  the  money,  205,  207;  conversations  with  Pratt,  389;  re- 
turns to  Hong  Kong,  390;  report  to  Junta,  410-413;  taken  to  Cavite, 
414;  meeting  with  Dewey,  405-414;  claim  of  promise  of  independence, 
404,  405,  413;  proclaims  a  civil  government,  396;  his  policy,  416-418; 
negotiates  for  peace,  475-478;  abandoned  by  conservatives,  478;  rela- 
tions with  Luna,  478  note;  disappears  in  mountains,  526;  captured  by 
Funston,  526;  oath  of  allegiance  and  proclamation,  526;  his  influence 

,  and  character,  382,  383. 

'Alcalde-Mayor,  a  provincial  governor,  220. 

Alexander  VI,  the  demarcation  bulls,  137,  138. 

Ammunition,  shortage  of  at  naval  battle,  297,  298, 

Amnesty  proclamation,  issued  by  MacArthur,  513. 

Anda,  Simon  de,  magistrate:  assumes  command  against  British,  166;  be- 
comes governor-general,  168;  his  character,  168. 

Anderson,  Brigadier-General  Thomas  M. :  commands  first  expedition,  304; 
estabhshes  camp  Dewey,  305 ;  negotiations  with  insurgents,  404 ;  article 
in  North  American  Review,  307  note,  315  note,  403,  4M. 

Andre,  Belgian  consul,  negotiations  through,  307. 

Animal  life,  extent  of,  74-76. 

Anti-Imperialists:  their  work,  367;  their  contentions,  372;  join  with  Demo- 
crats, 376;  Senator  Hoar's  views,  371 ;  arguments  of  Hoar,  Schurz  and 
Storey,  391 ;  opposition  continued,  bitterness  of,  459-461 ;  encourage  in- 
surgents, 459,  508,  509 ;  Schurz'  charge  of  bad  faith  toward  Aguinaldo, 
380 ;  accept  Filipino  statements  as  true,  404. 

Aquarium,  at  Manila,  77. 

Arellano,  Cayetano  S. :  in  Aguinaldo's  cabinet,  favors  American  control,  475 ; 
report  on  Spanish  legal  system,  232  note;  on  board  to  draft  municipal 
code,  519;  chief  justice,  517. 

Attraction,  Spanish  policy  of,  382. 

Audiencia:  215;  its  institution,  239,  241;  a  Supreme  Court,  239;  other  func- 
tions, 239-241 ;  its  branches,  242. 

Autos  accordados,  ordinances  of  audiencia,  as  precedents,  241. 

Badojis,  Junta  of,  145. 

Baguio:  a  health  resort  in  Benguet  Mountains,  66;  rainfall  at,  67. 

Barangay,  ancient  political  unit,  229,  231. 

Bates  Treaty,  with  Sultan,  469,  470. 

Benguet  Road,  its  location,  67. 

Biak-na-bato,  pact  of :  negotiations  between  Primo  de  Rivera  and  Agui- 
naldo, 199-205 ;  terms  of  the  agreement,  201,  203;  the  reforms,  201,  206. 

Bismarck,  Prince,  on  American  policy,  304  note. 

Blanco :   Liberal  governor-general,  192 ;  grants  safe-conduct  to  Rizal,  194. 

Board  of  Authorities,  213. 

Bonifacio,  Andres,  head  of  Katipunan,  191. 

Bryan,  W.  J. :  urges  ratification  of  treaty,  378 ;  alleged  relations  with  insur- 
gents, 508  note. 

Bukidnons,  a  promising  wild  people,  91. 

531 


532  INDEX 

Cabatan,  A.,  book  on  Java  cited,  17,  18. 

Cabeza  de  Barangay,  a  petty  native  official,  229. 

Camara,  Spanish  admiral,  starts  for  Manila,  312. 

Cambon,  Jules,  French  ambassador,  represents  Spain,  320. 

Caiio,  El :  completes  Magellan's  voyage  around  world,  145 ;  his  second  expe- 
dition, 145. 

Capitulation  of  Manila :  made  in  ignorance  of  peace,  326,  331,  425 ;  terms  of, 
313 ;  nature  of,  313. 

Casa  de  Contratacion,  or  India  House,  232.  ^ 

Chao-Ju-Kuo,  Chinese  geographer,  description  of  natives,  104. 

Chinese :  as  colonizers,  5 ;  early  traders,  visit  of  Mandarins,  170,  281  ;^  the 
Parian,  the  silk  market,  281 ;  as  artisans  and  laborers,  281 ;  industrious, 
become  wealthy,  284;  fear  and  jealousy  of,  281;  restriction  as  to  trade 
and  residence,  284;  massacres  of,  170,  171,  282,  283;  excluded  by  Gen- 
eral Otis,  American  exclusionary  law  in  force,  438,  439;  as  cooks,  110. 

Christians  and  non-Christians,  classification  of  people,  80,  86. 

Churches,  to  be  protected,  424. 

Citizenship:  under  treaty  of  Paris,  356;  under  acts  of  Congress,  358  note. 

Civil  government :  policy  as  to  establishing,  487 ;  in  occupied^  territory,  487, 
488 ;  unpopular  with  army,  488,  489 ;  war  powers  of  president,  489,  490 ; 
constitutional  questions,  490,  492;  political  precedents,  492-494;  the 
Insular  cases,  494-496;  the  new  Philippine  Commission,  496;  the  presi- 
dent's instructions,  497 ;  nature  of  the  government,  497 ;  its  foundation 
principles,  498-504 ;  commission  enters  on  its  work,  504 ;  condition  and 
prospects,  506;  issues  statement,  506;  public  hearings,  506,  507;  study 
of  topics,  507,  508;  effect  of  presidential  campaign,  508;  reelection  of 
McKinley,  511;  severe  measure  adopted,  512,  513;  organization  of  Fed- 
eral party,  513;  enactment  of  laws,  514,  518;  civil  service  law,  515,  516; 
reorganization  of  judicial  system,  517;  new  provincial  and  municipal 
codes,  519,  520;  commission  visits  provinces  and  organizes  provincial 
governments,  520-524;  defective  powers  of  commission,  524;  the 
Spooner  amendment,  524,  525;  Ag^inaldo's  capture  and  oath  of  alle- 
giance, 526,  527. 

Civil  service  law :  necessity  for,  515 ;  enactment  of,  516. 

Climate :   its  character,  78 ;  safe  with  precautions,  79. 

Cockpits,  revenue  from,  263. 

Codes :  ancient  Spanish,  233,  234 ;  modem  Civil  Codes,  238 ;  the  Penal  Code, 
_238;Order  No.  58,  238. 

Colonial  debts,  assumption  of,  333-337,  353. 

Colonization :  theories  of,  1 ;  history,  5 ;  modern  problems,  2 ;  modern  defini- 
nition,  3;  objects  of,  2;  involves  moral,  economic  and  political  con- 
siderations, 3 ;  primitive  people's  colonies,  5 ;  Chinese,  5 ;  Phoenicians, 
5;  Greeks,  6,  7;  Romans,  7-9;  the  feudal  kingdoms,  9,  10;  the  Mid- 
dle Ages,  10;  Venetians,  10;  Spaniards,  11-13;  Spanish  methods, 
11,  12;  Portuguese,  12;  Dutch,  13-19;  English,  19-28;  French,  29-31; 
Italian,  31-33;  German,  33-36;  Japanese,  36;  Belgian,  36  note;  a 
new  era,  27;  demand  for  tropical  products,  28;  territorial  expansion, 
pressure  of  population,  28 ;  new  ambitions,  29 ;  by  United  States,  53,  54 ; 
governing  non-contiguous  territory,  S3;  a  free  hand  in  Orient,  54; 
advanced  theories,  welfare  of  natives,  55;  importance  given  education, 
58,  59. 

Colony,  definitions  and  classifications  of,  2 ;  see  Colonization. 

Comyn,  Tomas  de,  description  of  natives,  106. 

Conferences  with  insurgents :  at  Iloila,  441 ;  Otis  with  Aguinaldo's  commis- 
sion, 448;  after  Malolos,  efforts  of  Schurman  Commission,  473-477. 

Conquest  of  Philippines,  343. 

Consejo  de  Filipinas,  211. 


INDEX  533 

Constitutional  questions :  istatus  of  the  new  territory,  490 ;  does  constitution 
follow  the  flag,  491 ;  the  Vest  and  Piatt  resolutions,  491 ;  the  property 
of  the  United  States,  491 ;  the  Louisiana  and  other  precedents,  492,  493 ; 
the  Insular  cases,  494-496. 

Constructive  period:  first  seventy-five  years  of  Spanish  rul^  153,  154,  159; 
Morga's  description,  159.^ 

Consuls,  American,  dealings  with  Aguindaldo,  see  Chapter  XV. 

Continental  opinion :  favored  Spain,  348-350 ;  as  to  relative  naval  power,  291. 

Conversion  of  Indians,  object  of  the  enterprise,  154,  155. 

Cooper,  Joseph  F.,  justice  Supreme  Court,  517. 

Corrupt  systems,  difficulties  of  reformers.  Governor  Bustamente,  163. 

Cortes,  Filipino  representation  in,  172,  173. 

Council  of  administration,  213,  214. 

Courts:  audiencia,  provincial  courts,  courts  of  first  instance,  243;  justice 
courts,  244;  ecclesiastical,  miUtary,  commercial,  treasury  and  conten- 
tious, 245-246;  inefficient,  247;  reconstituted  by  Americans,  430,  517. 

Cromer,  Lord :  Roman  colonial  policy,  9 ;  self-government  in  India,  45  note; 
in  Egypt,  49,  50 ;  ultimate  control  over  natives,  55. 

Crown  colonies,  2,  52. 

"Culture"  system:  in  Java,  16;  profitable  to  Netherlands,  17;  its  vicious 
character,  17,  18 ;  in  Philippines,  17  note. 

Customs  duties,  see  Taxation,  249. 

Day,  Dr.  Clive,  book  on  Java  cited,  16,  17,  18. 

Deceit  and  dissimulation,  results  from  environment,  112. 

Deidrich,  Vice-Admiral  von :  friction  with  Dewey,  301-304 ;  publishes  state- 
ment, 303  note. 

Denby,  Charles,  member  Schurman  Commission,  450. 

Deportations :  after  Cavite  revolt,  187, 188 ;  by  Americans  to  Guam,  513. 

Desmarinas,  early  governor,  158. 

Dewey,  Admiral  George :  command  of  Asiatic  squadron,  385 ;  ordered  to  be 
prepared,  292;  takes  fleet  to  Mirs  Bay,  292;  Prince  Henry's  farewell, 
292;  ships  of  his  fleet,  292;  sails  for  Manila  Bay  and  attacks,  295; 
ignores  mines,  293 ;  reports  victory,  299 ;  cuts  cables,  300 ;  awaits  troops, 
301 ;  relations  with  foreign  navies,  301 ;  friction  with  Germans,  301-304 ; 
arrival  of  General  Anderson,  304;  arranges  for  surrender  of  Manila, 
307;  discourages  immediate  attack,  310;  aids  in  attack,  312;  asks  Pratt 
to  send  Aguinaldo  to  Hong  Kong,  389-397;  meets  Ag^uinaldo  on 
Olympia,  398;  no  promises  made,  400;  calls  on  Aguinaldo  informally, 
402 ;  recommends  a  commission,  450 ;  member  first  commission,  450. 

Dialects,  number  of,  101. 

Dickens,  Charles,  satirizes  cultivation  of  natives,  3. 

Dogs,  as  food,  97. 

Drake,  Sir  Francis,  19. 

Draper,  General  William,  captures  Manila,  164. 

Earthquakes,  73. 

Ecclesiastical  system:  its  organization,  218;  interwoven  with  civil  govern- 
ment. 215,  220-222. 

Economic  Society  of  Friends,  organization  of,  174. 

Education :   154 ;  American  belief  in,  58 ;  among  Moros,  125,  126. 

Egypt:  England's  constructive  work,  48,  49;  Cromer's  rule,  weakened  under 
Gorst,  49 ;  Kitchener's  firmer  control  and  extension  of  native  participa- 
tion, 51 ;  education  in,  59. 

Embargoed  estates,  435. 

Encomienda :  the  system,  275-277 ;  grants  by  Legaspi,  156,  159 ;  abuses  under, 
277 ;  Morga's  report  on,  276  note. 

England:  early  colonization  by,  19,  20;  settlement  colonies  in  temperate 
climes,  20;  the  mercantile  theory,  20;  loss  of  American  colonies,  20; 


534  INDEX 

England — Continued. 

return  of  colonies  after  1815,  21 ;  humanitarian  spirit,  growth  of,  21 ; 
the  Colonization  Society  of  1830,  21 ;  three  periods  of  colonial  history, 
21-27;  training  the  colonies  for  self-government,  22;  views  of  states- 
men, 22-26;  Greater  Britain,  Seeley's  Expansion  of  England,  25,  26; 
Disraeli  and  the  Empire,  27;  the  new  policy,  27;  in  Egypt,  48-51;  atti- 
tude of  English  toward  natives,  52;  capture  of  Manila  by  English,  166; 
see  India. 

Environment :  passive  attitude  toward,  85 ;  dissatisfaction  with,  test  of  prog- 
ress, 85. 

Evil,  Oriental  view  of,  85. 

Expansion,  see  Policy  of  Expansion. 

Factories,  trading  posts,  colonial  outposts,  10. 

Federal  party,  its  organization  and  platform,  513. 

Filipinos:  as  a  separate  race,  100;  of  Malay  origin,  81,  89;  the  civilized  peb- 
ple,  include  Tagalogs,  Visayans,  Bicols,  Ilocanos,  Pampangos,  Pan- 
gasines  and  Ibangs,  100;  speak  different  dialects,  100,  101;  racial  differ- 
ences, 100 ;  occupy  coast  and  lowlands,  100,  101 ;  their  social  and  politi- 
cal organization,  101,  102 ;  descriptions  of  the  people,  104-109 ;  conflict- 
ing views,  103 ;  difficult  to  understand,  109 ;  are  gregarious,  good  na- 
tured  and  hospitable,  109;  family  life,  status  of  women,  109,  110;  as 
servants,  110;  truth-telling,  111;  different  standards  of  conduct,  112; 
indolence  and  climate,  112;  reserved,  proud  and  dignified,  112,  113. 

Financial  troubles :  Spanish,  mismanagement,  161 ;  burden  on  king,  161,  162 ; 
charges  against,  168,  169. 

Finley,  Lieutenant-Colonel  John  P.,  governor,  on  religion  of  Moros,  126. 

Fish  and  Fishing,  77,  78. 

Flowers,  77.  ^ 

Forced  labor :  regulation  of,  265,  277 ;  on  public  works,  275. 

Foreman,  John,  108. 

Foster,  George  E.,  colonies  a  trust,  3  note, 

France:  early  colonial  policy,  19;  modern  ambition,  29;  African  colonies, 
policy  hberal,  reforms  in  Algiers,  educational  work,  30,  31  note. 

Friars :  see  Monastic  Orders,  Ecclesiastical  System  ;  claim  exemption 
from  control,  218 ;  become  curates,  219 ;  their  number,  219 ;  absorb  civil 
power,  220-222;  their  good  and  bad  qualities,  conflicting  views,  222- 
225 ;  cause  of  insurrection,  438. 

Fuero  Jusgo,  an  ancient  code,  234. 

Germany :  becomes  an  aggressive  colonial  nation,  ZZ ;  Bismarck's  views,  ZZ ; 
acquisitions  in  Africa,  33-35;  her  policy,  35;  treatment  of  natives, 
35,  36. 

Gironiere,  Paul  de  la,  description  of  natives,  106. 

Governors:  Spanish,  list  of,  160  note;  their  character,  160,  161,  174;  pro- 
prietary, 155 ;  quarrels  with  ecclesiastics,  155,  162-164,  215 ;  occasionally 
energetic,  174;  qualities  of  a  good  governor,  216;  Enrile  organizes  the 
Economic  Society  of  Friends  of  the  Country,  174;  difficulties,  215;  the 
residencia,  216-218 ;  terms  of  271. 

Gobernadorcillo,  a  petty  governor,  229,  252. 

Greeks:  nature  of  their  colonies,  6;  Aristotle's  definition,  6;  the  city  state,  6, 
7 ;  independent  communities,  6 ;  the  ver  sacrum,  6. 

Greene,  Brigadier-General  F.  V. :  commands  second  expedition,  305 ;  at  battle 
of  Manila,  306-319;  incident  of  Filipino  trenches,  309;  account  of  battle, 
309  note,  316  note. 

Head-hunting,  custom  of,  94,  95. 

Hoar,  George,  Republican  Senator  and  Anti-Imperialist,  371. 


INDEX  535 

Holland:  the  Lisbon  trade,  13;  trading  companies,  13,  14;  Dutch  East-India 
Company,  14;  their  rule  in  Java,  15-18;  the  native  governments,  15 ;  the 
"culture"  system,  16-18;  Httle  efforts  to  train  natives,  16;  improved 
conditions,  education,  18  note;  colonial  constitution  of  1854,  18. 

Id^  Henry  C,  member  of  the  commission,  secretary  of  finance  and  justice, 
497. 

Ifugaos,  a  wild  tribe,  91. 

Igorots :  one  of  wild  tribes,  92;  two  groups  of,  Bontoc  and  Benguet,  92;  cus- 
toms and  modes  of  life,  92-99 ;  head-hunting,  94 ;  dog  eating,  97 ;  truth- 
telling,  96;  adopting  modern  customs,  96;  schools,  97. 

Ilocanos,  important  group  of  wild  men,  100. 

Ilongots,  a  wild  tribe,  92. 

India:  the  people,  38;  government  for  benefit  of  the  natives,  38,  39;  Queen 
Victoria's  Proclamation  of  1858  and  its  promises,  39;  natives  imbibe 
liberalism,  their  education,  39,  40;  British  concessions,  41;  the  King- 
Emperor's  Proclamation  of  1908,  42;  Lord  Morle/s  reforms,  43-45; 
Great  Britain's  Indian  problems,  46;  basis  of  her  rule,  46,  47;  further 
self-government  inevitable,  47,  48  note. 

Indias,  Laws  of  the,  extended  to  Philippines,  150. 

Inquisition :  established  in  Philippines  by  Salazar,  225 ;  a  commissioner  sent, 
226;  natives  not  subject  to,  227;  effect  of,  227. 

Instructions:  to  Philippine  Commission,  497-504;  to  Schurman  Commission, 
450,  473 ;  to  General  Merritt,  422,  423. 

Insular  cases,  494-496. 

Insurgent  leaders:  their  character,  456,  457;  inexperienced,  458;  visited  by 
Americans,  459;  shrewd  politicians,  382. 

Insurgents:  early  American  relations  with,  Chapter  XV;  charges  of  bad 
faith,  380 ;  effect  on  public  sentiment,  381 ;  Spanish  war  encourages, 
382 ;  Aguinaldo  at  Hong  Kong,  382 ;  his  character,  383 ;  Wildman's  re- 
lations with  Hong  Kong  junta,  387;  Aguinaldo  starts  for  Europe,  388; 
meetings  with  Pratt  at  Singapore,  389;  returns  to  Hong  Kong,  390; 
Pratt's  reports  to  Washington,  390;  newspaper  articles,  the  Serenade, 
and  Pratt's  speech,  391-396;  repudiation  by  secretary  of  state,  395; 
Dewey's  attitude,  397-400 ;  Aguinaldo  organizes  an  army  and  civil  gov- 
ernment, 396;  irritated  by  arrival  of  troops,  402;  friction  with  army, 
403 ;  Anderson's  correspondence,  404  note;  Filipino  claims,  Agoncillo's 
statement,  405 ;  in  the  Resena  Veridica,  405 ;  the  promise  of  independ- 
ence a  myth,  407 ;  repudiated  by  St.  Clair,  409 ;  the  intermediary,  Bray, 
409 ;  disproved  by  Aguinaldo's  acts  and  words,  410-413 ;  dissensions 
among  Filipinos,  417;  no  definite  policy,  fear  of  Spain,  417;  no  real 
cooperation  with  Americans,  419 ;  not  recognized  as  allies,  421 ;  refused 
permission  to  enter  Manila,  425. 

Insurrection:  against  Americans,  a  surprise,  456;  carefully  organized,  457; 
support  of  in  Luzon,  458;  encouraged  by  Americans,  459;  American 
troops  in  Manila,  462 ;  volunteers  remain,  462 ;  national  volunteers,  463 ; 
insurgent  army,  462 ;  attempt  to  burn  Manila,  462 ;  capture  of  Malolos, 
464;  battle  of  Calumpit,  464,  465;  occupation  of  San  Fernando,  466; 
Lawton's  advance  to  San  Maguil  de  Mayuma,  467;  fight  at  Zapote 
River,  467 ;  conditions  in  Mindanao,  468 ;  Bates  treaty  with  sultan, 
468 ;  disturbances  in  Negros,  470 ;  campaign  in  autumn  of  1899,  479. 

Insurrections :  early,  mostly  without  political  significance,  184 ;  disappointed 
hopes,  184;  tfiat  of  1823,  185;  Apolinario,  185;  revolt  of  soldiers  at 
Cavite,  incapacity  of  government  185.  186;  execution  of  priests,  185; 
popular  indignation,  186;  troubles  with  friars  over  taxes,  187;  deporta- 
tions, 187,  188;  insurrection  of  1896,  192,  198. 

Italy:  acquisition  of  Assab  in  1869,  acquisitions  along  Red  Sea,  31;  Eritrea 
and  Libia,  22 ;  prospects,  ZZ. 


536  INDEX 

Jagor,  Feodor :   description  of  natives,  108 ;  predicts  American  control,  54. 

Japan:   colonial  ambitions  of,  36;  early  relations  with  Philippines,  281. 

Jaudenes,  General  Firmin  :  Spanish  governor-general,  308 ;  surrenders  Manila, 
312.  ^   ^ 

Judges:  generally  Spaniards,  246;  qualifications  of,  246;  regulation  of  con- 
duct, 243. 

Judicial  power:  originally  in  governor-general  and  alcaldes-mayores,  238, 
239;  the  audiencia,  239-243;  inferior  courts,  243-246. 

Judicial  system :  see  Courts  ;  during  Spanish  regime,  243 ;  under  military 
government,  430;  reorganized  by  commission,  517,  518. 

Justice,  administration  of,  unsatisfactory,  246-248. 

Kalingas,  a  wild  people,  92. 

Katipunan :   a  revolutionary  society,  191 ;  organizes  insurrection  of  1896,  192 ; 

its  character,  191,  192. 
Keller,  Dr.,  cited,  2,  18,  31,  32,  33. 

Kings,  Spanish,  unsuccessful  efforts  to  protect  natives,  156. 
Kipling,  Rudyard,  writes  the  White  Man's  Burden  in  America,  370. 

Ladrone  Islands,  discovered  by  Magellan,  143. 

Language:  see  Dialects;  use  of  Spanish  in  courts,  518. 

Laws,  sources  of,  232. 

Laws  of  the  Indias,  232,  233,  236. 

Lawyers,  unpopular  with  colonial  authorities,  179,  180. 

Legaspi,  Miguel  Lopez  de :  expedition  to  Philippines,  146,  147 ;  first  governor, 

147;  reaches  Cebu,  148;  captures  Manila,  150;  his  death  and  character, 

151. 
Legislation,  codes  and  courts,  see  Chapter  IX. 
Leroy-Beaulieu,  influence  of  Moorish  wars  on  Spanish  character,  149  and 

note. 
Lewis,  Sir  George  Cornwall:   definition  of  colony,  2;  involves  expulsion  of 

natives,  3. 
Limahong,  Chinese  pirate,  invades  Philippines,  151-153. 
Location  of  towns,  fear  of  Moros,  71. 
Lotteries,  revenue  from,  263. 

McKinley,  William,  President:  originally  opposed  to  holding  Achipelago, 
362;  studies  public  sentiment,  364,  365;  his  control  of  situations,  330, 
365,  366;  original  instructions  to  Peace  Commissioners,  350;  negotia- 
tions with  Cambon,  321-329;  appoints  Peace  Commissioners,  329;  posi- 
tion as  to  colonial  debts,  338;  as  to  conquest,  342;  directs  demand  for 
entire  Archipelago,  342;  effect  of  reelection,  511. 

Mabini,  Apolinario:  the  "brains  of  the  insurrection,"  concedes  legality  of 
American  title,  455 ;  head  of  Aguinaldo's  cabinet,  449,  477 ;  favors  war, 
448 ;  address  to  commission,  507 ;  banished  to  Guam,  513 ;  defeats  Arel- 
lano's plan  for  protectorate,  477  note. 

MacArthur,  Major-General  Arthur:  commands  third  expedition,  305;  at 
battle  of  Manila,  312. 

Magellan,  Ferdinand :  discoverer  of  the  Philippines,  137 ;  description  of,  142 ; 
loss  of  royal  favor,  141 ;  naturalized  Spaniard,  142 ;  contract  with  the 
king,  143;  idea  that  demarcation  line  extended  around  the  world,  140, 
142;  sails  from  Seville,  143;  reaches  Cebu,  144;  his  death  on  Mactan 
Island,  144. 

Malolos  Congress,  last  meeting  of,  favors  peace,  476, 

Manila:  captured  by  Legaspi  and  organized  as  a  city,  150;  captured  by  Brit- 
ish, 164-168 ;  the  dishonored  ransom  bills,  168 ;  captured  by  Americans, 
311-318. 

Manila:  battle  of,  surrender  arranged  for,  308;  capitulation,  313-318;  Fili- 
pino troops  not  allowed  to  participate,  315. 


INDEX  537 

Manila  Bay:  naval  battle  of,  290-295;  means  of  defense,  290,  294,  295;  rela- 
tive strength  of  fleets,  299;  plan  of  battle,  296;  a  brilliant  victory,  299; 
losses,  299;  news  reaches  Washington,  300. 

Mapa,  Victorina,  justice  Supreme  Court,  517. 

Marksmanship,  at  battle  of  Manila  Bay,  296  and  note. 

Mas,  Sinibaldo  de :  descriptions  of  conditions  in  1842,  175-179 ;  recommenda- 
tions, 179. 

Masonic  societies,  as  revolutionary  agencies,  189,  190. 

Matta,  Don  Manuel  de  la:  confidential  report  on  conditions  in  1843,  179; 
recommends  radical  reforms,  ISO. 

Maura  law,  230. 

Mayon,  Mount,  72. 

Merritt,  Major-General  Wesley:  command  at  capture  of  Manila,  305;  his 
instructions,  308  note;  cooperation  with  Dewey,  308;  first  miUtary  gov- 
ernor, 422,  426 ;  goes  to  Paris.  426. 

Military  occupation:  see  Chapter  XVI;  to  ratification  of  treaty,  of  Manila, 
422,  423 ;  authority  under,  423 ;  personnel  of  military  government,  424, 
425;  General  F.  V.  Greene  in  charge  of  finances,  424-429;  legal  difficul- 
ties, 429,  434 ;  the  courts,  430,  431 ;  trade  and  commerce,  431 ;  with 
southern  islands,  432;  tariff  regulations,  432;  the  prisons,  433,  439; 
embargoed  estates,  435;  military  prisoners,  436;  Aguinaldo's  Spanish 
prisoners,  437 ;  regulation  of  Chinese,  438,  439 ;  troops  sent  to^  Iloilo, 
440;  negotiations  for  peace,  448;  Filipinos  favor  war,  450,  451;  the 
attack  on  Manila,  452. 

Milner,  Lord,  welfare  of  subject  people,  3. 

Minerals,  77. 

Minister  of  Ultramar,  211. 

Mirandaola,  Andres  de,  description  of  Filipinos,  102. 

Missionaries :  Spanish,  accompany  Legaspi,  147 ;  early  activities,  148 ;  at 
Manila,  151 ;  gave  character  to  conquest,  154 ;  rapid  increase  in  number, 
154,  158;  invade  China  and  Japan,  154,  155. 

Mohammedan:  early  missionaries  in  islands,  149;  established  at  Manila  be- 
fore arrival  of  Legaspi,  149;  religion  of  the  Moros,  115. 

Mommsen's  law,  363. 

Monastic  orders:  see  Friars;  commercial  activities  of,  171;  the  obras  pias, 
172 ;  control  of  Banco  Espanol  Filipina,  172 ;  became  unpopular  during 
close  of  last  century,  183 ;  abuse  of  natives,  183,  184 ;  the  claims  of,  218 ; 
number  of  friars,  219. 

Monopolies,  revenue  from,  263. 

Montojo,  Admiral:  commands  Spanish  fleet,  289;  preparations,  goes  to  Subig, 
293 ;  abandons  Manila  and  goes  to  Cavite,  295 ;  surrenders  to  Dewey, 
298. 

Morga,  Antonio  de:  early  magistrate,  description  of  conditions  in  1606,  159; 
description  of  natives,  105. 

More  raids :  factor  in  Philippine  history,  costly  expeditions  against  Moros, 
171 ;  continued  until  age  of  steam,  171 ;  initiated  by  Sande's  expedition, 
153. 

Moros:  Mohammedan  tribes  of  south,  so  named  by  Spaniards,  115;  never 
conquered  by  Spaniards,  171;  a  special  problem,  114;  slowly  improving, 
114,  115,  134;  missionary  work  among,  115;  the  separate  tribes.  116, 
118,  119;  the  Sultan  of  Jolo,  116;  a  warlike  people,  118;  their  weapons, 

118,  119;  running  amok,  118;  the  language,  119;  habits  and  customs, 

119,  120,  127;  their  religion,  125-127;  tribal  government,  123;  slavery, 

124,  125 ;    education    among.    125 ;    occupations.    128-130 ;    industries, 
Moro  exchanges,  129,  130;  the  datu,  115,  130^132;  their  code  of  laws, 

125,  131 ;  administration  of  justice,  133. 

Moses,  Bernard :  member  of  commission,  secretary  of  public  instruction,  496. 

Mountains,  height  of,  72. 

Municipal  code,  General  Order  Number  43,  board  to  draft  new,  519,  520. 


538  INDEX 

Nationality,  growth  of  sentiment,  3,  4,  5,  48,  49.  _ 

Natives :  treatment  of  in  colonies,  1,  2 ;  native  policy,  2,  3,  36 ;  in  early  colonies, 
36;  during  Middle  Ages,  37;  improvement  of  conditions,  3;  change  of 
views,  3;  spirit  of  humanity,  37,  38;  obligations  toward,  3;  Lord  Mil- 
nor's  statement,  trust  relation,  3  note,  38;  political  training,  4;  ignored 
by  Spaniards,  11;  conversion  of  Indians,  37;  just  Spanish  laws,  37; 
attitude  toward  of  English,  French  and  Germans,  52 ;  American  policy, 
55-60,  487,  488 ;  embodied  in  Instructions  to  Commission,  497,  498. 

Naval  power :  of  Spain  and  United  States,  290 ;  European  views,  290,  291 ; 
Montojo's  fleet,  290 ;  Dewey's  fleet,  292,  293. 

Negritos:  the  original  inhabitants,  86;  various  names,  87;  their  character- 
istics, 88 ;  a  vanishing  race,  89. 

Negros,  Island  of :  the  native  Republic,  471 ;  organization  of  civil  government, 
471 ;  the  Negros  constitution,  472  and  note. 

New  Era :  see  Chapter  VII ;  direct  steamers  from  Spain  in  1852,  opening  of 
Suez  Canal  in  1869,  182,  183 ;  restlessness  of  people,  183. 

Novisima  Recopilacion,  a  collection  of  laws,  232,  236. 

Officials,  Spanish,  general  character  of,  161. 

Opium,  tax  on,  262. 

Otis,  Major-General  E.  S. :  becomes  military  governor,  426;  letter  to  Agui- 
naldo,  427;  charge  of  military  operations  until  May  5,  1900,  nature  of 
duties,  480,  481 ;  his  character,  481-489 ;  succeeded  by  General  Mac- 
Arthur,  480 ;  member  first  commission,  450. 

Papal  bulls,  the  division  of  the  world,  138-140. 

Parish  priests,  see  Friars,  and  Ecclesiastical  System. 

Partidos,  a  collection  of  laws,  236,  237. 

Paterno,  Pedro  A.,  negotiates  pact  of  Biak-na-bato,  199. 

Peace  Commission:  membership  of,  329,  330;  high  character  of,  329. 

Peace  Protocol,  see  Treaty  of  Paris  ;  provided  for  possession  of  Manila,  321. 

Peninsular  laws,  how  extended  to  Philippines,  233. 

People:  native,  classification,  86,  87;  non-Christians  and  Filipinos,  80,  86;  the 
aborigines,  Negritos,  86,  87;  all  others  are  of  Malay  origin,  81,  89; 
classification  by  Blumentritt  and  Jesuits,  86;  Negritos,  86,  89;  the 
Moros,  90;  (see  Chapter  IV,  114-134);  the  wild  tribes,  90-100;  the 
Filipinos,  100,  113. 

Pershing,  Brigadier-General  John  J.,  governor  Moro  Province,  114,  125. 

Personal  status :  classification  of  residents,  270 ;  exclusion  of  foreigners, 
271;  status  of  natives,  treated  as  children,  272;  the  mestizos,  270; 
slaves,  272. 

Philip  II,  sends  Legaspi  expedition  to  Philippines,  146. 

Philippine  Archipelago :  its  location  and  extent,  63,  64 ;  its  physical  character- 
istics, 65;  rivers,  65,  66;  health  resort  at  Baguio,  66-68;  the  under- 
ground river,  68-70;  location  of  cities,  71;  mountainous  character,  72; 
volcanoes,  73,  74;  earthquakes,  73;  sinuous  coast  line,  73;  animal  life 
74-76;  the  flora,  76;  mineral  wealth,  77;  fish  and  fishing,  77,  78;  tem- 
perature, 78,  79;  chmate,  79. 

Philippine  Commission:  appointment  of  members,  496;  instructions  to,  497- 
504;  arrives  in  Manila,  504;  friction  with  army,  488,  489;  issues  state- 
ment, 506;  legislation  by,  514;  visits  provinces,  520-524;  organizes  local 
governments,  520;  defective  powers  of,  Spooner  Amendment,  524,  525. 

Philippine  insurgent  records,  381  and  note. 

Phoenicians :  a  colonizing  people,  5 ;  mere  traders,  5. 

Pigafetta,  Venetian  traveler,  description  of  Filipinos,  104. 

Polavieja,  General  Camilio,  governor-general,  his  treachery  toward  Rizal,  194. 

Policy:  early  Spanish,  religious  character  of  conquest,  155;  proprietary  gov- 
ernor, 155;  temptations  to  exploit  natives,  156;  protection  of  natives  by 
missionaries,  156. 


INDEX  539 

Policy  of  expansion:  see  Oiapter  XIV,  359;  of  United  States,  362;  develop- 
ment of,  362;  acquisition  of  Philippines,  a  question  of  policy,  360; 
conflicting  views,  360-362;  Mommsen's  law,  363;  opposed  by  con- 
tinental nations,  368;  English  views,  368,  369;  Kipling's  White  Man's 
Burden,  370 ;  McKinley's  attitude,  360 ;  policy  adopted  deliberately,  366 ; 
empire  and  democracy,  366,  367 ;  the  opposition  negative,  371 ;  Senator 
Hoar's  position,  371 ;  contentions  of  Anti-Imperialists,  372 ;  of  expan- 
sionists, 373;  controlling  factors,  374-376;  altruism,  376;  becomes  a 
party  question,  376,  377;  W.  J.  Bryan's  attitude,  378  and  note;  ratifica- 
tion of  treaty,  378 ;  by  Spain,  379 ;  future  left  undertermined,  378. 

Population,  at  time  of  conquest,  277. 

Portugal:  importance  in  trade  expansion,  12;  founded  few  permanent  colo- 
nies, 13 ;  treatment  of  Dutch  trade,  13. 

Pratt,  E.  Spencer,  consul-general  at  Singapore,  384. 

Prelation,  of  laws,  236. 

Primo  de  Rivera,  governor-general,  favors  reforms  from  above,  189. 

Principles :  at  foundation  of  the  American  government,  497 ;  no  exploitation, 
498 ;  the  well  being  of  the  native  people,  499;  established  for  their  bene- 
fit, 499. 

Procedure:  civil,  244 ;  criminal,  247  «of^;  new  Code  of,  518. 

Proclamation:  of  General  Merritt,  424;  a  public  statement  advised  by  Dewey, 
442 ;  the  "beneficent  assimilation"  proclamation,  423-446 ;  Otis'  changes, 
445 ;  Aguinaldo's  responses,  446 ;  by  Schurman  Commission,  474. 

Propagandists,  young  Filipinos  abroad,  188. 

Provincial  Code,  enactment  of,  520. 

Racial  differences :  East  is  East  and  West  is  West ;  theory  of  inherent  racial 
differences,  81-85 ;  the  Chinese,  82 ;  essential  unity,  83 ;  different  out- 
look on  life,  different  point  of  view,  84,  85. 

Raffles,  Sir  Stamford,  British  ruler  of  Java,  14. 

Ransom  bills,  given  British,  dishonor  of,  by  Spain,  168. 

Ratification,  Treaty  of  Paris,  378,  379. 

Reform  movement,  187. 

Representative  government,  in  tropical  colonies,  5,  489. 

Representation,  in  Cortes,  l72,  173. 

Resena  Veridica,  a  publication  over  Aguinaldo's  name,  405. 

Residencia,  its  nature  and  value,  216-218. 

Residents,  few  European  during  Spanish  times,  182,  271. 

Revenue:  in  Spanish  times,  raised  by  direct  and  indirect  taxes,  trade  and 
monopolies,  249,  262 ;  stamps,  papal  bulls  and  indulgences,  262 ;  sale  of 
opium,  262,  263 ;  lotteries,  profits  on  trade,  263 ;  the  tobacco  monopoly, 
264-266;  receipts  and  disbursements,  266-269;  mismanaged,  191. 

Rivers :  their  character,  65  ;  torrential  rains,  {^. 

Rizal,  Jose:  the  Filipino  hero,  188;  taught  the  necessity  for  education,  his 
novels,  188,  189 ;  their  effect,  189 ;  opposed  to  use  of  force,  197 ;  organ- 
izes the  Liga  Filipino,  189;  connection  with  Masonic  societies,  190; 
returns  to  Manila  and  is  exiled  to  Dapitan,  190;  disapproved  plans  of 
Katipunan,  191 ;  granted  permission  to  go  to  Cuba,  194 ;  arrested  and 
sent  back,  194 ;  his  trial  and  execution,  195-198 ;  his  monument,  198 ; 
President  Roosevelt's  estimate  of,  189. 

Rojo,  Archbishop,  surrenders  Manila  to  British,  165,  166. 

Roman  colonies:  object  of,  7;  municipia  and  colonice,  7;  military  colonies,  7; 
Roman  colonial  officers,  7,  8 ;  little  change  in  local  laws,  8,  9 ;  revenues, 
8;  citizenship,  9;  provincial  governments,  9;  policy  generally  con- 
demned, 9. 

Roosevelt,  Theodore:  orders  to  Dewey,  292;  naval  marksmanship,  296;  esti- 
mate of  Rizal,  189. 

Root,  Elihu,  Secretary  of  War,  devises  system  of  government  for  Philippines, 


540  INDEX 

St.  Lazarus,  original  name  of  Archipelago,  143. 

Salazar:  first  archbishop,  156,  159;  "the  Las  Casas  of  the  Philippines,"  156; 
sends  envoy  to  Spain,  157;  induces  reorganization  of  service,  157,  158; 
visits  Spain,  158. 

Salcedo,  Juan  de,  the  Cortez  of  the  Philippines,  saves  Manila  from  capture, 
151. 

Schurman  Commission :  members,  450 ;  to  study  situation,^  450 ;  efforts  to 
secure  peace,  473;  conference  with  insurgent  commissioners,  474,  475; 
policy  defeated  by  Luna,  477. 

Schurman,  Jacob  C,  chairman  first  commission,  450. 

Slavery:  among  primitive  Filipinos,  272;  classes  of  slaves,  272,  273;  forbid- 
den by  Spanish  law,  274;  existed  in  disguised  forms,  274;  even  after 
American  occupation,  controversy  about,  274  note;  Moro  slavery,  124, 
125;  encomiendas,  a  form  of  slavery,  275-277;  the  Bates  treaty,  469, 
470. 

Smith,  James  F.,  Brigadier-General  Volunteers,  governor  of  Negros,  470. 

Soudan,  nature  of  its  government,  52  and  note. 

Spain:  discovery  of  Philippines,  143;  controversy  with  Portugal,  140,  142, 
143,  145,  146;  regards  Philippines  as  in  the  west,  146;  relinquishes  her 
claim  to  Moluccas,  146;  regardless  thereof,  sends  Villalabos  to  Min- 
danao, 146;  qualifications  for  colonization,  10;  military  spirit,  11;  in- 
fluence of  religion,  11;  easy  conquests,  11;  power  of  Church,  12;  pas- 
sion for  saving  souls,  12;  system  of  trade  monopoly,  12,  271,  284;  im- 
pression made  on  natives,  12;  just  laws  for  Indians,  37. 

Spanish- American  War:  declared  and  Dewey  notified,  292;  could  not  be 
localized,  293. 

Spanish  government  in  Philippines:  211,  214;  see  Chapters  VIII,  IX,  X,  XI; 
the  royal  control,  232;  the  minister  of  ultramar,  Consaje  de  Filipinos, 
211 ;  the  governor-general,  his  powers,  212,  213 ;  the  Board  of  Authori- 
ties and  Council  of  Administration,  213,  214 ;  control  over  finances,  214 ; 
the  provinces,  227 ;  abuses  in,  228 ;  divided  into  pueblos  and  barangays, 
local  officials,  229 ;  election  methods,  230 ;  the  Maura  law  of  1893,  230 ; 
Spanish  cities,  231 ;  table  showing  organization,  231 ;  system  a  dead 
weight  on  people,  284. 

Sultan  of  Sulu,  treaty  with,  468,  469. 

Taal  volcano,  73. 

Taft,  William  H. :  president  Philippine  Commission,  496;  statement  of  policy, 
58 ;  original  views  as  to  annexation,  361 ;  work  at  Manila,  507 ;  state- 
ment to  Mabini,  507;  organizes  tour  of  islands,  520;  becomes  civil  gov- 
ernor, July  4,  1901. 

Tagalogs,  most  numerous  of  the  Filipino  groups,  100. 

Tariff  regulations :  during  Spanish  regime,  258 ;  during  military  occupation, 
432,  433 ;  applicable  to  ports  occupied,  443. 

Taxation:   the  Spanish  system,  249;  direct  taxes,  the  tribute,  250-252;  abol- 
ished in  1884,  the  cedula  personal,  252-254 ;  income  received  as  rent, 
theurbana  tax,  254-256;  the  industrial  tax,  256;  rates  for,  256,  257 
indirect  taxes,  customs  duties,  258;  classification  and  rates,  258-262 
licenses  and  stamps,  262 ;  trade  monopolies,  262-265. 

Temperature,  average  from  1885-1912,  78,  79. 

Theories :  of  colonization,  1-4 ;  American  theory,  4 ;  involves  training  natives 
for  self-government,  4;  aspirations  for  nationality,  4,  5. 

Theories  of  government,  literary,  211. 

Tingians,  a  wild  tribe,  92. 

Titles  of  nobility,  promised  by  Aguinaldo,  451. 

Tobacco,  the  monopoly,  264,  265. 

Tordesillas,  Treaty  of,  140. 

Torres,  Florentino :  one  of  Aguinaldo's  peace  commissioners,  448;  justice 
Supreme  Court,  517. 


INDEX  541 

Trade  and  commerce :  at  first  free,  277 ;  the  Chinese  trade,  277 ;  restrictions 
imposed  on  Mexican  trade,  278 ;  the  galleon  trade,  27&--280 ;  its  demoral- 
izing effect,  280 ;  trade  with  Spain  a  monopoly,  281 ;  illiberal  and  re- 
strictive policy,  174,  271 ;  the  Chinese  as  artisans  and  traders,  281,  282 ; 
European  and  American  traders,  271 ;  organization  of  society  unfavor- 
able to,  173;  royal  stores,  263 ;_  during  military  occupations,  431. 

Treaty  of  Paris:  preliminary  negotiations,  319-329;  terms  of  protocol,  321, 
325 ;  Spanish  construction  of,  324-332 ;  effect  of  capitulation  of  Manila, 
326,  331;  Spanish  contention,  327;  meeting  of  Peace  Commission,  its 
membership,  329,  330;  Filipinos  ask  representation,  330  note;  Spaniards 
demand  status  quo,  333 ;  the  colonial  debts,  333-337 ;  assumption  re- 
fused, 338;  demand  of  cession  of  Philippines,  339;  investigations,  340; 
personal  views  of  commissioners,  341,  342 ;  theory  of  conquest,  343 ; 
indemnity,  343;  proposal  of  arbitration  refused,  347;  European  public 
opinion,  348-350;  tender  of  $20,000,000,  in  lieu  of  debts,  353;  various 
views  as  to  amount,  351-353;  acceptance  of  American  proposals,  354; 
treaty  signed,  355 ;  its  provisions,  355-358 ;  certain  additional  islands 
purchased,  358 ;  ratification  of,  378,  379. 

Tribes,  word  applies  to  wild  people  only,  100. 

Tribute,  a  tax,  250,  252. 

Tropical  colonies :  treatment  of  natives  in,  2,  3 ;  native  labor,  1 ;  economic 
problems,  1,  2 ;  native  policy  in,  2. 

Truth,  oriental  conceptions  of.  111. 

Underground  river,  in  Palawan,  68. 

United  States :  theory  of  colonization,  4 ;  importance  of  its  Philippine  policy, 

4;  principles  on  which  it  rests,  56-58;  attitude  of  Europe  toward  its 

policy,  54,  55 ;  its  success,  60. 
Urdaneta,  Aiidres  de,  Augustinian  friar,  sails  with  Legaspi,  146,  147. 

Venetians,  their  colonies,  exploitation  of  people,  10. 
Villalabos,  Lopez  de,  names  Archipelago  after  Philip  II,  146. 
Visayans,  a  group  of  civilized  people,  100. 
Volcanoes,  72. 

White  Man's  Burden,  370. 

Wildman,  Rounceville,  consul-general  at  Hong  Kong,  387. 

Wild  tribes  :  90 ;  work  among,  93.  96 ;  habits  and  characteristics,  97-100 ;  hos- 
pitals, 96;  Bagobos,  90;  Manobos,  91;  Bukidnons,  91;  Ifugaos,  91; 
Igorots,  92 ;  Ilongots,  92 ;  Kalingas,  92 ;  Tirgians,  92 ;  their  picturesque- 
_  ness,  98,  99;  at  Exposition,  98. 

Williams,  Oscar  G.,  consul-general  at  Manila,  384. 

Williard,  Charles  A.,  justice  Supreme  Court,  517. 

Women,  native,  social  equality,  ambition  of,  110. 

Worcester,  D.  C,  member  Schurman  and  Taft  Commissions,  secretary  of  the 
interior,  450,  496. 

Wright,  Luke  W.,  member  of  the  commission,  secretary  of  commerce  and 
police,  497. 


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